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Barbara Harriss-White and Lucia Michelutti1
Throughout the world crime is on the increase, enforcement is being 
privatised and the proceeds of crime are being hidden in untaxed and 
unregulated jurisdictions. The distinction between the legitimate and 
the criminal economy is blurred. Power considered proper to the state 
is being decentralised and dispersed. The anthropologists of criminality, 
John and Jean Comaroff, go so far as to say ‘(l)awlessness is the presump-
tion everywhere’ (2018). The International Monetary Fund provides 
technical assistance on money-laundering and illegal financial activities 
to 120 of the world’s 196 countries (Lagarde 2017).
In this book a team of political economists and anthropologists ask 
how this global phenomenon works in South Asia – mainly in India but 
also in Pakistan and Bangladesh. To get answers called for serious field-
work, at the base of the economy. This was carried out between 2012 and 
2016. Studies of natural resources, raw materials and energy, construc-
tion and the built environment, and government procurement enabled 
the team to trace criminal economic activity and its politics throughout 
the subcontinent and at a wide range of scales.
The evidence shows entangled and often collusive relations 
between petty crime, extensive criminal organisations, and their labour 
forces, on the one hand, and politicians, the police, officials, judges and 
law-abiding businesses on the other –  relations in which it is often all but 
impossible to separate the legal from the illegal. Politics is systematically 
criminalised, and crime politicised. Italian scholars of organised crime 
use the term intreccio (intertwinement) (see for example Civico 2015) to 
signify that the world of crime does not exist in an alternative domain to 
that of the state but is deeply entangled with the actually existing state. 
Much of what the team found in South Asia fits this conception.2
2 THE WILD EAST
This Introduction situates the research in the scholarly literature 
on predatory capitalism, mafia and organised crime, and the criminality 
of political finance. It describes the way in which political economy and 
anthropology have been deployed to help in integrating and analysing 
shards of economic evidence that are largely, but not completely, hid-
den from official view, and concludes by briefly summarising the 11 case 
studies which make up the core of the book.
But the title, ‘The Wild East’, was not chosen lightly. The histori-
cal experience of the North American Wild West has been an important 
benchmark, which needs to be described and justified at the outset.
The Wild East?
The concept of ‘Wild West capitalism’ has been invoked to characterise 
rampant, ‘unfettered’ capitalist expansion in both China and Russia.3 
Before launching the ‘Wild East’ let us briefly explain how current under-
standings of the Wild West might be a useful framing to grasp the nature 
of criminal predatory economies across India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. 
As Fernand Braudel wrote, history needs models, ‘good or bad’, ‘against 
which events can be interpreted’ (1974, xi). Lasting three centuries but 
culminating in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Wild West 
period involved the conquest of territory in what is now North America. 
This territory stretched west of the Mississippi river and has only recently 
been identified as having been part of an immense Comanche ‘empire’ of 
bison, buffalo and decentralised settlement (Hamalainen 2009). From a 
rich tapestry of scholarship, two kinds of history of the Wild West can be 
distinguished: a bourgeois settler history and a radical history of subor-
dination and primitive accumulation.
In the first, the ‘Wild West’ was conquered slowly through treaties 
made between competing foreign nations and native tribes, and through 
political compromises, military adventures and the subordination of 
native people and animals. Farms, ranches and towns were created, hunt-
ing trails marked and mines staked and dug. Railways and the telegraph 
shrank space and time, and trade shifted from a north–south axis to east–
west, enticing great waves of foreign migrants. In their own narratives, 
the settlers of the Wild West developed ideas and values focussed on 
‘Jeffersonian’ agrarian democracy, individualism and self-reliance. Yet, 
the colonisers were also spurred on by the animal spirits of markets. New 
technologies and the compulsions of accumulation collided with craft 
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and independent workshop production. It was an era of unprecedented 
economic churning and growth (Rothbard 2017). Given that through 
much of this period, the state, in de jure infancy, was de facto absent; 
law and order, property rights and their protection were established by 
private agency, by ‘the market’, and by combinations of coercion and the 
spreading of ideas and practices of rule and justice. Voluntary organi-
sations, vigilantes and collective forces protected camps and wagon 
trains, miners, squatters and cattlemen. Settlers made rules and deter-
mined punishments collectively before migrating; they resolved disputes 
through their officers on the way. In their research into property rights on 
the frontier, Anderson and Hill (1979) stressed that conflict was costly, 
that instances of crime were relatively rare, and that violent punishment 
was the exception rather than the rule. They characterise this period as 
‘anarcho-capitalism’. And they conclude that gun-battles are largely a fig-
ment of Hollywood’s imagination.
The second kind of analysis points to what Marx famously called 
‘the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aborig-
inal population’ (1967, Ch. 30, 751) (together with the vast traffic in 
slaves from West Africa to American plantations which generated differ-
ent political dynamics in the American South). Within 75 years of inde-
pendence, armed settlers and militias (many consisting of expropriated 
British and Irish peasants and ‘1848er’ refugees from Europe) could and 
did seize vast tracts of land, pillage and rape, pushing west, expropri-
ating and violently wiping out almost all the native American people 
between the Appalachians and the Mississippi. It is this marginalisation 
and destruction of ‘Indian’ peoples, who were resistant to being incorpo-
rated as wage labour, that has generated the idea of the colonisation of 
the Wild West’s being a pre-capitalist petty bourgeois imperialism rather 
than a process of primitive accumulation in which both the preconditions 
for accumulation – property ownership and ‘free’ wage labour (Baker 
1990) – were prepared. For after the revolution, the post-independence 
state was structured so as to support capital and landed production. It 
enabled the establishment of an internal market, with countervailing 
power to the colonial ‘mercantile drain’ to Europe, in which land could be 
granted, sold and bought – such that the main obstacle to capitalist accu-
mulation was the persistent lack of free wage labour. After the Civil War, 
the second element vital to primitive accumulation, the labour force, 
was to be pieced together in a ‘singularly discontinuous way’ (Baker 
1990, 13). The newly freed black labouring under-class (most of whom 
remained on the land as debt-peons) was to be supplemented by waves 
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of assetless migrants, dispossessed in their East and Southern European 
homelands. By 1890, the Great Plains were settled and industries and 
their cities were furnished with a workforce.
***
Well over a century after the Wild West was conquered, what is the rele-
vance of these two versions of this period of American history to contem-
porary South Asia – how can they be used to justify the resonance of our 
title? Our reply is that the two approaches are useful to establish ‘events 
to be interpreted’ – and dimensions for comparison. From the first, the 
staking of control over resources (in South Asia below the surface as well 
as above); the modes of expansion of commodity economy, its scale and 
evolving technologies, the confrontation between craft production and 
capital, the roles of infrastructure and trade; contests in the development 
of the rule of private then public law and of democratic political control. 
In the second, the violent seizure of territory, transformations of forms of 
production and enforcement of new property rights over land and peo-
ple; the roles in state and class formation of regions with radically differ-
ent modes of production (in the American case, communal Indian social 
arrangements versus settlers versus slave plantations, long controlled 
by extractive merchants’ capital); the mobilisation and organisation of 
wage labour markets given the mass extermination and enslavement of 
people. In both narratives: the roles of regional politics and culture, of 
evidence, interpretation and of myth.
All these processes are at work in the criminal economies of South 
Asia. Yet unlike the Wild West, the ‘Wild East’ reported in this book is 
not so much a territorial expansion as an accelerated exploitation of 
raw materials and energy, finance and rapid commodity production. 
Whereas the colonisation of the Wild West generated long-term growth, 
criminal exploitation in contemporary South Asia contains the potential 
to reduce growth rates (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2016).4 In constitu-
encies where politicians are charged with criminal offences, economic 
growth has been found to be slowed by up to 22 per cent (Prakash, 
Rockmore and Uppal 2016).5 Unlike the Wild West, the Wild East is also 
developing after several decades of political independence, electoral 
democracy and functioning states. Far from shaping a process of rule of 
law, the Wild East has no shortage of regulatory law; instead it suffers 
a lack of enforcement capacities and ubiquitous enforcement failures.6 
Instead of developing state law from private or communal law, in the 
Wild East state law is being displaced by forms of authority vested in 
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private property and criminal practices. While in the Wild West crime, 
such as it was (cattle theft, the occasional seizure of local government), 
is thought to have been largely parochial, in the Wild East all kinds of eco-
nomic crime are reported to be rising sharply (PricewaterhouseCoopers 
2016). India’s corporate sector, to give just one example, has a history of 
grand criminal activity (capital flight, tax evasion, currency manipula-
tion) as well as of less grand crime (procurement fraud, financial fraud, 
misappropriation of assets) – and by salaried labour as well as top man-
agement (Anderson and Hill 1979; Kar 2010; PricewaterhouseCoopers 
2016). While the Wild West is said to have been built on individual-
ism and self-reliance, in the Wild East, criminal violence and collusion 
with the state – with bureaucrats, public sector managers, the police 
and politicians at all levels – are crucial for furthering accumulation. 
Electoral democracy has to be intertwined with untraceable money. 
The new criminal enterprises provide both legal and black money to 
finance political campaigns, and thus further create or consolidate 
criminal political economies. When elected, criminal politicians are 
protected by their political immunity and their political power protects 
and supports returns on their political and economic investments, and 
on those of their cronies and clients. However, despite these structural 
differences, the Wild East, like the Wild West, is driven by profit and 
the compulsion to accumulate private property, bringing social trans-
formations and widespread environmental devastation in its wake. In 
many parts of India, for example, we find that local tribal and low caste 
peoples are being coerced into the labour force, compelled to migrate, 
their resource base, life-worlds and physical and cultural environments 
destroyed. Like American Indians, Tribal Indians and Dalits are found to 
be ‘ground down by growth’: suffering marginalisation, starvation, con-
temptuously criminal exploitation and oppression (Shah et al. 2017). 
Among the new Wild Eastern varieties of ‘gold’ are air (as in spectrum), 
financial services, land, sand, coal, granite, stones, oil, water and other 
natural and biological resources such as sandalwood and meat, the con-
struction and real estate industries, chemicals and drugs, betting and 
film finance. It is the connections between accumulation, the workforce, 
the police, the bureaucracy and party politics that incentivise the politi-
cisation of crime and the criminalisation of politics, in which proliferate 
the ‘mafias’ and other forms of organised crime that are investigated in 
this book. These processes are far from linear. They are entangled pro-
cesses constantly infusing each other. The 11 chapters will cumulatively 
piece together examples of intreccio that are typical of Wild East forms of 
economies and of local ‘mafias’ operating on the ground.
6 THE WILD EAST
The Wild East ‘mafias’
The concept of ‘organised crime’ is one that is both fuzzy (Paoli 2014) 
and analytically quite ambiguous (Standing 2003; Briquet and Favar-
el-Garrigues 2010; Vigh 2015). Criminologists and sociologists of mafias 
devote relatively little time to studying forms of ‘organised crime’ out-
side the Western world. In the South Asian region, historians, social 
anthropologists and economists have commonly focussed on ‘informal-
ity’ (Visvanathan and Sethi 1998; Khan and Jomo 2001; Harriss-White 
2003; Srinivasan 2007), corruption (Wade 1985; Gupta 1995; Brass 
1997; Parry 2000) and/or studying colonial notions of ‘thuggery’, ‘the 
dacoit’ and ‘the criminal tribe/caste’.7 The relation between violence 
(whether of gangs/vigilantes or groups/riot-machines) and politics has 
also generated a sophisticated body of regional literature (Brass 1997).8 
However, until recently remarkably few studies have explored the day-
to-day working of the criminal economy and the specific politicisation of 
economic crime in South Asia (Harriss-White 2003; Gayer 2014; Kumar 
2014; Sanchez 2016). In a co-authored book entitled Mafia Raj: The 
Rule of Bosses in South Asia, Michelutti et al. highlight the centrality of 
micro-level il/legal economies and local ‘mafias’ to the individual careers 
of gangster-politicians across South Asia.9 These findings underline the 
need to move attention away from questions of criminal (political) lead-
ership and political violence to the study also of the ‘politicisation of 
crime’ and with it the economic operations of local ‘mafias’. They also 
suggest the need to move attention from trade in conventional illegal 
goods such as, for example, drugs (Jaffe 2013; Arias 2016; Civico 2015); 
human (or body-part) smuggling (Kleemans and Smit 2014) and/or 
arms trafficking (Levi 2014) to the study of the everyday criminal life of 
legal commodities. Here, we focus in particular on the illegal exploitation 
of natural resources, raw materials for India, Pakistan and Bangladesh’s 
exploding towns and cities. Such ‘green crimes’ are often considered ‘soft 
crimes’, less harmful and affecting fewer victims than ‘real’ predatory 
crime does (Van Solinge 2014, 500). But is this true? What sort of ‘mafia’ 
does the Wild East’s forms of predatory capitalism produce? How do 
these set of questions help us to further theorise criminal political econo-
mies and ‘mafias’ as an object of study?
***
The term and concept of ‘mafia’ has long been debated in the literature. 
One influential approach is to study mafia-like phenomena purely as an 
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economic activity: mafia as an ‘enterprise syndicate’ (Blok 1974); ‘mafia 
enterprise’ (Arlacci 1993); and a ‘protection industry’ (Gambetta 1988, 
1993; Varese 2001). By contrast Tilly (1985) has highlighted the relation 
between mafia and political sovereignty by introducing the fascinating 
proposition that organised crime can be compared to both war-making 
and state-making (see also Volkov 2002 and Varese 2011). Building on 
these insights Armao (2000) pointed out that what distinguishes mafia 
from other types of organised crime is that the former essentially uses 
politics and the judicial system to make a profit. According to Armao 
(2015, 3), when a structured and permanent group of individuals that 
uses violence to make profit through criminal activities ‘meets politics’, it 
gives rise to a third system called ‘mafia’. It is this open and non-legalistic 
definition that we refer to when we use the term ‘mafia’ in this book. In 
the Wild East’s political environment, ‘mafias’ did not develop in con-
texts in which local government authorities were unable to guarantee 
a minimum of security (as has been said to have happened, for exam-
ple, in the cases of Cosa Nostra in Sicily or ‘Ndrangheta in Calabria); 
instead, South Asian mafia groups tend not to pose as proto-states but 
rather fuse with the state and democratic electoral politics. And while 
Paoli (2003; 2014) describes mafias as political communities that are 
not fully institutionalised, the Wild East’s mafias are, in many instances, 
deeply politically institutionalised and socially embedded. These com-
plex multi-dimensional realities make it extremely difficult socially 
and legally to separate mafiosi from businessmen and politicians who 
connive with mafiosi. This entanglement is in reality a recurrent fea-
ture of ‘mafias’ across the world but it is still surprisingly little studied 
and theorised. Recently, for example Schneider (2018) and Ben-Yehoy-
ada (2018) have shown how legal definitions of the Sicilian Cosa Nos-
tra define the organisation as an internally cohesive, hierarchical and 
brotherhood-based system. Such views, they argue, not only hamper the 
prosecution of ‘non-Mafiosi’ collaborators but also contribute to shaping 
the public conception of the mafia–political nexus as two separate worlds 
(ibid.: 360). Distinctions between ‘inner circles’ and ‘external’ agents 
are indeed analytically problematic because in practice these groups 
are intertwined and interdependent. Reflecting precisely such entan-
glements, the now indigenous South Asian term ‘mafia’ is commonly 
used to refer to business enterprises with political protection that seek to 
monopolise particular trades, sectors and localities through extra-legal 
and violent means (as in the ‘alcohol mafia’, ‘water mafia’, ‘oil mafia’, 
‘coal mafia’ or a variety of ‘land grabbing’ practices by the ‘land mafia’). 
Such syndicates protect clients and cronies and work both against and 
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in tandem with local politicians, the justice system and the bureaucracy 
(Michelutti et al. 2018, 5; Martin and Michelutti 2017).
South Asian ‘mafias’ operate at a range of scales. As the following 
chapters will show, people talk about ‘small mafia’ and ‘big mafia’. Local 
expressions such as ‘company’, ‘lobby’, ‘firm’ or ‘racket/cartel’ (in Hindi 
English), ‘parivar’ (family), syndicates, ‘groups’ or ‘rings’ can locally 
describe anything from a protection racket to a violent lobby/interest 
group or a handful of ambitious criminals working as part of a team. In 
contrast to the Italian Sicilian ‘mafia’ (which often embodies the arche-
type of a criminal hierarchical and structured organisation in the media, 
in the public imagination as also in sociological and anthropological 
discourse), the so-called ‘mafias’ we encountered when doing the field 
research for this book, while developing strong dynastic dynamics, are 
neither hierarchically institutionalised nor endowed with long histo-
ries. They are often new entities which make strategic use of caste and 
community kinship connections and cultural idioms but are not neces-
sarily structured by them. ‘Companies’ and ‘groups’ are not appendices 
to coherent and centralised criminal organisations; rather they are part 
of broader systems of il/legal political economies. Crucially, there is a 
continuum between informal enterprises, criminal profit-making activ-
ities and what locals refer to as ‘criminal organisations’. The art of ‘get-
ting by’ often involves brushes with ‘organised crime’ (Pine 2012; see 
also Hoque and Michelutti, 2018). In seminal research Van Schendel 
and Abraham (2005) discussed the junctures between large-scale organ-
ised crime, micro-level organised crime and the informal economy in 
non-Western settings. They offer detailed case studies of arms smug-
gling, illegal transnational migration, the diamond trade, borderland 
practices and the transnational consumption of drugs in Asia, Africa, 
Latin America, Europe and North America. This ethnographic tour de 
force shows how distinctions between the ‘illegal’ (meaning prohibited 
by law) and the ‘illicit’ (meaning socially perceived as unacceptable) are 
historically changeable and contested. Importantly it shows how states, 
borders and the language of law enforcement produce criminality, and 
how people and goods that are labelled ‘illegal’ move across regulatory 
spaces. Building on these insights, the 11 case studies presented in this 
book further problematise relations between illegal and illicit by show-
ing how ‘mafias’ and many captains of industry are at the apex of much 
more extensive criminal economic systems embedded in formal, regis-
tered and regulated institutions and, crucially, the political sphere and 
its bureaucracy. In the next section, before delving into the details of the 
particularities and nature of Wild East ‘mafias’, we will outline some of 
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the mechanisms and logics behind the development of symbiotic rela-
tions among politics, businesses and crime across South Asia over the last 
four decades.
Business–politics nexus: testing a macro-economic 
model
Scholars across the social sciences rarely focus on the study of the 
relation between business, crime and (organised) political violence, 
‘despite the intimate link between politics and economics’ (Hazen and 
Rodgers 2014, 7). A remarkable exception is provided by the political 
economist P.S. Jha, who has developed a macro-level economic account 
of the criminalisation of politics and the politicisation of crime in India 
(Jha 2013), the country that is the main focus of this book. The two 
chapters on Pakistan and Bangladesh and secondary material available 
on the topic will enable us to identify contrasts and similarities across 
the three countries’ experiences when compared to Jha’s account. In 
Jha’s descriptive model, the origins of the criminalisation of politics 
in India are traced back first to the constitutional flaw of omitting the 
means to meet the costs of running a democracy (not only the high cost 
of election campaigns in demographically and territorially vast constit-
uencies but also the ongoing ‘fixed costs’ of democratic politics), and 
second to the 1969 decision by Indira Gandhi to ban company dona-
tions (to hobble her rivals). Funding for political parties went under-
ground, with devastating effects on both politics and the economy. 
First, intra-party democracy was stymied by the paramount need for 
regional fundraising ‘bureaucracies’, which generated path-dependent 
relations of clientelism and high economic entry barriers. These even-
tually solidified into dynasties across generations. Regional and local 
clientelist controllers of black cash and votes emerged to take power. 
Crime and physical intimidation then faced few obstacles to their devel-
opment as major political forces able to perpetuate path- dependent 
dynastic criminal organisations (see also Vaishnav 2017). Parties based 
on identity, aspiration or region emerged not only as a result of national 
parties neglecting the factors new parties used to mobilise voters (such 
as caste, ethnicity, regional neglect and under-development) but also 
as a reaction to the political spaces created by criminalisation. Jha 
argues, however, that the newer parties must suffer similar pressures 
and negotiate – and embody – political forces contradictory to their 
social aspirations.
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Meanwhile, criminal economic organisation networks thriving in 
the black economy needed protection by criminal protection rackets. In 
turn, the expense and inadequate protection afforded by these rackets 
led to old-style criminal political clients and new-style members and 
leaders of criminal organisations directly participating in party politics. 
Politics gives immunity to criminals who are elected legislators in cen-
tral and state governments. Since this immunity is incomplete, criminal 
protection forces (parallel monopolies of force) are needed at every level 
(including political protection for economic protection forces). India has 
not only succeeded in criminalising politics but also in politicising crime.
Although two kinds of clientelism can be distinguished: first, the 
fundraising clientelist networks that generate political princelings and 
second, criminal networks which ‘mobilise criminal funds and protect 
criminal enterprises like smuggling, bootlegging, timber theft and poach-
ing’, the two are on track to converge (Jha 2013).10 The economic effects 
of the development of political fundraising are then the side-effects of 
struggles to control cash flows within and among parties at various scales 
and in different regions. They have moved through three moments, 
which Jha models as follows. First a pre-emergency period, when political 
funds were levied in cash (instead of tax-deductible cheques) from cor-
porate company funders. Meeting with resistance, parties turned to small 
and medium local business and trade associations (see Harriss-White 
1993). So, political funding in return for special economic exemptions 
and the protection of local capital dispersed throughout the economy 
and became the scaffolding that buttresses the distinctively enormous 
scope of India’s informal economy.
Second came post-emergency: in a battle for control over funds 
between regions and centre, the latter retaliated by exacting tribute from 
both foreign companies and state enterprises – a practice most easily 
applied to the defence and energy sectors. This funding route resulted 
in serious, path-dependent inefficiencies from suboptimal technological 
choices. These include the inflation of capital costs, inflated-cost bench-
marks for future projects, the ‘gold-plating’ of future investments with 
necessary subsidies to ensure competitiveness, and the institutionalising 
of extremely costly delays and forfeited benefits. Projects were chopped 
up into components in the name of competition so as to multiply kick-
backs, while shoddy work, inefficiencies and irrationalities result from 
the politically driven shattering of megaprojects, thereby ‘putting the 
state up for sale’. According to Jha (2013), Outlook reported in 2009 that, 
between 1990 and 2008, 33 scams cost the public exchequer US$100 
billion per year. In this process, the economic space for redistributivist 
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development activity that might have benefitted the welfare of the mass 
of the population and India’s workforce was reduced both by lack of 
resources and by its irrelevance to criminal politics. Their neglect makes 
a mockery of much development discourse.
Third, during the reform period of market-led growth, company 
donations to parties have been rehabilitated – but such donations are 
unable to meet more than 10 per cent of election costs, so it is rational to 
finance individual powerful candidates. This is a cover for the crony cap-
italism that dominates Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
(Mazumdar 2008).
Small regional parties form coalitions to gain power and access to 
what appears to them to be a ‘bloated central state’. Control over cen-
tral bureaucracies and those of state corporations enables posts holding 
discretionary power in the regions to be allocated. Where competence 
yields to political connections, inefficiencies are hard-wired into the ‘for-
mal’ economy. And what of resistance?11 For Jha, India’s bureaucracy is 
effectively immune from prosecution and has the capacity to blackmail. 
The police have formal powers of enforcement but are widely alleged to 
be co-opted and complicit. Individual politicians, officials and police may 
be neither corrupt nor criminals but ‘resisters’ face punishment ranging 
from career demotion to assassination.12 The mature clientelist state, Jha 
concludes, is where power is exercised by a congeries of relations among 
business, career politicians, gangland mafiosi and the police.
While all breaches of economic law are crimes, not all crimes have 
a direct impact on the economy.13 In the UPA-2 parliament,14 nearly one-
third of Lok Sabha politicians had been charged with crimes – 13 per cent 
with serious crimes.15 Of the winning candidates in the 2014 elections, 
34 per cent had been charged with crimes and 21 per cent with serious 
crimes (a 50 per cent increase over the previous parliament). Some 30 
per cent of the ministers in the 2014–19 Modi cabinet faced charges; 
this rose to 39 per cent in 2019.16 While robbery and forgery are directly 
related to economic exchanges, the accumulation of assets is also asso-
ciated with murder, armed robbery, kidnapping, rape and the illegal 
possession of arms. If MPs are classified according to the political parties 
they represent, the relation between wealth and criminal charges can-
not be substantiated.17 However, from UPA-1 to UPA-2, the proportion 
of crorepati MPs doubled to 48 per cent; MPs with direct business invest-
ments must make up a much increased proportion.18 By 2014, 82 per cent 
of MPs were crorepatis with average assets of INR 15 crore (nearly US$ 
28 million; Association for Democratic Reform 2014); by 2019 the figure 
was 88 per cent.
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Nevertheless, Jha’s stylised economy consists of corporations and 
small firms (the latter of which he had earlier analysed as an interme-
diate regime (Jha 1980)). But India has developed what is arguably the 
largest and most extensive informal economy in the world, representing 
about 60 per cent of GDP and over 90 per cent of livelihoods.19 India’s is, 
in large measure, an economy of tiny businesses. From 1990 to 2011, the 
average number of employees in a registered business fell from three to 
two; 95 per cent of all businesses now employ fewer than five workers.20 
India’s informal economy is also not (only) the result of poor quality law, 
institutional scarcity or incompetence but evolved as a deliberate crea-
tion, long before the concept of informality was invented. Regulatory law 
and rules were sabotaged at their inception soon after independence, to 
restrict their coverage to a small minority of (larger) companies, activ-
ities and labour relations (Das Gupta 2016; Dietrich Wielenga 2019). 
Regulatory law is also disregarded through pre-emptive development 
(such as when large companies register as a number of small businesses 
under the regulatory threshold (Harriss 1982)). And when regulatory 
law is flouted and evaded (as in the unreported profits, wages or rent that 
make up the black economy; Kumar 1999) the criminal economy devel-
ops. It involves illegal business in legal goods and services together with 
illegal activity in illegal goods and services (Sinha and Harriss-White 
2007; Kumar 1999).21 Estimates of this black economy vary widely – 
from 25–75 per cent of GDP.22
Yet the criminal economy is not necessarily judged by society as 
illegitimate, because it has its own forms of regulation and social order. 
When non-compliance is widely accepted, it is the compliant person who 
is the social deviant. The criminal economy is not only the nutrient base 
of mafia dynasties, it is also the economy of segmented class fractions: 
petty production and more or less disguised labour (Harriss-White 2012, 
2014), intermediate classes and petty capital, and great state corpora-
tions. It also forms part of more or less ethnicised regional capitalisms. 
These show great diversity. It is only recently that regional variations 
in  the social character of the recorded economy have been discovered 
and then mapped (Dasgupta 2017; Pani 2017; Harriss-White, Stokke 
and Törnquist 2014; Harriss-White 2017b). At present however, regional 
relationships between the recorded and the criminal economies are a 
matter of speculation in which official data face case material.
In Pakistan and Bangladesh, the mapping of the social charac-
ter of regional economies is in its infancy (Chowdhury 2013; Gayer 
2014; Mallick 2014). If in India many have argued that the replication 
on the provincial level of Indira Gandhi’s authoritarian rule led to the 
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proliferation of parochial politics, which became the bedrock of ‘crimi-
nal’ political elements (Bardhan 1984; 1988; Kohli 1991; Corbridge and 
Harriss 2000), analysts of Pakistani politics have similarly claimed that 
authoritarian military regimes in Pakistan have promoted the growth 
of factionalism, political violence and illegal forms of capitalism (Rais 
1985; Waseem 1994; Jalal 1995), exacerbated in the 1980s by the rise 
in the heroin and weapon trades (Jalal 1995; Gayer 2014; see also Gayer 
in Chapter 11). In particular, over the past decade Pakistan’s military has 
become a key player in these illegal forms of capital accumulation. The 
disproportionate size of the military in the country’s economy is now well 
documented. A considerable proportion of these profit-making activities 
are carried out by the armed forces’ ‘welfare foundations’, which are 
some of the largest conglomerates in the country. Their activities include 
insurance, banking, educational institutions, gas extraction, cement 
production and agro-industries (see Blom 2011, 31–2; Siddiqa 2007, 
198–9). By the same token, decreasing industrial returns over the past 
few years have led to massive investments in real estate. This has been 
accompanied by a stark increase in land-grabbing operations (qabza), a 
lucrative activity that often sees the collusion of criminal bosses, bureau-
crats and elected politicians in the form of ‘qabza groups’ (Rollier 2016; 
see also Michelutti et al. 2018).
In Bangladesh, the Awami League lost power in 1975 to a military 
coup, ushering in an era of military dictatorships that lasted until 1990 
when democracy was ‘restored’. This unstable, violent period helped cre-
ate the foundations of the era of ‘confrontational’ politics between the 
two major political parties and their bonded clients vying for resources 
and patronage (Lewis 2011; Gardner 1995, 2012). This process hap-
pened at the same time as a devastating combination of natural and man-
made disasters, which together created conditions that helped further an 
unholy alliance of political violence, capitalism and crime (Ruud 2014). 
Autocracy gave way to democracy in 1990 but the deadly rivalry between 
the two main political parties is breeding a shadowy space where enforc-
ers and their political/business bosses thrive (Lewis 2011; Jahan 2005, 
2015). The question of political party funding is an extremely sensitive 
and very under-researched topic in Bangladesh. The political parties 
never disclose their funding sources. Hardly any party discloses finan-
cial information even internally. Political party funds are usually col-
lected directly from businessmen and industrialists. Such funds are often 
donated voluntarily out of vested interest, but in many cases they are 
extorted.23 During the democratic era, neoliberal economic policies have 
been accelerated compared to the previous martial period, when the 
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policies were initially put in place (by General Ziaur Rahman, founder of 
the BNP). From the mid-2000s onwards GNP grew at an average annual 
rate of 6 per cent. The extent to which the criminal economy slows or 
underpins this relatively high growth rate has not been established. As 
in India, depending on the chosen method of calculation, Bangladesh’s 
underground economy contributes between 45 and 80 per cent to GDP.24 
Similarly, in Pakistan there is no consensus among economists and esti-
mates of the contribution range between 30 and 90 per cent (Zaidi 2014, 
112). Definitions of formal, informal and black economies vary and over-
lap, further complicating estimates.25 Regulations and definitions delimit 
the boundaries of such economies and are exploited and manipulated 
to make profits in the Wild East. Collusion with the state and the violent 
enforcement of economic interests are both crucial for furthering capi-
talist accumulation trajectories across South Asia. Enterprises providing 
both black and legal money to finance political campaigns create and 
consolidate criminal political formations.26
The case studies
A multidisciplinary method and analysis: political economy 
and the anthropology of crime
Collecting data on criminal economies and ‘mafias’ requires an innovative, 
flexible methodology. In an attempt to fuse ethnographic micro-studies 
of communities/villages/neighbourhoods and local industrial sectors, in 
the following chapters we employ a plurality of approaches derived from 
the theories and methods of anthropology, political economy and the 
economics of institutions. So, while the knowledge base we are building 
is unusually resilient, we cannot escape the fact that similar phenomena 
are described in different terms and interpreted using a variety of analyt-
ical concepts: for example, political corruption, irregular capitalism and 
networks of connivance, criminal corruption, criminal enterprise, mafia 
assemblage, syndicate, ‘mafia raj’, ‘mastan raj’ and even hydro-criminal-
ity. The richness of this collection lies precisely in approaching a common 
task from different starting points, both in the real economy and analyt-
ically within a multidisciplinary approach. Five chapters are contributed 
by six political economists who are seasoned in what the great economic 
anthropologist Polly Hill called ‘field economics’. Six chapters employ 
ethnographic methodologies extensively and are the work of five experi-
enced anthropologists and a political sociologist. We now turn to broad 
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differences in disciplinary approaches before discussing field methods 
and summarising substantive results.
Political economy case studies
Jha’s macro-model has informed the research design of the first five 
chapters and shaped i) the identification of a ‘starter set’ of micro- 
economic agents from which the field investigation is developed, ii) the 
initial hypotheses driving fieldwork (the local-level feedback relation 
between crime and electoral democracy), and thus iii) the field methods 
to be used for comparable micro-level research. The cases presented in 
Chapters 1 to 5, on the four elements – earth (illegal coal (in Jharkhand) 
and riverbed sand (in Tamil Nadu)); fire (the century-old subterranean 
fire in Jharkhand); water (hydro-crime in Arunachal Pradesh); and air 
(spectrum illegalities sited in metropolitan megacities) – have been 
approached as natural resource extraction–distribution systems. Experi-
ence recommends that a differentiated approach to businesses and their 
workforces is needed to capture capital–labour class relations and reflect 
the inter-penetration of legal and illegal practices (Harriss-White 1999). 
Each system is made up of elements: technologies (which make the nat-
ural resource useful, even in the case of destructive fire); social/‘organ-
isational’ institutions, firms and state agencies; and their labour. These 
elements are dynamised by (market-mediated) economic relationships 
(work, money, the operating of machinery/technology/energy and the 
control of property) which enable commodity production and distribu-
tion to take place. A structure of secondary markets (e.g. transport, bro-
kerage, valuation) is also essential to such systems. And through them 
run distributions of profit, rent and wages, allocations that are ordered 
and controlled, if not registered or state-regulated. The informal econ-
omy is said to be ‘unorganised’ but it is not disorganised. Exactly the same 
applies to the criminal economy. Control is exercised and negotiated 
within and between businesses, between businesses and labour, other 
organisations (protection) and their labour, between businesses and 
the state bureaucracies and agencies (including the systems of finance 
and justice) and between the agencies of the state. The institutional 
alternatives to the state through which economic order is contested and 
maintained are awkward to characterise since some are entirely crimi-
nal (informal syndicates, contractors’ fiefdoms, criminal organisations), 
some operate inside legally registered entities (business associations, 
labour unions, even some mafia), some express authority derived from 
social identity (caste, gender, ethnicity, religion) and some penetrate the 
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state itself (parallel checkpoints, collusive allocation of public resources). 
These are not closed systems but open ones whose flexible boundaries 
are shaped and dynamised by law, custom, contingency – and by the 
understandings and resources of researchers themselves.
While the formal political parameters of the system involve the 
laws that are flouted, the remit and roles of state vigilance forces and 
the police, the judicial and penal systems, the focus of the first five case 
studies has been on party politics. Before linking the two realms – eco-
nomic and party political – we sought wherever possible to understand 
the recent development of major and minor political parties in their own 
terms, by questioning the social composition of parties and voters, fac-
tions and contentions within parties, and the relations of key individ-
uals to their – and other – parties. Through guesstimates and shadowy 
indications, the links of party funders, cash managers and major polit-
ical agents and players to the criminal economy (not always the sectors 
we have chosen as case material) before, during and after elections can 
be outlined. Political investments and achievements may be juxtaposed 
with the significance, if any, of immunity. This is scoping research; types 
of recursive links between the black economy of natural resource extrac-
tion and party politics emerged through the experience of fieldwork.
Field methods and problems of political economy
Each case study involved: i) previous experience of the sector, area and 
working language; ii) a period of background work; and iii) between 
two and four months in the field, alone or in a small team. Collecting 
economic data and mapping the patterns of legal-illegal enterprise and 
their relations to politics are not easy tasks. The mafia often buys silence, 
especially to do with these topics, and we tried to break this silence. The 
orthodox approach to economic fieldwork, involving censuses, stratified 
randomised samples and systematic interviews was clearly unfeasible. 
A systems approach to the economy and politics could be developed from 
stakeholder snowball techniques. The safety of researchers being a para-
mount consideration, basic principles of fieldwork involved not seeking 
out or talking to individuals who are directly involved in criminal activity 
about that activity – unless they volunteered. The paradox of stakeholder 
research on crime involving no criminal ‘stakeholders’ was resolved 
through triangulation. Data were collected through participant obser-
vation, conversations and interviews with key informants with triangu-
lable knowledge: (often retired) journalists, local academics, lawyers, 
civil servants, police personnel, bank managers, NGO workers, trade 
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unionists and transport operators, and minor politicians, party officials 
and members who have had in-depth experience of the sector. The objec-
tive was to construct an analytical narrative from shards of information 
from knowledgeable informants about the operation of the sector, i.e. 
how others – ‘third parties’ – behave. Accepting that there may be more 
than one narrative, the concurrence of two to three informants was taken 
as an approximation to a truth claim. Where, as in the case of illegal coal, 
one reputed official source estimates that 5 per cent of coal is diverted 
into the illegal economy while another reckons it varies between 25 and 
50 per cent, the two stories have to be told.
This method yielded a wealth of evidence and each team member 
wrote field reports of 20–25,000 words. These are the sources of the first 
five chapters. In three respects confidentiality has been assured in the 
field – and observed here: confidence pertaining to place, to the source 
itself and sometimes to the detail of the substance divulged. These 
detailed sources are embedded in the unpublished field reports, which 
were read and discussed critically by the wider project team. Much of the 
evidence in the five political economy chapters in this book has, there-
fore, to be taken on trust.
Even with this method, which has sought to maximise the compa-
rability of the case studies, the idiosyncrasies of place, the quiddity of 
sectors and the capacities of individual researchers inevitably generate 
original and unique analyses which constrain direct comparisons. Major 
problems also result from developing this ‘second best’ approach to eco-
nomic fieldwork on illegality (for example, data, usually considered as 
‘basic’, on costs and returns, wealth, detailed contracts, credit and the 
livelihoods of the labour force prove generally impossible to obtain). 
This book on India’s criminal economy has very little economic evidence. 
The alternative involves the fine granularity of the ethnographic projects 
described in the following section; however, the latter are idiosyncratic 
and have issues of replicability.
The anthropological perspective and ethnography
The political-anthropological perspective – with its focus on the every-
day conceptions and practices of legislature, legality, democracy, and 
the state at large – offers a particularly useful point of departure for 
understanding the relationship between the illegal and formal political 
and economic spheres whose everyday dimension is often left out of 
view in more ‘top-down’ institutional analyses.27 Participant observation 
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was the main research method employed by the authors of the six eth-
nographic chapters. This method is inductive and has the potential for 
uncovering unexpected links between different domains of social life. 
Hanging around, chatting, participating in daily activities and trying to 
understand criminal cultures and the grey zones of complicity and collu-
sion require relationships of trust to be developed. Many of us had done 
fieldwork in the selected localities for a number of years before starting 
this project. As a matter of fact, the research sites for this project were 
chosen not only keeping the regional balance in mind but crucially by 
considering the expertise of the researchers, their personal contacts and 
networks and their language skills. Such skills are essential to tackle a 
difficult anthropological research topic such as the criminal economy.28 
Long-term anthropological fieldwork (from 6–15 months) in the every-
day domains of life provided us with important insights into local cul-
tures of leadership, criminality and politics, as well as into the workings 
of ‘mafia methods’. These insights suggest that the study of criminal, 
political and economic configurations cannot be adequately captured 
only through the prism of the state, capitalism and the law. One must 
also pay attention to the way those involved in or affected by these for-
mations make sense of them through more varied and locally relevant 
notions of ‘the political’ and ‘wealth’. This includes vernacular under-
standings of kinship and religion, honour and masculinity, charisma and 
trust, and patronage relations based on community-, caste- and/or trib-
al-based ties. In short, one must consider the diverse socio-cultural imag-
inaries of power and money that undergird actors’ involvement in such 
criminal-cum-political formations.
This immersion and the shadowing of a number of bosses with dif-
ferent levels of power allowed the researchers to identify a number of 
recurrent businesses that contribute to shape the Wild East (Michelutti 
et al. 2018, Chapter 1). Across the sites we studied, the real estate sec-
tor was recognised as the ‘business’ that provided the most profitable 
economic opportunities for violent political entrepreneurs over the 
past decade. Land and property transactions opened up new career 
paths that required the capacity to handle coercion, manage extra-le-
gal activities and, most importantly, play ‘the game of politics’. Besides 
real estate development, other violent extractive industries in which 
bosses were usually involved included mining (e.g. sand, granite, lime-
stone for cement); the transport business; hotels and restaurants; the 
commercialisation of drugs; loan sharking, fraud, financial crimes and 
extortion (e.g. the collection of protection money – goonda tax/hafta/
chandabaazi – and kidnapping); and other means of violent regulation 
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of labour markets. The six ethnographic case studies explore a number of 
these sectors and related Wild East predatory forms of capitalism across 
North and South India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, and show how they 
intersect with local politics, electoral democracy, party funding and/or 
the formal and informal judiciary system.
Anthropological studies of economic illegality and violence often 
tend to focus on ‘losers’, ‘victims’ and ‘bottom-barrel thieves and hustlers’ 
(see, for example, Jeffrey, Jeffery and Jeffery 2008; Goffman 2014). Our 
research and analysis go empirically and analytically beyond ‘informal-
ity’, ‘survival questions’ and a focus on the poor and marginalised by also 
investigating multiple ‘winners’ and their trajectories in Wild East forms 
of capital accumulation. While studying local criminal business sectors 
we interacted with businessmen, henchmen, bosses, lawyers and politi-
cians, as well as day labourers. This required shadowing and interviewing 
members of the local business/criminal families, gang members, ene-
mies, rivals, businessmen, criminal lawyers, crime reporters, account-
ants, doctors, police investigators, astrologists, priests and the residents 
of the territories where the criminal economies we studied operate. The 
interviews were generally conducted in Bangla, Hindi, Punjabi, Telugu 
or Urdu, and less frequently in ‘pure’ English. Our long-term engagement 
with our field sites allowed us to collect granular bottom-up data that 
shed light on a number of questions at the heart of this book: How do 
il/legal economies work de facto? Who controls and regulates them? Who 
is dependent on whom? And why? Essentially, the six ethnographic case 
studies shed light on the complex Polanyian combination of reciprocity, 
exchange and redistribution (Ben-Yehoyada 2018) within South Asian 
mafias’ systems and highlight how complicities, cooperation and oppor-
tunistic partnerships are at the heart of local and regional criminal polit-
ical economies.
During our fieldwork, we were able to check our data against the 
preliminary results of the political economy cases studies discussed 
above. We attended six workshops together to discuss findings during 
the collection of data and the writing-up phases.29 Importantly, such dia-
logue, exposure and regular triangulations allowed us to pay attention 
to problems of internal validity within our studies. Patterns and outli-
ers could be observed as findings were collected across the sites. The 
material collected by the political economy case studies reminded the 
anthropologists that criminal economies and their ‘mafias’ were seldom 
only localised affairs. They showed us that it was impossible to limit the 
analysis of the businesses and industrial sectors to a village or a neigh-
bourhood as they were often linked – legally and illegally – with district, 
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regional, national and global economies. So wherever it was relevant and 
possible we connected our micro-level ethnographic data with informa-
tion on district/state/national/international networks, economic sectors 
and scales of political activity derived from print media, other media and 
archival, research and statistical resources.
Field methods and problems in the anthropology of criminal economies
While bosses and their violent appropriations were often extremely pub-
lic and visible (Michelutti et al. 2018), it was not easy to collect economic 
evidence and map local criminal economies. While our interlocutors were 
often ready to talk openly about murders they had allegedly committed 
or commissioned and show off their prowess by recounting unsavoury 
episodes of their careers, the topic of money remained an extremely sen-
sitive one. What remained obscure and untraceable (and also risky to 
explore) in our field sites was the organisation of local bosses’ economic 
activities. Businesses and related properties were often registered under 
‘borrowed names’, namely the names of relatives, drivers or bodyguards. 
Thus, on the one hand, violent entrepreneurs (dabang, mastan, badmash) 
seemed to invest a great deal of energy in enacting a violent reputation, 
and sometimes a Robin Hood and saintly boss image. Yet on the other 
they took great care to conceal the existence of the organisational struc-
ture of their mafia-like enterprises and the names of their associates.
We minimised risks by exploring the criminal economy indirectly 
as much as possible. For example, some of us explored activities such 
as protection/extortion not only by studying the terrain of money and 
organised criminal systems of protection but also by looking into local 
indigenous statecraft models of virtuous kingly/caste protection, or into 
idioms related to protecting women and honour and/or caste. We were 
able to gather data safely by exploring the social embeddedness of eco-
nomic crime. To elaborate, local ‘mafias’ present both ‘highly structured 
and well-established organised groups based on enduring memberships 
and more fluid and amorphous groups, with members coming in and 
out according to their particular needs and opportunities’ (see Rege and 
Lavorgna 2017, 173). At some levels, there is no controlling family, no 
boundaries separating members from non-members. And it is at these 
lower levels that we were able to gather insights on the more ‘secretive’ 
upper levels of the local mafias and their organisations. This holistic eth-
nographic approach and long-term fieldwork was combined with analy-
ses of disputes, court cases and complaints to the police. Exploring court 
cases and police documentation helped us to enrich our ethnographic 
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material and, at the same time, to explore how the police and the local 
judiciary were heavily implicated in sustaining and gaining from local 
criminal economies. Without police protection none of the criminal 
economies this book illustrates would have been able to operate.
Overview of the chapters
The case studies cumulatively reveal the micro-politics at work on dif-
ferent scales in economic crime ranging from theft and fraud, the flout-
ing of laws and rules concerning planning, economic and environmental 
regulation as well as the control of labour, tax evasion, the flight of cap-
ital and the enforcement of political protection. Their political ramifi-
cations all challenge the previous characterisation of the politics of the 
states concerned. In the first chapter, on the criminal economy of coal in 
Jharkhand, Barbara Harriss-White and Nigel Singh explore illegal coal 
economies and party politics. The formal, legal, informal and criminal 
elements of the supply chains or assemblages of ‘black’ coal are found 
to involve a range of public sector agencies, corporations, government 
ministries and departments; private mining companies, public and pri-
vate sector labour forces and labour unions; four scales of illegal coal – 
cycle wallahs, syndicates, coal traders and the mafia dynasties – and a 
multiplicity of other agents in derived markets for transport, forged 
documents, bribes, etc. Outlawed Maoist revolutionaries also receive 
‘revenue’ from ‘taxing’ the transport of black coal. A totalising system of 
transactions that are interlocked both politically and economically binds 
formal, informal and criminal together. It operates at scales ranging from 
the local, extending through Bihar to the major informal coal market 
of Chandasi in UP (Rajshekhar 2014), and spreads throughout North-
ern India where it satisfies demand for coal for heating, brick kilns, yarn 
dyeing, small-scale textiles and many more workshop industries, trades 
and services, which are prevented from qualifying for legal access to coal 
and coke. In the region of Dhanbad, hundreds of thousands of exiguous 
and precarious unregistered and rightless livelihoods depend on illegal 
coal and further countless livelihoods nationwide depend on its multi-
pliers. Spreading not just territorially but also through the political and 
bureaucratic systems, the local-level criminal economy is linked to New 
Delhi. Vast, partially registered, partially criminal conglomerate capital 
has been accumulated. The factoring in of this economy to the narratives 
of Jharkhand’s democratic politics explains them in terms that transcend 
a characterisation as the politics of a tribal homeland, the instability of 
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which has been attributed to heterogeneous ethnic rivalries (alluded to 
in Jewitt 2008). All parties have stakes in illegal coal. Political pressure 
points are pervaded by criminal interests that have guaranteed the par-
ty-political instability on which their criminal power flourishes.
Chapter 2 pursues the analysis of one consequence of the coal econ-
omy. In her analysis of fire and the ‘mafia’, Smita Gupta investigates the 
workings and effects of open-cast coal mining in the region of Jharia. 
Triggered by over a century of uncontrolled fires in India’s finest (and 
highly inflammable) coking coal deposits, emergency powers permit sur-
face mining technology to be used to extract and maximise the value of the 
remaining coal. But open-cast mines spread the fires, further threatening 
infrastructure and settlements, sparking accidents and now endangering 
the health and homes of 500,000 to 1,000,000 people around Jharia. 
Subterranean fire is the result not just of accidents, lightning or geolog-
ical pressures but of a range of deliberate economic crimes, in flagrant 
disregard for laws, policies and plans by state and central government, 
fuelled by a self-sustaining criminalised nexus. ‘Legitimate’ functionar-
ies – government servants, public sector enterprise employees, elected 
politicians, trade unions, corporate interests, police and other law-en-
forcement agencies – are linked through economic transactions with 
criminal gangs and their ‘pocket’ trade unions. The relations between 
trade unions, labour politics, party politics and the mafia that profit from 
uncontrolled fire and diverted stowage are mapped in this chapter. So too 
are additional crimes in which the law and rules of eligibility for rehabil-
itation and resettlement in regions threatened by subsidence have been 
increasingly restricted and then flouted with complete impunity by the 
agencies responsible. Reasons for such behaviour may be found in the 
economic and political marginalisation of eligible but low-status victims. 
Each day, impoverished workers successfully banished to distant, inade-
quate housing gulags have no alternative but to make their way back to 
the burning surfaces to scavenge coal.
Chapter 3 turns to the ‘sand mafia’ of Tamil Nadu. Here J. Jeyaranjan 
suggests pork-barrel politics as a conceptual lens to understand recent 
developments in the criminal economy of sand and its entanglement with 
electoral politics. He has researched the evolution of a supply system of 
ever-increasing economic scale, territorial reach and party politicisation. 
Tamil Nadu’s riverbed ‘sand mafia’ has developed so as to satisfy the rap-
idly escalating demand for sand in local construction and communica-
tions infrastructure, to counter regular waves of regulatory law and legal 
challenges, and to negotiate constantly changing official institutions. 
Legal and illegal revenue from sand mining fuels party funds, enabling 
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the rapid recent diffusion of pork-barrel politics. A new interpretation 
follows: of Dravidian politics moving from populism towards predation, 
an interpretation not fundamentally disturbed by the 2017 turmoil in the 
political leadership of Tamil Nadu following the death of Chief Minister 
J. Jayalalithaa.
In the fourth chapter grounded in political economy, Deepak 
Mishra researches hydro-criminality in Arunachal Pradesh through the 
lens of ‘political corruption’ and ‘accumulation by corruption’. Dams in 
the Himalayan region of North East India have not only been projected 
as a solution to India’s growing hunger for energy but also as the corner-
stone of the ‘Look East’ neoliberal development strategy for the region. 
Apart from the questions of the ecological, economic and social desirabil-
ity of such dams, Mishra reveals a new scale of hydro-criminal corruption 
and theft from both the state and collectively-owned tribal resources – 
involving several levels of politicians, bureaucrats and corporate houses 
interested in profit from these dams. The already nuanced and distinc-
tive politics of this sparsely populated but culturally diverse border state 
(involving the politics of multi-layered citizenship, the politics of ethnic-
ity, the politics of militarisation and the party politics of fraudulent and 
corrupt financial transfers from the centre to the state) is being enhanced 
and made even more complicated by the party-politicised politics of 
hydro-business.
In Chapter 5, on crime and politics in spectrum ‘markets’, Jai Bhatia 
charts the spectacularly large, rapid and corrupt expansion of telecom. As 
well as being socially transformative, telecom services are now a signif-
icant part of GDP and of the Indian state’s non-tax revenue. While spec-
trum is a publicly owned natural resource, the telecom sector it energises 
is increasingly dominated by a corporate oligopoly at the commanding 
heights of the economy. Bhatia shows how the state enables the consol-
idation of capital in spectrum through a menu of preferential policies: 
pro-business licensing, state-directed credit to telecoms and consumers, 
tax breaks, subsidies, incentives for mergers and acquisitions, regular 
bailouts when telecoms are over-leveraged and loopholes for inflation-
ary business valuations. She examines the embedded conflicts of inter-
est leading to regulatory capture and extensive criminal behaviour. The 
latter includes insider information, queue jumping and discretionary 
allocations, retrospective/ad hoc policy changes and unpunished viola-
tions, neglect of enforcement, endemic corruption and in-kind favours. 
Both major parties and their coalitions have benefitted from this criminal 
structure, as does a proliferating system of intermediaries who aid the 
negotiation of post-election allegiances. Despite occasional individual 
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scapegoats, a systemic complicity underlies large-scale and expand-
ing capital accumulation by business and the political elite: campaign 
finance in return for regulatory and financial privileges, the movement 
into politics of corporate barons – with egregious conflicts of interest – 
and the graduation from politics to politics-plus-business of the political/
bureaucratic families involved.
Bhatia’s analysis shows how neoliberal market ideology and infra-
structure is manipulated to legitimise the systemic plunder of bands of 
airwaves by a nexus fusing capital with political and bureaucratic elites. 
Vast losses to the exchequer result. Resistance comes from a variety of 
state institutions of regulation and enforcement – plus certain critical 
media outlets – but prosecution and sentencing are unusual and bail is 
often deployed to avoid hard punishment.
***
The six case studies grounded in anthropological analysis and/or ethno-
graphic material further reveal how criminal economies are embedded 
in everyday life, how they are legitimised or de-legitimised, how they are 
deeply connected with caste/community and kinship networks and how 
political bosses, the police and the manipulation of the law create and 
shape ‘Wild East’ capitalist forms of venture. They show on the one hand 
how part of the criminal economy spills into economies of favour and 
patronage at the very local level, and on the other how they merge with 
‘organised crime’. To this end, in Chapter 6 Michelutti puts forward the 
concept of ‘mafia assemblage’ to encompass and analyse the fluid and yet 
not disorganised il/legal configurations that we all encountered in the 
field. As a composite concept, ‘mafia assemblage’ implies heterogeneous, 
contingent, unstable, partial and situated patterns as well as hierarchies 
and rules. This conceptualisation allows us to offer nuanced analyses that 
make sharp contrasts between ‘old mafia’ as discrete bounded entities 
and ‘new mafias’ as multi-network, faceless and fluid businesses.30 The six 
case studies also reveal the principal role of intimidation and blackmail 
rather than explicit raw violence to sustain local criminal political con-
figurations. Bribes and intimidation are central to co-opting the police 
and the judiciary. The law is used to cover crimes, to intimidate, to abuse 
power and to facilitate extra-legal forms of accumulation. The manip-
ulation of the law further challenges dichotomisation such as informal 
versus formal governance and the view that ‘mafias’ are organisations 
that control social and economic flows outside the realm of the state. In 
addition, the criminal economies presented in the case studies reflect 
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predatory, parochial and self-interested forms of accumulation that mir-
ror social and cultural changes and aspirations in contemporary South 
Asia. Extra-legal forms of accumulation are deeply embedded in society, 
but ‘being part of society’ does not mean that they should be viewed as 
part of an ‘anti-economic moral economy’ à la Thompson (1993) or Scott 
(1976). On the contrary, ‘immoralities’, violent appropriations and the 
manipulation of the law are integral to social relations. Mafia ‘demo-
cratic’ forms of governance are based on relational modes of power and 
economic accumulation. Such collusions are illustrated throughout the 
six anthropological chapters.
More specifically, Chapter 6 explores the linkages between sand 
and oil mafias, caste and politics in Western Uttar Pradesh and border-
ing areas. Ethnographically, Michelutti scrutinises the criminal markets 
and the regimes of mafia governance that sand and oil help generate 
locally and regionally; analytically – as mentioned above – she puts for-
ward the concept of ‘mafia assemblage’. She shows how such il/legal 
arrangements criss-cross internal state boundaries and political con-
stituencies across Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh 
and Delhi. There is a great deal of literature that looks at transnational 
illegal economies, at the globalisation of crime and ultimately at border 
areas as places where the state fails to rule efficiently (Van Schendel and 
Abraham 2005). Yet, this chapter shows how ‘the rule of gangsters’ is not 
only a prerogative of marginal and unconquered ‘border areas’. It high-
lights how inter-state border areas are profitable business hubs and cen-
tres of criminal capital accumulation, as well as safe havens of impunity 
for the politicians involved in the businesses.
In Chapter 7, David Picherit develops these dynamics by looking 
at the criminal economy of ‘red sanders’ timber; its linkages and fusion 
with Telangana politics, caste factionalism and global networks that spill 
into the Middle East, Mauritius and China. Picherit maps out how local 
criminal economies shift and adapt to the changes informed by electoral 
democracy. Today the management and running of the red sanders tim-
ber business is in the hands of the locally elected MLA. In short, electoral 
democracy determines who the red sanders mafia ‘boss’ is. Such leader-
ship then follows the temporalities and contingencies of elections. Picherit 
illustrates these cycles through the creation of the new Telangana state – 
carved out from Andhra Pradesh in 2014. Having traced the continuum 
between informal, legal and criminal economies, he describes how red 
sanders smuggling relies on recruiting cheap seasonal inter-state labour 
migrants, is organised through various layers of middlemen and sub- 
contractors, requires political support, muscle and money, and above all 
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depends on political power to control both labour and the actual imple-
mentation of legislation. The chapter further reflects the importance of 
the socio-cultural context in the red sanders trade by discussing the mobi-
lisation of the regional heroic Robin Hood figures like the now mythical 
Veerappan. Finally, Picherit stresses (as do many chapter authors in this 
volume) the huge uncertainties and competitiveness that fuel the making 
and unmaking of fortunes and careers in the Wild East.
In Chapter 8, Tone Sissener explores the exploitation of another 
natural resource: land. Sissener shows that the justice system is deeply 
bounded in the politics, crime and business nexus. More specifically 
she investigates Kolkata’s real estate ‘mafias’ and discusses the relation 
between organised crime and local municipal authorities on the one 
hand and the manipulation of the laws surrounding title and tenure on 
the other. Legal battles, with near endless appeal processes, can easily 
drag on for decades, making room for illegal enterprises (‘the syndi-
cates’) to offer quick and favourable extra-legal or criminal settlements. 
The micro-politics of such ‘syndicates’ are studied against the backdrop 
of West Bengal’s ‘Mastan (enforcer/thug) raj’. The chapter highlights the 
networks of business, crime and politics that land acquisition entails and 
uses the concept of ‘blurred boundaries’ to tease out the overlap between 
formal/informal and legal/illegal.
This discussion is further developed by Nicolas Martin in the fol-
lowing chapter (Chapter 9), where he describes land grabbing in the con-
text of urban and rural Punjab. Over the last decade, both academics and 
journalists have noted the growing link between politics, business and 
crime in this northern state. Martin focusses on the relation between the 
‘land mafias’ and party politics and uses the concept of ‘political society’ 
to tease out his ethnography. The chapter casts a critical eye over the rou-
tinised and small-scale encroachment of village communal land in a rural 
Punjab district. While most literature on land grabs focusses on large-
scale state-led land grabs and mass displacement, Martin shows that the 
latter are not the only forms of land appropriation leading to accumula-
tion. Further, the dynamics around land grabbing described by Martin 
bear the imprint of political meddling. This feeds the needs for electoral 
mobilisation as well as the compulsions of capital accumulation. Martin’s 
case studies reveal how politicians often help farmers to continue occu-
pying village common lands illegally, doing so for electoral gains not 
necessarily consistent with the logic of ‘the market’ and of capital. So, 
what Martin describes is a ‘political crime’, as the perpetrators seem to 
be motivated by political motives rather than financial ones, though in 
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the long run such arrangements indirectly tend to benefit relatively well-
off Jat farmers at the expense of Dalits. They benefit the most well-off 
farmers disproportionately. Importantly, Martin’s granular ethnography 
shows how the land grabbers are the local president of the Youth Akali 
Dal (the ruling party at the time of the study) and a village Sarpanch.31 
Thus, two figures of public authority are the main runners of the micro-
level land racket.
Chapter 10 moves the analysis of the criminal economy to 
Bangladesh. Arild Ruud explores the legal and illegal relations between 
business and politics and their entanglement in the provincial town of 
Barisal. This chapter maps ethnographically how il/legal economies, 
money and politics run hand in hand in this town and how in recent years 
such arrangements have allowed a non-violent ‘political-criminal life’ to 
develop. But the drop in violence should not be taken as a sign of the 
state’s strength – as is often understood in the policy world – but on the 
contrary as an illustration of how criminal economic and political con-
figurations produce security and ‘order’ alongside violence (Gayer 2014; 
Arias 2016). Ruud’s chapter also restates the complexity of legal and for-
mal procedures that surround local Wild East forms of criminal political 
economies. Without law, crime does not pay. The complex contract and 
tender system he describes is marked by rules and counter-rules whose 
manipulation helps to cover, hide and camouflage illegal activity.
Finally Chapter 11, set in Karachi, shows again how connivance 
with the justice system is at the heart of criminal economies. Gayer fur-
ther explores the role of the law and the issues of order and disorder in 
this part of Pakistan. The chapter maps out a set of systematic and bru-
tal violations against industrial labour in the local textile industry and 
its intersections with the local ‘real-estate mafia’ and related protection 
rackets. Through judicial sources and the ethnography of a trial, he 
unravels Karachi’s ‘irregular’ industrial capitalism as a system resort-
ing intensively to a range of illegal practices without fully evading legal 
norms and the regulatory action of the courts. Rather than by its out-
wardly criminal nature, this mode of organisation of the economy is thus 
characterised by its uneven relationship with the law.
* * * 
From the varied analyses in political economy and anthropology reported 
in the 11 chapters, from different regions, sectors of the economy and 
theoretical/conceptual perspectives, Wild East criminal economies and 
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their ‘mafias’ emerge as ‘a normal facet of capitalism, no more outside 
its political economy than the other capitalisms to which we add such 
qualifiers as “merchant,” “industrial,” “finance,” “proto,” or “crony”’ 
(Schneider and Schneider 2011). Scholarly debate distinguishes primary 
accumulation from capitalist accumulation (Perelman 2001); the first 
entails a dual process involving on the one hand the seizure of resources 
prior to their productive investment, and on the other the dispossession 
of labour. The second is marked by the productive creation and appropri-
ation of value by capital from labour alongside its productive re-invest-
ment. The first is associated with transition and the second with mature 
capitalism; however, in the ‘Wild East’ they co-exist in a system. This sys-
tem is deeply intertwined with the state and often is the state itself. For 
example, in the criminal economy of coal, land and the minerals under 
it have been seized by state-corporates, depriving owners of anything 
but coal scavenging or wage-work, while at the same time the occasional 
court case reveals vast and diversified capitalist portfolios accumulated 
in the criminal economy (Chapter 1). In the Epilogue, Harriss-White 
examines the interconnectedness of the case studies and engages with 
the implications of the Wild East’s normalised predatory ‘system’ for the 
economy, ‘the rule of law’, democracy and governance at large.
Notes
 1. The authors share equal responsibility for the chapter and are listed in alphabetical order.
 2. Recent ethnographies of intreccio and other variegated forms of sovereignty as in ‘criminal 
governance’ and the ‘hybrid state’ – in Latin America (Rodgers 2006, Jaffe 2013), the ‘siste-
ma’ in Russia (Volkov 2002; Ledeneva 2013), and comparable situations in East Asia ( Wilson 
2015) and Africa (Lund 2006) – show how criminal (and violent) political configurations 
are often not simple entanglements of ‘criminalised nexuses’ or ‘networks’ or ‘parallel states’. 
Rather, they are systems of political economic governance in their own right where criminals, 
business officials and politicians work together to create an environment that fits their needs.
 3. As in Carothers 1998.
 4. At the macro level, the economy suffers losses through the removal and/or unintended uses of 
financial and material resources. At the micro level, enterprises that are victims of economic 
crime see their business disrupted, and incur additional costs relating to monitoring, detec-
tion, preventative measures, fines, fees and reputational damage (PricewaterhouseCoopers 
2016).
 5. This has been measured innovatively with satellite photographs of light pollution, to avoid 
problems with existing data and inappropriate spatial classifications.
 6. This does not mean that activity does not take place ‘as if’ laws were enforceable (Olsen and 
Morgan 2010).
 7. For a recent overview of this literature, see the volume edited by Rao and Dube (2013).
 8. For explorations of the growing nexus between crime and politics in India see also Sanchez 
(2016); Vaishnav (2017); Jeffrey (2010); Witsoe (2009); Jaffrelot (2002).
 9. See also Brass (1997); Hansen (2001); Berenschot (2011); Gayer (2014).
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10. Jha (2013) identifies a third route to fundraising consolidating predatory politics, the ‘Antulay’ 
route, involving the creation of private ‘trusts’ irrigated by fees for allocations of state resourc-
es of various kinds. Discovered and noted, punished but then rehabilitated in the form of the 
discretionary quota of development funds for elected politicians, unmonitored, and intended 
for distributive objectives, this official patronage resource is actually a base for private wealth 
appropriation by politicians.
11. On the AAP party and movement see Wyatt (2015).
12. For a summary of recent cases of murder by ‘resisters’ see Sharan (2012).
13. The repertoire of such crime involves practices of primitive accumulation alongside capitalist 
accumulation (Adnan 2013). The former requires resource seizure (not only land, but wa-
ter, energy sources and minerals) together with labour displacement and eviction. The latter 
includes the elimination of competition (between market and state, sectors, scales, regions, 
castes, etc.), the protection of monopoly rents, preferential allocations of resources (through 
subsidies, physical infrastructure, learning rents, etc.), under-pricing of resources (especial-
ly of wage labour), the use of force and threat, tax evasion and capital flight, the sabotage, 
capture and distortion of policy, and the evasion of (enforcement of) regulations (for com-
modity and financial transactions, for environmental and labour protection, for the control of 
licences). It also includes control over means of redistribution. Practices include relations of 
clientelism, direct entry to politics, politicised organisation of election logistics, bribery, fraud, 
coercion and physical violence.
14. UPA-2, the second term in the twenty-first century of the United Progressive Alliance, domi-
nated by the Congress party, was in power in central government from 2009 to 2014.
15. According to Singh (2009), while there were 128 MPs with criminal charges against them 
in the Lok Sabha in 2004 (24 per cent of the total), after the following election in 2009, the 
number had increased by 17 per cent to 150 MPs (30 per cent of the total) for which there were 
429 cases pending – indicating cases involving multiple crimes. After the 2014 election, the 
proportion rose to 34 per cent (186 MPs). The trend for MPs facing serious criminal charges is 
starker, moving from 55 MPs charged with 302 serious cases in 2004 to 72 charged with 412 
cases in 2009 (a 31 per cent increase) and to 112 in 2014 (a further 50 per cent increase) – 
indicating an increased concentration of multiple criminal cases (First Post 2014). In 2014, a 
total of 1,581 legislators in central and state governments faced prosecution in 13,500 cases.
16. See http://adrindia.org/content/lok-sabha-elections-2014 (accessed on 26 April 2019). Of 
course it is countered that accusations of crime-committing is part of the regular political to 
and fro, so such crimes are fabricated but with immunity extending during and often ‘infor-
mally’ after the period of office and with a minuscule proportion being successfully pursued 
(for example three in 2014, and one in 2017 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disqualification_
of_convicted_representatives_in_India (accessed 26 April 2019))), it is difficult to accept this 
argument.
17. See ‘Criminals in Politics: India’. http://indpaedia.com/ind/index.php/Criminals_in_poli-
tics:_India (accessed 26 April 2019).
18. One crore is 10 million. As of 2018, INR 1 crore (cr) = US$ 154,000/£110,000.
19. In India informality accounts for about 60 per cent of GDP, and 84 per cent of non-agricultural 
employment; in Europe 20 per cent and 11–30 per cent respectively; in China approximately 
40 per cent and 50 per cent, and in South Africa 25 per cent and 30 per cent (Medina, Jonelis 
and Cangul 2017; ILO 2018).
20. According to data from the Economic Censuses of 1990, 1998 and 2005 (see Harriss-White 
2012).
21. The black and criminal economy also generates large-scale capital flight and money launder-
ing worldwide (Global Financial Integrity 2017), compromising the capacity of the complicit 
political and economic elites to counter these practices (Srinivasan 2007, 2015).
22. See Harriss-White (2017a) for details.
23. See Chowdhury (2013); see also Jahan (2014).
24. In 2016, these figures were also used by the finance minister A.M.A. Muhith in one of his 
speeches. See BDNews Staff Correspondent (2014).
25. For discussion on the overlaps between different ‘economies’ see Roy (1996); Kanbur (2009).
26. For the relation between black money and election campaigns see Vaishnav (2017); on democ-
racy and bossism see Sidel (1999).
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27. Comaroff and Comaroff (2006; 2016); Heyman (1999); Roitman (2004) and Van Schendel 
and Abraham (2005); Auyero, Bourgois and Scheper-Hughes (2015).
28. Michelutti, Picherit, Ruud and Gayer build on a body of data collected over the course of sever-
al years. Martin and Sissener conducted fieldwork respectively in Punjab and West Bengal for 
15 months and built on their previous research in Pakistan and Bangladesh.
29. Workshops were held in Zurich, 25 July 2014; Cambridge, 4–6 September 2014; Oxford, 
 10–12 December 2014; Arundel, June 2015; Oxford, July 2016 and Paris, December 2016.
30. For a discussion see Paoli (2014).
31. A Sarpanch is a village panchayat head.
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The criminal economics and politics 
of black coal in Jharkhand, 2014
Nigel Singh and Barbara Harriss-White
In this chapter, an analysis of the implications of the criminal political econ-
omy for criminalised politics is developed. Probing the formally registered 
system for coal extraction and distribution alongside the differentiated, par-
tially registered, segmented supply chains that have developed in response to 
widespread unlicensed demand and the need for coal for cooking, workshop 
energy and winter heating over much of North India, criminality is found to 
pervade the entire system. Throughout the length and breadth of this crim-
inal assemblage, interlocked political and economic transactions entwine 
legal and illegal activity and accumulation assumes a great range of forms 
and scales. Dominated by a notorious coal mafia which has evolved atypi-
cally from a stranglehold over trade unions and mine labour, vast investment 
portfolios at the apex co-exist with extensive petty crime, generating returns 
barely covering subsistence. In a classic case of intreccio, the economic power 
of the mafia, its caste-embedded battles for supremacy and its need for state 
and party-political power suggest that Jharkhand’s distinctive politics of eth-
nic aspiration is very likely dwarfed by the tensions between the compulsions 
to unsettle and undermine countervailing politics to mafia supremacy and 
the compulsion to dominate local ruling and opposition parties.
Introduction
The estimates are rough and vary widely but it seems that in the central 
Indian state of Jharkhand perhaps a quarter of the coal is mined, scav-
enged and traded illegally. Illegal coal has been framed by scholars either 
as a repository of poverty or as a generator of dangerous and unhealthy 
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livelihoods in regions where there are few alternative work opportunities 
(Lahiri-Dutt 2007, 2014). The research reported in this chapter shows 
however how Jharkhand’s highly differentiated il/legal coal economy is 
the source of immense criminal wealth dominated by a coal mafia which 
acts as a durable force destabilising and undermining the mainstream 
pro-tribal party politics of Jharkhand – a state where Scheduled Tribes 
form 27 per cent of the 2011 census population of 33 million.1
Field methods for black coal
Our research on illegal coal used the political economy field methods 
described in the Introduction to this book and covered conditions in 
2013–14 in eight coal districts in Jharkhand, around Dhanbad, Ranchi 
and Hazaribagh (Singh 2014, 41), silence about which has been widely 
purchased by the coal mafia (Singh 2014, 30). Here this silence has been 
broken by gathering oblique but triangulated and positioned third-party 
narratives (evaluated on principles described in the book’s Introduction) 
and by interviewing people well placed in certain businesses. The set of 45 
informants that provided the field evidence used here was selected from 
among political party officials, labour politicians, officials in Coal India 
Ltd. and its subsidiaries, and representatives of the police, the law, jour-
nalism, academic research, landownership, and illegal and informal trade 
itself. They are listed in Appendix 1.1 on page 62. Despite this multi-sited, 
 multi-level approach to fieldwork, major problems result from applying 
this method to economic intelligence. While information about relations 
and  processes may be gathered and cross-checked, systematic evidence 
about assets, income, costs and returns is impossible to come by.
The social organisation of Jharkhand’s illegal coal 
economy
To build a political analysis of Jharkhand’s coal economy, first a model 
of its social organisation must be created. This is an exploratory exer-
cise that suggests greater clarity on paper than the messy, unstable and 
unclear relations on the ground – which Michelutti and Harriss-White 
term an ‘assemblage’ in the book’s Introduction. Three sets of extractive 
supply chain relations can be distinguished according to their regulatory 
status and forms of control: first, formal (state owned and/or regulated) 
activity; second, illegal supply (which breaks the laws by which the econ-
omy is governed); third, activity that is distinct from illegal activity due 
to its being informal, i.e. work either that the state does not require to be 
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regulated or that is below a threshold for regulation or (more controver-
sially) where state regulation exists but is not enforced (Kanbur, Lahiri 
and Svejnar 2012). However, much of the time, informal and illegal 
activities are sufficiently enmeshed as to be practically indistinguishable.
The formal organisation of coal (FC)
Even in an era recognised as neoliberal (Chatterjee and McCartney 2019), 
much of the FC structure consists of a large and complex set of very power-
ful state corporations operating under several ministries (Singh 2014, 30). 
First and foremost, Coal India Ltd. (CIL) dominates the local economy but 
is in turn regulated and formally dominated by the Ministry of Coal. Sec-
ond comes Indian Railways under the Ministry of Rail, which freights vast 
quantities of coal throughout the country. Third is a set of state corporate 
subsidiaries of CIL, notably Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (BCCL), Eastern Coal 
Ltd. (ECL) and Central Coalfields Ltd. (CCL). Central government public 
corporations are supplemented by agencies of the Jharkhand state: the 
Jharkhand Mining Authority (JMA) and the State Highways Department 
(responsible for monitoring volumes and quality through the system of 
check-posts). Then, major private sector entities are also formally regis-
tered and regulated: first, private coal companies (e.g. Tata) subcontracted 
to public corporations. Subcontracting is thought to account for an esti-
mated 70 to 80 per cent of CIL’s production. Then come heavy industrial 
companies with captive coal mines (e.g. Jindal). In both types of private 
enterprise, tight security discourages illegal scavenging.
In principle, the labour forces of these public and private entities 
are also formally registered and regulated. In practice, as the Sanhati 
(2011) report describes:
In the mining areas re-composition of the working class through migra-
tion, “uneven development” and technological attacks is a constant 
process. We can see in a very concentrated local space and time strug-
gles “within a proletariat” which represent the main lines of segmen-
tation of the global working class today. The proletariat in Dhanbad 
has many faces: the pauperised Adivasi (“indigenous”) and “rural 
poor” population at the fringes of the mining areas – the main base 
for the Maoist armed insurrection; the village workers in the “illegal 
mines”; the casualised workers in the main mines earning 10 per cent 
of their permanent workmates; the unemployed sons and daughters of 
local peasants and permanent workers organised in an “unemployed 
movement”. As a whole the local workforce is under-layered by various 
waves of migration since the nineteenth century.
38 THE WILD EAST
Labour unions – national and local – operate in both public and private 
mines. They also bridge the formal and the illegal subsystems. In some 
private mines, the labour force is reported to be much more complicit 
with management than those in CIL-operated mines because leaders are 
privately rewarded to deter the coal mafia control that characterises the 
public sector labour process. In other private mines, unions are reported 
to be privately complicit with management over shared returns to leaked 
IC while publicly antagonistic to management. This results not only from 
class contradictions but because management is casualising the labour 
force, subcontracting the operation of mines and attacking the rights 
of labour. In practice, throughout FC, the economic security of and the 
returns to labour are being eroded.
The social organisation of illegal coal (IC)
The illegal economy is ‘very substantial’, accounting for an estimated 
300,000 livelihoods in the eight IC districts (Singh 2014, 5), of which up 
to 100,000 are minors (Cantera 2015). Other estimates of the material 
size of the IC economy vary according to the interests involved. While 
‘officially’ in the eyes of the state corporate sector IC accounts for about 5 
per cent of CIL’s production – i.e. 23 million tonnes of an annual national 
total of 450 million tonnes (Firstpost 2014),2 a local police estimate for 
Jharkhand alone is 20–50 per cent. This, when Jharkhand’s production is 
60 million tonnes, will be anywhere between 12 and 30 million tonnes, 
and illegal coal will be much more if scaled to the national level. The 
IC sub-sector is both stratified and segmented between supply chain 
assemblages in which there is an inverse relation between the strata and 
aggregate gross output (high at the top) and the number of firms (few 
at the top). Four distinctive scales of operation forge specific kinds of 
assemblages.
First, coal cycle wallahs (CCW), an estimated 48,000 in Jharkhand 
(Singh n.d.), are drawn mainly from the foot of the pyramid of social 
status: Scheduled Castes and Tribes (SCs and STs) and Other Backward 
Castes (OBCs). The skills of illegal coal require ‘learning by doing’. 
Individuals or informal village-based groups of up to 10 people scav-
enge or steal from abandoned or active mines, from washeries, lorries 
and ‘rakes’/‘racks’ – lines of railway wagons. They thrive on public 
sector mines and avoid privately owned or subcontracted and man-
aged ones, repelled by their security forces (Singh 2014, 59–60). They 
may dump, wash and/or coke their coal and then transport it to local 
destinations. Demand for their commodities comes from small local 
 THE CRIMINAL ECONOMICS AND POLIT ICS OF BLACK COAL IN JHARKHAND, 2014 39
workshop industries (e.g. brick kilns, sponge iron plants, yarn dye-
ing), which cannot obtain coal for power through an official supply 
chain, and from domestic users. Though very small in scale, this is ille-
gal rather than informal because supply is unlawfully scavenged from 
abandoned mines or stolen from public sector units, mostly with the 
complicity of unions.
Own-account enterprise is a deceptively simple form of produc-
tion masking a range of work relations. Commonly operating on a logic 
of survival, in which income rather than profit is maximised, CCW are 
independent workers: for the most part, even in groups, they are non- 
accumulating petty producers. However, while more or less economically 
independent, some are politically regulated by being members of syndi-
cates. There, working on money advances, they may be wage-labour in 
a ‘formal’ disguise; and when paid by syndicates they are outright, ‘real’ 
wage workers (Banaji 1977).
Second, syndicates themselves are groups of 10–20 ‘goons’ (Singh 
2014, 9) who bulk stolen coal from the CCW workforce and also organ-
ise larger-scale transport. A colour-coded chit system denoting the 
status of bribes is monitored by check-post guards en route.3 In the 
twenty-first century they have become increasingly more numerous 
and well organised and may occasionally have visible fixed assets, e.g. 
motorcycles to pull the heavily laden bikes of ‘client’ CCWs uphill, or 
JCBs and trucks to rent out. Most of their business is also local, but 
increasingly the syndicates’ illegal coal – as with coal trade and mafia 
coal – makes its way from Jharkhand through Bihar to the largest (infor-
mal) coal market in Asia at Chandasi, outside Varanasi in Uttar Pradesh 
(UP) (Rajshekhar 2014).
Third, coal traders (CT) engage in larger-scale theft, often deliber-
ately to supplement the profits of their legitimate businesses. Sometimes 
known as the ‘small mafia’, they also use the chits described above to 
divert trucks and coordinate with check-post guards. Supplying small 
industries that are either unable to access FC due to the priority given 
to power stations and/or evading rationing, and are therefore forced to 
purchase unrationed coal, these illegal markets are the creatures of the 
state’s incomplete management of coal distribution.
At the apex, the coal mafia numbers 24 households, the most 
important being long-settled Rajput ‘Singh’ migrants from UP and 
Bihar (see Chapter 6 for the Rajput-dominated mafia in UP). While 
using the Indian term ‘mafia’, the coal mafia differ from many other 
kinds of Indian mafia through their investments in productive activ-
ity, their dealing illegally in a legal commodity and their origins in the 
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control of the labour force (discussed below). Their knowledge and 
skills are transmitted tacitly within the family – combining a profit- 
maximising logic with that of political power. Illegal coal is sometimes 
a supplement to legitimate business, such as labour contracting, union 
control, transport for large development projects or regulated coal 
trading. Illegal coal can also supplement other illegitimate business: 
sand, for example, which should be stored in mines to protect it from 
fire and subsidence but in fact is often traded (see Gupta 2013 and 
Chapter 2), or drinking water carried from Bihar. The largest ‘mafia’ 
are substantial criminal organisations under patriarchal management 
with labour forces numbering thousands and with a highly developed 
division of tasks, including specialised protection and internal surveil-
lance (Singh 2014, 18 and 42–43).4 Their activities include extortion 
through threats of labour unrest, forgery of documents with fake ori-
gins and destinations for commodity transactions, and the manipula-
tion of auctions. The large mafia houses have visible fixed assets and 
a monopoly of violence over their territories, along with more or less 
stable truces over spatial territory, rail rakes, road transport and the 
control of smaller CT and syndicates, punctuated by battles for power 
with occasional assassinations.5
A great coal mafia family, if not specialising in labour politics, will 
have a branch devoted to union leadership – perhaps even leadership of 
several labour unions. Whether or not from the mafia, union leaders liaise 
with CIL, politicians and officials to trade IC. Coal labour union leaders 
can also be found as directly elected MPs. A ‘handful’ of private mines are 
reliably reported as using funds from profits that are dedicated to ‘com-
munity development’ or ‘corporate social responsibility’ to pay off union 
mafia from challenging their security system, interfering in the labour 
process and diverting or stealing coal (Singh 2014, 66). This union route 
to mafia power is one of the outcomes of politicians’ need for votes. CCWs 
and syndicates break section 414 of the IPC when transporting coal by 
bike; they break the Coal Mines Act when stealing from a mine and the 
Indian Forest Act when exporting illegal coal from forests. Many more 
regulatory acts, including all the labour laws, are flouted by CTs and the 
coal mafia which scale up crime involving large-scale theft, tax fraud, 
assault and murder (see Gupta, Chapter 2).
The IC economy also includes sectors which exist only on paper, 
as fake companies/mines and factories, or exist as other derived mar-
kets and productive sectors that would have no raison d’être otherwise. 
Bribes, for instance, in which there is a market especially in state-owned 
companies, relate the size of regular ‘commissions’ to the scale of illegal 
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operations. Markets exist for equipment (for cycles and their fortifica-
tion), document forgers, the supply of diggers and trucks (sometimes 
moonlighting from CIL), illegal processing (washing and coking), the 
adulteration of coal, and for brokerage and intermediation for retail 
demand on whatever scale. Transactions between the syndicates and 
CT and between police and politicians generate livelihoods through 
brokerage. Money-lending agents mediate between the Chief Minister 
(CM) and CCWs; political touts and money carriers earn their living by 
arranging political deals, and organisers of immunity mediate protec-
tion services and their labour forces. In addition, other elements of the 
state are drawn into the making and distribution of rents from IC. These 
are alleged to include officials in regulating departments, revenue and 
commercial taxes departments, check-post/weighbridge operators, 
the police hierarchy – from Inspectors General and their deputies and 
superintendents downwards – ultimately reporting to the Jharkhand 
State Home Affairs Ministry. A given station may have officers in the 
pay of several mafias, CTs or syndicates: mafia-money power is reported 
to override formal rank and status inside the police force (Singh 2014, 
47). The judicial and political apparatuses at local, state and national 
level are not above taking rents from IC. Nor are interests inside the 
apparatus of public corporations: for example, managers in CIL and 
state corporations, Indian Railways officials and union leaders – the 
leadership of unions ‘recognised’ by CIL as having common interests 
with management. Last but not least, the parallel, formally outlawed 
political structures of the Maoist Communist Party, classified as terror-
ists in 2009, profit from both ‘providing legitimate protection’ and the 
policing of illegal compliance (Thakur 2009).
Comments
We can see from this summary of the social organisation of IC, first, that 
the illegality and the social reach of IC are both extensive. FC and IC are 
knitted together in a nexus of ‘interlocked transactions’. These are not 
necessarily the classical interlocked contracts in which a single contract 
binds conditions on two or more markets, e.g. money, labour and the 
marketed surplus (Subramanian 1992); rather they are a set of linked 
political obligations, contracts, payments and cooperative/complicit 
behaviour without which the IC sector would not work, yet which struc-
ture highly differentiated returns (Singh 2014, 10–12). For an example 
of large-scale theft, this system of interlocked transactions may be styl-
ised (inexhaustively) as in Box 1.1
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While Khan (2012) has modelled such arrangements as manifestations 
of patronage, clientelage and faction, in fact they are more complex than 
these principal-agent categories would imply. Formal occupational sta-
tus, social status, kinship alliances, economic assets, more or less armed 
capacity for physical threat against the vigilant state and criminal com-
petitors, capacities for sharing and collective action, the capacity to pro-
tect visible fixed assets (from motorcycles for uphill stretches for groups 
of laden CCWs to loading equipment and transport fleets) are all at play 
in this system of transactions.
This summary of IC social organisation also shows how the economic 
and political domination over IC of a cartel of mafia families has devel-
oped from roots in labour rather than in capital. Prior to nationalisation, 
Box 1.1  The system of interlocked transactions in black 
coal
•	 The federal Ministry of Coal receives payments for postings and for delay-
ing the implementation of regulations.
•	 Revenue Department/commercial tax officials organise falsification of 
supply chain transactions and arrange for delaying the implementation of 
regulations.
•	 Other officials silence the media, distribute cuts to junior officials.
•	 Police/home affairs officials are bribed for (non)enforcement and to silence 
the media.
•	 Union leaders organise the theft of raw material from mines.
•	 CIL managers exercise oversight of (false) permits and (false) accounts, 
quality, loading (false weights at weighbridges) and dispatch.
•	 Railway officials oversee the logistics of the illegal renting-out of individual 
wagons or wholesale diversion of rakes (‘racks’).
•	 State Highways Officials manage governance of ‘discos’ (colour-coded chits 
to indicate bribe status).
•	 Maoist cadres exact tax for protection en route.
•	 Forgers create documents ensuring the appearance of legal compliance.
•	 Politicians supervise protection, physical and bureaucratic access, patron-
age and evasion.
•	 Mafia control contracts, logistics, finance/rent allocation and protection.
•	 Unions manage contracts, logistics, finance/rent allocation and protection 
and demand extra fees from coal buyers for loading/transporting; union 
leaders in mafia (reported to be 9) organise labour.
•	 Mine labour organise cuts paid to union/mafia bosses to join union and 
access jobs.
Source: Singh 2014 fieldwork
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private mines paid protection forces to secure the owners’ physical safety, 
prevent theft and monitor work shifts. Nationalisation required the reor-
ganisation of the workforce: labour contractors and managers of labour 
camps for migrant workers emerged from among the organisers of pro-
tection. Some of the new class of labour contractors became leaders of 
unions, stimulated illegal trade and protected it. Then, in the Janata Dal 
era in 1970s Bihar, after the murder of a Congress union leader, they 
entered politics directly (Singh 2014, 51). Now leaders and management 
of national unions (such as INTUC and BMS) are widely alleged to have 
hidden interests in IC (see Appendix 1.2 and Gupta in Chapter 2). Public 
sector institutions have long been under pressure to privatise, yet FC is 
not only hollowed out through private subcontracting: even the 30 per 
cent of production it controls directly is also suffused with, and plun-
dered by, illegal private arrangements. The resistance caused by these 
interests is just as serious a barrier to the formal process of privatisation 
as it is to any attempt to crush IC.
The politics of the economic regulation of illegal coal
Neither the informal nor the criminal economy is disordered, so one 
element of local politics concerns how order is achieved in the absence 
of formal state enforcement. Several kinds of overlapping politics are 
involved. We can approach the question of regulatory order first through 
the four strata of the IC assemblage, although it is the labour unions that 
have paramount regulatory authority. Second and later, we examine how 
elected and unelected party politicians regulate IC and prevent enforce-
ment of the law; we then investigate the political roles played by social 
institutions. CCW are not collectively organised as gangs or associations. 
The groups of about 10 needed to coke coal are less structured than are 
the syndicates. Even when supplying syndicates, CCW coal and coke is 
sold by individuals through individual transactions (Singh 2014, 24). 
Sales routes and sales are established ‘by local custom’ through family 
and friends, with very loose coordination through ‘ad hoc village com-
mittees’. These divide territory, protect diggers, establish routes, counter 
police vigilance and suppress information (Singh 2014, 35).
Syndicates regulate the use of equipment (motorcycles) collectively 
but, despite their name, are not noted for other regulatory capabilities. 
Where they employ CCWs as labour, contracts are defined verbally, speci-
fying quantities and periods. Syndicates may reinforce bikes to carry great 
weights of coal (up to 2.5 tonnes a year; Lahiri-Dutt and Williams 2005). 
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Where syndicates’ motorbikes are used to tow bikes on uphill stretches and 
to oversee cycle convoys some 400 metres long, the syndicate  organises 
and rotates the CCW routes and group membership, liaises with the 
police and protects its CCWs at dump sites. Under these conditions, it is 
 estimated that the productivity of CCWs doubles and penalties to CCWs for 
non-compliance with syndicates are fierce. Syndicates are self-organising, 
as are CT and the mafia – the latter through their system of family- and 
kin-based honour and discipline and their control over unionised labour. 
Three ‘Singh’ mafia families, originally from UP and Bihar, extort funds 
from the labour they lead, pay a ‘randari’ (informal) tax and share rents 
with CIL management so that labour and small private intermediaries 
can take coal. In this way they expand the illegal coal trade, lead unions, 
threaten unrest and price and bid for work (which may not be completed) 
(Singh 2014, 51). They also control violent caste-based youth gangs, liaise 
between other mafia and CIL and are pro- or anti- the casualisation of 
labour depending on the political party in power.
The coal mafia have territorial agreements such that their monop-
olies enable greater rent extraction than competition between mafia 
houses would. Through threats to the physical security of their work-
forces, certain mafia families also control sets of local unions. They are 
also able to manipulate auctions through intimidation and underbid-
ding and can even manipulate CIL’s e-auctions this way, so that pur-
chase prices are cheaper than the official floors. Mining labour, both 
legally organised and illegally regulated, has a paramount role in IC. In 
the twenty-first century, two opposing political forces have agitated the 
labour force. One is geared towards labour casualisation and the strip-
ping of rights – via subcontracting the extraction of coal. The second, by 
contrast, involves the competitive coercing of labour into unions, not sim-
ply to empower labour but also to empower the mafia to control labour 
in IC. Individual labourers may now belong to multiple unions. Payday 
credit and debt have recently been introduced as a bonding mechanism 
by both private companies and competing mafia moneylenders. Unions 
such as the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC, belonging 
to the Congress party), the Rashtriya Colliery Mazdoor Sangh (RCMS), 
the CPI’s United Coal Workers’ Union (CWU) and the Anusuchit Jati-
Janjati Chhatra Sangathan (AJCS) – all aligned with Congress – then 
help CIL and its subsidiaries by their complicity in fixing and stabilising 
wages at relatively low levels. In return labour unions regulate the supply 
of illegal coal through diversion and theft, refusal to comply with CIL 
directives, overloading of trucks, collection of rent (sometimes shared 
with managers) and conniving with tax fraud. When ordered, union 
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members provide the manpower for kidnap, assault and murder. Unions 
are reported by many informants to have more operational power than 
the state corporations’ apparatus. Some unions are capable of manag-
ing IC without other alliances but most take protection from union-mafia 
combines. Apex union-mafia families also regulate territory and control 
the large-scale transport of IC in railway rakes. See Appendix 1.2 for coal 
union leaders’ business interests.
The politics of money flows to and from illegal coal: the circuit 
of profit
Financing IC requires amounts ranging from little more than zero (in 
the case of dependent CCWs) to massive amounts of capital (for the 
mafia). None of this is traceable – even finance for the large-scale rail-
way-rake transport business comes from illegal/black sources – includ-
ing, it is alleged, investments in working capital from black economy 
sources outside Jharkhand, and even outside India. Granted that else-
where, in less criminalised sectors and regions of India’s informal econ-
omy, businessmen have persistently expressed preferences for financial 
autonomy and against indebtedness (especially to official and tracea-
ble sources like banks), it is likely that mafia families themselves act 
as banks for the IC system. Indeed it was reported that of late they 
have hired agents to manage lending to CCWs and union labour (Singh 
2014, 45). For reasons of political hedging alone, flows of money made 
from IC will differ from allegiances and political interest. In the eight 
coal districts, syndicates, CTs and mafia all pay politicians and their 
aides, officials, CIL management and the police on a sliding scale, in 
which mafiosi pay the most and gain the most political leverage (Daniel 
and Williams 2013). Mafia families are thought to be associated in quite 
a stable manner with given political parties despite the fact that rival 
wings of the largest mafia family fund them all (Singh 2014, 54 and 
60) – and not just in Jharkhand but also in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, in 
order to ease the route to the Chandasi coal trading hub. Large mafia 
families will fund individual politicians as well as political party activity 
in the territories they dominate: they invest the most and gain the most 
in return. Within the mafia there is a hierarchy, some families having 
to pay leading mafia families (such as the ‘Singh Mansion’ (The Sun-
day Indian 2013)) while others make direct political investments. And 
lately the volatility of party coalitions in Jharkhand has required mafia 
families with a single-party allegiance to diversify their funding oppor-
tunistically and fund candidates from a range of parties.
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Criminal accumulation
Accumulation from IC is highly differentiated. At their most independent, 
CCWs are petty producers and traders, expanding through multiplica-
tion rather than accumulation but completely meshed in markets based 
on raw materials to which they have no property rights. Other elements 
in the assemblages for coal invest profit and accumulate. Syndicates 
invest in motorcycles and start to hire out JCBs; coal traders get hold of 
diggers and trucks. Mafia families route investments both privately and 
publicly. Privately, they are known to have invested in expanding IC and 
diversified into real estate and transport fleets, leisure resorts and pleas-
ure parks in Jharkhand, hotels in Mumbai (and across other Asian coun-
tries), in sand, water and heavy equipment for development projects. 
Black money may be laundered through such investments, and mafia 
dons become ‘gentlemen-traders’. For instance, the upwardly mobile 
OBC mafioso Dhulu Mahato, leader of the union sponsored by the local 
Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (JVM) party, has assets from IC estimated in 
2013 at INR 200 crore (US$28 million), together with a fleet of 100,000 
trucks (Singh 2014, 70).
Through public investments, the coal mafia are major funders of 
elections. Although local campaign requirements vary from INR 5 lakh to 
50 lakh per candidate (Singh 2014, 70) funding often dribbles in through 
many small consignments of cash under INR 20,000 – the threshold for 
registered declarations. Funding denotes ‘purchase’ and the biggest mafia 
families are able to purchase any local politician. This generates a poli-
tics of investment, debt and dependence which will play assertively and 
reactively within and between parties according to their electoral success. 
Political and economic losses are embedded in the state: CIL’s profits and 
revenues on royalties go to the Jharkhand state government. Industries 
where costs rise through the use of adulterated or low-quality, appar-
ently ‘cheap’ coal also lose. Political resistance ‘loses’. Political resistance 
so far has been countered successfully in Jharkhand by means ranging 
from transfers of posts to physical assault, including murder. Punishment 
through the legal system is rare. But when, uniquely, an ex-CM, Madhu 
Koda, was arrested in 2009 and successfully prosecuted, the CBI uncov-
ered illegal trade revenues totalling around INR 4,000 crore. The case also 
revealed investments in 700 shell companies, in mines, in an off-shore 
island, in real estate, sponge iron, private colleges in his constituency, 
transport and trucking as far away as Punjab and Haryana, hotels in New 
Delhi and Puri, a theme park, distilleries and print media and TV channels 
(for strategic silence) (Singh 2014, 64). To the extent that this diversified 
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portfolio emerged from violent seizures of natural resources and the dis-
placement of labour, its accumulation was ‘primitive’. But the productive 
investment in which resources have been sunk obeys the logic of advanced 
capitalist accumulation, with Indian characteristics.
Party politics in Jharkhand
Jharkhand nationalist parties are widely described as having used the idi-
oms and rhetoric of aboriginal empowerment and the interests of Sched-
uled Castes and Scheduled Tribes to plunder natural resources (Karat 
2012). In this way Jharkhand is no different from other elements of the 
new political wave that has conceded and created non-linguistic states.6 
The Jharkhand nationalist case involves demands for social justice and 
restitution from developmental marginalisation and comparative pov-
erty, through which capital has been accumulated by outsiders to the det-
riment of low-caste and tribal local citizens. Inside its new borders and 
crammed with – to date under-extracted – subterranean industrial raw 
materials, Jharkhand does not lack resources for development. Accord-
ing to Tillin (2008), Congress has not encouraged these movements for 
independence – succeeding in co-opting ‘less radical elements’ (which, 
in Jharkhand, include the coal mafia) – so the political drivers have been 
an alliance of the BJP-in-opposition, local parties in which low castes and 
tribes compete, and new social movements. Together, these have gener-
ated a politics of claim – to education, reservations, jobs and better social 
status – but based on unstable alliances grounded in identity.
Among the elements of identity it is ironic that language is promi-
nent. While for New Delhi and in the All-India optic, the local languages 
of the new states are dialects of Hindi, this is disputed by their speak-
ers, whose case is that new states are language-based too; in Jharkhand’s 
case, multi-lingually (Pattanayak 2013).
Jharkhand’s most important local parties are the Jharkhand Mukti 
Morcha (JMM), the All-Jharkhand Students’ Union (AJSU) and the 
Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (JVM). Campaigning for a tribal homeland and 
greater regional independence, the JMM developed with a politics unre-
lated to natural resources and as early as 1972 had a Marxist coordina-
tion committee led by Shibu Soren. Support was mobilised by focussing 
on the grievances of labourers and Scheduled Castes and Tribes. Later 
Soren was elected to the Government of India as an MP and forged links 
with Congress. While a student revolt against this arrangement created 
the AJSU in 1986, other splinter groups cohered to JMM in the 1990s, 
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and Jharkhand became a state in 2000. After the 2014 election, the JMM 
held only 2 of 14 Parliamentary seats from Jharkhand (the remainder 
going to the BJP). The AJSU’s originally militant regionalism has become 
increasingly pragmatic and AJSU is now allied with the BJP. Their pres-
ident has been Home Minister in the Jharkhand legislative assembly. 
Meanwhile, the JMM was consolidated in 2006 from a BJP splinter. Its 
MP, Dr Ajay Kumar, is an IPS officer, medical doctor, holder of an MBA 
and industrialist who developed an anti-mafia campaign in Jamshedpur.
Political parties in Jharkhand are funded by IC, the iron ore extrac-
tive industry, as well as bauxite, steel and construction industries. The 
AJSU is thought to rely on the aluminium industry. JVM has maximum 
financial support from the very coal areas where it attempts to chal-
lenge the mafia. Congress and BJP have mafia notables but are less 
dependent on their funds since they are able to supplement them with 
national corporate donations (Singh 2014, 36). Local cash collectors are 
employed to bulk the donations to all parties (Singh 2014, 63) helped 
by coercive pressures brought to bear by mafia families on other compa-
nies. Contemporary local politics in the state are widely characterised as 
grounded in ethnic divisions, local problems, and short-term and small-
scale mobilisations. The rising political party instability of Jharkhand 
weakens the chance that the state government has of crushing IC. Its 
relatively small number of MLA seats (81) combined with an increasing 
political fragility act to benefit IC and its mafia. The Legislative Assembly 
is too small to prevent coalitions being held to ransom by the threat of 
withdrawal (Singh 2014, 72). This fragility obstructs attempts to amass 
political opposition to IC.
Illegal coal and politics: intreccio
The entanglements between the il/legal economy, the state and party 
politics, for which Michelutti and Harriss-White invoke the concept 
of intreccio in the Introduction to this book, can be approached in two 
ways: the roles in party politics of those controlling illegal coal; and the 
reverse – the role of party politics in illegal coal.
Coal interests in party politics
Even before the 2014 election, the political interests of IC were tensely dif-
ferentiated. Some CCWs have formed a political constituency of Bandhu 
Tirkey’s Jharkhand Janadikhar Manch (JJM) – supporting the agenda of 
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political independence. As Tillin has explained (2013) the JJM demands 
the independence from ‘migrant’ Rajput capital of local OBCs, SCs and 
STs, along with local tribal control over natural resources and livelihoods 
creation. Other CCWs support Shibu Soren’s Jharkhand Mukti Morcha 
(JMM) on the grounds that Soren has declared their ‘right’ to take coal. 
Coal syndicates also pay JMM for the physical protection of the CCWs 
who provide their supplies.
In contrast with this paternalism in return for electoral support, the 
union leaders and other coal trade and mafia families position kin directly 
in politics. While all unions are vote banks for parties and family power 
prevails over party policy, the political allegiances of coal traders and the 
mafia are bound to labour union politics, which in turn are inextricable 
from the forms of ownership of mines. It is more efficient and less costly 
and risky to manage the politics of IC directly as an MLA than to lever-
age activity indirectly from outside the legislature through paying and 
patronising other politicians. As a lawmaker, the MLA is also immune 
from prosecution, a vital legal protection (Singh 2014, 71). Immunity 
is an important reason for active political engagement. Within the mafia 
elite of Rajput Singhs, active participation in both Congress and BJP pol-
itics is pervasive. For instance, within the Congress party union, INTUC, 
there is a three-way rivalry between the local MP and two MLAs not only 
for control of unionised labour but also for control of the illegal labour 
force of CCW paupers who scavenge and process illegal coal from mines. 
Within private subcontracted mines, unionised labour forces are bribed 
by local union-mafia into complying with management and resisting 
the mobilisation of casual labour. While inside CIL, a single (national) 
union may dominate a single mine or set of mines, and four unions have 
such ‘monopolies’ in mines run by BCCL, there tends to be competition 
between local labour unions and their local CT and mafia families. In 
privately subcontracted mines there is a battle to unionise their tempo-
rary casual labour because the stakes from rents and profits from IC are 
high and depend on the power and the roles of organised labour. In turn 
unions are well known to be affiliated with political parties, though some 
unions are diversifying their party portfolios (see Gupta, Chapter 2).
The mafia have interests in political instability because it prevents 
the mobilisation of sufficient political power to challenge IC. CCWs and 
syndicates, bound through their social identities to political parties seek-
ing to empower them, are also bound by their livelihoods to parties pro-
tecting IC. They are unstable political resources switching according to 
interests and driving a politics of ‘permanent crisis management’. And the 
unpredictability of local election timings and alliances creates demand 
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both for mafia funds and the vote banks controlled by the mafia, so that 
compromising links between the mafia and parties that have campaigned 
against IC are growing. All of this serves to strengthen the political clout 
of the mafia.
Meanwhile there are strong political relationships between the 
Government of Jharkhand and CIL officials. Where a state government 
minister or official also has trade union interests, this link is direct. Thus, 
Finance and Energy Ministers belonging to Congress in Jharkhand are 
alleged to have shared CIL subsidies, diverted coal to parallel trade, 
organised the labour for illegal transport by ‘rack’ and liaised between the 
mafia and CIL (Singh 2014, 68). When local party politics is increasingly 
unstable then the nexus of mafia and CT, union leaders, police, officials 
in public agencies and politicians is tangled and powerful enough not just 
to protect IC but also to prevent the privatisation of CIL – on which this 
edifice rests.
Party politics in the illegal coal economy
There are no clean politicians in Jharkhand. (Senior journalist)
Jharkhand is already a failed state. (Central government minister)
Our evidence here is drawn from before the 2014 election in the pre-BJP 
era, when the state legislative assembly was a series of unstable  coalitions 
under shifting control, but also when Jharkhand MPs from two local 
 parties were aligned with the United Progressive Alliance  government in 
New Delhi. Elected politicians have immunity at national and state level. 
But below the legislative assembly their less effective immunity is not de 
jure but secured de facto through the local political threats, bribes and 
allegiances described earlier in this chapter. So it is that in Jharkhand 
all major and minor parties – Congress, the BJP, JMM, AJSU, JVM, JJM 
plus the CPM (Maoist)7 – have stakes in IC. These work in  various ways – 
direct, indirect and oppositional – and in both governing and  opposition 
parties, inside and outside Jharkhand. The most powerful MLAs in 
each of the five significant parties are linked to IC, while some are also 
contractors to the state (in mining, water, transport and labour). As of 
2013, nine MPs and MLAs, including Jharkhand cabinet ministers, ran 
branches of national unions and control labour (threatening ‘trouble at 
pit’ for non-criminal businesses); they control dumps for CCWs, divert 
trucks from washeries, fix timing, transport and transactions, allocate 
routes and, more recently, manage loans to syndicates and other groups. 
MLAs sit on CIL governing bodies, control police postings within their 
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jurisdictions and can delay police charges, reopen closed mines for syndi-
cates, marshal the CCW vote banks, own and finance ancillary activities 
for IC such as transport, extort cuts from the profits of other companies 
and use profits to invest in loyalty and votes. Mafia families themselves 
engage as MPs, MLAs and mayors, not only in Jharkhand but also in Bihar 
and UP, controlling politicians lower down the ranks who can deliver 
vote banks, stabilising their own economic empires in the state arena and 
protecting them against threat and blackmail up the political greasy pole 
to New Delhi (Singh 2014, 44). In Jharkhand, INTUC leaders were Con-
gress MLAs: alleged both to manage illegal transport and protect it polit-
ically at the Central level. A former speaker of the Jharkhand Legislative 
Assembly is alleged to have invested in land sites for CCW scavenging 
(registered in his wife’s name), and to have used his caste contacts to 
manipulate the police and to manage permits, loading, routes and pro-
tection from obstruction for syndicates. His relations with local party 
officials, government officials (from district and block administrations, 
Revenue and Forest Departments), with unelected cadres and members 
of the JMM, JVM and AJSU are said to grease IC in return for fees, immu-
nity and silence (Singh 2014, 49). As Jharkhand’s politics is increasingly 
negotiated through coalitions, the coal mafia MLAs have been all the 
more vital since they have the political and economic resources neces-
sary to hold the balance of power.
While collusion among the coal mafia, the bureaucracy, police 
and politicians is thought to have been increasing since Jharkhand was 
formed, outright violence against people appears to have been losing 
relevance. The increasingly close four-way relationship benefits from 
proximity to the site of the seat of power, Ranchi, adjoining the coal belt. 
While the political analyst P.S. Jha characterises the mature clientelist 
state as a congeries of relations between business, career politicians, 
gangland mafiosi and police (Jha 2013), the fledgling state of Jharkhand 
is proving to be no different. Yet IC may not always require the direct 
involvement of local politicians. Positions in CIL, whose complicity is 
vital for coal theft and truck diversion, cannot be delivered at the level 
of the Jharkhand state: appointments are routed through the ministry in 
New Delhi. Businesses needing preferential access to coal can lobby the 
central government’s Coal Ministry bureaucracy, which formulates pol-
icy on matters such as weighbridges, CCTV surveillance and electronic 
stamping. Political arrangements lubricated by black money enable the 
ministry to command CIL to allocate and divert coal, just as it can delay 
or even stop the implementation of locally obstructive policies (Singh 
2014, 24).
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Apart from direct operational involvement, it is also widely 
reported that about half of the 81 MLAs and 14 MPs receive pay-
ment from IC. They take fees, divvy up cuts among themselves, the 
police and the Highways Inspectorate at state borders, manage the 
approval of bids to the Jharkhand Mining Authority and liaise – but 
do not directly operate in the sector. This kind of activity is resistant 
to shifting electoral outcomes (Singh 2014, 26). Meanwhile JVM 
MLAs formally express a politics of resistance – to ‘fight the mafia’. 
But at the time of our research, many were reported as busy skimming 
 syndicates and  controlling CCWs for both party and individual benefit 
(Singh 2014,  35). Mafia funding supports, and is in turn supported 
by, elected governments and elected oppositions. But the majority of 
electoral  candidates do not win. Losers are indebted to their funders. 
Mafia financiers are thought not to require the repayment of such debt 
(either in cash or kind), regarding it as a political cost (a ‘loss leader’), 
and suggestive of Jharkhand’s political fragility and of the subversion 
of its aspirational politics. The mafia dominates coal politics through 
the constitutive politics of capital/business and the control of all rel-
evant  markets for money and material goods, of labour, parties and 
movements, protection and force, and state penetration. Meanwhile, 
syndicates and less powerful CTs have similar links lower in the sys-
tem but face much higher risk, may make losses, lose elections (and 
the funds invested in them) and enjoy spells in jail (Singh 2014, 2–14, 
26). The increasing volatility of Jharkhand politics means politicians 
are not secure, and relinquishing immunity through electoral losses 
leaves IC politicians vulnerable to punishment. Once out of office, one 
union mafioso, Dhulu Mahato, formerly immune from prosecution 
for the violent release of a client from the police, was jailed (Press 
Trust of India 2016). To sum up in the words of local experts: the ‘top 
power structure and state coal mafia are linked conceptually’.8 The 
coal mafia has achieved ‘paramountcy – instead of delegating power, 
they get into politics to directly control and have real power’.9 More 
coal families have sought election since Jharkhand’s formation:
They have legal authority … Jharkhand has become privatised 
to the local mafia. They sought the direct election to direct the 
resources. Now they are decision makers at the MLA and Police 
level and have a legal basis for being mafia … The mafia then elect 
their own to allow criminal exploitation. (Professor, Indian School 
of Mines)
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The identity politics of coal
India’s extensive, socially regulated informal economy is one in which – 
alongside local business associations, and sometimes permeating them – 
so-called ‘soft’ institutions of identity, such as gender, ethnicity, religion, 
place, language and caste have proved more compatible with the cap-
italist economy than theorists of development have been inclined to 
acknowledge (Harriss-White 2003; Arora 2017). They are at one and the 
same time being dissolved by the needs of market exchange for acquired 
competences rather than ascribed character, and also being reworked to 
become not ‘soft’ but hard regulators of economic opportunity, entry and 
practice. While identity reflects trust, which reduces the costs of trans-
actions, it is simultaneously used to defend sectors against a competitive 
free-for-all and thus protect rents and profits. Social institutions which 
regulate market behaviour are powerful structural elements in India’s 
political economy. Though there is no scholarly consensus on what the 
dominant or prominent institutions are,10 gender, religion, caste and 
ethnicity are widely accepted as expressing important forms of authority 
that structure India’s economy.11 The same lens needs applying to ille-
gal coal and the question asked – which social institutions are indispen-
sable to the criminal economic order of IC? From the research reported 
here the answers can only be suggestive and need further development. 
Extrapolated from the narratives of informants, they are those institu-
tions and forms of political authority that were said to make sense of IC.12 
Each is summarised and then mapped onto other politics laid out earlier.
Dynasty
Modern India is suffused with political dynasties: after 2014, 20 per cent 
of MPs were from political dynasties, rising from 15 per cent in the BJP to 
half of the rump Congress. Non-watertight explanations for this range from 
‘family culture’ and voter preference to party political encouragement for 
loyalty (Chandra 2016). To these, Jha would add the reduced costs when 
transmitted through dynasties of the knowledge, contacts and practices 
of mobilising untraceable party funds (Jha 2013). The mafia is not just 
a set of criminal organisations, it is a set of political dynasties competing 
against one another for ‘paramount power’ (Singh 2014, 34). Alongside the 
cross-generational accumulation of political power, mafia dynasties are also 
developing economic authority not only in IC but in related industries, the 
local bureaucracy and in labour control. Their private protection forces are 
drawn from the coal labour they also seek to control at work in the mines.
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Caste and ethnicity
Mafia dynastic competition is also construed through caste and ethnicity. 
The elite Rajputs from Bihar who have settled in Jharkhand were initially 
challenged by local high-caste Bhumihar families (one of whose leaders 
was assassinated in 1977). Rajput mafia families may diversify funding to 
several parties – wherever they can fortify their castes as well as position 
their private interests strategically. These prominent business families 
also ensure that members are placed in the state bureaucracy and in the 
management of local CIL subsidiaries. Rajput networks are then consoli-
dated in politics, the state and the economy.
But Jharkhand is a state where OBCs, SCs and STs are the largest 
elements in the population. The rise and fall of Dhulu Mahato should be 
seen in this context. Mahato, who is OBC, combines caste politics with 
being a union mafioso controlling the UCW (now linked with AITUC 
and MCC) and a party politician (in the AJSU-JVM). Two factors may 
account for his different party-political engagement from those of the 
Singhs: first, his local, ‘insider’ role as champion of Scheduled Castes and 
Tribes against the immigrant outsiders – despite the latter’s several gen-
erations of residence in Jharkhand. Second, the possibility of developing 
a defence of the coal mafia through local politics at a stage when mafia 
representation in the legislative assembly had not yet been consolidated 
(Singh 2014, 27–30).
Summing up: there is little evidence that the politics of dynasty, 
caste and ethnicity does anything but strengthen the grip over IC of the 
Rajput mafia.
Consequences
To complete the integration of illegal coal into the account of Jharkhand’s 
development, the final task is to suggest its implications for the economy 
and politics.
Economic consequences
The economic impact of illegal coal is ambivalent. On the one hand, in a 
so-called neoliberal era widely criticised for its jobless growth (Kannan 
and Raveendran 2010), IC provides hundreds of thousands of livelihoods 
in Jharkhand alone. IC is then supplied cheaply to satisfy a highly seg-
mented demand for energy that lacks official entitlement to coal. These 
take the form of income supplements to a wide range of public sector 
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employees, wage labour throughout the coal economy and enterprises 
ranging from petty production/self-employment to large criminal organ-
isations. The unplanned investment in IC and use of its profits may have a 
range of legal statuses but is productive as well as unproductive.
On the other hand, the diversion of coal has a negative impact on 
formal industrial capacity utilisation, output and productivity – revealed 
at its worst in the historically unprecedented North Indian blackouts of 
2012. Shortages increased demand for coal imports (estimated at 168 
million tonnes and $17 billion in 2014–15 before the shock to demand 
resulting from demonetisation; Cornot-Gandolphe 2016). Illegal coal 
invites both capital flight and unplanned illegitimate overseas investment, 
the opportunity cost of which is the reduction of productive investment 
in India and local opportunities for money laundering. The diversion of 
revenue starves the state of public sector resources and constrains and 
denies the development of a redistributivist development project, which 
the decades-old aspirational politics of Jharkhand has had as its objec-
tive. It has set in carbon a solid structure of economic and political inter-
ests against the destruction of illegal coal.
Consequences for politics
As a result of IC, far from being ethnically aspirational, Jharkhand’s pol-
itics is mired in instability and predation. The powers that might chal-
lenge IC and enforce its regulation are deactivated by the penetration 
throughout local politics of the interests of illegal coal.
In other Indian case studies in this book, the politics of illegal 
resource extraction has been concluded to be a destructive politics of 
mafia criminality (fire in Jharkhand, Chapter 2), predatory, pork barrel 
politics (sand in Tamil Nadu, Chapter 3), a politics of accumulation by 
corruption (hydro-crimes in Arunachal, Chapter 4), systemic plunder 
(airwaves for telecom, Chapter 5), a ‘competitive mafia raj’ and ‘goonda 
raj’ (fuel and sand in UP, Chapter 6), that of internationalised criminal 
capitalism (red sanders timber in AP, Chapter 7), of a mafia state (real 
estate in West Bengal, Chapter 8), and of politicised predation (land and 
property titles in Punjab, Chapter 9).
Far from developing a shadow state whose existence is depend-
ent on formal state institutions (as theorised by Harriss-White in India 
Working, 2003), or being a failed state (as Bihar’s Chief Minister charac-
terised it in 2008; Kumar 2008), in 2014 the Jharkhand state was a highly 
successful mafia state. In its coal economy, legal and illegal, economic 
assemblages and political transactions are systemically interlocked in 
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tangled relations of intreccio. While the mafia are often characterised as 
autonomous from the state,13 here they are an integral part of it, capa-
ble of mediating access to it and ruling large territories – both physical 
and political. While CIL is the nutrient base of its largest operations, 
abandoned public sector mines provide the resources for the smallest 
livelihoods. Meanwhile the politics of identity overlay those of political 
parties and in complex relations of collaboration, evasion and the power 
of assets they bring an order to the class-based criminal economy which 
prevails over that of the state.
Resistance
The powerful hierarchical assemblage of IC must not be accepted as 
undynamic and uncontested. Although resistance was not the central 
focus of field research, the latter can now be used to identify interests 
conflicting with those of IC. These include conflict within the coal mafia 
itself, as well as resistance against the mafia by syndicates, CCW, min-
ing labour, civil society organisations and movements, national political 
parties, the Indian government and its public sector agencies, and by the 
outlawed, officially terrorist Maoist party. Deserving more space than is 
available here, our discussion of conflict in IC can be no more than brief, 
selective and suggestive. First, within the mafia itself there is persistent 
 party-politicised family feuding ‘over business’: property ownership (e.g. 
Singh Mansion) and union control. This congeries of enmity is thought 
to have motivated the killing with three others in March 2017 of Neeraj 
Singh, former Congress deputy mayor of Dhanbad and unsuccessful con-
testant of the Jharia legislative seat. His cousin, successful BJP MLA for 
Jharia and coal transporter Sanjiv Singh, has been arrested, along with 
Sanjiv’s brother. All are from the Suraj Deo Singh, a leading Rajput mafia, 
dynasty (Mishra 2014; Pandey 2017).
In civil society, the alliance of peoples’ movements ranges from the 
National Forum of Forest Peoples and Forest Workers, the local Rajmahal 
Pahar Bachao Andolan and the People’s Union for Democratic Rights to 
religious orders. It is the illegal activities of FC rather than IC that tend to 
mobilise civil society. The case of Sister Valsa, a Catholic nun, economist 
and teacher, murdered in 2011 after years of death threats by forces sus-
pected to be either mafia goons in cahoots with mine operators or alter-
natively Maoists, shows the lengths to which opposition will go to silence 
protest. Land encroachment by mining companies, delays in compensa-
tion and awards of contracts to tribal people reduced by displacement to 
scavenging coal illegally from company convoys have provoked outrage 
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(India Today 2011; Pohkarel and Beckett 2012; India Today 2017). How 
have these tight and yet seething and contested arrangements fared 
under an authoritative/authoritarian BJP regime in the state and cen-
tral government? Ever since 2014, if it had wished to crush IC, the BJP 
has had the necessary precondition of authority. But even when politi-
cal authority dominates legal due process, it is evidently insufficient to 
do more than reinforce local links between the governing party and the 
mafia.
Last, the guerrilla Maoists have aligned their political interests with 
those of ‘rural tribals’ and see the exploitation of coal as the economic 
power base of class enemies. This extends to the paramilitary forces pro-
tecting FC and even to the segment of organised wage labour that works 
on permanent contracts. In practice the Maoists’ need for revenue blunts 
their hostility to IC. Their reputed 7 per cent tax on small mines subcon-
tracted to CIL, on abandoned mines operated by syndicates, and the levies 
on both CIL’s transport and that of IC have caused West Bengal’s journal 
of dissent, Sanhati (2011), to evoke the ‘mafianisation of the Maoists’.
Conclusions: discussion and implications
Discussion
By outlining the assemblages of formal and illegal coal, their interlink-
ages and implications, and revisiting the politics of Jharkhand from the 
perspectives, on the one hand, of the economic interests embodied in 
illegal coal and, on the other, of political parties penetrated by them, 
the wide-reaching social ramifications of natural resource crimes have 
been exposed. Formal-informal-illegal politics and economies are tightly 
intertwined and feed into each other in relations of intreccio which cross 
class, span labour- and party-politics, and penetrate public corporations 
and the range of agencies of enforcement. Here, let us draw together 
some observations from this case that are relevant to wider debates.
First, the coal mafia and violence. As a category, the mafia is used 
for (fictive) kin-based organisations developed for the protection of 
persons and violence against enemies; in being so used it challenges 
the state’s monopoly of violence. By contrast, Jharkhand’s coal mafia 
exercises direct violence against natural resources, and against the 
state’s regulation of them and violations of the property rights which 
protect them. The extortion of natural resources is not always violent 
to  people: its threat alone is enough for most labour to comply with 
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 criminal bosses. The pervasive ‘culture of silence’ constrains that of 
physical violence. Coal traders, syndicates and CCWs do not carry 
weapons. The routinely armed mafia, if attacking people, are mostly 
engaged in  family feuding, mainly about territory.
A second distinctive characteristic of Jharkhand’s coal mafia that is 
relevant to general debates concerns the mafia and labour. The origins 
of apex mafia organisations are heterogeneous, some arising through 
their control over mining labour through trade unions. Indeed the labour 
force in criminal production and distribution of coal also doubles as the 
mafia’s protection force. A third conclusion involves the mafia and reg-
istered business; specifically the extent to which illegal business supple-
ments – and is meshed in – legitimate activity, with the latter being used 
to mask the former. Yet another characteristic is the mafia’s dependence 
on extracting resources from public corporations rather than private 
companies.
We can make further observations concerning the role of local 
political parties. In Jharkhand, parties of social and regional identity or 
developmental aspiration have emerged not only as responses to the past 
neglect of factors used for their mobilisation (caste, ethnicity, regional 
neglect and underdevelopment) but also as a reaction to the political 
spaces created by the rampant criminalisation of natural resource extrac-
tion. Here we see that they are pressured to embody political forces 
contradictory to their social aims: illegal accumulation diverts taxable 
resources from a social development agenda.
Diversity and variation are built into IC assemblages. The balance of 
the social components described earlier and of their powers and roles var-
ies according to the political competence of the regional state-corporate 
subsidiaries of CIL; the heft of local versus national party politicians and 
their positioning in the IC structure; the site and the economic position-
ing of mafia households; the degree of competition or capture of mines 
by national and local labour unions; and the weight of legal business.
Implications
In this case study, the resources needed to cover the periodically convul-
sive and the routine day-to-day costs of Indian electoral democracy have 
been seen to be met (in part) through illegal coal. Coal is but one of many 
illegal nutrient bases for democratic politics. In Jharkhand alone bauxite, 
iron ore, steel and construction also supply political funds. In the differ-
ent case of Tamil Nadu (Jeyaranjan, Chapter 3) the vast sums of daily 
tribute centralised from riverbed sand are supplemented by those from 
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beach sand, granite, liquor and construction. The scale of these criminal 
flows is significant and brings corresponding political influence.
In actively abetting or ignoring this malfeasance, the state’s own 
developmental and distributive projects are captured. The case of coal 
thus leads to a rebalancing of the orthodox political analysis of Jharkhand 
away from redistributive social justice and towards the politics of mafia 
accumulation through extortion and exploitation. The political space for 
redistributivist development activity that might have benefitted the social 
reproduction of the workforce is crushed by lack of resources or of rele-
vance to criminal politics. The workforce has come increasingly under 
criminal control at work and its conditions of reproduction outside work 
are being privatised. The kind of accumulation manifested in IC is the 
subject of wider debate over the balance between the creation of pred-
atory capitalism through primitive accumulation versus expanding the 
production of capital through the axiom of accumulation: ‘Accumulate, 
accumulate! That is Moses and the Prophets’ (Marx 1887; see also Adnan 
2013 for contemporary debates). The case of IC shows that both forms of 
accumulation, primitive and capitalist, are at work in meshed forms and 
in parallel, contradictory and specific ways.
Primitive accumulation will end only when two conditions are met. 
First, sufficient capital will have to have been accumulated to reduce the 
capitalist class’s need for criminal rents; and second, conditions must be 
such that viable states and independent political parties are needed by cap-
ital itself to control criminal rents. But this analysis of illegal coal and the 
other case studies of natural resource crime in this book show that there is 
no guarantee that processes of predatory rent, of criminal accumulation, 
of the undermining of legal-ethical obligations and of the sabotage and dis-
placement of formal state organisational capacity will yield to those from 
legitimate profit-seeking capitalism in the foreseeable future.
Notes
 1. Based on a 22,000-word field report by Nigel Singh in 2014, ‘The Political Economy of the In-
formal and Illegal Coal Trade in Jharkhand’, carried out in the pre-election spring of 2014 and 
building on Singh’s earlier fieldwork in 2012–3, as reported in the Guardian newspaper; see 
Singh 2013. Page references refer to the unpublished 2014 document, where Singh’s detailed 
sources are identified and the quality of evidence is carefully evaluated.
 2. An alternative estimate is INR 1,800 crore ($4bn at 2011 rates) (Press Trust of India 2013).
 3. Singh (2014, 38) provides details of routes where payment is needed.
 4. Family members are said to be shadowed by non-family members so as to evaluate perfor-
mance.
 5. V.P. Sinha in 1977, Suresh Singh in 2013 (Singh 2014, 31 and 34) and Neeraj Singh in 2017.
 6. Uttarakhand, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand in 2000 and Telangana in 2013.
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 7. Maoists, internally split between faction and caste, exact ‘tax’ to ignore mining.
 8. Senior journalist.
 9. Major landowner.
10. Dominant institutions buttressing capital can be distinguished from prominent institutions 
(which may be the same ones) pervading workforce relationships (Hodgson 2001).
11. See Upadhya 2009, for instance, for capital and Harriss-White et al. 2013, for self-employment.
12. Gender which persists as a fundamental structure in the economy undoubtedly plays a role in 
IC but was not the subject of interviews in this research. See Lahiri Dutt 2014, 229–56.
13. See Michelutti’s review in Chapter 6 of this volume.
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Appendix 1.1: Interviewees
Names have not been disclosed, in order to maintain confidentiality of 
sources with inside knowledge of IC and access to mafia.
Journalists: Senior editors and journalists in Ranchi and Dhanbhad 
of Prabhat Khabar; Hindustan Times; Dainik Jagran; Times of India; The 
Pioneer; a local Hindi newspaper stringer, Ramgarh; The Hindu; Reuters 
Bureau Chief, New Delhi.
Academics: Professors at the Indian School of Mines’ Department 
of Management Studies; Centre for Mining and the Environment; and Dr 
Ramesh Sharan, economist, Ranchi University.
Political officials: A BJP Dhanbad senior official with contacts in 
the ‘Singh Mansion’ coal mafia; a senior BJP official for the ECL region; 
an ex-Chief Minister of Jharkhand.
Traders: an established coal trader family; individual coal cycle 
wallahs at an abandoned mine in Ramgarh; a private sector mining con-
tractor, operating in CIL mines; a smaller coal trader, Ranchi.
Coal India: an ex-CIL official in the Dhanbad region; a head of secu-
rity for Central Coal Fields Limited (CCL); a former member of the apex 
Planning Department of CIL; a local trade union official in Ramgarh.
Police: an assistant director general of the Jharkhand police 
force; Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG)e, Hazaribagh, formerly 
Dhanbad, transferred for trying to prosecute coal mafia crime.
Lawyers: Chair of Dhanbad’s Bar Association.
Union leaders, politicians: MLA for Bokaro (JVM), senior leader of 
Dhanbad Coal Karamchari Sangh; potential JVM MLA candidate; senior 
leader (now deceased), a wing of Janata Mazdoor Sangh (JMS), former 
deputy mayor of Dhanbad; senior leader, Bihar Janta Khan Mazdoor Sangh, 
Congress district Secretary; local BMS union representative, Ramgarh.
Others: Bulu Imam, major landowner.
Appendix 1.2  Jharkhand coal union factions influential in illegal coal 
(May 2014)
Faction INTUC Rashtriya Colliery Mazdoor Sangh (RCMS) – 
Rajendra Prasad (R.P.) Singh faction
Party affiliation Congress party
Leader’s official 
position
Joint General Secretary (INTUC); Congress MLA for 
Bermo; Jharkhand Finance Minister, Energy Minister (also 
Welfare)
(Continued)




Transportation – road; activity ‘behind the curtains’ – 
a euphemism for illegal activity conducted within a 
legitimate business; cut of union funds.
R.P. Singh’s son Anup Singh (an aspiring politician, but 
not yet with an MLA seat) is actively involved in this business.
Coal India Ltd. 
subsidiaries
CCL, BCCL, ECL
Notes R.P. and Anup Singh are reported to work closely with Ajay 
and Amit Singh (sons of Suresh Singh; confirmed by others).
However, INTUC leaders are careful not to have 
businesses owned in their name.
INTUC (the national parent organisation) claims 1.16 
lakh members.
Faction INTUC/RCMS – Chandrashekhar ‘Dadai’ Dubey faction 
(General Secretary)
Party affiliation Congress party
Leader’s official 
position
Congress MLA Bishrampur; former Congress MP for 
Dhanbad; MP candidate, Dhanbad 2014 (Trinamool 
Congress); former Jharkhand Minister of Rural 




Road transportation; ‘behind the curtains’ activity; cut of 
union funds
Coal India Ltd. 
subsidiaries
CCL, BCCL, ECL
Notes Leader of a rival RCMS wing – both Singh and Dubey claim 
union leadership.
Dubey stood as Trinamool Congress MP candidate 
2014. Expelled from Congress in April 2014, after he 
criticised party leadership when he was not offered 
Congress’s MP candidacy in Dhanbad.
In March 2014, Dubey accused Chief Minister Hemand 
Soren (JMM) (Congress is their coalition partner) of being 
engaged in illegal mining and the most corrupt Chief 
Minister.
Faction INTUC/RCMS – Mannan Malik wing
Party affiliation Congress party
Leader’s official 
position
Dhanbad MLA (Congress); President, Congress committee 
(Dhanbad)
(Continued)




Transportation – road; activity ‘behind the curtains’ – 
a euphemism for illegal activity conducted within a 
legitimate business; cut of union funds.
Coal India Ltd. 
subsidiaries
CCL, BCCL, ECL
Notes He does not have explicit links to coal mafia families. 
However, his son Hubban Malik is linked to Ranvijay Singh 
(below) who funds Congress.
Faction INTUC/RCMS – Ajay and Amit Singh wing
Party affiliation Congress party
Leaders’ official 
position
No official position in INTUC or RCMS; however, likely 




Transportation; believed to work closely with R.P. Singh 
and Anup Singh (see INTUC/RCMS above). But they do 
not have their own union.
Coal India Ltd. 
subsidiaries
Ajay and Amit Singh’s business is focussed on BCCL; but 
RCMS is also active in CCL, ECL.
Notes Ajay and Amit Singh are sons of Suresh Singh, a major coal 
mafia don murdered in 2011.
Suresh Singh was Congress Treasurer (with close links 
to INTUC) and stood as a Congress MLA candidate in 
Dhanbad twice, losing to Kunti Singh (BJP) from the rival 
Singh Mansion family (below).
Faction Janata Mazdoor Sangh (JMS) (Jharkhand) – affiliate of the 




Joint General Secretary of this wing recognised by the 
Ministry of Coal. Kunti Singh, Jharia MLA, is his mother 
(and widow of Surya Deo (S.D.) Singh, former Dhanbad 
MLA (who established the JMS and family transportation 
business; died 1991).
Indu Singh (Kunti’s sister) is mayor of Dhanbad (Chair 
of Dhanbad Municipal Corporation). S.D.’s other younger 
brother Ramadhir Singh is President/Chair of Ballia zila 
parishad (Uttar Pradesh). The family originate from Ballia.
Alleged ‘parallel’ 
business
Transportation; apparently road only not rail; extortion – 
randari tax.
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Notes Sanjeev Singh (a.k.a. ‘Singh Mansion’) leads this wing in 
rivalry with his uncle Bachcha (see below).
Sanjeev and Ramadhir are accused in the murder of 
Suresh Singh (below).
Neeraj Singh is in his 30s; he has been speaking to 
various parties to find an MLA seat to contest. Neeraj had 
sought a Congress candidacy but was blocked by Congress 
leader R.P. Singh (above, of INTUC).
The Surya Deo/Sanjeev/Bachcha Singh families are rivals 
to the Suresh Singh family; they fund opposing parties.




Ex JDU, RJD; former Jharkhand Minister of Urban 




Transportation; apparently road only not rail; extortion – 
randari tax.
Coal India Ltd. 
subsidiaries
Notes Bachcha Singh – younger brother of S.D. Singh – leads this 
wing together with nephew Neeraj Singh, deputy mayor 
of Dhanbad (Independent). This faction is not officially 
recognised by the Ministry of Coal.
Faction Bihar Janta Khan Mazdoor Sangh (BJKMS) (Jharkhand) – 
led by Ranvijay Singh
Party affiliation Congress party
Leader’s official 
position




Transportation – road and rail; extortion – randari tax.
Coal India Ltd. 
subsidiaries
Mainly BCCL.
Notes Leader Ranvijay Singh is the son of Sukuldev Singh 
(deceased), a cousin of Suresh (see Ajay and Amit Singh 
above), with whom he was once linked but with whose family 
this faction is now in dispute over road and rail transporation. 
Sukuldev was also a rival of the Singh Mansion family and 
was attacked by S.D. Singh in the 1980s for setting up the 
BJKMS (and also INTUC leader S.K. Roy).
(Continued)
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Faction United Coal Workers Union (UCWU) (AITUC affiliated) 
(Jharkhand)
Party affiliation JVM (de facto)
Leader’s official 
position
Dhulu Mahato, Bhagmara MLA (JVM), is effectively leader 
(with no official title). UCWU is Dhulu Mahato’s personal 
power base. But General Secretary is Lakhanlal Mahato.
Dhulu Mahato is the biggest funder of the JVM (led by 
ex-Chief Minister Babulal Marandi). Dhulu claims to fight 
against established mafia interests on behalf of workers.
As UCWU is AITUC affiliated, Dhulu will also have links 
to CPI(M) leaders and AITUC General Secretary Gurudas 




Transportation (major scale). Road. Not clear yet if he is in 
rail; extortion – randari tax
Coal India Ltd. 
subsidiaries
BCCL: Dhulu Mahato is believed to control a third of BCCL 
mines. Powerful in Bhagmara and Katras pockets.
Notes Dhulu Mahato was originally in AJSU (before joining JVM). 
He also worked in Samresh Singh’s union DCKS where he set 
up Tiger Force (an organised youth gang used to intimidate 
management, used in workers’ protests). At this time, Dhulu 
was in AJSU. He then left DCKS and AJSU and joined JVM.
He is also believed to have originally been employed 
by Suresh Singh to help run his rail business smoothly (as 
Dhulu has good relations with OBC and ST groups; dubbed 
‘localites’).





Bokaro MLA (JVM); former minister in Babulal Marandi’s 
government, 2002/3.
Contested Dhanbad constituency Lok Sabha election 
2014 (JVM). Long-standing trade union leader who has 




Transportation (but on a much smaller scale). Road not 
rail.
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Notes DCKS is a small union which set up Tiger Force with Dhulu 
Mahato. 
Dhulu broke away to organise the United Coal Workers 
Union (he is also JVM affiliated).








No major ‘parallel’ business – but leaders may make small 
profits on the side.
Coal India Ltd. 
subsidiaries
Notes Little power in Jharkhand.
Faction Bihar Colliery Kamgarh Union (BCKU) – CITU affiliated, 




Founder, veteran Left union leader A.K. Roy, was Dhanbad 




No major ‘parallel’ business. Roy had a reputation for being 
upright (though ISM’s union specialist Pramod Patak says he 
too may have made profits).
Coal India Ltd. 
subsidiaries
BCCL; some parts of ECL (that are nearer Dhanbad/Jharia)
Notes Roy fought the three Singh families (above) and had good 




Jharia’s century-old fire kept ablaze 
by crime and politics
Smita Gupta1
In a sequel to Chapter 1 on coal, this chapter addresses the ‘negative exter-
nality’ of fire, showing how fire has become an essential input to the expan-
sion of il/legal coal mining. It focusses on the damaging consequences of a 
century of unplanned, illegally negligent and dangerous mining, of sand 
for stowage stolen and black-marketed by the coal mafia in collusion with 
public corporations, of criminal pollution and lately of the surfacing of 
subterranean fire laying siege to Jharia town and its region. While three 
separate planning organisations are responsible for rehabilitation and 
resettlement, victims of the fiery threat to habitats and livelihoods are 
progressively and illegally disenfranchised by procrastinating state agen-
cies. Some have been forcibly evicted. The irony that many disenfranchised 
workers are forced by lack of alternatives to scavenge coal illegally is not 
lost. The assemblage of fire includes complicitous trade unions, all political 
parties which benefit through illegal funds, officials in public corporations 
and government departments, the coal-fire mafia, criminal protection 
forces and illegal workforces. The fluidity of the fire assemblage stems in 
part from egregious conflicts of interest: between the coal-fire mafia, which 
accumulates through the destruction of coal; between labour contractors 
for public sector fire-fighting and sand-stowing who are also coal mafia; 
between compromised leaders of labour unions and exploitive interests 
of the coal-fire mafia; between national interests in eviction for capital- 
intensive opencast mining and local mafia interests in corralling a desper-
ate labour force atop the fire for hazardous coal extraction and pilferage. 
The politicisation of criminal organisations and of labour and the crimi-
nal entwining of labour politics with party politics combine to make fire-
crimes an exemplary case of intreccio.
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Introduction: a town sitting atop a burning inferno
In the twenty-first century, the 100-year-old smouldering underground 
mine fire in the Dhanbad-Jharia coalfield started to erupt at the surface 
in the settlements of coal miners. Several single-storey houses around 
the colliery developed cracks. The main roads and highways developed 
fissures, as did the railway lines. The Director General of Mines Safety 
(DGMS) in the state corporation, Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (BCCL), the 
Jharkhand state government and the private mining companies have all 
failed to undertake protective and remedial measures, and now the fire 
has spread under the old town. This chapter explores the nexus of eco-
nomic criminal interests and politics that perpetuates the fires, shapes 
their ‘deregulation’ and subverts the state’s responses to their victims.
Jharia (in Dhanbad district, Jharkhand) lies in the mineral-rich 
Damodar river valley covering a total area of 435 km2, and is the repos-
itory of most of India’s coal, copper, iron ore and uranium reserves. 
Industrial underground coal mining started here in the second half of 
the nineteenth century, after which both steel manufacturing and power 
generation became important economic activities. The town has a pop-
ulation of one million people; almost half live on top of the century-old 
fire and around three-quarters are affected by it. In the Jharia coalfields, 
there are about 110 official coal mines and reportedly a similar number 
of unofficial or illegal mines. They are India’s chief source of coking coal, 
essential for steel production (see Chapter 1).
Coal India Ltd. (CIL) increasingly outsources entire opencast 
mines to multinational companies and companies previously only 
engaged in transport and logistics. Opencast production conditions 
have allowed the intensive exploitation of both coal and labour: and 
most private investment is in dynamite-blasting, heavy earth-moving 
machinery (HEMM), mechanical diggers and dumpers and trucks – 
most of which are discrete parts of the production process and easily 
outsourced. As a result of opencast mining, coal production by Coal 
India Ltd. doubled between 1991 and 2010, even as underground 
production fell. Companies that have leased mines from BCCL have 
vested interests: first, in ever-faster extraction of coal, ostensibly to 
‘dig out the fire and save the coal’; and second, in the fire spreading 
beyond officially allocated seams/areas so that they can expand open-
cast mining operations under the guise of emergency fire-fighting. 
Profit lies in more fires, not fewer.
The Jharia coalfield has over 40 workable coal seams. Unlike else-
where in the world, here the upper seams have far superior quality coal, 
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and the seams below the eighth level contain medium to non-coking coal. 
This natural bounty has proved to be Jharia’s ecological undoing since it 
has meant cheap and quick extraction of quality coal from a spread-out 
area, converting the entire landscape into a large scarred coal mine, and 
displacing and impoverishing local people. The shaft and gallery under-
ground mines are raided illegally. Very few are run legally by the Tatas and 
BCCL, and BCCL runs at a loss. The diversity of coal deposits means that 
mining can be undertaken and coal transported at widely differing scales, 
under property regimes and labour relations ranging from primitive tools 
to large-scale, industrial mechanised mining technology and relentless 
labour exploitation – and including a range of illegal activity ranging from 
petty theft from tailings to the grand theft of full rail wagons (Chapter 1).
In this chapter we will explain how the nexus between politics and 
economic crime violates policies for both fire-fighting and fire prevention on 
the one hand and policies for resettlement and rehabilitation on the other. 
Collaborator trade unions enforce this criminal economy of fire and gener-
ate a new impetus for political parties to control these trade unions. This 
account results from a stakeholder approach to field research over a period 
of several months in 2015–16 following up a nine-member fact-finding polit-
ical and legal study of the fire and the processes of rehab and resettlement 
carried out in 2013 (Communist Party of India (Marxist) 2013). The second 
phase of field research focussed on the distinctive politics of fire. As in the 
first report, evidence was provided by residents, coal corporation and local 
government officials, community leaders and union members, scientists and 
experts. Sources have not been identified for security reasons unless permis-
sion was given or the comment is in the public domain.
The history and anatomy of coal fires
‘Jharia district has been an epitome of unplanned, unscientific mining 
since the first mine opened in 1894, and we have been paying the price 
ever since’ (T.N. Singh, former director of the Central Mining Research 
Institute, Dhanbad). Mining in Jharia started in 1894 and the first coal 
mine fire was reported in 1916. By 1972, there were about 70 active 
fires spread over 17 km2, affecting half of Jharia’s 90 mines/collieries. 
Landslides and subsidence are common, covering about 35 km2 in this 
coalfield alone. BCCL’s preference for opencast and slaughter mining 
methods meant that pits were dug near the abandoned underground 
mines,2 which are a labyrinth of open corridors previously occupied by 
coal seams standing on coal pillars. When oxygen enters from the air 
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above, it causes spontaneous combustion in deserted mines. Such fires 
have high ecological and economic costs, burning away a non-renewable 
and vital energy resource.
The fires contain highly poisonous gases such as carbon monoxide 
and carbon dioxide, methane, nitrogen oxides and sulphur, and other 
particulate matter. Not only do these cause underground explosions 
and land subsidence, they also contribute to cancers and respiratory dis-
eases (Finkelman 2004). Atmospheric effects include local temperature 
increases and, through methane, CO2 and radiative forcing, contribute to 
global warming (Chikkalur, Sagar and Sankar 2009). Groundwater lev-
els are falling continually as, due to mining, the aquifers are disturbed 
and their yield is significantly reduced. Water is contaminated and acid-
ifies due to the leaching by sulphur present in coal. Land degradation 
from the open pits, the overburden and the fires combine to inhibit plant 
life. The fire surrounds Jharia town on three sides and has entered the 
city in several places. In 1979, a committee chaired by Mr S.P. Gugnani, 
Joint Secretary in the Department of Coal, observed that:
the gigantic and multifarious subsidence problems in Jharia 
Coalfield was caused due to existence of old workings with full 
height extraction and wide galleries, multi-seam and multi-section 
development under shallow depths, existence of developed seams 
under extracted lower seam with stowing, etc. There are many 
towns, villages, rivers, roads, railway line etc., in Jharia Coalfield 
which are standing over small pillars/stooks reported to be water 
logged. If, by any chance, this water drains away it may cause sub-
sidence. In addition, fire is also active in some areas, causing dan-
ger to the surface structure. In many mines, size of pillars, which 
were left below the surface structures as a protective measure, is 
not known because of non-availability of off-set plans of abandoned 
workings. (Bharat Coking Coal Limited 2008)
The prevention and proliferation of fire
However, while BCCL attributes responsibility for fires to old work-
ings or mining prior to nationalisation, it is no small irony that many 
of the well-known measures for preventing and controlling fires in coal 
mines have been developed by, and established in, India. These include 
hydraulic sand-stowing of hollow mines; blind-flushing with fly ash and 
grout; injecting inert gases, such as nitrogen, into cavities; isolating 
affected areas by trenching, grout barriers and back filling; surface 
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sealing and blanking, etc. And yet their implementation is extremely 
lax, with only 10 fires controlled since 2008 according to available data 
(Raju et al. 2016). Meanwhile, the central government corporation, the 
largest coal company in the world, Coal India, and its subsidiaries and 
subcontractors are pursuing the task of extracting the coal faster than the 
fire spreads, which officials admit off the record is not possible. By 2002, 
on paper, BCCL had apparently filled the burning mines with 50 million 
tonnes of sand. Most experts (including BCCL officials themselves) agree 
that less than 20 per cent of this sand was actually brought to the affected 
mines and put in the pits. This is because the contracts for sand stow-
ing were given to the same criminal organisations, known as the mafia 
(see Chapter 1), which controlled coal transport, trade unions, etc. False 
invoicing, fraudulent certification by DGMS and continued production 
by BCCL meant that about 80 per cent of the sand was shown on paper 
and paid for, but never used. This ‘sand scam’ earned millions for the coal 
mafia and was widely reported by newspapers and journalists (see Daniel 
and Williams 2013). Thus, the coal mafia and the BCCL officials worked 
openly and collaboratively: the mafia was even referred to as another 
BCCL ‘department’ since it not only regulated fire and sand but was also 
mobilised to break workers’ movements and to lock the workforce work-
ing for state corporations into the debt and penury to be discussed below.
By the early 1990s, these fires had burnt an estimated 42 million 
tonnes of coking coal. Still, about 7,000 million tonnes of coal reserves are 
under different surface properties and around another 1,800 million are 
jammed under fires. Opencast mining is offered as the solution to  control 
and ‘dig out the fire’ and the coal but, paradoxically, this fire-fighting 
measure sets previously unaffected areas on fire. Another solution that 
had been found feasible in certain circumstances was the rapid digging 
of trenches that were non-combustible. In 2009, this practice was sub- 
contracted to two agencies that were engaged in illegal mining and, 
according to a journalist, ‘had a vested interest in the fire jumping the 
trench’. The trench-digging was so deliberately slow and erratic that once 
again the solution became the problem and the fire jumped the barrier as 
oxygen spread to hitherto unexposed seams.
Non-enforcement and violations by state agencies
The coal mines regulations and the systematic support rules require that 
the cavities formed after the extraction of coal be immediately filled with 
a mixture of sand, water and fire-retardant chemicals to avoid damage 
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to the surface area and prevent subsidence; however, these rules and 
regulations have never been enforced by the Director General of Mine 
Safety (DGMS). Even at the time of nationalisation, certificates of the 
mines’ ‘good health’ were alleged to have been issued without verifica-
tion, via political pressure and monetary ‘gifts’. In the past two decades, 
since the spread of fire has assumed catastrophic proportions, the DGMS 
has served several ‘show cause’ notices to BCCL for non-compliance with 
fire regulations. In the mid-2000s, it even recommended a total ban on 
mining, pending compliance. This was not accepted. Clearly, ‘(t)he stum-
bling block in controlling fire is not lack of technology, but the incompe-
tence of BCCL itself’.3
As per the law, no mining can take place at or below the surface 
within 50 metres of a highway or railway track; therefore, the under-
ground mining by BCCL under and close to the highways and railway 
lines is a blatant violation. A letter from the chair of the railway board to 
the Secretary of the Ministry of Coal, dated 5 April 2002, charges BCCL 
with undercutting the safety and stability of railway lines in the area by 
‘indiscriminate mining without following safety provisions stipulated 
by the Directorate-General of Mine Safety’ (quoted in Sethi 2006). In 
response, BCCL asked the railways to hand over the Dhanbad–Pathardih 
railway line on lease, wanting the 182.27 acres below the rail-line in 
order to dig out the fire, mine the coal and expand hydraulic sand stow-
ing. To quote a BCCL manager in the field: ‘of course it is a violation, but 
the coal below the railway line was of high quality’. The railway board fell 
in line and leased the land to BCCL for 15 years.
Regulative shift: from stabilising fires to mass displacement 
of selected victims
In 1979, a committee headed by Mr S.P. Gugnani in India’s Department 
of Coal examined the safety of people living over underground work-
ings. It determined the policy formally implemented until 2005. This 
comprised three inter-related but distinct strategies: i) fire- fighting 
measures to douse and cut off the fires; ii) stabilisation of old workings 
to repair and halt fires and subsidence in controllable areas; and iii) 
evacuation and rehabilitation of inhabitants in uncontrollable ones. 
BCCL’s 2005 Master Plan for Dealing with Fire, Subsidence and Rehabil-
itation in the Leasehold of BCCL (updated in March 2008) changed the 
Gugnani approach. ‘The final and permanent solution is evacuation 
of the affected area and rehabilitation’ (BCCL 2008, 17), it specified, 
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doing away with the distinction between controllable and uncontrolla-
ble areas in inhabited subsidence-prone unstable areas; people would 
henceforth be evacuated irrespective of the degree of control. This 
reversed the government’s stand in the supreme court. The supreme 
court order dated 16 January 2008 stated:
(a)s regards fires and subsidence of earth in the mining areas, two 
reports have been filed by the Committee appointed by this Court … 
It is pointed out by the learned Amicus Curiae that no serious steps 
have been taken either for rehabilitation of the residents of the affected 
area or for controlling the fires in these areas … many a time the reme-
dial measures are not taken and whatever action is taken so far, are 
not sufficient. (Jharkhand High Court 2011, emphasis added)
According to a field interview with Ashok Aggarwal of Jharia Bachao 
Samiti:
Very little was actually done by way of mitigation and redress. The 
fires are purposely not being put out by BCCL. They want the fire 
to spread. All political parties are united on this, because the ille-
gal mining that is facilitated and even accelerated by the fire funds 
parties in their elections and in feeding their foot soldiers, not to 
mention in affording luxurious lifestyles. It is no surprise that the 
entire political class wants the fires to spread. The situation was 
deliberately allowed to escalate and then it was very easy for the 
authorities to throw up their hands and declare that the situation is 
now out of control!
G.K. Bakshi of CITU too is of the view that BCCL did this because their 
interests (plus those of the private companies to which the mining is 
outsourced) lie in letting the fires burn. Opencast mining is BCCL’s pre-
ferred mining technique, but laws relating to forests, land acquisition 
and public infrastructure have to be complied with in order to move into 
new coal-bearing territories. An array of squatters, occupiers, tenants, 
owners, workers, residents, panchayats, etc., has several types of rights 
on these lands, whose claims have to be addressed through due process. 
Only in an emergency and life-threatening situation can the state exer-
cise extraordinary powers, on ‘humanitarian’ grounds, to bypass due 
process and forcibly evict people without proper resettlement and reha-
bilitation. One of the ‘humanitarian’ procedures is even more aggressive 
coal mining. The fire is the perfect fait accompli and coal mining is both 
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the cause and effect in this pursuit of profit. Where a fire does not cre-
ate a sufficiently hazardous situation or the inhabitants prove to be more 
stubborn, and when all else fails, the police have been used to forcibly 
remove the residents – a measure justified as combining their immedi-
ate survival interests with the national interest (Gupta 2013). The BCCL 
chief managing director has declared that ‘the fire is being dealt through 
engaging hired Heavy Earth Moving Machinery and coal thus released is 
being mined and sold’.4
Contractors are recruited from coal mafia families, other private com-
panies and family members of politicians from all the mainstream political 
parties, and BCCL has regularly outsourced several operations, includ-
ing fire-fighting, to them. Of course, the central governing party (which 
controlled the Coal Ministry and BCCL) also captures contracts but it has 
been tactically important not to alienate the opposition excessively and to 
distribute some contracts to them in order to ensure their complicity. As 
the mining technology shifted towards highly mechanised HEMM-based 
opencast mining, which required far less investment, the fire provided the 
golden opportunity to hand out ‘fire-fighting’ excavation contracts that 
were nothing but an excuse to bypass all procedures and rules and award 
de facto coal mining rights. This becomes clear from an analysis of some of 
the recent contracts that have been awarded for ‘excavating the fire’.
The Dhanbad coal-fire mafia has developed a nexus of interests with 
politicians, officials, owners of industries and leaders of trade unions 
which is the stuff of Indian legends: Bollywood cinema publicly depicts 
the blurring of lines between law, law enforcement and crime – to which 
the public at large acquiesce.5 Relationships have developed complexity 
and the ‘politicisation of criminals’ is perhaps now as relevant a concept 
as the ‘criminalisation of politics’ (National Commission to Review the 
Working of the Constitution 2001).
The coal-fire mafia: a product of ‘nationalisation’
After the mines were nationalised, the mine owners were replaced by a 
criminal class complicit with BCCL. It is this mafia that is responsible for 
perpetuating the fires. Some pre-existing private mines, escaping take-
over through bribes and influence, continued as illegal entities. The coal 
mafia took over as contractors and managers of these illegal mines, and 
acted as a combination of jobber-labour-overseer-foreman-trade union 
leader in the legal BCCL mines (Sanhati 2011). The mafia took over con-
tracts in three areas – labour, transport and sand stowing – with transport 
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contracts serving as a facilitator both for illegal coal mining and for the 
fudging of sand transport records, overstating the volume of sand actu-
ally carried to the mines. The impact of this on the fire was disastrous: 
fire-proofing happened only on paper. In many instances, the top strata 
of this mafia came from a section of the coal industry’s trade union lead-
ership, operating through regional allegiances and caste dominance to 
 preserve its authority. Local Bhumihar and Rajput dons set up armed 
gangs and trade unions of people from their areas and castes. Trade 
unionists say that it is extremely difficult – near impossible – in many 
parts of Dhanbad for authentic trade union work to break through these 
caste and regional ties cemented by loans, employment and other forms of 
patronage. In turn, the mafia helped corrupt BCCL officials to amass huge 
illegal wealth in return for ignoring the non-execution of fire-prevention/
fighting measures, says S.K. Bakshi, a prominent CITU leader, in an inter-
view with the author: ‘Huge contracts were given by BCCL to companies 
set up by Suraj Deo Singh and his family to fill up abandoned mines with 
sand. The fire spread because management turned a blind eye.’ The theft, 
diversion and trade of coal on the black market, overstated and fabricated 
fire- preventive/fire-fighting operations and transport costs, and fraudu-
lent labour contracts and muster rolls all occurred through what has been 
called the ‘usurpation of the state’ (Bharti 1989).
Labour politics then fed party politics. One retired bureaucrat reported 
facing great political pressure in the 1990s when he tried to push the 
Dhanbad administration to inspect trucks operating late at night or before 
dawn to check if they were laden with sand to fill the mines or instead 
with stolen coal. He said, ‘Party leaders are nothing but gang leaders. They 
ensured that men of their ilk were elected to local bodies, the state legislature 
and Parliament.’ He explained that the secret annexures to the still-classified 
Vohra Committee Report, set up by the Ministry of Home Affairs in 1993 
to examine the functioning of criminal syndicates/mafia organisations and 
their links with government officials and political leaders, contained incon-
trovertible evidence against several Dhanbad politicians and bureaucrats on 
how they ‘set the city on fire’. He reported that secret logs maintained by 
two corrupt railway employees showed that about twice the amount of coal 
accounted for left Dhanbad daily, only to vanish en route at an unscheduled 
stop in the forest. ‘All this coal was being dug up in the name of digging out 
the fire, no records are being kept of quantities in the name of urgency. The 
fire is a Godsend for these vultures.’ The spread and intensity of hazardous 
mining expanded and with it, inevitably, the fire spread – as did indiscrimi-
nate opencast mining, ostensibly to dig out the fire.
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Fire and safety: the coal-fire mafia and trade union interventions
History bears witness to the severe brutality of class struggle against 
the labour movements in mining areas (Simeon 1996). For this very 
reason, trade unions have tended to be caught in a political paradox; 
both are vehicles of the class struggle as well as its biggest antagonists. 
In the case of Dhanbad, a powerful section has been co-opted, devel-
oping into the foundation and organising principle of the mafia. This 
has meant the loss of an important institution for democratic rights 
mobilisation and struggle. The undermining of workplace safety 
through the crushing of genuine trade unions and the complicity of 
the mafia-unions have also fanned the fires. The All India Trade Union 
Confederation (AITUC) and its later offshoot Confederation of Indian 
Trade Unions (CITU) represent the communist trade unions active in 
the area since the onset of mining. By the late 1960s, the ultra-left 
Maoist-Leninist trade unions also became active with the ascendancy 
of Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union (BCKU) led by A.K. Roy. On the other 
side of the party political spectrum, the All India Trade Union Con-
gress (INTUC), the Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS), affiliated respec-
tively to the centrist Congress and right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP), and the Janata Mazdoor Sangh (JMS) union, affiliated to the 
self-acclaimed ‘socialist’ (not communist)6 mafia, viewed their mem-
bers as tools in this economic and political fight to accumulate money 
and power, through collaboration with mine management. Mafia 
dons like V.P. Sinha, Suraj Deo Singh and Suresh Singh combined 
party politics, trade union and mafia activities. As class collaborators, 
they became the natural enemies of the leftist trade unions, killing 
many of their leaders. The most crucial linkage between the mafia 
and coal mining was through the labour contractors. In the classic 
pattern of jobbers, credit played an important role in contracts linking 
the money-lender, the labour contractor and the trade union leader. 
At the mine offices when wages were disbursed, the mafiosi ensured 
compulsory monetary extractions from the workers. Members of the 
mafia also ran gambling and liquor dens, further skimming workers’ 
wages. The mafia controlled trade unions and used agitational tools 
such as the gherao, lightning strikes and demonstrations as real or 
potential threats to extort protection money from illegal mine own-
ers and the public sector undertakings (PSU). Besides being victims 
of such extortion, managers of BCCL also used these selfsame trade 
union leaders to discipline troublemakers.
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Thus, workers had to face hostilities from the growing coal mafia. 
A.K. Roy then provided the workers with an organisation to defend them-
selves.7 Vehemently opposed by the mining management and the collab-
orator trade unions, his was one of the few trade unions that raised the 
issue of industrial safety and hazardous mining. After the Emergency in 
the mid-1970s,8 the ‘mafia dons’ decided to become politicians – initiat-
ing the process of ‘politicisation of criminals’ in this region. The mafia 
realised that bribery alone was not enough to influence state policies 
in their favour; elected representatives also often failed to protect them 
adequately. Therefore, they needed to enter legislative institutions 
directly; this also legitimised and reinforced their power through immu-
nity. For example, while being a mafia don, Suraj Deo Singh (from 1977 
to his death in 1991) and after him his widow Kunthi Singh (from 2004 
to 2014) were legislators. His strong links with socialist politicians like 
Jaiprakash Narain and Chandrashekhar, the former Prime Minister of 
India (also from Balia district in UP), helped (Iqbal 2012; Kalbag 2013). 
The infiltration of the socialist parties by criminals and local strongmen 
accelerated as the fortunes of the Indian National Congress faded after 
the Emergency, a phenomenon that continues to this day.
A.K. Roy then had to respond and first successfully defeated these 
hostile forces in the Bihar assembly elections in 1967. The BCKU entered 
electoral politics as the Marxist Coordination Committee (MCC) and 
such was Roy’s appeal that he was elected MLA while being incarcerated 
during the Emergency. He represented Dhanbad three times, each in the 
Lok Sabha and the Vidhan Sabha, and started losing only after liberalisa-
tion, in 1991. After Suraj Deo Singh died, many of his clan occupied pub-
lic offices, in recent times mostly contesting on BJP tickets. The mayor 
and deputy mayor of the city are presently drawn from feuding factions 
of the family, as are the MLAs from Dhanbad and the adjoining Bokaro 
region. Two family members contested the Jharia assembly seat in the 
2014 elections, one on a BJP ticket and the other from the Congress. 
Such extensive party-political penetration affects both the extent of the 
fires and the safety of mining conditions.
The politics of fires and mine accidents
A senior serving officer in the safety watchdog the Directorate General of 
Mines Safety (DGMS) told me in January 2016 that ‘safety was not at all a 
concern for BCCL and CIL and there have been too many accidents in the 
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coalfields’. The same factors that led to the unmitigated spread of the fire 
also generate a large number of mining accidents in Jharia: unscientific 
mining compounded by institutional and political collusion to compro-
mise safety. The undermining of trade unions destroyed this important 
watchdog role. The DGMS official commented:
(A)fter nationalisation and under the mafia regime, DGMS com-
pletely surrendered and abdicated from its watchdog and regu-
latory role. Even though CIL and its subsidiary gave orders worth 
crores of rupees for safety equipment, gear and interventions, these 
were through contractors and sub-contractors, which were mostly 
controlled by the mafia. Little or nothing was done.
The other reason why safety is undermined is economic – not only the 
desire for increased private income streams but also concerns for pro-
duction ‘efficiency’. Meeting production targets has meant initiating 
cost-cutting measures, the increasingly hazardous mining of previous 
workings or mines adjacent to abandoned workings, and reckless open-
cast or slaughter mining. Safety norms such as the mandatory thickness 
of barriers between water bodies are then ignored. Abandoned water-
logged mines are not maintained, air pockets are not tested and seepage 
is neglected. The Bagdigi colliery disaster in February 2001, which killed 
29 people, was caused during the pursuit of a 60,000-tonne shortfall in 
the 1.8 lakh-tonne annual target. The compulsory 60-metre barrier that 
separated Bagdigi from the waterlogged abandoned Jairampur mine had 
been breached. Workers’ lives are given the lowest priority: most work-
ers are not recorded, nor are most accidental deaths. However, the trade 
unions cannot escape some of the responsibility for lack of safe working 
conditions since there is a mandatory tripartite safety committee made 
up of representatives from trade unions, the BCCL management and cen-
tral government. Yet this does not meet regularly; often no meetings are 
held for years.
Charred by underground fires: the Bagdigi, Bhatdih and Sugamdih 
explosions revisited
If the failure to prevent mining accidents is investigated further, crim-
inal reasons why fires continue unabated are revealed. After flood-
ing, the second most pervasive cause of accidents and loss of life 
is explosions. Fires cause underground roofs to collapse due to the 
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accumulation of methane and coal dust – as happened in the New Ken-
dra colliery where 55 miners were killed in January 1994. ‘The impor-
tant reasons for explosions include the absence of fire stoppings; the 
absence of mechanical ventilators in fire-affected seams; the use of 
open lamps rather than safety lamps; overly thin and un-maintained 
strata between the seams… Methane accumulation can be controlled 
through three measures – ventilation, safety lamps and methano- 
metres and, most importantly, hydraulic sand-stowing of used mining 
channels. Further, the coal-air suspension, which makes the methane 
even more lethal, needs constantly to be settled with water spray-
ing’, according to a geologist at the Indian School of Mines, Dhanbad 
(interviewed in December 2015). There is abysmal managerial and 
regulatory failure in this regard. ‘It is a real scam. The management 
basically manufactures a roof collapse at the opening of the channel 
and seals it with sand, for show. The tunnels are in fact empty spaces 
which collect methane. I am convinced that this inadequate stowing 
and sealing is the cause of the Bhatdih and many other explosions,’ 
said a CITU leader, speaking in 2016 about the 50 miners killed in a 
September 2006 accident in Bhatdih. He said
The actual trigger was probably an electric spark caused by old 
wiring which had remained unattended for three decades… The 
Bhatdih colliery management was using a dangerous explosive 
in an inadequately ventilated, un-stowed, third-degree gassy 
mine with poorly-maintained electric cables and full of the 
highly volatile and combustible methane and coal dust. Is there 
any doubt that this accident is man-made, like the fire in the 
Jharia coalfields?
Brinda Karat, a former member of parliament who repeatedly raised the 
issue at the central and state government levels, observed:
All agencies – BCCL, CCL as the mine owners, DGMS as the regu-
latory authority and the central government (which is entrusted 
with mine safety under the constitutional division of responsi-
bilities) – have abdicated their responsibility. The mafia and its 
collaborator unions not only terrorised the city for profit and 
power, but also enforced the management’s lackadaisical cul-
ture and cost-saving practices threatening workplace safety and 
workers’ lives. The same factors that cause accidents also spread 
the fire.
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Fire and the illegal coal economy
Quite apart from the fact that illegal coal accounts for about 20 per cent 
of the total annual output (by the government’s own admission) (India 
Environment Portal, n.d.) and feeds the accumulation trajectories and 
political might of a few people, it is, as explained in Chapter 1, a very 
important source of livelihood for thousands of working-class families. 
Coal is used as energy by thousands of small informal businesses that do 
not qualify for coal from official sources. Although those on the lowest 
rung of the pyramid earn a pittance, it is nonetheless an important alter-
native to the retrenchments and lost jobs after neoliberal labour reforms 
and mechanisation.
Chapter 1 describes the four major forms taken by the illegal coal 
sector in Jharia.9 Two further aspects shape the nature of the criminality 
of fire: first, the underlying labour relations – distinguishing hired labour-
based employment from family labour-based self-employment; and sec-
ond, the stage dominated by illegal activity – production or distribution.
To consider the first of these, labour relations, an estimated 100 
mines are sites of unauthorised or unregulated mining managed by 
powerful politicians-businessmen using hired labour. Unscientifically 
and unsafely exploited, these mines accelerate the spread of fire. In 
such sites the poorest self-employed workers and their unpaid family 
labour also scavenge for coal, bribing law enforcement officers and, 
at the same time, being victimised by them. Their collection grounds 
include the hazardous abandoned underground shafts, fire-affected 
subsidence holes, parked lorries, railway sidings and wagons and open-
cast mines. A huge number, they are victims of the fire as oustees and 
are subject to hazardous labour processes. Many retrenched workers 
displaced from the fire-affected areas have taken up scavenging to sub-
sist. At abandoned burning mines in Jharia, men, women and even 
children scavenge daily to sell their pickings on the local market. Since 
coal scavenging is their main source of income, any relocation which 
does not afford alternative livelihoods will be met with resistance. In 
Boka Pahari and many other similar settlements, thousands of people 
live over blazing coal fires and earn a fraction of the minimum wage. 
Not only is this activity physically dangerous – constant exposure to the 
threat of accidents, inhaling poisonous gases – it is also regarded by 
law enforcement agencies as trespassing. Facing disciplinary measures 
from mine companies and enforcement agencies, scavengers and coal 
cycle wallahs are forced to pay a share of their labour as bribes to police 
officers and other mining officials.
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In the second aspect, whether it is production or distribution 
in which illegality predominates, we can locate cases where coal is 
diverted by the legal owner or leaseholder, with the help of transport-
ers and hired labour, from its specified purpose to other uses, such 
as brick kilns. BCCL managers responsible for monitoring are mostly 
complicit but plead helplessness given the political clout of the mine 
owners and other coal traders and mafia involved. The theft of coal in 
transit – from trucks and railway wagons, by organised gangs hiring 
groups of foot soldiers (with the collusion of railway and other gov-
ernment functionaries) – supplies illegal coal for traders and for the 
dominant mafia.
Fire provides the justification and the smokescreen behind which 
these illegal activities occur. Fire creates hazardous workplaces and is, 
in turn, created by unscientific and unsafe techniques. Illegal mines con-
tribute further to the spread of fire to new areas since no precautions 
are taken and explosions are common. Such mines include a whole 
range of enterprises – from small-scale village mining with primitive 
equipment to highly organised, large-scale and semi- mechanised mines 
employing hundreds of workers, in connivance with CIL. We found 
instances where the same mine was operated illegally and legally, such 
as in Basra where 25 local brick kilns purchase the illegal coal mined 
from the 10-foot upper seam, while the lower layer is mined by CIL. 
Often, mines which are considered unremunerative for working by CIL 
at its regulated wage and safety standards are informally transferred 
to the highly unsafe, labour-intensive and low-paid but more profitable 
illegal realm, through the labour mafia. The hallmark of these mines is 
their low safety standards, which cause deaths and fires – both unre-
corded. So, a large part of the local workforce, especially in rural areas, 
is absorbed into these hazardous and underpaid illegal activities. ‘No 
political party that is interested in winning elections will ever suggest 
the closure of these illegal mines’, said a senior journalist in January 
2016.
Eviction, resettlement and rehabilitation (R&R)
Despite the long history of the fire and the several committees and 
enquiries that have been set up to address it, and despite their rec-
ommendations (which embodied more or less the same approach 
of combining fire control and stabilisation, with recourse to human 
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resettlement only where land stabilisation was impossible), very little 
has been done by way of mitigation and redress. As with fire, so with 
rehabilitation: the law is frequently broken. Once the situation had 
been deliberately allowed to develop uncontrolled, the authorities 
evaded responsibility for its outcome. Both the central government 
and CIL/BCCL have evaded liability for R&R as conceived in the law 
and policy.
The evasion of liability for R&R by CIL and the Indian government
In India, the legal right to resettlement and rehabilitation for project-af-
fected persons was not recognised by law until 2013, and was guided 
mostly by policies from different ministries: railways, highways, etc. To 
a large extent, access to the process of rehabilitation was the outcome 
of political or popular mass movements against displacement. As an out-
come of such political resistance, Coal India Ltd. also introduced a policy 
to address the R&R of people affected by mining. However, over time, 
coverage and entitlements narrowed.
R&R entitlements of workers
Even though they may have been working the mines for years, and some-
times decades, BCCL employees find their rights constantly violated since 
they are designated by BCCL as ‘contract workers’ bound to contractors 
engaged in ‘work of a temporary and peripheral nature’. Several courts 
have ruled this to be a ‘sham and bogus’ practice, and have decreed that 
long-term workers should be treated as direct employees of the company 
since the work is evidently of a perennial and permanent nature.10 Under 
the Mines Act 1952 (periodically amended), all these unorganised sec-
tor contract workers would be designated as ‘employed in a mine’ with 
full liability borne by the ‘mine owner’. This early definition of eligibil-
ity included all forms of labour, employment and management, with lit-
tle scope for mischievous interpretation and misuse. In fact, the Mines 
(Amendment) Bill, 2011 (Government of India 2011) expands the defi-
nition of ‘owner’ to any person having ‘ultimate control’ over the affairs of 
the mine. The moment contract workers are recognised as bona fide mine 
workers and BCCL is recognised as the ‘owner’ or ‘principal employer’ 
irrespective of intermediation by contractors and subcontractors, they 
hold all the statutory and non-statutory rights conferred upon BCCL 
workers, including to full R&R.
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The entitlements of ‘affected persons’
The scope of the law is inclusive. Section 13 (2) (j) of the Mines and Min-
erals (Development and Regulation) Act of 1957 empowers central gov-
ernment to make rules about the rights of third parties in cases where 
‘any such party may be prejudicially affected for reason of any pros-
pecting or mining operations’. Even the Mines and Minerals (Develop-
ment and Regulation) Act of 2015 (Government of India 2015) makes 
provisions that benefits should accrue to ‘the family affected by mining 
related operations of the company’, including livelihoods essential to 
mine workers such as refuse sweeping and retail trading. There appears 
to be no ambiguity in the legislative intent of these formulations: it is to 
ensure that R&R reaches any and every family adversely affected by any 
and every mining-related activity. However, the executive – through the 
Ministry of Coal and CIL – have deliberately and substantively under-
mined this legislative intent in successive policy documents (CIL’s R&R 
policy or the Jharia Action Plan) by excluding many groups of formally 
eligible victims. Below we discuss two examples of the repercussions 
of this progressive and extra-legal exclusion from eligibility. In one, 
the definition of ‘affected persons’ in the R&R policy of CIL is fairly 
inclusive and covers most categories – encroachers, owners and liveli-
hood-dependents. By adding the phrase ‘involuntary displacement for 
any other reason’ it also makes CIL responsible when their mining has 
adverse effects on ‘residence or other property or source of livelihood’ 
or ‘involuntary displacement’ by any activity (not only a project) of CIL 
including – but not restricted to – land acquisition. This clearly includes 
the fire and subsidence-affected victims too. But such persons have 
progressively been denied coverage, with eligibility being restricted to 
land losers or bona fide land owners to the exclusion of squatters and 
encroachers. Similarly, in the second example, even though the Jha-
ria Master Plan is designed for CIL areas, it excludes the provision of 
a job to families affected by fire and subsidence, even though this is 
required by CIL’s own R&R policy (Coal India Limited 2008). In 2012, 
CIL diluted its own 2008 policy by inserting the additional condition 
that entitlements would only accrue to those losing at least two acres of 
land. DGMS is the enforcement agency responsible for declaring areas 
as fire-affected and endangered or unsafe for human settlement. Unless 
DGMS process is followed and the area is declared dangerous, the pro-
visions of the Master Plan do not kick in. In 12 years, DGMS has sur-
veyed only 30 per cent of the area.
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Illegal eviction without full R&R
There are three legal frameworks within which R&R takes place in the 
leasehold lands of BCCL.
1. The comprehensive Master Plan (approved by the Ministry of Coal 
and the government of Jharkhand) deals with fire, subsidence 
and rehabilitation, with R&R for non-BCCL persons (‘encroachers’ 
and owners) in the areas declared endangered by BCCL/DGMS, 
financed by the Ministry of Coal and implemented by the govern-
ment of Jharkhand.
2. In the non-endangered areas within the leasehold, Coal India’s 
2012 R&R policy kicks in only when land acquisition proceed-
ings have started. It restricts entitlements to only those ‘displaced 
persons’ who are what it calls ‘entitled project affected persons’: 
persons who lose more than two acres of land. Displaced people 
appreciate the entitlements under this policy because it offers jobs 
as economic rehabilitation. But very few people are eligible.
3. A recent BCCL intervention has resulted from a BCCL Board deci-
sion to enforce so-called ‘local settlements’ and provide ‘temporary’ 
R&R to ‘encroacher’ families residing in the coal-bearing areas 
where opencast mining is underway (e.g. 292 families from the 
Ghanoodih opencast mine can squat on BCCL land with no rights 
whatsoever and receive meagre financial assistance from BCCL of 
INR 10,000 per family). As discussed below, these are completely 
illegal evictions and violate the Master Plan as well as Coal India’s 
own policies.
Illegal eviction as ‘temporary’ resettlement by BCCL
In several localities, people live in small settlements on the upper ter-
races of opencast mines. Many of these hamlets are also home to the 
unorganised contract workforces of these same mines, whose employ-
ment is as insecure as are their lives. As the fire expands into these areas 
and fire-fighting excavation is contracted out, BCCL in connivance with 
the contractors and local police – and in a shocking illegality – dynamite 
out ‘encroachers’, who should be considered ‘affected persons’ under 
CIL’s own R&R policy. BCCL gives a one-time lump sum settlement of 
INR 10,000 and a temporary plot on a reclaimed and refilled mined site 
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to construct houses (at victims’ own cost!). This is both a dishonest and 
undemocratic ploy to deprive the oustees of their R&R rights.
The practical role of the Coal Ministry’s Master Plan
The Master Plan package has one serious flaw: its complete disregard 
for employment and sustainable livelihoods. While it formally caters for 
residence and basic needs, it does not provide for any economic rehabil-
itation. Furthermore, relocation has been planned to locations where 
employment is not available. This has made the process extremely 
unpopular among the oustees. This unacceptable R&R is admitted on 
record by even the most senior BCCL and state government officials, 
two of its three main architects.11 The Belgoria township built under the 
Master Plan bears eloquent testimony to the indifference and inaction 
of the various actors – BCCL and the state government’s Jharia Rehabil-
itation and Development Authority (JRDA) – over the last 17 years. No 
public consultation process was initiated by the agencies before plan-
ning the resettlement site nor was consent sought. Sustainable liveli-
hoods and access to public programmes and development schemes 
were not ensured, resulting in no access to basic needs for food and 
social security, or to social infrastructure. Even burial sites were not 
made available; nor was transport available in the remote site, 8 km 
from Dhanbad. ‘New Jharia township’ in Belgoria is a complete mis-
nomer for this rather sorry apology for resettlement, consisting of an 
already dilapidated and crumbling cluster of ugly housing with blocks 
of cement falling off and large cracks, mould and seepage spots mark-
ing almost the entire set of flats.
The location of Belgoria is a problem, given the distance and its 
poor and costly connectivity to Dhanbad and Jharia where health and 
educational facilities are sited. Several oustees (women in particular) 
quit their employment because of prohibitive travel costs. There is, in 
fact, no health centre, hospital or medical care except for a token mobile 
health van which BCCL sends in a couple of times a month for a few 
hours. People have to travel to Dhanbad or return to Jharia for health-
care, which is private and costly. We were told that, after hiring a private 
vehicle in the absence of ambulances, a woman died in labour on her way 
to hospital in Dhanbad. While there is a ration shop for PDS supplies, less 
than a fifth of the households have ration cards. A few shops have sprung 
up but there is no marketplace. The importance of various identity cards 
like the voter ID, ration card, MGNREGS job card, etc., cannot be over-
emphasised, as these not only establish identity but are also a necessary 
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condition for access to various citizenship rights. These include develop-
ment programmes and schemes such as the employment guarantee, sub-
sidised food, pensions, scholarships, health care, disability allowances, 
anganwadis (nurseries) and crèches, etc. Lack of ID is therefore a viola-
tion of the Master Plan itself.
Slow R&R: a conflict between local and central politicians?
Most officials on record either blame ‘the people’ themselves for not 
shifting or sometimes admit to problems in how the R&R strategy is 
implemented. The official nodal agency for shifting non-BCCL families 
from endangered zones, the JRDA, claims that the main bottleneck in 
the implementation of the Master Plan is the unavailability of land. 
To resettle the 55,000 families from 595 sites, the estimated require-
ment of land for JRDA is 2,700 acres and the arrangement is that BCCL 
will provide this. BCCL argues that this is impossible because it has 
no vacant safe areas. An alternative hypothesis regarding the mystery 
behind why the endangered people have not been resettled would 
invoke the relationship between crime, politics and policy in reaping 
coal profits. Put simply, the R&R has not happened because the busi-
ness nexus between local politicians and illegal mining interests wants 
the workforce to stay where it is, atop or near the illegal mines and 
sites of theft and scavenging. A strong incentive and vested interest 
among the local and regional politician-industrialists to maintain the 
status quo would explain on the one hand the persistence of illegal coal 
mining profits and on the other the ineffective R&R. The entire edifice 
of illegal profits rests on the easy and cheap availability of a destitute 
workforce which has no alternative to the precarious and hazardous 
theft, mining and scavenging of coal.
In early 2016, several communist trade union leaders and a 
right-to-information activist reported an emerging conflict between local 
political leaders and the central leadership over R&R. While the local pol-
iticians, who are also in the coal business, are keen to maintain the status 
quo and have this army of scavengers and labourers live on burning land 
close to the sites of illegal mining, theft and diversion, the national-level 
political leadership wants to evict all residents and allocate the entire 
fire-affected area for opencast mining to large national and multinational 
private companies. In the short run, the relocation of the workforce to 
distant areas would create a labour shortage for the illegal operators and 
a crisis of livelihoods for those resettled. According to a retired BCCL sen-
ior manager, the BCCL management is divided – with those among the 
88 THE WILD EAST
local functionaries that accumulate rents from corruption worried that 
they will soon suffer reduced political status in the hierarchy of illegal 
coal when the big mining companies with direct reach to the central gov-
ernment of India come to Jharia. Meanwhile, the middle class and its 
institutions are quiescent. One would think that if the very bowels of a 
town were on fire, it would cause immense outrage and disquiet, and so 
the absence of rage outside the shanties around mines is surprising. But 
the caste and ethnic composition of the oustees is distinct from that of the 
local middle classes…
Conclusion: crime, mining, fire and politics
When coal was nationalised in 1971, the PSU Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. 
(BCCL) became the main coke-producing company in the Jharia region. 
The non-enforcement of legally mandated and compulsory precautionary 
and remedial measures generated unscientific and unregulated coal min-
ing, causing unconstrained underground fires. These fires are fanned in 
a premeditated and cynical fashion through the criminal economic prac-
tices described in this chapter. The increasingly intensified extraction of 
coal – through opencast mining without any regard for the safety require-
ments of the land and the workers – is driven by outsourcing to private 
mafia-owned companies. Paradoxically, extraction through opencast min-
ing is presented as the solution to the fire whereas, in fact, it is a cause. 
Ironically, corruption in the purchase and transport of sand for stowing in 
mines to combat fire was the incentive for the growth of the coal mafia in 
the first place. BCCL works through contracts to powerful coal-fire mafia 
organisations, exploiting a pauperised workforce. It earns profits through 
fabricated fire-fighting work, illegal mining, large-scale theft of coal and 
sand, extortion and protection and real estate development, intertwined 
with legitimate mining, transport and other auxiliary contracts.
The mafia has penetrated all of the mainstream parties in Jharkhand, 
and its ability to change policies in its favour through bribery or through 
nepotism – appointing sons and relatives of politicians and bureaucrats 
in its companies – has given it political legitimacy and clout. The coal-fire 
mafia has not shied from eliminating trade unionists from left-wing par-
ties and has run its own collaborator unions. This means that the central 
and historically crucial role of labour in workplace safety has been seri-
ously compromised. This mafia feeds on the fire. Fire helps bypass legal 
procedures for the application and regulation of prospecting licences or 
mining leases. Fire increases illegality and illegality spreads the fire – a 
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vicious cycle of crime and destruction that undermines hundreds of 
workers’ health and livelihoods while devastating the environment. The 
central government now favours mass eviction but lacks a coherent and 
legal plan for rehabilitation and resettlement. A clamour to evict all the 
residents threatened by fire and subsidence has grown, now supported 
by the mainstream national political parties who have developed inter-
ests in large mining contracts. A contradiction is developing, however, 
between local illegal mining interests and the Master Plan, because of 
the fear of losing the cheap workforce willing to labour in the hazardous 
fire. It is indeed ironic that a town whose very existence is based on coal 
mining, to which labour has migrated from different parts of the country, 
is likely to be physically obliterated by this very activity.
Notes
 1. Co-ordinator, Centre for Adivasi Research and Development, New Delhi. Engagement with 
policy research on adivasi (indigenous people, literally forest-dwellers) issues has taken me to 
Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and other parts of Central and Eastern India, and the North East. I am 
extremely indebted to activists and researchers for their solidarity and deep insights into these 
issues. In particular, I will mention Adivasi Adhikar Rashtriya Manch, Chhattisgarh Bachao 
Andolan and the Campaign for Survival and Dignity. For the people living on the fire, I hope 
this paper becomes a small contribution to raising awareness of the disaster.
Professor Barbara Harriss-White, on one of her several impressive and gruelling field visits 
to India, read a fact-finding report I had previously written on fire and displacement in Jharia 
and suggested I collaborate on the research programme that resulted in this book. She provid-
ed the framework and research outline and greatly enhanced the report with her comments 
and suggestions, for which I remain deeply indebted to her. She helped me ‘walk the extra 
mile’ in relating the fire to economic crime and policy.
I also thank the University of Oxford for providing the resources for a survey and field 
visits, in a very smooth and stress-free manner.
 2. Slaughter mining methods involve the extraction of coal from upper subterranean seams 
alone, while opencast mining extracts from the surface.
 3. D.D. Mishra, Director, Central Mining Research Institute (CMRI) and expert on Jharia fires, 
quoted in an interview by R. Mahapatra (2015).
 4. Minutes of the Expert Appraisal Committee (Thermal and Coal Mining) 17–18 December 
2012, Ministry of Coal, New Delhi.
 5. Gangs of Wasseypur, Gundey, Koyla, to name a few.
 6. This is a strange paradox in India where several ruling-class regional parties describe them-
selves as socialists and followers of Lohia largely on account of their anti-Congress stance in 
the 1970s and 1980s.
 7. Expelled by the CPI(M) in the late 1960s allegedly for left deviation and Naxalite sympathies, 
he organised most of the contract workers in private mines and formed the militant and formi-
dable Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union.
 8. A period of 21 months beginning in June 1975 during which Indira Gandhi ruled India under 
a state of emergency, overriding democratic process.
 9. We have conducted a detailed study on illegalities in coal mining and its role in spreading fire 
in Jharia: see Gupta 2017. This section is a summary of the paper.
10. There are several citations for this, e.g. Ahmedabad Electricity Company Ltd. vs. Electricity 
Mazdoor Sabha 2000 84 FLR 5 Gujarat HC.
11. The third being the union government. See Report of the Standing Committee on Coal and 
Steel (2012–13) 15th Lok Sabha (Government of India Standing Committee on Coal and Steel 
2012–13).
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Sand and the politics of plunder 
in Tamil Nadu, India
J. Jeyaranjan
The chapter shows the working of Wild East forms of criminal economies by 
exploring the evolution of pork-barrel politics and organised looting in Tamil 
Nadu. It shows a shift from populist to predatory forms of politics by unravel-
ling the local il/legal economy of sand mining. In contemporary Tamil Nadu, 
profits from the criminal extraction of sand are directly and indirectly injected 
into the electoral process and are employed to fund vote buying – a tactic of 
electoral fraud widespread in this part of India. Criminals fund political par-
ties, shaping vote outcomes through vote buying as well as through the allo-
cation of preferential policies and state resources after the elections. Expert 
commissions of enquiry have exposed law-breaking by the sand mafia assem-
blage in the state. The criminal economy of sand is resisted by social and polit-
ical activists, students, exceptional journalists and public interest lawyers.
Introduction: Tamil Nadu and criminal populist politics
When the criminal politics of riverbed sand is factored into the politics of 
the southern state of Tamil Nadu, far from being populist, what emerges 
is pork-barrel politics with Tamilian characteristics. In this chapter we 
make a first attempt to map the hidden connections between electoral 
politics and cash amassed and distributed illegally from the 1980s to the 
present. Our focus on the political and economic logistics of criminal-
ity in riverbed sand mining represents a case where a known criminal 
source of cash is deployed in politics, one among many (granite, beach 
sand, liquor and real estate). For the past 50 years, the state of Tamil 
Nadu has been under the rule of either the DMK (Dravida Munnetra 
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Kazhagam; Dravidian Progressive Party) or the AIADMK (All India Anna 
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam). While in government, both parties intro-
duced many important welfare programmes, some universal, some tar-
getted. For instance, the food security programme in the state is one of 
India’s best, with universal coverage and every household entitled to 20 
kg of rice every month at no cost. Similarly, a midday-meal programme 
provides free lunches for all schoolchildren in the state. A health sector 
programme ensures the availability of vital medicines in all state hospi-
tals. And, as well as drawing resources from the federal pool, the state 
has used its own resources to expand the number, scope and coverage of 
such schemes and programmes. To boost its public distribution system, 
for example, Tamil Nadu has managed to draw food stocks from the cen-
tral pool in excess of its allocated quota – as the federal pool is always 
left with surplus in its annual outlay due to poor and very low levels of 
uptake by less-developed states. As a second example, the Integrated 
Child Development Services (ICDS) programme was expanded in paral-
lel with assistance from the World Bank in Tamil Nadu beyond the provi-
sions of the Indian government funding (Vivek 2015, 7). Another notable 
scheme that doubled cash assistance to beneficiaries is the support given 
to pregnant women. While the centre gives INR 6,000 as assistance to 
each pregnant woman, the state matches with an equal sum and, as of 
2016, provides total assistance of INR 12,000.
It is therefore unsurprising that the academic discourse for politics 
in Tamil Nadu is broadly located within a narrative of ‘populism’, with a 
specific scholarly meaning that puts people’s welfare at the core (Swamy 
1998; Subramanian 1999; Harriss 2000). Many labels have been devel-
oped to describe this focus. Wyatt (2013a), for example, attributes the 
new kind of policies enunciated by the AIADMK since 2011 to ‘protec-
tion populism’. By contrast, the policies adopted by the DMK in its ear-
lier avatar were termed ‘empowerment populism’ (Swamy 1998, 110). 
Subramanian (1999) distinguished the policies of the DMK as ‘assertive 
populism’ and those of the AIADMK as ‘paternalist populism’. The DMK 
too has since moved towards ‘paternalist populism’ (Swamy 1998). The 
recent framework adopted by AIADMK, since it came back to power in 
2011, is identified as ‘technocratic populism’ as ‘it best expresses the 
combination of “people-centred” politics and the enthusiasm for more 
effective delivery of governance outcomes’ (Wyatt 2013a, 373; 2013b). 
Most recently, Walton and Crabtree (2018) have invoked Tamil Nadu as 
an exemplary case of ‘crony populism’.
The argument that the politics of these two parties is ‘populist’ 
is premised on a direct link between the policies of mass welfare and 
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the electoral outcome (exemplified by Swamy 1998 and Subramanian 
1999). Welfare programmes broaden the party base and win elections. 
But is there such a direct, one-to-one, linear relation between the welfare 
policies of the ruling party and electoral outcomes? Is electoral politics 
so simple and uncomplicated to comprehend? On the contrary, a perusal 
of the Tamil Nadu legislative assembly results since 1984 indicates that 
there is no direct link between the policies of the party and electoral out-
comes. Electioneering has not been a simple process in which welfare 
schemes implemented by a given political party have won them votes.
The supremacy of people’s political agency in elections can be 
best understood through an analysis of the electoral outcomes of recent 
assembly elections. The 2006 assembly election brought the DMK to 
power and the electoral victory was widely attributed to a very promis-
ing manifesto. The DMK government kept its promises and introduced an 
INR 2/kg rice programme along with a complete waiver of farm loans. 
It launched the free distribution of colour television sets, LPG stoves, 
health insurance and a social security scheme for agricultural labourers 
and farmers. It also introduced a massive free housing programme that 
converted thatched huts into concrete houses. With this array of welfare 
schemes, the party faced the assembly elections in 2011 only to lose very 
badly. While this electoral defeat is attributed to a whole host of reasons 
(Jeyaranjan and Vijayabaskar 2011) it is clear that ‘populism’ alone does 
not fetch votes.1 Local field experience of elections suggests a very differ-
ent narrative – that of pork-barrel politics, starting locally but spreading 
to the entire state during the previous parliament and assembly elections.
‘Money for votes’ politics
Apart from fast-tracking the implementation of welfare and government 
programmes in a by-election, the most important evidence is the distribu-
tion of cash to voters.2 The well-known ‘Thirumangalam formula’ of dis-
tributing money to most of the voters in a constituency gained notoriety 
during the 2009 by-election in that constituency during the DMK regime. 
Each voter was paid INR 3–5,000 by the ruling DMK, which then won 
massively, as documented in news sources including Raju 2015; Krishna 
2014; and Hiddleston 2011. During by-elections, each cabinet minister 
is put in charge of an assigned electoral area and has to engage about 
10,000 voters. Payments of INR 5,000 to each voter cost about INR 50 
million per constituency. There may be 20 ministers deputed to the con-
stituency to do such ‘election work’, and by distributing this kind of cash 
to about 10,000 voters in their respective areas the entire constituency 
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is saturated with cash. The outcome of such a concentrated effort by 
the entire state cabinet and ruling party (both AIADMK and DMK) has 
been that they have not lost a by-election from 2001 to now. Through 
the development of pork-barrel politics with Tamilian characteristics, 
the DMK won all the by-elections during its regime and the AIADMK has 
repeated this feat during its own terms.
During the 2014 parliament elections and in the 2016 assembly 
elections, Chief Minister Jayalalithaa adopted the Thirumangalam by- 
election formula to distribute money to voters. The scale of this strategy 
is mind-boggling. On average each parliamentary seat is six times larger 
than an assembly seat. Never before in the history of either parliamentary 
or assembly elections in Tamil Nadu has money been distributed on such 
a grand scale. In each assembly constituency, AIADMK cadres identified 
50–75,000 non-DMK, and non-AIADMK voters and each of these non- 
Dravidian party voters was given INR 1,000 to vote for the AIADMK. The 
DMK and other candidates could not generally match the ruling AIADMK’s 
scale of money-distribution. Even opposition candidates commanding that 
scale of private money realised that they lacked the AIADMK’s efficient 
distribution machinery for elections. Consequently, the AIADMK used the 
power of money to win most of the seats it contested. Tamil Nadu politics 
therefore needs to be understood in a way that transcends the boundaries 
set by mainstream ‘populist’ discourse. In turn the complex interconnec-
tions of massive amounts of money disbursed to voters during elections 
and the source of such vast amounts of cash need to be probed.
Urbanisation and construction, welfarism and riverbed 
sand
Tamil Nadu and neighbouring states in South India are not only devel-
oping through welfare expenditure but have also been witnessing steady 
economic growth with a corresponding increase in per capita income 
(alongside gross inequality).3 Rapid urbanisation has led to nearly half 
of the total population living in towns and cities (Sivakumar 2011). 
Demand for housing is also rising due to the consumption linkages when 
agricultural incomes are supplemented by non-farm livelihoods. Through 
social sector policies and the public distribution system for rice, the state 
subsidises the everyday requirements of the population, thereby releas-
ing money for other expenditure, including housing. An efficient pub-
lic transport system encourages daily commuting to work. Remittances 
from migrant workers outside the country are also on the rise. All of 
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these developments combine and lead to an increase in demand for hous-
ing. The state has its own construction and housing programmes and the 
real estate and private, labour-intensive construction sector together set 
the conditions for a booming demand for materials. Cement and concrete 
production relies on sand as an important ingredient. Although there is 
an alternative in the form of fly ash and ‘M-sand’ (granite crushed into 
minute granules with machines), these materials cannot satisfy demand. 
M-sand is costlier than river sand, and river sand is available as a natural 
resource in the state (see Chapter 6 for UP).
The supply of riverbed sand prior to the 1980s
During the 1980s, the growth rate of the state was some 25 per cent 
lower than in the twenty-first century;4,5 the level of urbanisation too was 
lower, as was demand for building materials, with sand for construction 
drawn from local sources. Sand was manually loaded onto bullock carts 
from the nearest riverbed. A paltry fee was collected for the sand by the 
local panchayats. Effectively, sand was available as a free good that could 
be appropriated for an insignificant fee by cart owners. Sand was trans-
ported whenever the carts that were habitually rented out remained idle, 
meaning that the capacity utilisation of the carts was enhanced. Most 
of the cost of sand covered labour and transport. Sand mining provided 
a small-scale livelihood for poor owners of a cart and a pair of bullocks 
who lived in, or close to, a town. There were no regulations governing 
the local extraction of sand from riverbeds. In cities like Chennai, small 
lorries (known as half-body lorries) were hired to bring sand from nearby 
sources. Sand mining was undertaken using manual labour; few engaged 
in the activity and it fell beneath the politicians’ radar.
The entry of politicians
During the late 1980s, when the real estate boom started, demand for 
sand increased. Small-time mining using carts and manual labour was 
unable to meet this demand. Apart from covering transport and labour, 
a significant component of the price was for sand per se. For the first 
time, sand developed value as a commodity. Since sand was a common 
property resource, it came up on the politicians’ radar. Money started 
to play a very important role in everyday political life; apart from 
becoming involved in real estate, arrack shops and bars, politicians 
also entered sand mining. Disputes over sand mining among small-time 
 SAND AND THE POLIT ICS OF PLUNDER IN TAMIL NADU, INDIA 97
local politicians attracted the attention of higher-level politicians, who 
gauged the potential for money in sand from the intensity of such dis-
putes. Investing their own resources, they co-opted local politicians as 
junior partners in sand ventures. Political power shielded them from 
regulatory rules that could be enforced by local revenue officials and 
the police. In turn the revenue officials and police also sensed the profit 
from sand mining and started to test it by demanding regular (and 
increasing levels of) bribes.
In the 1980s, the regulation of sand shifted from the jurisdiction 
of the local panchayat to the Public Works Department (PWD). The 
PWD identified areas of excess sand deposits in riverbeds and permitted 
their removal so that river water could flow unhindered. The removal 
of excess sand deposits was auctioned by the PWD. District-level politi-
cians from the AIADMK and the strong men from the opposition party, 
the DMK, colluded across party lines to form cartels, bid low and yet win 
contracts to remove sand. Profits were shared among the cartel members 
with advance payments sometimes replacing a share in profits. Thus, at 
the district level, sand became an important source of cash for the two 
Dravidian parties. Through the control of sand contracts and sales, the 
district secretaries and ministers from the districts also benefitted from 
sand mining. As the demand for sand increased, so the cashflow swelled 
and competition intensified. So too did physical violence. Sand auctions 
grew to be arenas for ever greater displays of muscle power, political 
power and money, by means of which competition was elbowed out.
Scale and impact
Increases in demand, prices and cash flows led to the indiscriminate min-
ing of sand. The small-time operators owning bullock carts were barred 
from working on the riverbeds. Machines were introduced to expand 
the scale of excavation. The regulatory conditions stipulated for quar-
rying were ignored. For several years, no one realised what the danger 
of unplanned mining would be, during which time violations had severe 
consequences:
(1) The area where sand was to be removed was not marked.
(2)  The sand was scooped from depths of 15 feet, whereas approval 
was never given for removal deeper than 3 feet.
(3) Machines were used for loading when by law they were banned.
(4)  Each load was limited to 2 units (200 cubic feet), but this was 
routinely exceeded.
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(5)  Very few loads were recorded and routine unpermitted loads 
cheated the treasury.
(6)  Lease periods were extended by false claims that miners had not 
completed the removal of the contracted quantum of sand and, 
based on the affidavit, the miners obtained court orders extend-
ing their contract period.
(7)  There was no practical monitoring by the officials formally 
responsible.
Mining as organised looting: the early 1990s 
and the entry of Fort St George
The AIADMK took power in the 1991 legislative assembly elections. 
J.  Jayalalithaa became Chief Minister (CM) and many consequential 
decisions were taken during her first tenure. The disproportionate assets 
case that landed her in prison in 2014 is a product of that time. Chennai 
city was booming and the Palar river was the main source of sand for the 
city’s construction industry. ‘M.’, a Dalit from Chengalpattu town on the 
banks of the Palar, which in that stretch is a wide sandy riverbed, dry for 
most of the year, was a fleet owner, a supplier of sand to Chennai and 
part of a cartel paying the district administration regularly for Palar sand. 
A district collector gave him the blueprint for a new system whereby he 
could have a monopoly right over Palar sand provided he struck a deal 
with the CM’s friend, Ms Sasikala. He was also assured by the collector 
that the latter would negotiate the deal.
The deal came through in 1993. M. had to pay INR 1 crore every 
week to Ms Sasikala, the friend and confidante of the CM, and in turn he 
had the monopoly of Palar sand in the Chengalpattu stretch. The monop-
oly was formally conferred on M. by invoking the power under Rule 39 of 
the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules through which the gov-
ernment can invoke its ownership right over the state’s mineral depos-
its. It can avoid open auction and issue a government order based on an 
application from the contractor to quarry in a particular plot of land over 
a specified period in return for a payment. This extraordinary power was 
intended to preserve and develop the mineral wealth of the state and to 
be invoked in the ‘public interest’.
Using this loophole in the interpretation of the law, M. was 
appointed as contractor. This initiated a looting of monumental pro-
portions that continues to this day. Given that M. paid promptly and the 
deal proved mutually effective, the same model was extended to other 
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river basins in the state and the same rule was invoked for awarding 
similar contractual monopolies during that time. From among these 
contractors, ‘O.A.’ captured contracts for several sand quarries in the 
state’s riverbeds. Meanwhile, M., enjoying the monopoly bestowed by 
the government machinery, prospered for three years until the 1996 
elections. Since the deals were transacted directly with the political 
apex, the district-level administration was under his complete control, 
money poured in and he promptly paid the agreed sums to all con-
cerned, including the personal aide of the CM. Sand mining reached a 
new ‘height’ in the Palar basin, with the district administration reduced 
to silent spectators, shorn of all regulatory oversight powers. Since M. 
complied promptly with contractual obligations, he retained the con-
tract until the following elections.
His success and the wealth he managed to accumulate in a short 
span of time indicated the potential of sand mining: he was able to pur-
chase the largest bungalow in Chengalpattu, previously owned by a big 
landlord (who was the symbol of feudal wealth and stereotyped as such 
in many Dravidian movement plays scripted by DMK leader Annadurai). 
It was indeed a more than symbolic moment, one whose significance was 
publicly appreciated when ‘sand money’ purchased the long-standing 
manifestation of local ‘feudal wealth’.
During the following decade, this set of political arrange-
ments and pay-offs became the model for sand mining. Control of, 
and returns to, sand mining shifted permanently to the CM’s office 
in Fort St George. This was also the period when the state govern-
ment machinery experienced a role reversal, from being an employer 
resourced from legal revenue to being an employee paid from illegal 
loot to regulate and secure this stream of politically legitimised crim-
inal money against capture or sabotage by others. The government’s 
principal duty was thus to check the ‘illicit’ sand mining while protect-
ing the contractor’s ‘legal’ mining.
Regime change in 1996 and the continuation 
of the system
The anti-Jayalalithaa wave that swept Tamil Nadu during the 1996 general 
elections brought the DMK back into power. Jayalalithaa was defeated in 
her constituency, where voters were angered by her widespread corrup-
tion, reputed arrogance and ugly display of wealth. Seamlessly, the DMK 
assumed control of sand. The contract system for sand continued, with 
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a few DMK notables forming a cartel and seizing the Palar contract from 
M. Without experience or infrastructure, they brought in O.A. as their 
partner in Palar dealings. In the process O.A. was outsmarted and ousted 
from the Trichi and Thanjavur district quarries, which are located in the 
Cauvery river systems and have the largest deposits of sand in the state. 
‘M.D.’, the Trichirapally strongman of the DMK, developed rent-sharing 
formalities with Fort St George, found suitable local partners and con-
trolled all the sand mines in these two districts. Mining intensified fur-
ther with blatant violations of contractual conditions:
 1. Although the contract was only for a particular plot of land spec-
ified in the lease deed, the contractor treated the entire riverbed 
as their leasehold.
 2. Contractors dug down to any depth until the sand was exhausted.
 3. The use of machinery became more common.
 4. Mining continued brazenly throughout daylight hours.
 5. The movement of sand to neighbouring states increased.
 6. Permit laws were extended through legal orders.
 7. Lease periods were extended by the same means.
 8. Protests from the local community were crushed.
 9. Officials were given their due share and they, in turn, faithfully 
served the interests of the contractors.
10. The nexus between the politicians, contractors and officials grew 
so much stronger that the regime change from AIADMK to DMK 
did not alter any elements or relations in this system other than 
the replacement of politicians.
During these eight years, from 1993 to 2001, sand emerged as a peren-
nial source of cash for the ruling party (irrespective of whether it was the 
DMK or AIADMK). The sand contractors organised the work, collected 
the money and gave a major share to the ruling party chief. The law was 
blatantly violated and a massive revenue stream was appropriated and 
diverted from the state exchequer to the ruling political elite.
However, the extension of a contract was not entirely within the 
domain of the state government. Contractors could go to court and apply 
for an extension with the connivance of the ruling party. Yet since many 
players were competing for more benami contracts,6 rivalries among the 
contractors intensified and inevitably some were marginalised while others 
emerged victorious under both AIADMK and DMK regimes. Fort St George 
came to feel the marketing system needed fine-tuning and tightening to 
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confer absolute control over the sand sector. With the firm hold of the top 
political boss, a single-window system for cash flows would increase the 
efficiency with which money was extracted from the contractors.
Exposure of blatant misuse of special power by the state
In invoking the special power of Rule 39 of the Tamil Nadu Minor Min-
erals Concession rules, the state administration hardly bothered with its 
duties vested in the law as the custodian of public property. In awarding 
such leases to the sand contractors, it had systematically flouted all the 
regulatory law. This was amply demonstrated in the judgment on a set 
of writ petitions filed in the High Court of Madras in 1997, judgment on 
which was delivered in 2001. The petition by Mr Kuppusami, a leading 
lawyer and social activist from Karur, challenged the granting of a con-
tract by the PWD to Mr K. Ramaswamy and questioned the very basis 
of invoking Rule 39. The court, while conducting the trial on these writ 
petitions, summoned files and records. After perusing the material filed 
before the court, it found that there was no reason for the contracts to be 
awarded on the basis of Rule 39 because, since no grounds were men-
tioned as to how the contractor would develop the mineral wealth of 
the state, no public interest was involved. The contractor had not been 
selected based on tender or auction. The state had arbitrarily used its 
powers to bestow this special privilege on the contractor in an act said 
by the judge to be ‘whimsical’. The government had decided on the lease 
apparently based on the recommendation of a high-level committee. But 
while the committee had recommended a lease for 10 hectares, a lease of 
25 hectares was proposed in the government order. And later, the recom-
mendation of the committee had been altered retrospectively to 25 hec-
tares of land. When the land was leased out, no plan of the leased area 
was either attached or approved. This strategic omission was to enable 
the contractor to mine in the survey area mentioned in the government 
order to a total extent of 334,140 hectares of riverbed. Using this loop-
hole, the contractor had obtained several orders from the court for the 
change of plots during all of which the original plot was never surren-
dered. The ‘consideration’ or rent for the lease was INR 1 lakh in the first 
year, with a 20 per cent enhancement over the next four years. However, 
from the one quarry alone, the weekly earnings from sand were esti-
mated by the court to be INR 1 crore, thus fetching an annual income of 
INR 50 crore for an investment of INR 1 lakh. Even more blatant was the 
non-registration of the lease deed.
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The judgment clearly indicated the corrupt motives behind the pro-
cess of granting the original lease under Rule 39 of the Tamil Nadu Minor 
Minerals Concession Rules. The judgment observed that:
(b)esides, the materials available on the file disclose that the exer-
cise of power is not bona fide but it had been resorted to for a priori 
considerations. It could even be suggested as born out of corrupt 
motive, and corrupt obligation had advanced the cause of individ-
ual to the detriment of the state exchequer. (W.P. No.16010/97 and 
6712, 6713 of 1998 p 50 of the Judgment dated 30.4.2001 in the 
High Court Judicature at Madras.)
The judgment quashed the lease and also ordered the quashing of 35 
other grants that had been made invoking Rule 39. It further commented 
that ‘the State government should have ordered investigation by the 
CBI … if it had not been done so far’. Obviously, the state government 
bureaucracy refrained from ordering any investigation by any agency as 
they were aware of the involvement of the Chief Minister and her friend.
The state as a camouflage for looting: the direct entry of the state 
as a fair player in sand mining 
In 2001 the AIADMK was returned to power. In July 2002 another judg-
ment was pronounced by the Madras high court which paved the way 
for the AIADMK government to assume the moral high ground and 
take over sand mining as a state monopoly. Filing a contempt petition, 
Mr Janardhanan of Chennai contended that the state – represented by 
the bureaucracy – had failed to enforce the order of the high court of 
Madras regarding illicit mining in the Kosasthali river, located north of 
Chennai city. The high court had appointed an advocate commissioner, 
Mr Ashok Chakravarthy, to assess conditions in the riverbed during an 
earlier hearing and had passed a set of orders. None of the earlier orders 
had been honoured and another contempt petition was filed by the same 
petitioner. The state argued that it had complied fully with the earlier 
orders and that the illicit mining was under control – which was vehe-
mently contested by the applicant. The same advocate commissioner was 
appointed once again to assess the situation on the ground. The latter 
vouched for the contentions of the petitioner and the high court ordered 
the government to constitute a high-level committee consisting of scien-
tists, geologists and environmentalists to conduct a survey with reference 
to sand quarrying and the damage caused. The state was also ordered 
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to follow the recommendations of the committees and to pass necessary 
legislation.
The judgment blamed the local political leaders who ‘anchor the 
whole operation as the conduit for the huge bribes fuelling the well-oiled 
network’. It added that the ‘contractors are extracting many times the 
permitted amount of sand, as enforcement agencies turn a blind eye … 
Government officials who are supposed to check illegal sand quarrying 
join hands with sand smugglers’.7 Acting on the directions of the high 
court, the state constituted a high-level committee, which submitted 
its report in June 2003. The committee found that rivers and riverbeds 
belonging to the state had been seriously damaged. The river ecology had 
also suffered due to indiscriminate and unscientific mining. The commit-
tee also assessed the damage caused over time by heavy machinery to the 
riverbeds, banks and electrical and hydraulic structures.
The main recommendations of the high-level committee include:
1. Entrusting the mining of riverbed sand to a single agency.
2. No roads to be constructed in riverbeds.
3. No heavy machinery.
4. Quarrying time to be restricted between 6 am and 6 pm.
5. Maintaining proper accounts for the quantum of sand quarried.
6. Disseminating information about the lease.
7. Severe penalties and punishment for violations.
8. Prevention of quarrying in patta (legally owned) lands located 
within 250 m of the riverbank.
In its instructions, the high court clearly stated that the government fol-
low the recommendations of the high-level committee. So the government 
accepted the recommendations of the committee and issued Government 
Order M.S. No 95, dated 1 October 2003, based on them. From the follow-
ing day, it cancelled all the contracts and leases for sand mining in public 
land as well as on patta lands. From then on, the state became the sole 
miner of sand in the state. This was done ‘in the public interest’ to ensure:
1. The elimination of indiscriminate and unscientific sand quarrying.
2. The uninterrupted availability and supply of sand in a regular and 
orderly manner to the common public.
3. The availability of sand at affordable prices to common public, 
thereby effecting a reduction in the cost of construction.
4. The augmentation of the state government’s revenue. (Govern-
ment of Tamil Nadu, G.O. M.S. No 95 dated 1.10.2003, 1)
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Following this government order, the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession 
Rules 1959 were amended with the addition of a new clause, 38A, which 
gave the state the monopoly right over sand. The amended rule has survived 
all challenges in the high court and the supreme court and, to this day, the 
State of Tamil Nadu is the sole agency entitled to mine sand in the state.
The questions as to why the state chose to take that recommenda-
tion of the court seriously and to appoint a high-level committee to look 
into the ill effects of sand mining by contractors, and – more importantly – 
how parties making huge amounts of illicit money through their contrac-
tors from 1993 onwards would countenance the possibility of foregoing 
it and diverting this flow of funds to the state exchequer deserve further 
discussion. Demand for sand was growing daily and money was pouring 
in to the Chief Minister and her friend Sasikala through the contractors. 
No reprimand, mild or strong, from the judiciary or press reports could 
make the ruling party relinquish the use of income from sand for political 
purposes. Until then, even in court affidavits, the AIADMK government 
repeatedly swore that sand was mined as per the guidelines. It is a puz-
zle why the government took the advice of the high-level committee and 
went in for a state monopoly system controlling huge cash flows hitherto 
the domain of the party and private coffers.8
It is certain that civil society activists and the media considered the 
decision of the state to take over sand mining as a victory against the ille-
gal sand industry. ‘The state had assumed the role of guardian angel. The 
fragile ecology of the entire river system in the State, we believed, would 
be restored and rejuvenated and would remain there safe in its hands,’ 
said Mugilan, an environmentalist (Rajasekaran 2015). ‘While hailing 
the government’s action, Ossie Fernandez, one of the conveners of the 
Campaign for the Protection of Water Resources – Tamil Nadu, described 
the government’s action as a “step forward” in protecting water resources’ 
(Viswanathan 2003). This euphoria was short-lived. The Public Works 
Department was selected to be the sole agency for sand mining in Tamil 
Nadu. It started mining operations and managed them for about three 
months. The state’s own sand mining operation led to chaos. The PWD 
managed to load fewer than 200 lorryloads of sand from each quarry 
against requirements for over 10 times more. Consequently, sand was in 
short supply and its price skyrocketed throughout the state. Whether this 
was caused by the inability of the department to manage the logistics of 
sand, or whether the shortage was deliberately designed at the behest of 
the erstwhile contractors to dislodge the department from sand mining 
was, at first, anybody’s guess. Be that as it may, the PWD had to bring 
back the contractors to handle the logistics of sand.
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The re-entry of the contractors and restoration of cash 
flow to Fort St George
Subsequent events clearly indicated that the chaos was engineered to ena-
ble the re-entry of contractors into sand mining. Loading operations were 
contracted out through the tendering process – all falling into the hands 
of ‘O.A.’, the large sand contractor of the earlier system, chosen by Jayala-
lithaa to be the sole contractor. While in the paper records, many ‘lifting 
contractors’ were named as working in different quarries in the state, all 
were O.A. benamis and O.A. became the de facto owner of all the state’s 
sand. Department officials did not even supervise sand mining. They 
received monthly cash packets directly from O.A. The new rate for the 
state-level bribe was INR 25 crore a month and to be paid in cash directly 
to Jayalalithaa through named benami contracts for all O.A.-controlled 
quarries. Although PWD constantly claimed that as an arm of the state it 
has been judicious in exploiting sand, it neither undertook sand mining 
nor had any control over mining operations. Unlike in the past, a smoke-
screen had now been created that withstood any paper scrutiny. The 
department claimed in all affidavits filed before the court that it mined 
scientifically and thus did not harm the ecology and environment. But 
underneath this facade, a brilliant scheme of perennial looting has been 
established with an efficient system of single-window negotiation, where 
only one contractor remits the agreed sum at the designated location and 
is responsible for all other costs, payments and cuts.9
The economics of sand mining by the lifting  
contractor (LC)
While PWD is the formal operator of sand mines in Tamil Nadu, the 
entire operation is actually controlled by the lifting contractor (LC), who 
chooses the appropriate sites for the sand pits or quarries and notifies 
the PWD. The district collector then permits the quarry to be developed. 
The LC mobilises machinery and labour. Poclains10 scoop the sand and 
the lorry fleets transport it to roadside yards. The LC paves motorable 
roads in the riverbed for the smooth and quick extraction of sand. Every 
day the LC produces about 100 demand drafts (a negotiable instrument 
issued by a bank directing another bank or branch to pay a certain sum 
to the payee) drawn in favour of the PWD and the PWD officials issue 
permits to quarry 100 loads of sand. One load of sand is 2 units (1 unit 
is 100 cubic feet). Although the permit is restricted to 100 loads every 
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day, the LC continuously scoops and transports to the yard as many loads 
as required, using its own vehicles. Whoever wants to buy sand has to 
go to the yard and pay for it in cash. As of 2015–16, sand transactions 
were measured using the unit of the bucket. The machine that loads the 
vehicle scoops the sand into a bucket. Each bucket costs INR 500. Sand 
lorries range from ordinary trucks to large ‘up-to-date modern’ dump-
ers. A normal lorry can take seven buckets of sand. Thus, a lorry-load of 
sand is worth INR 3,500. Larger lorries can take 10 buckets with a total 
value of INR 5,000. The number of lorry-loads of sand sold per day varies 
from yard to yard – between 1,000 and 5,000 loads each. Estimates of 
the number of loads sold daily vary enormously. If there are 50 quarries 
and if 3,000 loads are packed from each quarry, 150,000 loads of sand 
could be loaded every day throughout the state. If INR 3,500 is paid for 
each load, the total amount collected per day could be INR 525 million. 
Extrapolating, the annual amount collected would be INR 19,162.50 
crore.11 The annual proceeds from the sale of sand that are remitted into 
the government’s treasury account total just around INR 200 crore, as per 
the demand for grants on PWD presented in the assembly  (Rajasekaran 
2015). All the rest (in the region of INR 19 lakh crores) is shared between 
the contractors, the politicians, the bureaucracy and others. The main 
contractor bears the costs of operation.
In an investigation by Frontline, the current affairs magazine, into 
sand mining (Rajasekaran 2015) the notional loss to public finances due 
to the unofficial lifting of sand per annum was estimated at INR 2,300 
crore. This calculation is premised on the fact that quite a substantial 
amount of sand sold in the yard is not reported, and the estimate of loss 
to the exchequer is based on the actual number of loads of sand sold. So 
the actual prices at which sand is sold at the yards are as crucial as the 
quantities involved. Sand prices at the yard are four to five times higher 
than the price fixed by the state. Thus, there is gross under-reporting 
both of sand sold and of the price at which sand is sold. If the calcula-
tion is reworked based on the actual price of sand in the yard, it would 
also come to our estimate. Three thousand loads of sand per quarry from 
50 quarries amounts to 150,000 loads and each load at the rate of INR 
3,500 per load works out to INR 525 million. The annual accrual could be 
estimated at INR 19,162.5 crore. The DMK treasurer (by 2017, also exec-
utive leader) M.K. Stalin has also estimated the magnitude of the loot 
in sand at INR 19,000 crore, which corroborates our estimate.12 Stalin’s 
estimates are grounded in his experience as the deputy Chief Minister 
from 2006–11, when the same arrangement was functioning during the 
previous DMK regime as well!
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The current system is reported to involve the lifting contractor ‘S.R.’ 
paying INR 10 crore in cash every day to the Chief Minister. This contrac-
tor controls the operation of all the sand and soil quarries in the state. 
The state and district administration cooperates with S.R.’s agents and 
employees. His business partners include the Finance Minister (‘O.P.S.’) 
and another cabinet minister who both share the collection – unlike ear-
lier when they received a fixed monthly payment. The sand quarries func-
tioned under this same arrangement during the previous DMK regime 
as well, but O.A. had to confine himself to the northern region leaving 
the Cauvery segment to K.C.P., a prominent DMK industrialist from the 
Cauvery region. When the AIADMK returned to power, O.A. regained 
complete control and lost it to S.R. only in 2015. Then S.R. outbid O.A. 
and got the deal in his favour mainly due to his proximity to O.P.S., who 
was the Chief Minister in 2015 when Jayalalithaa was out of power and 
imprisoned.
Democratic politics and illegal money from sand
In Tamil Nadu, electoral-democratic party politics involves armies of local 
party functionaries or cadres. The lifting contractor (LC) uses money sys-
tematically to co-opt each one of them.
While the chief of the ruling party receives about INR 300 crore 
every month (a daily stream of INR 10 crore (US$ 1.5m)) from the sand 
LCs, other lower level representatives of the people also receive sand con-
tractors’ money every month. Every village panchayat president in whose 
territory a quarry is located is reported to be paid INR 100,000 ($1,500) 
by LC every month; village councillors receive INR 10,000 ($150) 
monthly. The local member of the legislative assembly is reportedly paid 
INR 500,000 ($7,500) per month for every sand quarry located in his 
constituency. The union secretaries of the ruling party and the main 
opposition party are also paid monthly by quarry managers. High-level 
payments to other political functionaries are handled by the represent-
atives of the LC. It is not only the elected representatives of the people 
who are on the LC payrolls. Officials of all the departments concerned are 
paid on a monthly basis depending on their status and power: the highest 
paid at the district level are district collectors and the police superinten-
dents. All relevant officers further down in the hierarchy are on the LC 
payrolls. There are a few exceptions that refuse to accept money and are 
shunted out at the earliest opportune moment. Local representatives of 
the press are also paid every month. The media coverage of sand mining 
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by the local representatives of the state and national media is minimal 
and uncritical compared with other stories they cover.
Sand money and the response of the state
From various reports submitted by the court-appointed advocate com-
missioners, it is evident that when the relevant officials are paid gener-
ously by the LC on a regular basis, the official machinery works entirely in 
the interests of the LC rather than fulfilling its mandated role. The advo-
cate commissioner documented the indiscriminate mining in Kosasthalai 
river in 2000 and 2002. Indiscriminate and unscientific mining was also 
extensively documented by the expert committee appointed by the high 
court to examine the Tamiraparani river.13 All other subsequent findings 
have indicated the perpetuation of unscientific and indiscriminate sand 
mining. The claims of the PWD in all the above cases were found to be 
blatant lies. Its officers claim with impunity that the mining was scientific 
despite the findings of the experts and advocate commissioners. Impor-
tant violations that are recorded as evidence in these cases and that con-
tinue unabated include:
 1. The mining area is not specified.
 2. The mining area is not demarcated and identified.
 3. A mining plan is not prepared.
 4. The quantum of sand to be mined is not specified.
 5. The quantum of sand mined so far is not specified, recorded or 
disclosed.
 6. The sand loaded is hugely under-reported (100 loads reported 
versus 3,000 loads unreported per quarry).
 7. Money collected for sand is seriously diverted.
 8. Sand is enormously over-charged.
 9. Cash is collected for all the sand sold. All transactions thus hap-
pen outside the formal system and generate huge flows of black 
money.
10. Sand is scooped from the entire depth of the deposit (whereas 
the permitted depth is only 1 metre).
11. Far more machines than permitted to scoop are used.
12. Unauthorised roads are built in the riverbed.
13. Permanent structures are built in the riverbed.
14. Water courses are diverted.
15. Unauthorised quarrying takes place near the water supply works, 
bridges and irrigation heads.
 SAND AND THE POLIT ICS OF PLUNDER IN TAMIL NADU, INDIA 109
16. Bunds are broken.
17. Scant regard is paid to the boundaries of villages where a quarry 
is permitted.
18. Sand is moved to the yard and sold from there though the court 
has banned the operation of yards in the past.
19. Sand is quarried round the clock while as per the court order 
mining can be done only from 9 am to 6 pm.
The monitoring committee meetings at the taluk (district sub-division) 
and district levels are routinely passing identical minutes verbatim, 
meeting after meeting, indicating the level of their seriousness. Environ-
mental assessments are done by non-experts and are sometimes granted 
without evidence from field conditions. All these violations are reported 
in various advocate commissioners’ reports and in the expert-committee 
reports submitted to the courts.
Thus the enforcement systems that have been established have all 
been corrupted by the sand contract system. Enforcement is on paper 
alone. The relevant officials collude with the LC. The servants of the peo-
ple are now the slaves of the contractor.
Democratic protests and the sand contractor
Flouting all rules and norms, the entire state machinery works for the 
smooth functioning of sand mining and transport. However, indiscrim-
inate sand quarrying and transport leads to enormous ecological and 
social problems in the vicinities of the riverbed quarries. Water tables are 
depleted. Irrigation is affected as wells run dry; profits decline as crops 
dry up. Drinking water becomes scarce. With the stagnation in agricul-
ture, crop-production and employment are both in jeopardy. Roads and 
pathways are destroyed. Fatal accidents on paths and roads are on the 
rise with the continuous movement of heavy vehicles laden with sand. 
This ecological destruction and social danger is not taken passively. Peo-
ple resort to dharnas (strikes), hunger strikes, road blocks, representa-
tions, petitions, exhibitions and so on. In response, the sand contractor 
deploys multiple methods to negotiate such protests, including:
1. In extreme cases, assassinating the person protesting.
2. Maiming and injuring individuals to terrorise them.
3. Physical assault by private armies hired by the contractor.
4. Using the police to fabricate false cases, arrest and harass the 
protestors.
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 5. Entangling protestors in prolonged litigation.
 6. Manipulating caste identities to divide protestors.
 7. Directly bribing protestors with money.
 8. Offering work to compliant villagers on a regular basis.
 9. Employing small-time local leaders as supervisors.
10. Funding temple festivals, sports events and annual village festivals.
11. Funding the construction of temples.
12. Organising medical camps.
13. Offering cash loans to buy assets.
14. Hiring local vehicles to move the sand from the riverbed to the 
yard.
15. Prioritising local vehicles to transport sand from the riverbeds.
16. Issuing parking and access tokens to local leaders who can cash 
them by selling them to lorry drivers from outside the region, 
thereby helping the latter to jump the queues.
17. Making regular payments to local leaders.
18. Awarding scholarships to students from the villages where quar-
ries are located.
19. Bribing litigants who go to court to drop their cases.
20. Buying the lawyers who appear for the litigant.
There are few exceptions where the community has defied this barrage 
of ‘carrot and stick’ tactics and with the help of the courts has stopped the 
contractor. To illustrate, through a court order, Nallakannu, the veteran 
CPI leader, succeeded in stopping sand mining in the Thamiraparani river 
for five years. Kuppusamy of Karur managed to get the court to quash the 
lease granted under Rule 39 of the Mines Act. Shanmugam of Anbil won 
a court order to close certain quarries in Cauvery and Kollidam that had 
been functioning illegally for more than five years. Raju, a lawyer, man-
aged to have mining suspended in the Vellar riverbed in Vriddachalam 
(for details, see Ilangovan Rajasekaran 2015). In these exceptional cases 
people were mobilised to struggle against the designs of the LC and the 
state machinery. But in a large number of other instances, with the active 
connivance of the state government machinery, the contractor has suc-
cessfully neutralised the democratic protests of the victims.
Judicial interventions and sand mining in Tamil Nadu
The Tamil Nadu judiciary has intervened in important ways to address the 
disastrous effects of sand mining activity. It put an end to the private con-
tracting system and led to direct mining by the government department. 
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It banned sand mining in certain quarries for a specified period of time 
whenever it took note of indiscriminate mining. However, the judiciary 
has turned a blind eye to the massive corruption in sand. While it had 
provided patchy relief to certain villages, it failed to ask, or shied away 
from addressing, the basic question as to how a government department 
could flout all norms and continue functioning since 2001, while claim-
ing to the contrary. Who is behind this audacity? In a democratic system 
how can such massive corruption continue so blatantly? The victims have 
knocked at the doors of the court on several occasions for verdicts and 
the court has, on some occasions, appointed its own fact-finding com-
missions. All the commissions have reported that there is no account of 
the quantity of sand mined but confirmed its blatant and indiscriminate 
extraction. The courts have suggested new methods of monitoring but 
the government has never implemented any of them. Instead of scrutinis-
ing the failure of the state machinery and the bogus affidavits, the court 
keeps suggesting even more regulation. Committees appointed by the 
courts have repeatedly shown the falsity of claims in affidavits submit-
ted by the departments to the courts. Despite this, the courts continue 
to have faith in the departments of the state and assign more and more 
responsibilities to the very departments that are the principal violators of 
the law. No court has ever demanded evidence of the beneficiaries of this 
malfunctioning system.
Conclusion
The case of sand clearly indicates the close link between democratic pol-
itics, elections and crime in exploiting natural resources. The existing 
scholarly consensus about Tamil Nadu’s politics overwhelmingly ignores 
the complex web of welfarism, corruption and clientelism at its core. Our 
case study of criminal enterprises in sand reveals the ‘money-for-votes’ 
politics that has spread through the election process and is now firmly 
entrenched not only in electoral democracy but also is an indispensable 
part of the democratic polity of the state. Black money is generated in 
sand mining by siphoning substantial sums to the ruling party’s private 
coffers, thus diverting potential tax revenue from the state exchequer. 
A part of this money is deployed during elections to pay voters for their 
votes. Thus money that should have found its way from state investments 
into development schemes is used for cash payments for votes.
Corruption used to be understood as a by-product of Dravidian pol-
itics. The elected party used the state exchequer to expand its populist 
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schemes so as to retain an electoral base. However, a new politics has 
developed in which money is disbursed during election campaigns to 
 voters throughout the state, resourced through the crime of extract-
ing natural resources, like sand. In the new arrangement, populist dis-
bursements from the state exchequer are spliced during elections with 
pork-barrel transfers of cash to most of the voters throughout the state – 
practices that now define the democratic process. Our examination of 
natural resource crimes has resulted in a radically different and new 
interpretation of politics in Tamil Nadu. It also warrants more case  studies 
(such as on criminality in granite, liquor and beach sand) to establish the 
entrenchment and institutionalisation of other ‘convection systems’ of 
criminal accumulation, bound to the democratic process.
Notes
 1. Arm-twisting by the Congress party for more seats, the 2G scam, a formidable opposition al-
liance, the acute electricity shortage, food inflation, land grabbing and brazen corruption by 
lower-level DMK functionaries and the extraconstitutional power wielded by the first family 
(that of Karunandidhi, the then Chief Minister) are some of the reasons for the DMK’s defeat 
in those assembly elections.
 2. We interviewed politicians, officers, contractors, journalists, law officers and middle-men. All 
of them shared with us details about sand mining and politics on the condition of anonymity. 
Hence, the evidence in this chapter is not attributed and has to be taken at face value alone.
 3. The mining of beach sand is outside the scope of the research reported here; see Suresh 2015.
 4. Based on information collected through interviews with persons associated with this process 
and whose identity cannot be revealed.
 5. At 8.5 per cent per annum in real terms from 2004–14 and at 6.5 per cent in the 1980s and 90s; 
see Government of India 2015; Kohli 2006.
 6. Contracts disguising the identities of transacting parties.
 7. Paras 22, 23 and 25 of the Judgment of Madras High Court dated 26.7.2001 in Contempt 
Petition Number 561/2001.
 8. These cash flows were not spent entirely on elections. Massive properties were acquired over 
time and because of such accumulation both Jayalalithaa and Sasikala were sentenced to four 
years of imprisonment by the supreme court of India. Sasikala is serving her prison sentence; 
Jayalalithaa died in 2016. See Ravishankar 2017 and Subramanian 2017 for an attempt to 
unravel the wealth accumulated by Jayalalithaa and Sasikala.
 9. This brilliant plan introduced by Jayalalithaa was not a new concept to emerge after the PWD 
takeover of sand mining. The system had been conceived and implemented earlier, during 
her previous regime between 1991 and 1996. TAMIN is a state-owned corporation involved 
in mineral mining, including granites. During the early 1990s, granite exports boomed; an 
engineer-turned-civil service official (I.A.S.) was directing TAMIN. In collaboration with a 
small-time contractor in Madurai, he conceived the idea of lifting contracts and showed the 
private profit matrix that makes it possible for the ruling party to use public wealth. The small-
time contractor who began as a lifting contractor for TAMIN in Madurai eventually grew into 
a multi-billionaire who came to control all of TAMIN’s granite mines. He is the king-pin behind 
the granite scandal of present day Tamil Nadu (for more details, see Rajasekaran 2015).
10. A poclain is a mechanised digger with buckets and grabs to move rocks, rubble, earth and 
sand.
11. This estimate is based on interviews with former sand yard managers and employees in Tirichi-
rapalli district. For an all-India estimate, see Rege 2016.
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12. Dinakaran, Tamil, 3 September 2015, Trichy edition p. 5.
13. Order of the High Court of Madras in WP.NO.11562/2010. The court found that most of the 
rules of the Mining Act were flouted in the Kollidam riverbed (order dated 3 August 2012 in 
WP(MD) NO.4699 of 2012). Indiscriminate and unscientific mining was reported by the advo-
cate commissioner in the Cauvery riverbed (WP(MD) NO.9336 of 2015) in Trichy district.
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Dams, development and politics 
in Arunachal Pradesh, India
Deepak K. Mishra
Grounded in political economy, this chapter explores the il/legal economies 
of dams by exploring the crime-governance nexus produced by dam construc-
tion. It considers the politics of hydro-development, of political parties, of cor-
porate houses and of local ethnic competition. Processes are traced to show 
the criminalisation of politics as well as rampant accumulation from crime 
and corruption in and around dams and infrastructure for hydro-electricity. 
This evidence not only shows extensive inefficiencies in the management of 
water but also how ‘hydro-criminality’ requires the violation of customary 
‘norms of violation’ in access to watercourses, forests and land, the breaking 
of state law and the manipulation of loopholes and environmental laws.
Introduction
In the Himalayan region of North East India, dams have been projected 
not only as a solution to India’s growing hunger for energy but also as 
the cornerstone of the neoliberal development strategy for the region. In 
Arunachal Pradesh alone, a state of 1.3 million people spread out over 
83,743 km2 of mountainous land cut by mighty rivers, nearly 160 mem-
oranda of understanding (MoU) for hydro-electricity projects,1 hardly 
noticed at the national level, have been signed. A group of activists, with 
support from students and directly affected locals, oppose the construc-
tion of these dams for two broad reasons: first, the ecological, economic 
and social desirability of such dams; second, the question of criminal 
corruption regarding these dams, involving politicians, bureaucrats and 
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corporate houses. This chapter focusses on the second course of resist-
ance: the linkages between dams, development and political corruption 
in the Himalayan state of Arunachal Pradesh.2
Dams in the context of neoliberal development
In Sunil Khilnani’s evocative expression, ‘India in the 1950s fell in love 
with the idea of concrete’ (Khilnani 1999). Nehru himself called large 
dams the ‘temples of modern India’, part of the strategy of rapid indus-
trialisation through hydro-electricity, flood control, navigation and 
fisheries, lean-season river flows, improved roads and irrigation for agri-
cultural transformation. Yet dams also led to the enclosure and flooding 
of land, deskilling and displacing large numbers of people, dispropor-
tionately from Scheduled Castes and Tribes which were already poor and 
marginalised. They generated environmental problems, ranging from 
loss of biodiversity to soil salinity (D’Souza 2008). In the post-reform 
phase (since the early 1990s), as the Indian economy started to grow at 
historically unprecedented rates, ‘energy security’ has been among the 
key concerns of the state.3 And the ‘securitisation of water’ has delegiti-
mised alternative perspectives on water and livelihoods. As Hill observes:
Accelerating the construction of hydro-power in the Himalayas 
becomes portrayed as something akin to a geostrategic imperative, 
with the effect that some commentators demand the silencing of 
dissent and the scrapping of due process around the social, envi-
ronmental and economic impacts of planned projects within their 
borders. Discussion over the appropriate courses of action to coun-
ter the perceived “illegal” or “unjust” construction taking place on 
the other side of the international border (China) tends to have a 
singular focus on technocratic supply-side solutions of building 
more large-scale dams and empowers those with expertise in that 
domain at the expense of other visions of what development could 
or should entail. (Hill 2015, 733)
Hydro-power is being propagated as a ‘clean’ source of energy and mega 
dams are being projected as an indispensable component of India’s devel-
opment strategy. Unlike the multi-purpose dams of the past, they are 
increasingly being justified on the grounds of power generation alone; 
and the state’s role as the primary agency for energy infrastructure has 
been replaced by the idea of the state as coordinating the participation of 
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the private power sector (Schneider 2015). Both the Shukla Commission 
Report and the Vision 2020 document prepared by the DONER (Minis-
try of Development of the North Eastern Region, Government of India) 
emphasised the national demand for energy and the infrastructure deficit 
of the region as a key hindrance to its response. And these ideas were given 
great significance in India’s Look East policy, which aspires to integrate 
North East India with East and South East Asia (Haokip 2015; Das and 
Thomas 2016). Other factors reinforced the case for developing hydro-
power in North East India. The persistent and heavy fiscal dependence of 
the North Eastern states on central government grants contradicted the 
assumptions of the neoliberal federal order, operationalised through pro-
visions like the Fiscal Responsibility Act.4 Meanwhile the ‘success’ of two 
hilly states, Himachal Pradesh and Sikkim, in generating their own fiscal 
resources through hydro-power strengthened the argument that hydro-
power potential could be leveraged to end the fiscal dependence on the 
central government of the mountainous, ‘special category’ frontier states 
(Mishra and Upadhyay 2017). So, policy has been changed to incentivise 
hydro-power and encourage private sector investment. These include tax 
exemptions, a provision for up to 40 per cent of saleable energy to be pri-
vately traded, and special access to benefits of the Mega Power Projects 
policy (for circumstances when electricity is generated for more than one 
state). Inter-ministerial groups, special task forces, single-window clear-
ance procedures and monitoring by the central government add to the 
institutional complexity of hydro-power development. These initiatives 
ride roughshod over local customary law. Land in Arunachal is owned 
by tribal communities governed by customary law, and private owner-
ship of land has been forbidden (Harriss-White, Mishra and Upadhyay 
2009; Mishra 2015).5 People other than Arunachal Pradesh Scheduled 
Tribes (APST) cannot legally hold land occupancy certificates. And in the 
absence of a legal land market, the valuation of commonly held land for 
collective compensation purposes is an arbitrary exercise where under-
valuation is hard to prove in a court. In the rest of this chapter we explore 
the relation between legal crimes in hydro-development, the flouting of 
customary norms and party politics.
Dams in Arunachal Pradesh: contestations over 
development
Although discussions about the hydro-power potential of Arunachal 
Pradesh are long-standing, it is only since 2000 that a serious effort to 
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exploit this potential has started (Ete 2014). Central and state government 
politicians have mastered and propagated a new discourse expressing 
the centrality of dam-construction for Arunachal’s future development. 
The state’s hydro-power policy proclaims that the state could be ‘floating’ 
on ‘hydro-dollars’, as Middle Eastern oil states do on ‘petro-dollars’ (cited 
in Baruah 2012). In March 2015, the then Chief Minister Nabam Tuki, 
who also held the finance portfolio, claimed after the commissioning of 
just three ongoing hydro-power projects in the state that it would earn 
INR 445 crore (INR 4.4 billion ($66 million)) annually as revenue from 
12 per cent power supplied by the projects free for the state to sell.6 At the 
completion of all ongoing projects, Arunachal Pradesh would meet 40 
per cent of India’s power demand and graduate from severe dependence 
to financial self-sufficiency. The political elite has recognised two road-
blocks to completion: first, environmental clearances – the state’s own 
procedures protecting the Himalayan ecosystem and societies immedi-
ately engaged with it – and second, civil society demands for compensa-
tion and political mobilisation against dam construction in Assam and in 
Arunachal Pradesh.
The interests in ‘hydro-criminality’
The politics around the signing of MoUs to build dams is shrouded in a 
great deal of stealth and secrecy. MoUs are decided not through open 
competition but at the apex level, formally that of the Chief Secretary 
but in practice at the level of the Chief Minister. It is the Chief Minister 
and a few of that minister’s coterie who make the decisions to award 
contracts. Other politicians down to local MLAs representing regions 
to be affected by dams profess ignorance of details (Ete 2014).7 While 
Arunachal has a special nodal Department of Hydro-power Devel-
opment to monitor and implement MoUs, in practice, after signing, 
another kind of bureaucratic politics comes into play. While the initial 
signing of MoUs is implemented through the state-level bureaucracy, 
ground-level processes of surveys, impact assessments and clearances 
involve a large number of central government agencies, particularly 
the Indian government’s central cabinet (if special concessions to reg-
ulations are required) and the Ministry of Environment and Forests, 
which operates with compartmentalised responsibilities and tasks. 
Then, when construction begins, a further range of local players enter 
hydro-development.
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Capital
Many companies work in the increasingly complex economic structure 
of the hydro-power sector in Arunachal, prominent among which are 
public sector companies, such as the North Eastern Electric Power Cor-
poration Limited (NEEPCO), constructing large dams in three districts 
and also taking over projects allotted to other developers or through joint 
ventures.
From DONER data, the private-sector share of power gener-
ated is likely to be around 57 per cent while, of the total MoUs signed, 
86 per cent are with private sector companies. In a series of reports 
in the Economic Times, the investigative environmental journalist M. 
Rajshekhar pointed out that three different kinds of companies ‘flocked 
to Arunachal’ to develop hydro-power. The first were large private sec-
tor power companies, like that of Naveen Jindal, a prominent industri-
alist and then Congress party MP. These companies aimed ‘to expand 
and diversify capacity’. Jindal Power Ltd. (JPL), a subsidiary of Jindal 
Steel & Power Ltd., is involved in several hydro-power projects, three of 
which operate through subsidiaries in collaboration with the Arunachal 
Pradesh Hydro-Corporation. Meanwhile Reliance Power is operating in 
11 locations inside the state. The second were EPC (engineering, pro-
curement and construction) firms, which saw a chance to move up the 
value chain. Mostly from Andhra Pradesh, they had experience in build-
ing dams and other large construction projects, but not of financing and 
operating them.8 The third were companies which had neither experi-
ence in building dams nor the desire to build hydro-projects; they sim-
ply wanted to sell their contract speculatively to the next buyer for quick 
profits.9 Playing smaller roles were ‘companies in the business of, among 
other things, seeds, travel, highways and real estate’ (Rajshekhar 2013). 
The Economic Times report points out:
The company with the maximum number of licences, 12 in all, 
to build and operate hydro-power projects in Arunachal Pradesh 
is Energy Development Company (EDC). Amar Singh, the for-
mer Samajwadi Party leader, is its chairman, and actor Amitabh 
Bachchan was on its board till July 2011. Around the time it bagged 
10 of those Arunachal projects, adding up to 500 MW, EDC was 
operating 16 MW of hydel capacity. This is one kind of mismatch in 
the efforts of Arunachal to become a hydel powerhouse overnight. 
(Rajshekhar 2013)
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The very fact that so many of the companies were from Andhra Pradesh 
should not be taken as entirely accidental. However, although middle-
men who acted as go-betweens between Arunachal politicians and the 
Andhra owners of these companies were mentioned in interviews, no 
further details were forthcoming other than that such middlemen have 
careers brokering transactions in a range of projects such as roads, build-
ings and bridges.
The bureaucracy
Members of the next class of actor, bureaucrats and technocrats, mainly 
work as ‘junior partners in fixing the deals’.10 Yet the junior partner is 
of great significance at the stage after deal-making when basic proce-
dural formalities have to be addressed. Alongside the processes of sur-
vey and construction, bureaucrats at different levels protect the interests 
of private companies. Land acquisition has proved to be an extremely 
difficult process and support from the district administration and local 
politicians was crucial for the construction process. The safety and secu-
rity of personnel and materials, the transport of machines and build-
ing materials, the negotiation of local demands and minor accidents all 
needed brokerage by the local administration. Even when public sec-
tor companies like NEEPCO are building infrastructure and dams, this 
local bureaucratic support to private business is essential since work is 
constantly being subcontracted to private companies. Government offi-
cials rarely voice their experiences in public. A small proportion oppose 
hydro-power development programmes per se, while others view hydro-
power generation as a necessary step towards the development of Arun-
achal Pradesh, and yet others distinguish the likely benefits of dams for 
future development from the pervasive and systemic corruption that 
characterises their execution.
Local politics
As construction work is launched, local politicians – the local Arunachal 
Minister, MLA and their followers – come to control the work.11 It is they 
who negotiate with local gaon burhas (headmen) and villagers, prepare 
and broker the deals on formal and informal compensation packages, act 
as arbitrators in cases of conflict and provide informal sources of secu-
rity for the staff, machines and materials.12 It is hard to imagine that all 
these micro-political and economic services would be provided without 
any quid pro quo. Two different classes of operator support the activities 
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of the companies at the local level – although some individuals combine 
both roles. One is the politicians, who make deals with company officials; 
they also help set the terms and conditions for the various kinds of deals, 
rents and bribes (in cash and kind) offered to others. The second group 
is the contractors, who are provided with work orders and supply orders 
as part of these deals. Often linked to the politicians through family and 
local ethnicity, contractors have been very vocal in organising support 
for the dams. The village-level leaders, such as the gaon burha and the 
panchayat members, also play significant roles in dam construction. Land 
and forests are legally under community (tribal) control; hence commu-
nity support is a precondition to dam projects. Some village leaders are 
simply clients of local MLA patrons and act as their representatives on the 
ground. However, since they have to face their villagers on a day-to-day 
basis, they do not necessarily agree with the project managers – many 
are sceptical about the benefits of dams. From the perspective of their 
interests, these dams and dam construction companies are a threat to 
their livelihoods and resources. Some of them even actively supported 
and organised the anti-dam movement. Many, however, are unable to 
resist. While their tribal people expected them to protect their land and 
forests from encroachments, the local leaders lacked the financial power 
or social prestige and influence to confront their MLAs and other power-
ful politicians intent on forcing this transformation through.
Civil society
Local intellectuals (school, college and university students and teachers; 
government officials, a small number of journalists, NGO workers and 
independent researchers) do not constitute a coherent interest group. 
Until recently, civil society in Arunachal Pradesh had a relatively narrow 
base. However, the politics of dams has created a new space for political 
mobilisation through a range of organisations. The resistance to dams 
has been strongest in the Siang valley, where a large number of organ-
isations such as Forum for Siang Dialogue, Siang People’s Forum, Sirit 
Siyom Banggo Dam Affected Peoples’ Forum, Siang Bachao Andolan and 
the Nyiko Bachao Forum have been active in resisting the dams on vari-
ous grounds. Other prominent groups include the Save Mon Region Fed-
eration from the Kameng-Tawang region. Anticipating the likely adverse 
impacts of these dams on the lower riparian areas of Assam, a strong peo-
ple’s movement has also taken root in Assam. Prominent among these 
groups is Krishak Mukti Sangram Samiti, Assam led by Akhil Gagoi, a 
leader who was also part of the Anna Hazare-led movement for a Jan 
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Lokpal Act. Several NGO groups, such as Barefoot College, Tilonia, South 
Asia Network of Rivers, Dams and People (SARDP) and Kalpabriksha are 
also involved in various ways, particularly in advocacy against the dams. 
Among all these actors, probably the most affected and yet least heard are 
rural people living near proposed dams and their infrastructure. Despite 
hearing rumours that their lives are going to be greatly affected by the 
dams, they have never been formally consulted. When interviewed for 
this research, their dominant narrative was that dams might be neces-
sary but the way they were being executed prioritises the interests of the 
‘rich and powerful’ over those of ‘ordinary local people’. Many were also 
cynical about the anti-dam groups because agitators seemed to pursue 
their own self-interest, by bargaining with the ruling party or with the 
construction companies for a share in contract work or compensation 
money, rather than fighting for justice, the environment or for the wider 
interests of local society.
The contours of contestation
In this section, we examine one of the cases of local resistance and con-
flict that dam construction has triggered concerning the flouting of tribal 
norms for the extraction and management of natural resources as well as 
about political decisions. This case study enables us to draw some con-
clusions about the relations between customary crime, legal crime and 
politics, which will be developed in the next section.
Among the proposed dams in Arunachal Pradesh, it is opposition to 
the Siang river dam projects and the mega hydel (hydroelectric power) 
project over the Subansiri that is the most developed. The Siang river 
dams are being proposed in areas dominated by the Adi tribe, one of the 
two largest tribal groups in the state. The Adis’ apex collective political 
institutions, called Kebang, are well organised (Danggen 2003). Adis are 
relatively well educated13 and well represented among the Arunachali 
elite, which consists of politicians, bureaucrats and the professionally 
skilled. Adi opposition to the dam project, which was to be constructed 
by the JayPee group, a private consortium, was grounded in ways sug-
gestive of the pervasive criminality of dam-building. Inadequate infor-
mation at the early stages and doubts about its environmental impacts 
and socio-economic benefits were at the core of opposition to the project. 
The legal requirement for public hearings based on adequate informa-
tion-sharing has been rampantly violated. According to a recent press 
release by the Siang Indigenous Farmers’ Forum and Siang People’s 
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Forum, their opposition to the project is on the following grounds of 
negligence:
[S]uch insensitive and indiscriminate allocation of all the river 
valleys of the state in general and Siang belt in particular may lead 
to tribal holocaust due to multiple impact of environment  hazards, 
demographic changes due to migrant labour, loss of social habitat 
of the tribal people, change in socio economic  policy of the state 
due involvement of corporate politics in the state against the tribal 
interest. There is no adequate Govt (sic) policy to redress the 
grievances of project affected people and there is no clear cut Govt 
policy on relief, rehabilitation, settlement and compensation for 
land loss in case of installation of mega dams in the Siang valley 
either from union Govt or state Govt… Arunachal Pradesh have 
80 per cent forest cover, but all the forest are private forest owned 
by private individual or community and the same is duly recog-
nized under the customary practices. But despite recognition of 
land rights under the customary practices, the Govt is yet to come 
out with clear cut policy for recognition of the same. (Arunachal 
Times, 3 March 2015)
In a policy no-man’s-land, such questions of ownership and compen-
sation were common to almost all the projects in the state. What was 
unique to the Siang dams was the higher levels of political awareness, the 
multiple centres of power within the local community and the political 
competition they generated. The value of fertile plains-land collectively 
owned by the Adi was also another reason why submergence of such land 
was locally unacceptable; it flouted customary norms. At an early stage of 
this project, the then Chief Minister of the State, Dorjee Khandu, strongly 
favoured the construction of the dam and attempted to mobilise opinion 
in its support. A newspaper report summarises the unambiguous support 
that the dam construction got from the political leadership:
Chief Minister Dorjee Khandu reiterated his stand over the need 
of improving the economic background of the state to make it self- 
sufficient and self-reliant… The Chief Minister was addressing a 
consultative meeting of the project affected people of East Siang 
with the government and Jay Pee group at the Banquet hall today… 
Even for a small project we need to plead the Centre for fund, the 
chief minister lamented. Hydro Power is only such resource which 
could sail Arunachal Pradesh towards sustainable and resourceful 
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development, he assertively said… Taking part in the discussion, 
MP Ninong Ering, MLAs Tamiyo Taga, Ralom Borang and Passang 
Dorjee Sona strongly advocated for construction of the project. 
(Arunachal Times, 9 September 2010)
The student organisations in the area, particularly the Adi Students 
Union (AdiSu), were opposed to the project on the grounds that it coun-
tered local peoples’ rights over land and forests. The AdiSu alleged that:
the [outcome of the] meeting was pre-decided as the meeting was 
held with the sole motive to take pro dam decision… [A]ll the del-
egates of the meeting were pro-dam people with vested interests 
who have been brought to Itanagar by the government and Jaypee 
Associates. It’s a blot on democracy and indigenous people’s rights 
by the Government and the Jaypee Associates whose only motive is 
profit.14 (Arunachal Times, 9 September 2010)
The protestors, organised under various names, not only mobilised at the 
grassroots level but also attempted to collaborate with NGOs and move-
ments in various other parts of the country, notably Assam. In a meeting 
held in Guwahati, RTI activist and General Secretary of Siang Indigenous 
Farmers’ Forum, Tashik Pangkam, alleged that ‘nine MoUs were recently 
signed clandestinely without any public hearing… All norms concern-
ing big dams – be it land acquisition, rehabilitation of displaced people, 
downstream impact assessment, forest clearance, etc, – are being vio-
lated with impunity.’ Anti-big dam activist Neeraj Vagholikar, while ques-
tioning the rationale behind the centre’s hurry in clearing mega dams 
in Arunachal Pradesh, said that it had not learned any lessons from the 
Lower Subansiri hydro-electric project stalemate.15
Opposition has also grown in Assam to dams in Arunachal Pradesh. 
Often the issue is framed as an Arunachal-versus-Assam problem, echo-
ing the conflicts around the still-unresolved land boundaries that have 
been used in the past by political parties in both states to create rifts. The 
political confrontation picked up momentum in mid-2011. ‘East Siang 
district administration on May 23 had warned the people that strong 
action would be taken against anti-dam protestors if they take law into 
their hands’ (Arunachal Times, 27 May 2011). As tensions escalated, the 
Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) resorted to force: lathi charges and 
blank firing to disperse agitators.
Since that turning point, the politics of the Adi belt has centred on 
the question of hydel projects. The Bane Kebang, the Adi’s apex body, has 
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been confronted with an existential crisis as it has become very difficult 
for them to take a stand on hydel. According to a relatively younger mem-
ber of the Kebang in an interview,
The top leadership consists of influential members of the commu-
nity, which means they are either former and serving bureaucrats 
or businessmen. While there have been repeated demands from the 
public for taking a stand on the issue, it has been very difficult for 
the leadership to take a stand that would go against the government 
and the politicians of the ruling party.
Reports on the 36th Annual Conference of the Adi Bane Kebang sum up 
the dilemma of the organisation. Tayi Taggu, chair of the Hydro Power 
and Surface Communication Committee (HPSCC), elaborated on the 
hydro-power potentialities of the state, especially the Siang river, and 
explained why dams were the need of the hour:
Mega dams in Arunachal might not be fully viable, but we can 
certainly opt for smaller dams. We have already submitted a 
memorandum to the government in this regard… The Siang is an 
international river, and since China which controls its headwaters 
has already started building dams on it, we must not relegate our-
selves to the weaker side. (Echo of Arunachal, 12 November 2015)16
International prestige is at stake.
If they took positions on the question of desirability of dams, tribal 
government institutions such as the Kebangs were attacked from within. 
An opinion published in the Arunachal Times under the provocative title 
of ‘Kebang versus Development’ even accused one such Kebang of creat-
ing the grounds for future conflicts between APSTs and the emergence of 
‘anti-national activities’:
The kebang was organized just to oppose the Lower Siang HE Project 
(2700 MW) to be executed by Jaypee Arunachal Power Ltd…. there 
were no such valid points of discussion about the refusal of this 
project. We all know that Arunachal Pradesh can excel in Hydro 
Power. It will provide employment facilities both directly and indi-
rectly to our young generation. Almost all big developers of India 
like Reliance, Jaypee, L&T, DS Group are in Arunachal Pradesh only 
because of Hydro Power… The members of Bogum Bokang Kebang 
expressed that they are ready to take extreme action against those 
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who are in favour of hydro-electric project. That is a clear indication 
of communal conflict and inter Adi society clash in the near future. 
I request all forums of Adi Communities not to invite non Adi person 
in our Adi kebang. (Arunachal Times, 18 October 2011, emphasis 
added)
Several general patterns of political engagement emerge from the contes-
tations that characterise the construction of dams in Arunachal. First, it 
has led locally to deep socio-political polarisation. Tribal community insti-
tutions have a long history of consensus-building through negotiations 
and bargaining, which has expressed itself through electoral politics in 
Arunachal. Despite the fact that regional parties have been in power 
only for very brief periods of time and that national level political par-
ties – Congress and in recent years the BJP – dominate state politics, local 
politics in the state is anchored to inter- and intra-community solidarity 
as well as competition (Ghosh and Mishra 2013). The new dam-based 
modes of delivering development will have significant effects including 
rising inequality, the concentration of political power and erosion of the 
local social trust through which tribal society governs itself. The killing of 
two people by police gunfire, during protests against the arrest of a prom-
inent anti-dam activist, is a rare incident of political unrest and violence 
in Arunachal.17
The second kind of political engagement reinforces the private 
interests and power of state-level legislators. The signing of MoUs and 
MoAs at the apex level is followed by a series of negotiations with local 
interests, in which the MLA and his or her associates and the district 
administration are key players. Managing and suppressing dissent, these 
figures also act as local guarantors for the project. This local authoritar-
ian politics around dams builds and consolidates disregard for law.
Third, and in contrast, by opposing the criminality of the dam pro-
jects, local activists have tried to create solidarity networks within and 
outside the North East, which, again is a relatively new phenomenon in a 
state where nativist politics has strong roots.
Fourth, as Ete (2014) comments, the politics of these
contestations are, [however], more layered than merely a “resist-
ance against destructive development”. There is a range of local 
conflicts being played out: conflict between communities and the 
state, between communities and private companies, as well as intra- 
community contestations. These conflicts demonstrate the complexity 
of the local politics of hydro-power development. (Ete 2014)
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Linking dams and the political process
It is now possible to explore the links between the institutional context in 
which dam construction has been undertaken in Arunachal Pradesh and 
the political processes in the state. Earlier we exposed the implications 
of the corruption and violation of customary norms associated with dam 
construction and party politics in Arunachal. Within the limitations of 
the evidence collected, in this section we reflect first on how the politics 
of dam construction is embedded in the state’s complex politics, and sec-
ond on how the politics of dam construction and the corruption around it 
has also influenced politics in the state.
Corruption and election cycles
Political corruption has a different connotation in popular experience in 
Arunachal Pradesh from that identified in the constitutional framework – 
which refers to deviations from the rule and/or from established legal 
parameters. Corruption is often seen in relational terms, embedded in 
the informal economies and tribal norms of reciprocities and patronage. 
However, there are increasing indications that this local relational con-
cept of corruption is being violated and contested.
It is now fairly common for politicians to bribe voters – in cash and 
in kind – during the elections. There are obvious links between the calcu-
lative philanthropy of politicians at election time and the massive corrup-
tion that has effectively been normalised in the electoral politics of the 
state. This involves the siphoning-off of public money for private benefit, 
thereby breaking many procedural norms and laws of the land. In the few 
cases that have been discussed in public, the typical modus operandi was 
to divert public money to private accounts by awarding supply orders 
to close relatives.18 This corruption cascades in cycles of reciprocity and 
‘retail’ corruption that is ever more decentralised, but which is linked to 
high-level multi-crore scams.
The links between scams and state politics came to the forefront 
when Kalikho Pul (who was Chief Minister of Arunachal for a brief 
period, after the legislators of the ruling Congress party broke away and 
formed a government under his leadership with the help of the BJP) 
lost power following a ruling by the supreme court and committed sui-
cide in his official residence. His long suicide note gives details of many 
alleged illegal deals involving politicians and judges.19 These include pri-
vate commissions from the auctioning of rivers, the systematic private 
embezzlement of official development funds, of financial transfers for 
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the power sector and the public distribution system, for SGSY logistics,20 
flood relief, other funds for central government’s sponsored schemes, 
and non-Plan expenditure and bribes for transfers and promotions. While 
criminal malpractices and corruption are widely regarded as wrong out-
side the election cycle, when they underpin electoral politics then they 
are morally normalised.
Political parties and corruption
The relationship between the looting of state resources and electoral 
democracy is very strong. Other chapters in this book confirm that it is 
by no means confined to the contemporary era, to Arunachal Pradesh or 
North East India. In the case of Arunachal Pradesh, as elsewhere, politi-
cal corruption needs to be embedded in the political economy of develop-
ment itself to be understood.
While corruption has been theorised as an outcome of excessive 
state intervention and the resulting rent-seeking behaviour of bureau-
crats, liberalisation has led to an increase in corruption rather than elim-
inating it (Harriss-White and White 1996). Key to understanding the 
centrality of, and increase in, corruption in Arunachal’s politics is the role 
of central assistance to the state government. The fiscal dependence of 
the state on central government has been one of the significant undercur-
rents of centre–state politics in the region (Ghosh and Mishra 2013). The 
use of ethnic politics by local elites for state power and ‘rents’ has been 
a persistent feature of India’s development (Adduci 2012). But while in 
other contexts, access to state power becomes a means to extract a rent 
from various sources, including capitalists, in Arunachal and other hilly 
states ‘given the overwhelming significance of the government sector in the 
economy, the state itself becomes the primary site of rent extraction and con-
flicts over it’ (Ghosh and Mishra 2013, 306, emphasis added). The social 
and economic mobility of tribal elites and individual accumulation tra-
jectories within tribes is rooted in access to state resources through both 
lawful and unlawful means:
Occupationally this group consists of politicians, businessmen 
and traders, and bureaucrats. The expansion of the state bureau-
cracy, of construction and infrastructural activities undertaken 
by the military and the civil administration, the timber trade and 
general trading and business opportunities in consumption goods 
created by the emergence of the urban, service class have nurtured 
these elites. But the key to their economic base is their access to 
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the resources of the state, which has depended in turn upon their 
capacity to exploit an ethnicised polity and society. (Harriss-White, 
Mishra and Upadhyay 2009)
The opening-up of the hydro-power sector to private capital is probably 
the first major break in these relations of criminal accumulation, and 
in this sense the scaled-up pattern of Indian corruption is being main-
streamed in Arunachal. As yet, the significance of local state resources 
persists. The routine instability and frequent switching of loyalty to the 
party in power at the centre is rooted in this political economy of rent 
seeking and the competition around it.
Ethnic networks are key to this persistence, structuring political com-
petition. Reciprocities are transacted through the distribution of favours – 
such as work orders, supply orders, bureaucratic positions – in cash and 
also in kind (TV sets, motorbikes, cars and medical expenses). This criminal 
predation is sanctioned by tribal communities, precisely because the loot is 
shared. In turn, when corrupt politicians are attacked by rivals, ethnic net-
works are mobilised. Politicians, for example, have protected bureaucrats 
and contractors who have grabbed government land (often the gardens of 
government buildings) in a quid pro quo for their support. In the absence 
of a strong capitalist class, this system of political and economic crime has 
given rise to a regime of accumulation by corruption.
Property rights over water
Hydro-power development cannot take place without establishing a set 
of transferable property rights over water. In Arunachal, political corrup-
tion involving water dates to the era before the ‘MoU virus’, as the then 
Minister of State for Power Jairam Ramesh described the AP situation in 
2008 (Chakravartty 2015). From time to time, the post-colonial state has 
asserted its rights over rivers and streams,21 whereas, in local contexts, 
many community leaders still describe all bodies of water as the collectively 
owned property of the local tribe. Recently however, through promoting 
schemes like fish ponds, the state has helped create private property rights 
over water bodies. The destruction and private commercialisation of com-
mon property rights has done nothing but accelerate under hydro-power 
development. It is difficult, however, to pin legal concepts of corruption 
and crime on these relationships. Given the property rights structures and 
the fact that rules governing the transfer of property are either absent or 
ambiguous, it is local collective moral norms that supply the basis for judg-
ments, punishments and movements of political resistance.
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Hydro-power projects as a new site of accumulation 
by corruption
Building dams creates opportunities and costs, which are unequally dis-
tributed across society. Local politicians, private tribal contractors and 
bureaucrats obtain new fields of power and rents. The Inner Line Per-
mit, which restricts entry to outsiders and prevents their purchasing land 
or immovable property or obtaining trading licences, has created rents 
for those tribal people able to rent out land, apartments for offices and 
domestic use, business licences and rent from the state (Harriss-White, 
Mishra and Upadhyay 2009). This ethnically segmented business class is 
tightly networked to politicians, either through family or clan linkages or 
patronage relations. Their access to government supply orders is negoti-
ated through ethnic competition and political brokerage. Shares in con-
tract work and supply orders are often an index of a tribal community’s 
bargaining strength (Harriss-White, Mishra and Prakash 2017). Dams 
and the associated investment in roads have opened up further scope 
for rent collection for this class. Allotting work orders to firms owned by 
close family members of prominent ruling-party politicians is routine. 
Frequent allegations against prominent politicians involve them siphon-
ing public money through a combination of fraud and nepotism. How-
ever, such is the dense thicket of secrecy among the political elite that 
it is only through Public Interest Litigation and court investigations that 
these cases are brought into the public domain.
The mechanisms of ‘hydro-criminality’
It is therefore difficult to unearth the exact ways corruption and crime 
take place. However, by collating fragments of information with insights 
provided by informants, we have mapped their workings. Some of 
these processes are specific to dam construction, while others are part 
of the general political landscape of Arunachal. Given the lumpy capi-
tal investment, prolonged gestation period and flow of profits over time, 
the redefinition of property rights over water is crucial for profits from 
hydro-power (Baruah 2012). There are two key implications for cor-
ruption. First, property rights over water and the terms and conditions 
under which they are transferred to the hydro-power developer are cru-
cial to the project’s profitability. Second, given the risky nature and mag-
nitude of the initial investment that is required and the long gestation 
period that follows, the developer is dependent on those who (formally 
or informally) safeguard and guarantee these rights during the lengthy 
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construction phase. The stream of returns likely to be generated after the 
dam is operational and the capacity of the developer to mobilise large 
initial sums of money are crucial indicators of the capacity to bribe. Our 
research has identified a set of modes of corruption reported to have 
taken place in the construction of dams.
1. The state’s power to allocate rights over flowing water for com-
mercial use in itself has triggered corrupt bargaining for property 
rights. As Rajshekhar (2013) points out, there was no regulatory 
control over the state government’s rationing permission for such 
transfer of property rights. This has resulted in a much higher num-
ber of projects that can be justified on grounds of demand or feasi-
bility. Furthermore, permission to construct dams was granted to 
parties without any transparent competitive bidding, allowing the 
emergence of a clandestine secondary market for signed MoUs.
2. Because of the ways the contracts to build dams were awarded, 
many companies were granted permission without any prior expe-
rience of dam construction. Insider information suggests that the 
two key parameters that governed such access were proximity to 
ruling party politicians and the ability to mobilise bribes. This then 
incentivised the illegal market in MoUs.
3. Public sector banks financed the private companies. MoUs guar-
anteed the mobilisation of such loans but they were also contin-
gent on political patronage. The manipulation of the ‘joint venture’ 
arrangement between private companies and state agencies, when 
the projects awarded to some private companies were re-desig-
nated as joint venture companies with state-owned corporations, 
was another source of fraud.
4. The flouting of existing legal provisions, the deliberate manipula-
tion of information and evidence during the preparation of feasi-
bility studies and fraudulent clearance procedures, environmental 
impact assessments, detailed project reports and cost–benefit anal-
ysis have led to substantial profits for private firms. Companies 
were unlikely to be able to manipulate the early data-intensive 
phases without backing from politicians and bureaucrats, in both 
the state and the central government.
5. Apart from property rights over water, the construction of dams 
involves acquiring a substantial amount of land for reservoirs, 
construction sites and other installations. In Arunachal Pradesh, 
compensation for such land involves additional complications 
because, while land is formally owned by the village communities 
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or the government, informal private property rights over land 
have developed in practice. Often, as soon as the land acquisition 
process starts, powerful elites encroach upon this land and then 
demand compensation as private owners. In fact, this has been one 
of the ways through which local elites are pacified by private com-
panies. In some other cases, a nominal amount is given to the vil-
lage funds as compensation for the collectively owned land while a 
substantial amount is given to influential people and local leaders.
6. Payments to the state exchequer as royalties from the sale of power 
have not yet started to flow in, but by 2015 some INR 14,000 crore 
of advance payments had already been made by several Public 
Sector Units.22 After taking over as Chief Minister on 9 April 2007, 
Dorjee Khandu promised to reopen the state-owned APEX Cooper-
ative bank whose 32 branches had lain defunct for two years after 
a loan scam of over INR 200 crore had been unearthed. Within a 
few weeks, the CM secured a loan of INR 225 crore from the PSU 
power major – the North-eastern Hydropower Corporation – and 
poured liquidity into the bank, enabling it to reopen, much to the 
relief of hundreds of thousands of depositors who were mostly 
poor locals (The Hindu, 4 May 2011). According to critics, among 
the major defaulters of the cooperative bank, causing its closure, 
had been politicians and their associates.
7. Probably the biggest source of corruption is through the award of 
work and supply orders to the individuals nominated by politicians. 
These range from work orders related to infrastructure building, 
to supply orders and resettlement sites. Huge stone-crushers have 
appeared near the dam sites. The stones and sand are collected 
from the village commons, but individual informal suppliers gain 
substantially in the process. Thus, the corrupt patronage network 
facilitates primitive accumulation.
8. There are provisions for the employment of local people in the dam 
projects but recruitment is finally decided by the local leaders and 
company officials, rather than through transparent, formal pro-
cesses of recruitment.
9. Payments of bribes in kind by the construction companies to local 
politicians and influential persons are prevalent. They take several 
forms – from truckloads of cement, iron rods, sand and other con-
struction materials to occasional help through the use of company 
vehicles.
10. Employees of dam construction companies and local business-
men have also created novel ventures with rapid illegal profits. 
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For example, the diversion of truckloads of cement and other dam 
construction materials and the off-loading of some of it for clan-
destine sale on the black market generates fraud in so-called joint 
ventures.
During the frequent periods of political crisis in Arunachal, the ability to 
generate sufficient cash to buy support from MLAs is alleged to be crucial 
to their resolution. The financial support from dam construction compa-
nies is likely to play an important role.
What are not being documented here are the secondary or deriv-
ative cycles of corruption, because these do not necessarily result from 
dam construction alone. However, lower-order corrupt practices by local 
officials, traders and others are incentivised through the demonstration 
effects of politicians and senior bureaucrats.
The implications of ‘hydro-criminality’ for party politics
The signing of large numbers of MoUs prior to hydro-development has 
proved a major departure from business as usual. From the politics of 
clientelage – demanding ever greater resources from the central govern-
ment, underpinned by the threat of Arunachal’s being a militarily sensi-
tive border-state – a new politics of local resources has emerged. ‘From 
beggars for jobs, our youth could be providers of jobs’, said a politician in 
the Arunachal state assembly. Has the new politics of dams altered state 
politics in fundamental ways, or is it simply yet another manifestation of 
well-established corrupt and criminal practices?
Our field research has implications for answering this question.
1. While transparency was never the hallmark of policy-making in 
the state, there is a new intensity of secrecy regarding the signing 
of MoUs. Informed public discussion or debates (even within the 
political classes) regarding the desirability of the projects or about 
the commitments that are being agreed to in these MoUs are con-
spicuous by their absence.
2. After the top-level signing of MoUs (usually in the CM’s office), 
local MLAs and ruling-party politicians are mobilised to operation-
alise the plans, which cement longstanding patronage networks.23
3. In the recent past, there has been opposition to the construction 
of dams, mostly by villagers likely to be directly affected by dam 
construction and subsequent operation, which has added a new 
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dimension to politics in the state. Politics of resistance, and the 
attempts to quash resistance, are opening up a new idiom of poli-
tics in the state.
4. Company representatives have intensified coercive efforts to get 
written consent from local leaders and panchayat representatives; 
often the text of such agreements (prepared by the company) is 
deliberately vague about promised benefits.
5. Apart from politicians, local contractors act as intermediaries 
between the construction companies and the local people, adding 
complexity to the class fractions competing to accumulate capital.
According to Rajshekhar, who explored what he called ‘Hydelgate’ in 
Arunachal, hydel in Arunachal has four parallels with the controversial 
politics of coal-block allocations in 2006–09, which he also investigated. 
First, Arunachal agreed both more hydel projects than planned, and at 
greater physical capacity and with greater financial demands on the state. 
Second, the state used discretionary powers to allot dam sites, thereby 
increasing the clout of state politicians, bureaucrats and local brokers to 
influence allocations. Third, besides sector heavyweights such as Reli-
ance Power, Jindal Power and NHPC, the list of 55 companies featured 
speculators with experience, if at all, in unrelated businesses. Fourth, 
construction has barely begun. The state does not have adequate roads 
or transmission lines. Companies lack appropriate finance (Rajshekhar 
2013). The 2016 judgment by the National Green Tribunal on the Nyam 
Jang Chhu Hydro-electric Project (NJC-HEP) in Tawang24 mentions the 
following violations of established legal procedures: deliberate conceal-
ing of facts; improper impact evaluation; and faulty assessment of the 
impacts of the project on the part of the bureaucrats.
The case of ‘hydro-criminality’ in Arunachal may be understood as 
part of larger processes of accumulation in post-liberalisation India with 
implications for politics in the state. First, with increasing competition for 
money that comes through normal government channels, the enhanced 
rents act as key sources to finance elections, buy the support of fellow 
politicians and control the (ruling) party machinery. Single families or 
dynasties have come to dominate the political scene in an unprecedented 
fashion, likely owing their resources to a step-change in the social con-
centration of fraud and bribery. However, because the day-to-day safety 
of the skilled personnel employed by the companies at the dam sites can-
not be guaranteed from above, many local-level negotiations have also 
taken place with locally influential politicians and others. These have 
involved their incorporation as partners in contract works, the allocation 
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of jobs to local kinspeople and bribes in cash and kind (particularly 
cement and other house construction materials).25 So, the large number 
of dams provides scope for local-level elites to increase their shares of 
bribes and fraud in kind because their support is crucial for the day-to-
day protection and survival of company officials.26 The two processes, 
one of concentration and the other of diffusion of fraudulent accumula-
tion, interact.
Set against these findings is the argument that dams may not have 
altered the political process significantly. Power relations between the 
central leadership (of the party in power, whether the Congress party 
or the BJP) and the state leadership remain ones of abject dependence. 
However, during and after the state and parliamentary elections in 2014, 
hydro-power dams have risen up Arunachal’s political agenda. Ministers 
and politicians of the ruling party have defended them in public, link-
ing dams to the ‘pride’ of the people of Arunachal (‘from being a deficit/
dependent state, we can become a giver/contributor to rest of India’), 
to a secure and prosperous future for future generations, while only a 
few opposition leaders have criticised the dams.27 The politics of hydro-
power, however, has not thrown up a new political leadership, in terms 
either of personalities or of ideological positions. Leaders of the anti-dam 
activists are cynically feared capable of switching sides – after claiming 
a share of the illegal tribute for themselves. Rural respondents regularly 
alleged that those who claimed to represent their interests had already 
struck deals with company managers or politicians.
Nevertheless, earlier rounds of field surveys and first-hand knowl-
edge of political developments in the state lead us to suggest that anti-
dam agitations are creating new political spaces the effects of which are 
as yet unknown. This dissent results from two factors: first the betrayal 
of tribal peoples’ access to resources, and second, the use of force against 
protesters in a way that is not normal in the state. Without a pan-Aruna-
chal body organising resistance, there are only a few instances of local-
ised movements being coordinated and extending solidarity to various 
groups in Assam, Delhi and elsewhere (Gohain 2008). In a political 
context dominated by differences between ‘indigenous’ tribal people 
and ‘outsiders’, this has clearly been a political innovation. This process 
is developing elsewhere in North East India, as Chowdhury and Kipgen 
(2013: 207) observe:
‘It is the crisis of alternative political and cultural imagination that 
has stopped the process of a “creative appropriation” of the nation-
alist discourse on the “North-east”, to frame a counter hegemonic 
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discourse… However,… the situation is not entirely bleak, as the 
recent developments of forging identity beyond the local level ren-
ders hope that in the near future a regional level identity might be 
conceived.’ Similarly, in the context of Sikkim, it has been argued 
that ‘hydro-power protests have widened the space for dissent 
against government high-handedness, not only in dam construc-
tion, but also in other realms of governance and politics’ (Huber 
and Joshi 2015, 21).
Arunachal’s party politics shows continuity in its competitive plunder of 
the stream of public funds transferred from New Delhi. Meanwhile, the 
proliferation of bargaining with private dam-building companies has cre-
ated scope both for an increased centralisation of power and for a revival 
of older forms of corrupt local patronage for logistical and protection 
services.
The overall logic of neoliberalism that tends to equate the business 
interests of corporations with ‘market-led development’ in the collective 
interests of all has further legitimised such practices and helped to isolate 
those who voiced disagreements over hydro-development. Deregulation 
and greater private sector participation are not enough to reduce 
rent-seeking (Harriss‐White 1996), and the structural dimensions of 
‘hydro-criminality’ need far greater attention than have been accorded 
to them.
Notes
1. Activists citing various other sources claim that the actual number of MoUs signed so far is 223 
(Assam Tribune, 8 August 2015). The exact number of MoUs that have been signed so far and 
their status has itself become a major political question. The Central Ministry for the Develop-
ment of North Eastern Region put the number of projects to be undertaken as 86 in 2010. In 
March 2015, the state government, under Chief Minister Nabam Tuki, stated in the assembly 
that ‘The State Government has allotted 160 hydro-electric projects of installed capacity of 
46948.20 MW to various CPUs & IPPs. Out of 160 HEPs, Ranganadi St-I HEP (405 MW) is 
under operation while Kameng HEP (600 MW), Pare HEP (110 MW) & Subansiri Lower HEP 
(2000 MW) are under execution’ (Arunachal Times, 10 March 2015).
2. Because of its political sensitivity, the research method involved an exploratory survey of pur-
posively chosen key informants. Many respondents were apprehensive, speaking only under 
conditions of anonymity. The reliability of their information was cross-checked through trian-
gulation. Focus-group discussions on the experience of hydro-power development were also 
conducted with villagers. In this research, we have extensively, but not uncritically, relied upon 
local newspapers, published in English, the medium of instruction in the state, to substantiate 
the various arguments made in this paper. Though owned mostly by politicians from the state, 
over the years the ‘Letters to the Editors’ columns of these newspapers have been used by the lo-
cal population to express their opinion vociferously. So the subject matter of this chapter is not 
whether a specific crime or corruption has taken place or not; rather it is about how the alleged 
acts of corruption and criminality are perceived by various actors on the ground.
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3. However, dam-building in the Himalayas is not just an Indian phenomenon. Several studies 
have contextualised the recent rush for construction by China, India, Nepal, Bhutan and other 
nation states (Dharmadhikary 2008).
4. The Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act 2003 was aimed at eliminating Aruna-
chal’s revenue deficit and bringing down fiscal deficit to 3 per cent of GDP. For a critical discus-
sion see Jha (2011).
5. On March 12, the state assembly passed the controversial Arunachal Pradesh (Land Settle-
ment and Records) (Amendment) Bill, 2018, under which ownership of land is conferred 
on those Arunachali citizens possessing ‘certificates of land possession/occupancy’ (https://
scroll.in/article/872474/arunachal-pradesh-gives-individuals-ownership-of-land-but-will-
they-really-benefit-from-it). This chapter describes conditions before this Act.
6. See Echo of Arunachal, 11 March 2015; Arunachal Times, 10 March 2015.
7. During our field investigations, we found that even those ‘public leaders’ (three to be precise) 
with connections with the MLAs and ministries were not aware of the details of the signing of 
MoUs. Bureaucrats (four) involved in the execution of the MoUs and dealing with ramifica-
tions of such contracts seem to be aware of the shadowy deals but even they had no definite 
knowledge of the specifics of the deals (for example who contracted whom, what the ‘per-
centage’ is that is paid as a bribe, etc.), although all of them admitted that money must have 
changed hands.
8. For the full report, see http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-04-30/news/ 
38930347_1_hydel-arunachal-projects-jindal-power.
9. ‘Seeing the huge interest from hydel promoters, they began going to a state politician, taking a 
project, bringing it to a level where a company could buy it from them and start construction,’ 
according to A.K. Mathur, the head of Synergics India, a hydelpower consultancy in Noida 
(quoted in the Economic Times, 30 April 2013).
10. A state government employee, aged about 50, claiming to have known the players.
11. This stylised description is based on interviews with several key informants, such as: (a) a 
manager of a private construction company who was in charge of operations; (b) a retired 
government servant who has developed an interest in social work; (c) an anti-dam activist; (d) 
a contractor, who is also, incidentally, a government servant, engaged in building houses at a 
rehabilitation site; and (e) local academics.
12. The following incident, reported in the newspapers, highlights the role played by politicians 
in case of a conflict between the companies and the people. ‘[Local MLA Mama Natung] was 
addressing a public gathering at Seba village under Pijerang circle of East Kameng district after 
inaugurating a Bailey bridge over Papu River constructed by Sussi Infra Pvt Ltd in presence of 
Deputy Commissioner Sandeep Kumar Singh and Krishna Paradeshi Project Head of Sushee 
Pvt Ltd. The said bridge collapsed in March 29, 2014, after subcontract company ARTHA’s 
overloaded machinery plied over a weak bridge. The Sushee Pvt Ltd later took over the matter 
and entered agreement with the local MLA and youth of Seba village, agreeing to build new 
Bailey bridge over it’ (Arunachal Times, 5 December 2015).
13. The first college in Arunachal Pradesh was established in Pasighat in Adi territory. For a dis-
cussion on the evolution of the town and its implications for tribal identity politics, see Pras-
ad-Aleyamma (2014).
14. Rights of local communities over land and forests are protected in Arunachal Pradesh as per 
the Arunachal Pradesh Land Settlement and Records Act, 2000 and the Balipara, Tirap, Sadiya 
Frontier Tract Jhum Land Regulation, 1947.
15. Assam Tribune, 9 August 2015.
16. The two reports published in the Arunachal Times on the same day highlights the pressure on 
the local community organisations.
17. For details, see Gupta Kashyap 2016.
18. Accepting money during election campaigns is one openly acknowledged deviation from the 
rules, described in many of our interviews.
19. The text of the suicide letter was published in English (see Wire staff 2017).
20. Suvarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY), launched in 1999, is India’s anti-poverty pro-
gramme through rural self-employment, focussing on self-help groups for women.
21. The Arunachal Pradesh Land Settlement and Records Act 2000 classified all water bodies as 
property rights of the government.
22. Arunachal Times, 3 March 2015.
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23. This is not to imply that there are no cases of contestation, bargaining or ‘disloyalty’ within the 
patronage networks. As one villager who supports the anti-dam agitation put it: ‘We told the 
minister. We are loyal to you and will still vote for you in the elections. But on the issue of dams, 
we do not support you.’
24. Copy of the judgment available at eLaw.org (n.d.). For further discussion of the case, see Alley 
(2017); Ghosh (2013); and Sivaramakrishnan (2015).
25. A report published in the Indian Express of 13 December 2016 on allegations of corruption in a 
hydel project, based on a report by the chief vigilance officer of a public sector unit, describes 
the nature of collaboration between politicians, government officials and private sector com-
panies (Tiwary 2016).
26. Threats include the following: threat of physical violence to company personnel; forcible lift-
ing or theft of machines or raw materials; demanding of favours or services, e.g. transport in 
vehicles for other purposes; disruption of work.
27. Arunachal Times, 8 October 2010.
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Crime in the air: spectrum markets 
and the telecommunications sector 
in India
Jai Bhatia
This chapter explores the intertwining of crime and governance produced 
in the markets for spectrum. In so doing it traces the criminalised expan-
sion of telecom. It investigates the systemic plunder of airwaves and a form 
of intreccio that involves capital, political and bureaucratic elites. Crimes 
result from privileged and discretionary control over information and 
resources, politicised manipulation of regulative laws and selective enforce-
ment failures.
Evidence is suggestive of large-scale and expanding capital accumula-
tion by business and the political elite and the exchange of regulatory and 
financial privileges in return for campaign finance. Alongside widespread 
nepotism and cronyism the chapter traces important parallel shifts into pol-
itics on the part of corporate businessmen and into business on the part of 
politicians and officials. It shows how regulative law is effectively manipu-
lated and how politicians modify law retrospectively to make ad hoc exemp-
tions benefitting political-cum-business cronies.
The capture of spectrum in the air for telephony is among India’s most 
egregious economic and social achievements,1 and is often cited as 
an example to justify the economic reforms of the 1990s. Telecom is 
touted as one of India’s most successful sectors for its booming spec-
trum markets, its market-driven policy initiatives, and for how the 
industry has come to provide telecom services to the vast majority 
of the population at affordable rates. The subscriber base of wire-
less telephony increased from 5 million in March 1991 to 1.2 billion 
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subscribers in March 2016 (TRAI 2017), and the cost of services fell 
by 87 per cent between 2001 and 2015 (Economic Times 2015).2 The 
telecom sector has also been economically and socially transformative 
as it has come to contribute 6.5 per cent (US$140 billion) to India’s 
GDP in 2016 (Government of India 2017b), compared to a global tele-
com sector that contributes 4.4 per cent (US$2 trillion) to worldwide 
GDP (KPMG 2017). Sinha (1996) and Virmani (2000) have argued 
that as a part of India’s critical infrastructure, greater connectivity 
through telecommunications has led to a boom in other industries 
such as information technology, software and e-commerce. In addi-
tion, various studies have found that the ‘mobile (phone) revolu-
tion’ has benefitted and empowered various groups in Indian society, 
including women (Prasad and Sreedevi 2007), fishermen (Abraham 
2006) and the poor (Souter et al. 2005).
Although the telecoms sector is dominated by some of India’s 
best-reputed business houses, including Reliance Industries’ Reliance 
Jio, the ADAG Reliance Group’s Reliance Communications, Birla Group’s 
IDEA Cellular, Tata Group’s Tata Teleservices and Bharti Group’s Bharti 
Airtel, it has been well publicised as being riddled with instances of 
misallocation of spectrum, financial scandals and fraud. Problems have 
been documented in the fragmentary and uneven implementation of 
policy, insider knowledge of policy changes, under-invoicing of telecom 
revenues, clientelism and corruption. For example, in the 2G spectrum 
scandal, spectrum was under-priced and allocated to specific companies 
favoured by the then Union Minister for Telecom, Andimuthu Raja. The 
Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) calculated that the 2G allocation 
scandal resulted in the loss of INR 176,000 crore (US$26 billion) to the 
exchequer (Bhandari 2012; Kaushal and Thakurta 2010). Subsequently 
122 licences were cancelled by the supreme court of India in 2012 and 
the Telecom Minister Raja and many others who were involved were 
jailed for their offences (Acharya 2012; Bhandari 2012). However, such 
punitive action did not curb corruption or stop scandals and frauds. There 
have been several further instances, most notably allowing Reliance 
Communications and Tata Teleservices to convert their ‘limited mobility’ 
licences (or CDMA) to general licences (or GSM) without participating 
in an auction as required by a supreme court mandate.3 The allocation 
of Broadband Wireless Access (BWA) spectrum to Reliance Jio was also 
controversial, provoking allegations of fraud in how the spectrum was 
acquired from the state. The CAG estimated ‘undue benefit’ – i.e. the loss 
to, or theft from the public exchequer as a result of these two cases – to 
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the magnitude of INR 12,626 crore (US$2.8 billion)4 and INR 19,000 
crore (US$4.1 billion)5 respectively (CAG 2015; Thakurta and Chaudhuri 
2015; Thakurta 2016).
This chapter explores two key elements of the spectrum markets in 
India: first how a sector modelled on market (neoliberal) principles mani-
fested constant and recurring scandals and fraud such that it quickly became 
a textbook case of regulatory capture and crony capitalism. More specifically, 
it examines a narrowing alliance between the political and economic elites. 
Second, how the role of the state changed with respect to ‘creating and main-
taining healthy markets’,6 where market ideologies, policy processes and the 
regulatory infrastructure were all manipulated to legitimise the systematic 
plunder of a natural resource such as spectrum.7 To this end, this chapter 
is organised as follows. First, the political economy of spectrum markets is 
outlined. Second, the role of the state in creating and maintaining spectrum 
markets on neoliberal principles is examined. Third, the consequences of 
the narrowing alliance between the state and business elites are analysed to 
show why the scale, frequency and magnitude of scandals has not decreased 
over time, despite a neoliberal policy regime which theoretically offers an 
assault on rent-seeking from a slimmed-down, transparent and accountable 
state (Harriss-White and White, 1996).
Political economy of spectrum markets
At the heart of the telecom sector is the scarce natural resource of 
spectrum (or bands of airwaves) which are owned by the Indian state. 
The state leases out spectrum to private businesses for a set period 
of time to provide telecom services. It auctions this spectrum and 
in return receives non-tax revenues (including up-front spectrum 
payments from auctions, spectrum instalment payments, spectrum 
usage charges, fines and other charges), which amounted to INR 
56,034 crore or 22 per cent of the state’s non-tax revenue for 2015–16 
(Government of India 2017b). Table  5.1 provides further details of 
the state’s revenue from the telecom sector between 2009–10 and 
2015–16. For businesses, the allocation of spectrum is one of the most 
important transactions: it is access to spectrum that gives businesses 
the ability to provide and expand their telecom services. Access to 
greater quantities and qualities of spectrum also enhances their com-
petitive edge in providing services. Currently, spectrum for the use of 
commercial wireless telephony is auctioned in bands or frequencies 
between 800MHz and 2400MHz. Lower frequency airwaves have a 
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Table 5.1 Indian government revenue receipts
Contributions to communications receipts (in crores)
Particulars 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 2014–15 2015–16
Licence fees 9,792 10,030 11,161 11,500 12,651 14,068 14,974
Spectrum 
usage charges
3,423 3,861 4,850 5,201 6,115 6,930 7,550
Upfront auction 
payments




Other fees 2,664 395 1,390 1,093 3,079 -1,182 10,577
Total 15,879 120,548 17,401 18,902 40,114 30,624 56,034
Telecom sector's share of non-tax revenue (in crores)
Particulars 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 2014–15 2015–16
Communication 
receipts
15,879 120,548 17,401 18,902 40,114 30,624 56,034
Total non-tax 
revenue
116,276 218,603 121,671 137,355 198,870 197,857 251,260
Share of total 14% 55% 14% 14% 20% 15% 22%
Source: Government of India 2017a; IRCA 2016; Non-tax revenue  
receipt budget 2016
longer wavelength or range, and therefore can carry the telecom sig-
nal greater distances, but have a low bandwidth, which restricts the 
ability to carry data. In comparison, higher frequency airwaves have a 
shorter range but a higher bandwidth and therefore can carry greater 
amounts of data over shorter distances.
India’s telecom market is the product of the Indian state. Spectrum 
markets in India came into existence in 1994 when private businesses 
were first allowed to enter the telecom sector and bid for spectrum. In 
order to understand the development of this market, the preconditions 
of the telecom sector prior to opening up need to be outlined. In the 
1970s and 1980s, due in part to import restrictions, the licensing of 
manufacturing activities and a lack of infrastructure, the Indian econ-
omy was characterised by chronic shortages of goods and services. In 
the telecommunications industry, the average waiting time for a fixed 
(land) line telephone connection was between 5 and 10 years (Sridhar 
2011). In 1991, there were five million telephone connections with 
another five million on the waiting list (Sridhar 2011). Petrazzini 
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(1996) claims that the Department of Telecom’s (DoT) dismal perfor-
mance was not entirely a failure of state policy but rather a reflection of 
the Indian bureaucracy’s practices of petty corruption, misuse of privi-
lege and patronage. These problems in the state’s institutional structure 
meant that neoliberal reforms could take root without much political 
resistance. Indeed, market-oriented telecom reforms were welcomed as 
they almost immediately alleviated the problems of shortages, delays 
and bureaucratic control.
The decision to restructure the telecommunications industry 
started with the National Telecommunication Policy 1994 (NTP-94), 
which allowed private companies to enter the wireless telecoms mar-
ket. Sinha (1996) points out that instead of licensing two or three 
private companies to provide telecom services nationally, the DoT cre-
ated 22 ‘telecom circles’ or licences specific to a geographical area, 
allowing several private companies to participate in telecom market 
space. The explicit goal of such a policy was to ensure the uniform 
development of national telecom networks in rural and urban areas 
alike. It also encouraged competition and reflected the state’s com-
mitment to creating a market-based economy (Virmani 2000; Gupta 
2002). It helped the state to create a market for spectrum and the 
entry of so many private firms into the telecoms market led to an 
increase in demand for spectrum. In order to build spectrum markets, 
the Indian state created an independent regulatory institution, the 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI), whose 
sole focus was to establish a liberal (competitive) market environ-
ment. The DoT previously functioned as both policy-making body and 
regulator; however, these two roles could not be reconciled without 
a conflict of interest, as it was part of the DoT’s mandate to generate 
non-tax revenue for the government. It was also obliged to protect the 
interests of state-owned MTNL and VSNL,8 which made private and 
foreign businesses nervous (Sinha 1996). Sinha (1996) argues that 
this conflict of interest made US companies reluctant to participate 
in telecom tenders. International pressures also increased, as India’s 
entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) brought pressure to 
create an independent regulator that could enforce spectrum prop-
erty rights.
Another crucial step in the state’s development of spectrum markets 
was the setting up of the Telecommunications Dispute Settlement and 
Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) in 2000. The judicial system was weighed 
down with a backlog of cases stretching back 30 years. Since any judg-
ment took years to be handed down, the development of the Telecom 
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Industry was delayed (Moog 1992; Mashru 2013). By contrast, the 
TDSAT adjudicated disputes and disposed of appeals in a reasonable time 
frame. The creation of a separate tribunal dealing specifically with tele-
com-related cases helped enforce and secure property rights over spec-
trum for private companies, which in turn established the credibility of 
spectrum rights and increased market confidence. The state’s method of 
allocation of spectrum was central to the planning and growth of spec-
trum markets. Since 1994, the Indian state has trialled many methods of 
allocation, including: i) a ‘beauty contest’, where interested firms submit 
business plans to a government committee, which judges candidates on 
who best meets the criteria published; ii) ‘first come first served’, where 
firms are allocated spectrum in order of the receipt of their applications 
for spectrum; and iii) ‘auctions’, where firms have to compete with each 
other by bidding for spectrum. Each method was supported by eco-
nomic rationales and deemed suitable for the circumstances of the time. 
Allegations of corruption, nepotism and patronage permeated the vari-
ous methods of allocation – indicating that the problem was not in the 
choice of allocation method but in the way in which the methods were 
implemented (Kaushal and Thakurta 2010; Bhandari 2012). The next 
section argues that under the guise of promoting the development of 
markets, the state has implemented a pro-business policy regime that has 
narrowed the alliance between the state and telecom businesses and has 
legitimised repeated instances of impropriety and the brazen plunder of 
spectrum. Big business houses, politicians and bureaucrats work hand 
in glove with each other criminally to appropriate the assets of the state. 
They are able to evade the law and bend regulations to illicitly enrich 
themselves. There have also been a considerable number of cases inves-
tigated by the Central Bureau of Investigations (CBI), the CAG and the 
Income Tax and Enforcement Directorate (ED) where the state’s guardi-
ans of a natural resource, be it coal, oil or spectrum, were found guilty of 
aiding its plunder.
Making and maintaining ‘markets’ and ‘business’
In the 1990s, the formal ideology of the Indian state changed from a 
mixed economy (where, despite the extent of the informal economy, the 
state was the driver of much industrial development) towards a mar-
ket-dominated economy where the state gradually liberalised trade, 
deregulated industrial policy and privatised many state-owned enter-
prises outside essential commodities and defence – reasoning that a 
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market-led economy would accelerate development. The telecommuni-
cations sector was one of the earliest reflections of this change in state 
ideology. Prior to opening up the telecom sector to private investments, 
the state was the sole provider of telecom services. With the move to the 
market economy, the role of the state became that of a facilitator pro-
viding the right environment in which private businesses could flourish. 
This often meant that, in the name of ‘creating and promoting’ markets, 
the state could undertake a series of pro-business policy changes that 
specifically favoured existing domestic business houses.
The discrepancy between the state’s pro-market ideology and 
pro-business policy practices, despite being regarded by some analysts as 
‘spurious’ (e.g. Panagariya 2008), is vital to understanding the narrowing 
alliance between state and business (Kohli 2012). A pro-market ideology, 
where the state limits its role in the economy and permits markets to decide 
the allocation of resources, asserts that markets will result in optimal allo-
cations of resources. Policies such as privatising public sector companies, 
reducing subsidies, restricting the state’s role in commodity price fixing, 
easing tariffs on foreign goods, devaluing the currency and encouraging 
private investments are preconditions to this allocative process.
However, in practice, the Indian state created and implemented 
policies that were pro-business rather than pro-market. It did not retreat 
from the forefront of the economy or cede allocation decisions to markets 
but instead repeatedly intervened to support the growth of private busi-
nesses. On the supply side, the state actively facilitated the availability 
of capital, labour, technology and even entrepreneurship (Kohli 2012). 
Capital was made available by providing credit from state-owned banks 
to big businesses, via tax cuts and direct subsidies. Labour was repressed 
and any activism was actively discouraged by the state as well as busi-
ness (Kohli 2006). In the case of technology and entrepreneurship, the 
state invested in education and research and development, and negoti-
ated with foreign firms to facilitate technology transfer. On the demand 
side the Indian state adopted an expansionary monetary and fiscal policy 
regime. On the one hand, the monetary regime made credit for consump-
tion easier to obtain in terms of equated monthly instalments (EMIs) on 
consumer durables, auto-loans and credit card overdrafts, while on the 
other hand an expansionary fiscal policy regime reduced the taxes and 
tariffs on imported goods. The exchange policy was also kept favoura-
ble to trade: exports were incentivised through duty drawback schemes 
such as the Duty-Free Replenishment Certificate (DFRC) and Duty 
Entitlement Passbook (DEPB) and cheaper credit through the Export 
Packing Credit (EPC) scheme. The production of goods for domestic 
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and foreign consumption was promoted through a myriad of subsidies 
and tax rebates. The state also indulged in activity that distorted prices, 
such as undervaluing the Indian rupee, subsidising exports and making 
wages lag behind productivity gains, in order to encourage businesses to 
profit and grow. The state’s pro-market rhetoric masked its pro-business 
policy regime, which systematically ensured the profitability of private 
businesses. Such a pro-business policy regime was not only legal but also 
gained legitimacy and popularity over time as an important developmen-
tal tool. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led by Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi won the 2014 elections on the basis that their development model 
was superior to any previous government’s, because they had adopted a 
pro-business attitude to designing the policies that governed the econ-
omy (and would provide jobs…).
In the telecoms sector, it is evident from both policy recommenda-
tions and constant public rhetoric about ‘creating and maintaining healthy 
markets’ that TRAI, the independent telecoms regulator, created pro-busi-
ness institutions to regulate the sector, which accelerated capital accumu-
lation in the private telecom businesses and put their interests above those 
of either the state or telecom consumers. Every time telecom companies 
faced a financial crunch the regulator would urge the DoT to ‘revitalise the 
sector’ by changing policies to enhance the profitability of telecom com-
panies. For example, in 2017 the new entrant Reliance Jio started a price 
war and as a consequence the profitability of all the telecom companies 
decreased significantly, so much so that many of them found it difficult to 
service their debt and began defaulting on their loans. The state conven-
iently stepped in to reduce the spectrum usage charges (SUC) from 6 to 2 
per cent and extended the spectrum instalment payment period from 10 
to 15 years, which immediately lowered companies’ financial obligations 
and reduced their cash outflow, in turn boosting their profits. All major 
policy changes have been unidirectional in favour of private businesses 
and can be traced back to moments of decline in the profitability of the 
private telecom companies as examined below. The field experience and 
methods are laid out in the Appendix to this chapter, below.
The change from National Telecom Policy 1994 to New Telecom 
Policy 1999
The National Telecom Policy of 1994 permitted private operators to 
provide telecom services through the issue of telecom licences. These 
licences required their holders to pay a fixed licence fee. Many companies 
rushed to get a licence to enter the telecom markets. Given that wireless 
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technology was a new technology, it was difficult to predict how consum-
ers would behave or what pricing would allow the markets to grow, and 
businesses quickly found themselves over-leveraged and unprofitable. 
Business associations such as the Cellular Operators Association of India 
(COAI) lobbied the TRAI and the DoT to help reduce the financial pres-
sure on the private telecom businesses. In 1999 the sector was on the 
verge of collapse when the New Telecom Policy (NTP) 1999 was intro-
duced, allowing existing licence holders to switch to a revenue-sharing 
model in place of the fixed licence fee. This policy change allowed tel-
ecom businesses to renege on their contractual obligations to the state, 
which freed them from the obligation of paying the high fixed annual 
licence fee that they had agreed to pay while bidding for the spectrum. 
It allowed them to switch to a licensing regime whereby they could pay a 
percentage of their earned annual gross revenue (AGR). Such a change 
in policy meant that the telecom companies did not have a fixed financial 
obligation to pay but paid licensing fees only as a percentage of the rev-
enue they earned, which immediately had a positive impact on profita-
bility and revived the sector. In other words, the state came to the aid of 
telecom companies through this policy change, which legally permitted 
them to convert their spectrum obligations from a fixed cost to a reve-
nue-dependent cost, which led to telecom companies becoming profit-
able. Higher profits in turn boosted the future expectation of profits, 
which boosted the business valuations of telecom companies.
Change from New Telecom Policy 1999 to New Telecom Policy 2012
In the aftermath of the 2G scandal verdicts, where the supreme court of 
India cancelled 122 licences belonging to telecom companies, many had 
to bid again for their 2G licences and financed their re-purchase of spec-
trum by taking on more debt. As a result the telecom sector was once again 
overleveraged and in the financial doldrums. Subsequently, in 2012 a new 
policy was introduced to ‘revitalise’ the sector once again. Unlike NTP 94 
and 99, where telecom companies could bid for no more than two circles 
(with the state’s intention of promoting competition among many telecom 
companies), the National Telecom Policy (NTP-2012) allowed companies 
to switch to a Unified Access Service Licence, which permitted telecom 
companies to hold spectrum across all telecom circles. This policy spurred 
financial activities such as mergers and acquisitions, with the intention of 
capitalising on cost savings from financial or debt restructuring, opera-
tional and network synergies and the cost savings that would arise from 
economies of scale. In addition, the NTP-2012 went a step further, allowing 
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private companies to not only pool and share their spectrum but also trade 
their spectrum with the stated goal of creating efficiency (Department of 
Communications, GOI 2012). While this move is consistent with market 
ideals, allowing telecom companies to trade and thus commoditise spec-
trum has the potential to create a secondary market for spectrum in which 
companies can speculate for profit. Here, there is a danger of shifting the 
companies’ focus from providing efficient and effective telecom services to 
gleaning as much profit as possible from trading.
Change from New Telecom Policy of 2012 to (Expected) 
New Telecom Policy 2018
In 2016, the entry of Reliance Jio triggered a price war in the telecom 
sector, which led to a steep fall in the average revenue per user (ARPU), a 
key measure of profitability. To stay competitive in the market most tele-
com companies have to bid for every new generation of spectrum, which 
has led most to take on progressively more debt. Spectrum obligations 
and interest costs further increased the mountains of debt the telecom 
companies acquired. For example, the average debt-to-equity ratio in the 
telecom sector in 2016 is 2.53, which means for every rupee of equity 
there are 2.53 rupees of debt. Bharti Airtel, the market leader in terms 
of revenue and number of subscribers, has an even higher debt to equity 
ratio of 4.96 (Mulgaonkar 2016; Bhatia and Palepu 2016). Telecom com-
panies have also been showing signs of stress, given the high levels of 
leverage. In early 2017, Reliance Communications, an ADAG Reliance 
Group company and the fourth largest telecom company, defaulted on 
a INR 49,000 crore (US$7.5 billion) loan (Reuters 2017). Once again, a 
new telecom policy is expected in 2018, which in the name of ‘revitalis-
ing the market’ will further benefit the telecom companies.
Foreign direct investment regulations
The Ministry of Finance defines foreign direct investment (FDI) limits on 
foreign equity investment in Indian companies sector by sector. In line with 
other sectors, the FDI limits for the ‘Basic and Cellular Services’ increased 
to 100 per cent in 2016 (49 per cent through the automatic route9 and 
over 49 per cent with government approval), allowing Indian companies 
to tap foreign investors. The demand from foreign capital has led to pres-
sure to increase business valuations of telecom companies, which has in 
turn allowed the Indian promoters of telecom companies to sell a part 
or all of their stakes in their telecom companies at a substantial profit. 
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Alternatively, they partner with the foreign companies on very favoura-
ble terms. Although the state’s continuous pro-business policy changes 
have accelerated the process of legal capital accumulation in the telecom 
sector, they have also spurred a host of illegal and criminal activity within 
the sector. In the next section I analyse the illegal and criminal activities 
that have been investigated by state agencies and discussed widely in the 
media, and argue that these illegal activities increased as a consequence 
of the ever-closer alliance between the state and business. In addition, the 
next section also argues that these illegal activities have led to a constant 
recurrence of scandal, fraud, corruption and financial impropriety in the 
telecom markets and that such activities are not a deviation from India’s 
neoliberal market system but rather an innate characteristic of it.
The narrowing alliance between the state and business
In fact, India’s telecom sector has quickly become a textbook case of reg-
ulatory capture.10 The size, scale and the quantum of money involved 
in spectrum markets has attracted politicians and bureaucrats who see 
power in their ability to allocate spectrum to private businesses. Poli-
ticians (such as ministers for telecoms, communications and finance) 
and bureaucrats (such as telecom secretaries, finance secretaries, TRAI 
Chairmen, TRAI secretaries, DoT and TRAI advisors, etc.) are responsible 
for the entire span of the policy process from formulation, implementa-
tion and evaluation to addressing and formally enforcing contraventions. 
Such responsibilities bestow upon them the formal power to direct ben-
efits subversively to specific businesses. Such instances can be seen in 
the examples mentioned below. The means by which specific businesses 
benefitted illegally include (but are not limited to) providing businesses 
with prior knowledge of policy changes, retrospectively changing poli-
cies, allowing ad hoc exemptions, adopting alternative interpretations of 
specific policies in specific cases,11 poor (uneven) implementation of pol-
icies, discretion in permitting businesses to exploit policy or procedural 
loopholes, and systematic disregard of blatant violations of policy.12
With the entry of private businesses into new sectors of the econ-
omy, politicians and bureaucrats become the gatekeepers: allocating 
and managing scarce resources, regulating property rights and rationing 
access to state assets. Together they enrich themselves and their political 
parties. Over time such relationships develop into a nexus of politicians, 
bureaucrats and businessmen. Through bribes or in-kind favours, private 
businesses in turn cultivate individual or partnership relationships with 
 CRIME IN THE AIR 151
them. Often such relationships are institutionalised through a parallel 
system of working where the big business houses already have deep con-
nections to political parties and state institutions. Every state officer that 
takes charge tends to be keen to toe the political line as they enjoy the 
rents and windfall benefits (bribes, in-kind benefits, etc.) of being posted 
to that position. The relationship between business and political parties 
has become critical to political party finances, as a significant quantity 
of political contributions and electoral campaign financing comes from 
their business patrons.
Another trend that shows the narrowing alliance between the 
state and business is that many businessmen have become politicians 
and vice versa. For example, Dayanadhi Maran, who with his brother 
Kalanidhi Maran owns Sun Group, an organisation with interests in 
television, broadcasting and telecommunications, became the Minister 
of Communications and was subsequently accused of using his powers 
as Telecom Minister to aid Sun TV’s business interests (Kaushal and 
Thakurta 2010; Bhatia and Palepu 2017). Similarly, Vijay Mallya, the 
owner of the now-defunct Kingfisher Airlines, was also a two-term MP; 
in 2002 his position as a member of the consultative committee for the 
Ministry of Civil Aviation and the standing committee on commerce gave 
rise to a serious conflict of interests. Mallya used his privileged position to 
obtain undue benefits for his business, which included large loans from 
public sector banks (Rajshekhar 2016). In another case of conflict of 
interest, Kupendra Reddy, a real estate baron from Karnataka, was made 
a member of the select committee on the Real Estate (Regulation and 
Development) Bill, 2013 and (to no surprise) was subsequently accused 
of using his position to aid his business interests (Rajshekhar 2016). 
There are other such examples.
In the telecommunications sector, the key source of crony capital-
ism, corruption and clientelism is the market system itself. This dates 
back to the opening up of the sector to private investment – and its effects 
are debated. On the one hand, supporters of neoliberalism argue that 
fraudulent behaviour is an aberration from normal market practice by 
unscrupulous companies – facilitated by poor regulation (Bhagwati 
and Panagariya 2013). On the other hand, critics see a systemic prob-
lem as inherent to a profit-seeking environment, while the regulations 
designed to curb this behaviour are undermined by the guardians of the 
system (politicians and bureaucrats) themselves. In 1996, for example, 
the Union Minister for Telecommunications in the PV Narasimha Rao 
Congress government, Sukh Ram, was investigated by the Central Bureau 
of Investigation (CBI) for irregularities in awarding telecom contracts 
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to private telecom companies (Kaushal and Thakurta 2010). The first 
information report (FIR) noted that INR 3.62 crore were found in suit-
cases at his residences, which the CBI alleged were bribes that Sukh Ram 
had taken in exchange for favours he had granted as Telecom Minister. 
Increasingly dispensable as a member of the Congress party ‘old guard’, 
Sukh Ram was in 2009 found guilty of misusing his position as Telecom 
Minister when he awarded a contract to supply polythene insulated jelly 
filled (PIJF) cables for the Telecom Department to a private firm, Haryana 
Telecom Limited (HTL), for INR 30 crore in exchange for bribes – as per 
the court proceedings (PTI 2011; India Today 19 November 2011). Sukh 
Ram was sentenced by the special CBI court to three years of imprison-
ment for ‘being part of a criminal conspiracy to defraud the exchequer’ 
and amassing assets disproportionate to his known income (Kaushal and 
Thakurta 2010).13
Both major political parties belong to institutionalised criminal cau-
cuses of politics and business. Bureaucrats serving outgoing politicians 
are vulnerable to investigations and said to keep sensitive records hidden 
at home, while appealing for protection to ousted ministers, themselves 
open to reprisals. In 1999, Pramod Mahajan (a member of the BJP) was 
appointed as Telecom Minister and was subsequently accused of bla-
tantly bending rules to aid the Reliance Group (Bhupta 2015; Kaushal 
and Thakurta 2010). Reliance Infocomm (RIC) acquired a basic teleph-
ony licence, which had a bundled CDMA licence for last-mile coverage; 
these licences were popularly referred to as ‘wireless local loop (WLL)’ 
licences or limited mobility licences. The sluggish CBI investigations 
found that Pramod Mahajan had permitted RIC to obtain ‘full mobility’ 
and become a nationwide operator without paying the full licence fees. 
RIC had paid INR 533 crore, whereas another cellular operator had paid 
INR 1,633 crore over the same time period for the same licences (Bhupta 
2015; Times of India 3 January 2006; Kaushal and Thakurta 2010). 
Subsequently, the comptroller and auditor general (CAG) also confirmed 
that the loss to the exchequer and undue benefit to the Reliance Group 
was in the region of INR 1,100 crore (Times of India 3 January 2006). In 
addition, the CBI investigations into Pramod Mahajan’s activities revealed 
further details of the quid pro quo relationship between Pramod Mahajan 
and the Reliance Group, one involving a business-political family and not 
merely an individual.14 RIC issued a total of one crore shares to three com-
panies, namely Fairever Traders, Softnet Traders and Prerna Auto, for 
INR 1 apiece (Times of India 3 June 2006; Economic Times 9 June 2011). 
These three companies were associated with Ashish Deora, who was the 
business partner of Rahul Mahajan and Anand Rao, Pramod Mahajan’s 
 CRIME IN THE AIR 153
son and son-in-law (Economic Times 9 June 2011; Jagannathan 2014; 
Times of India 2006). Within two months RIC issued a further 32 crore 
shares to Reliance Communications Infrastructure Ltd. at a premium of 
INR 52.71 (Economic Times 9 June 2011). The CBI alleged that Pramod 
Mahajan received a kickback in the form of the under-priced shares 
(Economic Times 9 June 2011; Jagannathan 2014).
In 2006, the then Telecom Minister Dayanidhi Maran was accused 
of accepting kickbacks for assisting the Malaysian-based Maxis Group to 
acquire Aircel Ltd by allegedly ‘arm-twisting’ Aircel’s former chairman C. 
Sivasankaran to sell the company (Vaishnav 2017). After a subsequent 
decade replete with other scandals involving other telecom companies, 
together with snail-paced investigations, as per the charge sheet eventu-
ally filed by the CBI in 2016, it was alleged that Dayanidhi Maran’s family 
business, Sun Group, received an investment of INR 740 crore in exchange 
for his assistance in helping Maxis Group acquire Aircel Ltd (Firstpost 19 
December 2016; Bhatia and Palepu 2017). Sun Group was not the only 
telecom fraud involving political–business families. The Aircel–Maxis case 
also involved the former Congress party Finance Minister, Palaniappan 
Chidambaram, who was accused by the CBI and the enforcement direc-
torate of misusing the power of his office in granting Foreign Investment 
Promotion Board (FIPB) approvals to foreign companies to invest in Indian 
companies. Maxis Group’s aquisition of a 99.3 per cent financial stake in 
Aircel violated the 74 per cent upper limit on foreign direct investment 
in the telecom sector at that time. In investing INR 3,514.45 crore, Maxis 
Group also violated prevailing foreign investment regulations requiring 
any investment in excess of INR 600 crore to be reviewed by the FIPB and its 
recommendations to be forwarded to the cabinet committee on economic 
affairs (CCEA) for a final decision. In this case, the file was never sent to the 
CCEA; instead the Ministry of Finance under Palaniappan Chidambaram 
received the FIPB’s recommendations and approved the investment (Bhatia 
and Palepu 2017). In May 2012, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) raised a 
ruckus in parliament, accusing Chidambaram of corruption in the Aircel–
Maxis case. The BJP MP Subramanian Swamy alleged that in exchange for 
providing the requisite FIPB approvals, Chidambaram’s son Karti’s com-
pany received a 5 per cent equity stake in Aircel Ltd. Chidambaram claims 
that these allegations were a political attack by the BJP on the Congress 
party, while the CBI and ED continue their investigation into the individu-
als involved (Bhatia and Palepu 2017).
The Aircel–Maxis controversy also highlighted a legal loophole that 
many foreign companies use to circumvent FDI norms while attempt-
ing to stay within the legal limits of FDI regulations. Lawmakers and 
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bureaucrats are aware of this loophole but choose to adopt an alternative 
legal interpretation of FDI policy: although the Maxis Group owned only 
74 per cent of the equity, it used non-convertible preference shares to 
invest in 99.3 per cent of the equity, thereby allowing them to bypass the 
FDI limits of the time (Bhatia and Palepu 2017). Such preference shares 
often receive a fixed dividend and have dividend priority over equity 
shareholders. Preference shares can be either irredeemable or redeem-
able, non-convertible or convertible into equity shares, and can have 
cumulative or non-cumulative dividends. As per the Foreign Exchange 
Management Act (FEMA) of 1999, only fully and mandatorily convert-
ible preference shares by a foreign buyer would be counted as FDI. All 
other kinds of preference shares are treated as debt and open to the inter-
pretation adopted by the bureaucrats.
As a result of the Aircel–Maxis controversy, Dayanidhi Maran 
was forced to step down as Telecom Minister and Andimuthu Raja was 
appointed in his place. In 2008, under Raja’s leadership, 2G spectrum 
was allocated on a first-come-first-served basis. However, many pri-
vate companies used their influence and closeness with politicians and 
bureaucrats to manipulate the system and were awarded under-priced 
telecom licences, many of which were then sold onward to foreign inves-
tors for a large profit (Bhandari 2012). The CAG report15 of March 2010 
highlighted how some businesses illegally received prior insider knowl-
edge that the deadline for the first-come-first-served spectrum alloca-
tion was going to be ‘preponed’ at very short notice (CAG 2010). These 
favoured businesses had prepared their demand drafts, letters of intent 
and other relevant documents before the new cut-off date (Bhandari 
2012; Thakurta and Gatak 2012; Kaushal and Thakurta 2010).
Three months after spectrum was allocated, the Department of 
Telecoms revised their guidelines for intra-circle mergers and acqui-
sitions. The guidelines dropped any mention of the word ‘acquisitions’ 
and read ‘Any permission for merger shall be accorded only after comple-
tion of three years from the effective date of the licences’, which meant 
that only mergers would be prevented, paving a way for companies that 
had won spectrum licences to be acquired by foreign firms at terms very 
favourable to their Indian promoters (Kaushal and Thakurta 2010). For 
example, Swan Telecom was one of many companies to be incorporated 
with the intention that it would bid for 2G spectrum. Swan Telecom had 
capital of INR 28 crore (US$4.4 million) in 2007 and was awarded 22 
licences in 2008 (Mankotia and Raj 2011; Bhandari 2012). Subsequently 
in 2008, it managed to sell 45 per cent of its stock to the UAE telecom 
company Etisalat for US$900 million (Kerr and Fontanella-Khan 2008). 
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The CAG of India estimated the loss to the exchequer from the under-pric-
ing of 2G spectrum to be approximately INR 176,000 crore (US$26 bil-
lion), which subsequently led to the cancellation of 122 licences by the 
supreme court of India in 2012 (Bhandari 2012; Acharya 2012; Kaushal 
and Thakurta 2010).
Broadband Wireless Access (BWA) spectrum auctions in 2010 were 
also riddled with controversy, including several allegations of crimi-
nal intent by manipulation of the rules. It was alleged first that Infotel 
Broadband Services Private Limited (IBSPL), a private firm that won BWA 
spectrum at an auction, was fronting for the Reliance Group, and second 
that after the auction was conducted and the licences allocated the regu-
lations were changed retrospectively to benefit the Reliance Group. IBSPL 
had paid-up capital of INR 2.51 crore with one client, from which it earned 
INR 14.78 lakh and had a bank balance of INR 18 lakh, yet IBSPL had man-
aged to meet the financial requirements for the spectrum bidders and pro-
vided a bank guarantee of INR 252.5 crore as earnest money (which was 
several hundred times its capital) (Gatak and Thakurta 2016; Thakurta 
and Chaudhuri 2015). The DoT had, perhaps conveniently, failed to check 
the creditability of IBSPL. As soon as IBSPL won the BWA spectrum, its 
authorised share capital was raised two thousand times from INR 3 crore 
to INR 6,000 crore, and 75 per cent of its shares were issued to Reliance 
Industries Limited (Gatak and Thakurta 2016). Subsequently, IBSPL was 
renamed Reliance Jio Infocomm Limited. Gatak and Thakurta (2016) cite 
a draft report of the CAG, ‘The DoT failed to recognise the tell-tale sign of 
rigging of the auction right from [the] beginning of the auction’, which 
reveals that many state institutions were aware of the violations but, with 
fractured jurisdictions and no ex ante powers, to date little has been done 
to address them.
The BWA spectrum auction originally stipulated that this spectrum 
could be used only to provide broadband or data services. This prevented 
its holders from providing ‘voice’ services. Many telecom companies 
did not bid for this spectrum (or bid aggressively for higher and higher 
amounts) as the regulations restricted its use for voice. After IBSPL had 
won a majority of the BWA spectrum and had been acquired by Reliance 
Industries, the regulations were changed to allow voice calls over the 
BWA spectrum.16 The regulator and the DoT justified the change in pol-
icy as reflecting the ‘march of technology’, where the next step following 
‘Internet Protocol (IP)’ was ‘Voice Over Internet Protocol’ (VOIP) tech-
nology. The question still arises as to whose interests were served by the 
BWA spectrum’s not being priced with VOIP in the first place. The CAG 
reported that such a retrospective policy move allowed Reliance Jio to 
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enter the telecom markets by paying an ‘entry fee’ of INR 15 crore and 
a ‘migration fee’ of INR 1,658 crore, while benefitting to the tune of INR 
22,842 crore, which they would have had to pay had they bid fairly for the 
BWA licence that allowed voice calls (Gatak and Thakurta 2016).
Corruption and the links to political party finances
The public discourse on corruption and crony capitalism seldom goes 
beyond pinpointing an individual politician or bureaucrat when he or she 
is caught in an illegal or criminal activity. It is the greed of the individual 
in question or his/her lack of ethics that attracts condemnation. The insti-
tutions, processes and relations constituting the system of which they 
are part are never publicly questioned. Yet it is widely accepted that cor-
ruption cannot take place without the tacit agreement of a whole chain 
of people working in a particular state department, and it is also very 
unlikely that the political party to which the individual belongs knows 
nothing of their activities. It is most likely that the bribes are shared up 
and down the chain of command.
Political parties are also likely to benefit from corruption scandals, 
as money obtained criminally can be used for election campaign expenses 
while bypassing regulations designed to make political party finances 
more transparent. In 2014, the Centre for Media Studies estimated the 
amount that political parties spent on parliamentary elections to exceed 
US$4.6 billion – of which only 2.2 per cent could be traced back to donors 
and recipients (Economist 2014). As per the election commission’s rules, 
political parties are legally not allowed to spend more than INR 70 lakh 
(US$115 thousand) per parliamentary seat, but it is common knowledge 
that political candidates spend between 50 to 100 times that amount on 
their election campaigns (Economist 2014; Mahajan 2016). In 2012, the 
Observer Research Foundation think-tank reported that parliamentari-
ans from Congress and the BJP openly discussed their spending INR 20 
crore (US$3.3 million) on their campaigns when the official limit was 
INR 16 lakh (US$26,000) (Economist 2014). In 2016, the Union Minister 
of Finance, Arun Jaitley, also alluded to the extensive use of black money 
in political party finances in a Doordarshan News interview (Mahajan 
2016).
There is only one political repercussion I want to see with this 
(demonetisation) and that is that politics and the process of elec-
tions will also get cleaned because of this. This will have an effect on 
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political parties as well. So far in our country there has been a prac-
tice of invisible political funding, that will also have to be visible in 
a democracy. (Arun Jaitley, 10 November 2016)
Although there are several ways whereby political parties generate black 
money, corruption is the champion. In 2014, criminal cases were pend-
ing against more than one-third of the elected members of parliament, 
demonstrating the extent to which crime, corruption and politics are 
linked (Vaishnav 2017). If the politician is uncharged, he or she contin-
ues to run for elections while amassing wealth both personally and for 
the party. If caught, then a politician is scapegoated as an individual. The 
question then arises of the specific conditions under which a political 
party chooses to save its candidate. Although there is no direct answer, 
my fieldwork may be able to shed some light on these conditions.
Over the course of my fieldwork, many telecom bureaucrats 
acknowledged that they feared being investigated by the CBI and/or 
ED after retirement or when the government changed. Many of them 
believed that they would become victims of politically motivated inves-
tigations when an incoming government would want to show up the 
outgoing government as incompetent and corrupt. Often investigations 
would start by looking into the activities of low-level bureaucrats and 
slowly spread to the entire chain of command, giving the politicians 
time to make backroom deals. Pradip Baijal, a former chair of the TRAI, 
described his experience facing an investigation motivated by political 
malice in his book A Bureaucrat Fights Back (2016) and in an interview 
with me. He explained how he had had to seek the help of Arun Shourie 
and Yashwant Sinha (the Telecom Minister and the Finance Minister 
respectively at the time when he was TRAI chair) to resolve the case 
against him. Many bureaucrats explained that they coped with the fear 
of being subjected to politically motivated investigations by keeping a 
copy of every document they signed. In political circles, it is also well-
known that criminal cases against politicians are often not resolved but 
kept pending for years so as to allow the government in power to bring 
the case to centre stage and use the threat of punishment (jail time) and 
bad press to limit the actions of the political party in opposition. At times, 
political parties have no choice but to allow their ministers to go to jail. 
Very often after the media frenzy calms down the minister is allowed bail 
and is able to continue with political and social duties.
For example, A. Raja, the Telecom Minister (and a member of the 
DMK), was arrested with 15 others (including Kanimozhi, the DMK patri-
arch M. Karunanidhi’s daughter) accused in the 2G spectrum scam case 
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in February 2011. Raja spent 15 months in jail before he was granted bail 
(Kattakayam 2012). In 2017, Raja and others were acquitted of any wrong-
doing in the 2G spectrum case on the basis of a lack of evidence (Kumar 
2017). It remains a mystery as to why in 2012 there was enough evidence 
in the first place to jail Raja and his associates and why that evidence 
was insufficient in 2017. Another mystery concerns the case’s delays. It 
might have been providential timing: just before the 2G scandal verdict 
was given, there were many rumours that the BJP was considering an alli-
ance with the DMK in Tamil Nadu. These rumours were further fuelled by 
Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Tamil Nadu, where he met the ailing DMK 
leader Karunanidhi, in November 2017 (CNN News 18 7 November 2017; 
Hindustan Times 7 November 2017). Internal party politics may also play a 
role in politically motivated investigations: many media sources reported 
on Dayanidhi Maran’s ‘stepping on the toes of DMK patriarch Karunanidhi 
and his sons’, as a result of which he was punished with continuous investi-
gations into his actions as Telecom Minister (Ramadurai 2011).
The ways in which businesses transact with political parties have 
also evolved. Kochanek (1996) in his seminal study of business lob-
bying in India highlighted the practices of ‘briefcase politics’, whereby 
industrial capitalists would commonly illicitly buy influence with money 
after political contributions, legitimate or otherwise, were banned in 
1969 (Mazumdar 2008; Kohli 2012; Panagariya 2008; Kochanek 1987). 
McDonald (1998) argued that the Reliance Group had succeeded in 
reversing the client–patron relationship, in which state officers competed 
to bring profitable opportunities to the Reliance Group in return for finan-
cial rewards. Businesses offered substantial financial rewards in the form 
of political contributions, election funding and bribes at the party level. 
Meanwhile, at the individual level they offered jobs in the private sec-
tor that might benefit a bureaucrat’s family, or offers of post-retirement 
employment, admissions and scholarships to schools or colleges, or access 
to elite hospitals, housing communities, etc.
Over time, there has been a push towards formalising the purchase 
of political influence through the use of advocacy groups, think-tanks 
and policy and industry consultants who act as middlemen and often 
organise conferences and closed-door meetings between industry pro-
fessionals and state officials to facilitate backroom deals. For example, 
Niira Radia, a known lobbyist, was caught on tape by an Income Tax 
Department wiretap, speaking to top businessmen about the shares of 
benefits that each would receive when Raja became Telecom Minister 
(Radia Tapes 2009). It seems that big business conglomerates (with 
interests in several sectors) view their relationships with the government 
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strategically. Political contributions (legal and illegal) are thought of as 
a fee to yield influence or to access any government department. When 
a specific favour is to be granted by the government then the business 
pays a variable cut, to be apportioned to all involved. So business leaders 
cultivate individual relationships with important political party leaders 
in the belief that, since political parties hold power transiently, as long 
as the business leader has contact with each political party, he or she will 
be able to draw on that relationship when necessary. It seems that when 
a party loses power, political contributions are diverted to the winning 
party and the system of corruption and influence persists.
Conclusions
Spectrum markets in India represent a key example of the neoliberal 
nature of India’s economy. The wireless telecom sector was built on 
forms of application of market principles that allowed private busi-
nesses to dominate telecom service provision. Spectrum rights are at 
the heart of the telecom markets; they are necessary for the provision of 
telecom services and have a value in themselves because telecom com-
panies often engage in mergers and acquisitions to obtain these rights. 
Acting as market regulator, promoter and guardian, the state created a 
market for spectrum rights, which allowed a private oligopoly to own 
and control these rights for a set period of time. The state is formally 
responsible for overseeing the functioning of the market and stepping 
in when there is a risk of disruption. In the telecom sector, the state 
actively and legally promoted the interest of private businesses in the 
name of revitalising telecom markets whenever profits were threatened. 
Most of the companies that formed the telecom oligopoly belonged to 
the big domestic business houses, such as the Tatas, Birlas, Reliance, 
etc. The telecom companies often borrowed large sums of money from 
public-sector banks in order to bid in the spectrum auctions (Ghosh and 
Guha 2017; Press Trust of India 2017). While increasing competition 
among telecom companies reduced their revenues, high interest rates 
squeezed margins. Every time these telecom companies have found 
themselves over-leveraged and unprofitable, the state has stepped in 
and revised the telecom policies in order to reduce the financial pres-
sure on the companies. Most of the large policy changes can be traced 
back to the financial difficulties facing private telecom companies; from 
the National Telecom Policy 1994 to the New Telecom Policy 1999 to the 
New Telecom Policy 2012 and once again in 2018 when a New Telecom 
160 THE WILD EAST
Policy was introduced as the National Digital Communications Policy, 
aiming to address the current difficulties of ballooning debt and falling 
revenues in the sector. The regulators’ rhetoric that ‘healthy companies 
make healthy markets’ masks the extensive financial assistance that the 
state provides to the private telecom businesses of some of the richest 
conglomerates.
As the representatives of the state, which both creates and regulates 
spectrum, politicians and bureaucrats are in positions of power as pol-
icy makers, regulators and enforcers. Their inherent conflicts of interest 
are exacerbated when they then grant favours to specific businesses. The 
market economy has blurred the distinction between formal legal ‘discre-
tion’ and criminal behaviour. Many big business houses use their exten-
sive networks across various state departments to cultivate relationships 
with state officials and political parties. Corruption is endemic in the tele-
com sector. This sector has witnessed an unprecedented number of scan-
dals, which have involved titans of Indian industry and major political 
parties, Telecom Ministers, Finance Ministers, Prime Ministers and sen-
ior bureaucrats. Crimes have included illegally providing specific busi-
nesses with prior knowledge of policy changes, retrospectively changing 
policies in their favour, allowing ad hoc exemptions and going slow on 
investigating violations of policy. Very often the judicial procedure is 
used to delay or completely avoid paying fines; telecom companies file 
a case appealing the fine levied by the DoT, and while the case goes on 
for many years, the telecom company in question continues operating. 
State–business relationships in the market-led economy have become 
extremely lucrative for state officials individually and for the political 
parties in power as well as for businesses. The scale and the magnitude of 
the sums of money involved have vastly increased over time, amplifying 
corruption, clientelism and patronage.
Notes
 1. Here spectrum refers to a range of radio waves.
 2. The cost of an outgoing local call fell from INR 6 per minute in 2001 to INR 0.80 per minute in 
2015 (Economic Times 2015)
 3. The DoT, in consultation with the TRAI, changed the law so as to advantage Reliance and the 
Tatas. The then chair of TRAI, Pradip Baijal, was investigated over allegations of providing Re-
liance with a ‘back door’ into the telecom sector. See page 157 for details. The Tatas benefitted 
less as their CDMA licences were mainly for the big metros. The requirement for an auction to 
allocate spectrum was mandated by the supreme court only in 2012, during the delivery of 
the verdict on the 2G scandal. In this case, the law itself was tweaked by the state to make an 
exception to advantage specific businesses.
 4. In 2005 the exchange rate was INR 45.01 to the dollar
 5. In 2010 the exchange rate was INR 46.30 to the dollar
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 6. This was a mantra expressed widely by informants during fieldwork, in both private and public 
contexts.
 7. The system has become increasingly neoliberal, which over time normalises, legitimises and 
rationalises the actions of politicians and bureaucrats. Most of my interviewees representing 
state institutions were investigated for wrongful action at some point or another but they 
seemed to believe that their actions (of giving away spectrum cheaply) were justified by revo-
lutionising the telecom markets. The DoT, TRAI and TDSAT (even RBI) state institutions often 
rationalise bad practice in the telecom sector – and the institutional framework was set up so 
as to bail out the sector every time the private ‘telcos’ got into trouble.
 8. Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited is a state-owned telecommunications service provider. 
Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited is a formerly state-owned telecom company now owned by 
Tata Communications.
 9. The automatic route of foreign direct investment gives foreign companies permission to invest 
in Indian companies without prior approval from the Ministry of Finance.
10. The capture of the regulators by those regulated.
11. Adopting alternative interpretations of specific policies in specific cases refers to bureaucrats 
and politicians interpreting a particular law/regulation in a way that benefits a specific busi-
ness but switching back to a more stringent interpretation for other businesses, giving the first 
business a competitive advantage. An example is found in the case of interconnection charges 
(IUCs); i.e. charges that telecom company A must pay telecom company B for the use of B’s 
network when A’s customers want to call B’s customer. Until 2016, the IUC charge per call was 
fixed at 14 paise and on average total revenue to telecom companies from IUCs amounted to 
approximately INR 20,000 crore (Rathee 2016). In order to provide some certainty over costs 
incurred by telecom companies, the TRAI was committed to leaving the IUCs at 14 paise for 
the next few years. With the entry of Reliance Jio in late 2016, the TRAI began a consultative 
process of revising the IUCs down. As Reliance Jio was a new entrant in the market, their cus-
tomer base would make proportionally more outgoing calls and receive fewer incoming calls in 
comparison to other networks, which would mean that Reliance Jio would end up paying other 
telecom companies more in IUCs than it would receive. Merrill Lynch estimated that with an 
approximate subscriber base of 30 million, IUCs would cost Reliance Jio INR 2,400 crore in 
its first year of operations (Parbat 2017). The TRAI chair R.S. Sharma interpreted the TRAI 
mandate, which was to ensure that there is high quality of services and that consumers are 
protected, to mean that IUCs needed to be reduced so as to reduce the number of call failures 
arising from the Reliance Jio network. Subsequently, IUCs were reduced to 6 paise, leading to 
a windfall gain for Reliance Jio (Hindu Businessline 2017). Other telecom companies lost out 
on revenues that they would otherwise have made.
12. The punishment for contravening policy is often just a fine, which, if it exceeds a certain 
amount, is then disputed in court. Such court processes drag on for years while the telecom 
companies continue their operations normally (which includes violating other policies).
13. From media reports, it seems that Sukh Ram served the sentence. He was also convicted and 
sentenced by different courts in three different but related cases, which, at age 91, he is still ap-
pealing in higher courts. After a six-year wait, a hearing was tabled for May 2018. Meanwhile 
in 2017 he crossed from Congress to the BJP but rejoined Congress in 2018.
14. There is no public evidence that money passed from the individual to their political party, 
though this is widely alleged in private.
15. Many such reports are leaked in draft, after periods spent wrestling with misinformation and 
attempts to manipulate, and ultimately are published in a mellower form.
16. Using the cloak of transparency, consultative papers are released by the TRAI, and are open to 
public comment. Advocacy professionals and telecom consultants write reports supporting the 
change. TRAI then issues its recommendations to the DoT, which then decides and implements 
the changes. Both major parties are privy to this process.
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Appendix: Field methods
My research was conducted between October 2016 and December 2017 
in Mumbai and Delhi. The main sources of data collection included 
in-depth semi-structured elite interviews with bureaucrats, politicians, 
industry leaders and regulators. I also attended telecommunications 
industry events, conducted a financial evaluation of telecommunica-
tions companies, drew on official and semi-official ‘grey’ literature on 
telecommunications policy as well as newspaper and magazine articles 
and books written by interviewees (or about the interviewees) on their 
experiences in the telecom industry. I consulted previous interviews 
given to the media by interviewees and any ‘street’ knowledge that I 
could get from journalists that would improve my understanding of the 
sector. I triangulated information through these various sources to ver-
ify information. The academic literature mentioned some of the main 
challenges with elite interviews which were applicable to my research: 
gaining trust and building a rapport with the interviewee, whether the 
researcher should record or not and ethical issues (Ostrander 1993; 
Gewirtz and Ozga 1994). I did not find any of these challenges to be 
difficult when conducting my research. For me trust was not an issue; 
I did not need my interviewees to trust me, I needed them to respect 
my research, which was a challenge which I discuss below. All the elite 
interviewees were very clear from the beginning as to whether I could 
record or take notes. This was not a problem; I simply had to follow the 
wishes of the interviewee. In terms of ethical issues, all my interviewees 
were adults and industry veterans and gave their informed consent to 
me interviewing them. In my case, none of my interviewees asked to 
remain anonymous.
For my elite interviews, I faced a different set of challenges from 
those emphasised in the literature. The first was to identify potential inter-
viewees. In any industry, there are a number of key people that industry 
insiders implicitly know of and respect. It becomes critical to find out who 
these people are because in all my interviews I was asked, ‘Who else are 
you going to speak to or have spoken to?’ Answering this question set the 
tone for the interview and signalled my credibility as a researcher to the 
interviewee. At times I found some interviewees to be very similar, but 
I found that being known as a credible researcher often outweighed the 
costs of doing an extra interview. I also found newspaper reporters and 
journalists to be a very good source for identifying key people.
One of the most difficult aspects of elite interviews is the research-
er’s ability to tap into the existing networks of people in the area being 
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researched. Most ‘elites’ in my study – bureaucrats, business leaders and 
policy makers – are very busy and seldom make time to speak to a student 
unless they get a reference or a recommendation from their friends, fam-
ily or colleagues. The researcher’s ability to leverage their personal and 
professional connections to tap into this network is critical. Once they get 
an opening into a network then it becomes a question of the research-
er’s persistence and skill to secure introductions to other people in the 
network. This problem is further complicated because there are several 
such networks of people: in my case, networks of bureaucrats, networks 
of telecom business managers and networks of policymakers. At times 
these networks overlapped, allowing the researcher access to other net-
works, while at times it worked as a disadvantage as some people would 
assume that the researcher had ulterior motives given their association 
with the other networks. In my case, navigating networks was one of the 
most challenging aspects of elite interviews.
Another challenge of conducting elite interviews is preparation. 
Mine included full background research: where the interviewee grew 
up, went to school, college; what positions they have held; their politi-
cal party affiliations; whether there have been any scandals/court cases 
against them; their hobbies or social clubs, etc. Reading everything writ-
ten by them and about them becomes important; often the first question 
I was asked was whether I had read their book and what I thought of it. 
Also, going through their previous interviews is important so as not to 
ask the same questions again. I was once caught off guard by an inter-
viewee who answered a question by asking me whether I had seen the TV 
interview he had given a few weeks ago – he said he had answered this 
question there and that I should go home and listen to it. I couldn’t ask 
a follow up question as I didn’t know what his answer was. In addition, I 
found that many interviewees appreciated being asked about an answer 
that they had given in an older interview – the surprise that I had watched 
that interview flattered them and helped me build a rapport with them. In 
order to fully gain from an interview, days of preparations were needed.
After such intense preparations, it was very challenging to deal 
with cancellations and last-minute postponements. For example, I once 
spent over six weeks arranging and preparing for an appointment with a 
former attorney general of India and flew from Mumbai to Delhi specially 
for this appointment. When I arrived at the appointed time, I was made 
to wait outside for three hours in the summer heat of Delhi only to be 
told that ‘Sir is busy so he can’t see you’. In the moment, dealing with the 
frustration of wasted time, money and energy is very difficult. Another 
example was when I was told by an interviewee that ‘perhaps we should 
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continue this interview when you are more advanced in your research’, 
which in other words meant that I was wasting his time. I found deal-
ing with such criticism quite disheartening and bouncing back from an 
interview gone wrong was tough. Another major challenge concerns the 
kind of questions asked, which reflected credibility as a researcher. If my 
questions were too simple, the interviewee would lose interest quickly; if 
the question was too complicated then they wouldn’t attempt to answer 
it. Finding the correct balance was critical. Background research and 
reading or listening to previous interviews was a good way to find that 
balance. Many guides to elite interviews suggested that to build a rapport 
with the interviewee the researcher should find a common connection 
such as shared interests, being a member of the same social clubs, or hav-
ing attended the same universities, etc. In my experience, I found this 
advice to be quite unhelpful. Many of the policy makers I interviewed 
were educated at Oxford, which is where I also studied. It did not help me 
to have Oxford University as a common connection. Instead I found that 
if I asked the right questions, I gained their respect as a researcher, which 
allowed me to build a better rapport with them.
Finally, another important challenge that I faced was how to under-
stand the points of view of the people who did not agree to be inter-
viewed. In the academic literature and guides to elite interviews, I did 
not find any comprehensive advice on how to fill in the knowledge gaps, 
when persons critical to the sector refuse to be interviewed. In my case, 
the perspectives of Telecom Ministers were vital to building an accurate 
historical narrative of the telecoms sector in India. When I asked various 
Telecom Ministers for an interview, I received standard replies telling me 
that as there were court cases pending against them, the matters were sub 
juris and therefore they were not allowed to speak about them. However, 
one of the ministers’ lawyers got in touch with me and said, ‘Please watch 
his television interviews over the last year and you will have everything 
you need’. Although I was aware that this advice was given in self-inter-
est, I found it to be quite useful for filling in gaps in my research. Not only 
did I listen to their interviews but I also got hold of the various supreme 
court judgments, which provided me with details of both sides of the 
argument and allowed me to build a more holistic historical picture.
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The inter-state criminal life of sand 
and oil in North India
Lucia Michelutti
This chapter explores the inter-state criminal political economies of the sand and 
oil mafias in North India. It puts forward the concept of ‘mafia assemblages’ to 
nuance understanding of ‘organised crime’ and simultaneously provides insights 
into contemporary political formations. Mafia assemblages in the studied cases 
are not hyper-fluid, autonomous and amorphous illegal networks; nor are 
they discrete, structured, hierarchical and bounded ‘mafia systems’. The crim-
inal economies of sand and oil constantly mutate, transform and break up as 
they adapt to new business opportunities and political constraints. The chapter 
explores how the sand and oil mafia assemblages intertwine and how the very 
same local political bosses protect (and are part of) them. Contrary to economic 
analysis that emphasises different tax rates as the main engines of cross-border 
criminal economies, the working of sand and oil mafias suggests that it is instead 
the search for impunity by political bosses and the nature of caste territorial sov-
ereignties that drive criminal economies in border areas.
This chapter investigates North Indian criminal political economies 
by looking at two locally intertwined il/legal commodity chains: sand 
(baloo) and oil (tel). It is based on fieldwork observations and on inter-
views with key informers – criminal bosses, syndicate members, police 
officers and criminal lawyers – as well as on long-term research on local 
cultures of caste sovereignty, kinship and territoriality.1 The setting is a 
provincial town and a rural tehsil (sub-district) in Western Uttar Pradesh 
(UP) and its bordering areas in Rajasthan, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh and 
the National Capital Region (NCR). Sand is available and illegally mined 
from the Yamuna, Chambal and Banas rivers. Crude oil and fuel are pil-
fered from the Mathura-Jalandar pipeline. This 535 km-long pipeline, 
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from Mathura Indian Oil Corporation via Delhi, Panipat and Ambala, 
transports petrol products to various consumption centres in Delhi, UP, 
Haryana, Uttarakhand and Punjab.
In many parts of the globe, criminal groups have emerged as 
prominent illegal suppliers of sand (Beiser 2015; Rege 2016; Rege and 
Lavorgna 2017, 160; Romig 2017). Equally, oil rackets are a source of 
illegal revenue for a variety of transnational mafia-like groups. In India, 
there is undeniably plenty of illegal money to be made from oil prod-
ucts and to be shared among refinery company personnel, engineers, the 
police, politicians and local communities and this is often reported by 
the press (see for example Anand 2016). It is also a well-known public 
secret that petrol pumps are an extremely lucrative business for which 
the licence is difficult to obtain and often granted to politicians or mem-
bers of their families. Similarly, it is common knowledge that sand is 
managed by varying combinations of labourers, local contractors, min-
ing companies, mobsters, the police, bureaucrats and politicians (Witsoe 
2009). In this book we have already explored some of these dynamics 
in Tamil Nadu (see Chapter 3). Both the il/legal sectors under study 
here (the oil and sand ‘businesses’) are at the heart of what Michelutti 
et  al. (2018) conceptualised as mafia raj (rule of mafia).2 These busi-
ness activities do not produce wealth but rather capture wealth through 
violent assertions of authority and/or through political encompass-
ment.3 Unfortunately, the exploitation of sand destroys riverbeds and 
natural resources, and the adulteration of fuels contributes to the high 
levels of air pollution present in Indian towns and cities today. These 
are the outcomes of serious environmental crimes, crimes that flout the 
laws protecting riverbeds and air quality. Ethnographically this chapter 
scrutinises the criminal markets and the regimes of mafia governance 
that sand and oil contribute to generating. Crucially, I will show how 
such arrangements criss-cross internal state boundaries and political 
constituencies.
There is an emerging anthropological literature that looks at trans-
national illegal economies (cf. Scheper-Hughes 2003; Vigh 2015), the 
globalisation of crime (Nordstrom 2007) and ultimately at border areas 
as places where the State fails to rule efficiently.4 Yet, throughout this 
book we show that ‘mafia raj’ is not only a prerogative of marginal and 
unconquered ‘border areas’. This chapter further confirms this point. 
In India, internal borders have been historically exploited in a variety 
of ways to gain profit and to secure impunity (Harriss 1977). Yet there 
is no study which looks at Indian inter-state border areas as profitable 
business hubs and prime centres of criminal capital accumulation, and, 
170 THE WILD EAST
importantly, as safe havens of impunity by political violent entrepre-
neurs. By contrast the press, TV, social media and fiction and movies 
are full of stories about ‘inter-state rackets’. In India, the term ‘racket’ is 
often used as a synonym for organised crime. Particularly in conversa-
tions, it is popularly employed to underline illegal activities that are per-
petuated by gang-like groups and to contrast such ‘serious (organised) 
crimes’ with more socially embedded informal enterprises where it is not 
always possible to distinguish gang members from non-gang members 
and whose activities, despite being illegal, are often socially condoned 
as licit.5 These distinctions are, however, in practice very blurred. In this 
chapter, I will show how exploring the nature of inter-state rackets may 
provide a means to map where ‘organised crime’, informal networks and 
a plethora of actors meet, co-function and produce threshold spaces in 
which ‘order and disorder, lawful and unlawful, norm and exception, 
outside and inside conflate. It is in these spaces that arbitrary violence is 
practiced as legitimate and necessary, and where the reality of the inter-
twinement [the mafia raj] takes shape’ (Civico 2015, 22). In the cases of 
the sand and oil illegal business I conceptualise such continuums as the 
‘sand mafia assemblage’ and the ‘oil mafia assemblage’.
I find assemblage theory attractive because it provides a vocabu-
lary to grasp both the fluidity of the studied criminal, political and eco-
nomic configurations as well as their dense structuring and territorial 
materialisation at given times. More specifically I draw on the concept of 
assemblage proposed by Deleuze and Guattari (1987) to problematise the 
concept of ‘organised crime’ and simultaneously to provide insights into 
the nature of contemporary governance and issues of impunity in North 
India.6 Mafia assemblages are not hyper-fluid, autonomous and amor-
phous illegal networks; nor are they discrete, structured, hierarchical and 
bounded ‘mafia systems’. On the ground, the criminal economy constantly 
mutates, transforms and breaks up as it adapts to new business opportu-
nities and political constraints (cf. Standing 2003). The ‘Wild East’ pred-
atory ethos is in constant movement and there are no singular organising 
principles or logic behind its structuring; however, this does not mean 
that sand and oil ‘mafias’ are disorganised. On the contrary, mapping their 
tentative and unstable arrangements will help to single out what is fluid, 
what is fixed, when, where and for what reasons. Importantly, such an 
exercise will make tangible and visible the symbiotic assemblage of com-
plicities and opportunistic partnerships that structure and provide contin-
gent legitimacies to local mafia raj regimes. This chapter is divided into 
four parts. The first explores the economic and political backdrop against 
which the sand mafia and oil mafia assemblages operate. It outlines the 
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predatory economies, the political polarisation and the uncertainty that 
characterises the local Wild East. The second and third parts document 
the itinerant economic opportunities that sand and oil offer to local vio-
lent entrepreneurs and populations. They describe the broader il/legal 
sand and oil commodity chains, and the strategies employed to exploit 
profit at different stages of the supply chain. I will illustrate the ‘cultural, 
regulatory and policing factors’ (Rege and Lavorgna 2017: 162) that 
support and enable the studied local mafia assemblages to operate (and 
govern) with relative impunity. In the process, I will also outline the var-
ious types of relationship that emerge around sand and oil and how they 
shape varieties of life strategies for the people and communities that exist 
in their midst. The concluding fourth part examines the implications of 
such chains of il/legality for capital accumulation and the role of ‘border 
territories’ in creating and maintaining the necessary impunity to allow 
such accumulations and ‘mafia raj’ regimes.
Western Uttar Pradesh – the ‘Wild East’
Predatory economies
Western Uttar Pradesh has undergone tremendous economic and 
social transformations over the past two decades. Today, over 200 mil-
lion people live in the state, a fifth of whom are Muslim. The rest are 
mostly Hindu, divided broadly between three mutually antagonistic 
caste groups: the upper-caste Brahmins and Thakurs (the local Rajput 
caste); the lower-caste Dalits; and the ‘other backward classes’ such as 
the Yadavs. This region of Uttar Pradesh has been increasingly thought of 
in the popular national perception as the Sicily of North India. Western 
Uttar Pradesh is widely known for its endemic violence, for being cultur-
ally shaped by the ‘macho’ ethos of its dominant castes like Jats, Yadavs, 
Gujars and Thakurs, and for being marred by communalism and caste-
based conflicts. Available statistics and sociological studies have defined 
this area as the cradle of ‘a subculture of violence’ and the home of ‘insti-
tutionalised riot systems’.7 However, what is perhaps deeply misleading 
is the portrayal of this region uniquely as a poor provincial backwater. 
This is a land where over the past decade fortunes have been made in 
one generation and where upward mobility and entrepreneurship are 
fully entrenched in the imagination and fantasies of the younger gener-
ations. As outlined in the Introduction to this book, the economy of this 
region has also been changed by the commercialisation of agricultural 
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land and changes in land use. We are witnessing skyrocketing real estate 
prices as a result of quicker access to Delhi, thanks to the construction 
of the Yamuna Expressway and its proximity to the industrial and res-
idential hubs of Noida and Faridabad. These developments have given 
rise to an intense scramble for valuable economic assets and have opened 
up a space for violent entrepreneurs, whom I shall call dabangs (bosses), 
and for their flexible organised ‘companies’ to regulate and control illegal 
trade and production in legal commodities or services related to urban 
development and the expansion of infrastructure (Michelutti et al. 2018, 
Chapter 1). The power syndicates involved in the area are many − as the 
following pages will show, they are also flexible, volatile, fragmented and 
in constant flux. To complicate their mapping, the socio-cultural and eco-
nomic area in which they operate overlaps with four states: Rajasthan, 
Haryana, Delhi and Madhya Pradesh. Hence, most local ‘mafia’ networks 
are inter-state criminal groups, which makes them difficult to police. 
Unfortunately, there is a complete lack of coordination between central 
and state police bodies. India does not have a national-level agency to 
coordinate the efforts of the state police forces; nor does it have central 
enforcement agencies to fight organised crime. There is no agency to col-
lect, collate, analyse, document and act as a central exchange of informa-
tion relating to national, inter-state gangs operating in the country and 
internationally (Sharma 1999: 112). It follows that by simply crossing 
the border with Rajasthan a person who commits a murder in UP can eas-
ily avoid being investigated, caught and prosecuted. So, this area enjoys 
an extra layer of impunity due to its inter-state geographical character. 
More specifically the tehsil under study, which I shall call Jaganpura, bor-
ders two states in the proximity of the NCR (National Capital Region). 
The tehsil has the highest rates of recorded murders and attempted mur-
ders in the district. High levels of crime exist in symbiosis with routinised 
forms of social and political violence and conflicts. Rajputs and Jats are 
the most numerous and powerful castes in the area, followed by Brah-
mins, Gujars, Chamars and the Muslim communities.
From competitive mafia raj to monopolistic mafia raj
Local criminal economies have been shaped not only by economic liber-
alisation but crucially by the opportunities created by lively multi-party 
competition, paired with a high level of communal and caste-based con-
flict in the areas where they govern.8 It has been established that political 
parties select criminal candidates in those areas where social divisions are 
the most contested.9 From the mid to late 1990s, Uttar Pradesh started to 
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witness the political rise of iconic bosses.10 The Samajwadi party govern-
ments of 2002–07 and 2012–17 have been labelled as ‘Goonda Raj’/‘mafia 
raj’ due to the high proportions of elected MLAs with criminal histories; 
between 2012–17 in particular (when data for this chapter were col-
lected), Western Uttar Pradesh presented what Martin and Michelutti 
(2017) defined as a ‘competitive mafia raj’. These are highly violent forms 
of bossism that are triggered by the co-existence of multiple and competi-
tive centres of power, which tend to clash. These are settings where crim-
inal bosses can enter directly into politics. Mafia raj configurations are, 
however, always in flux. The victory of the BJP in the state elections in 
March 2017 may signal the end of a competitive cycle. In 2017, the SP was 
defeated by the BJP, which won in part on an ‘anti-mafia raj’ ticket. The 
newly appointed Chief Minister, Yogi Adityanath – a controversial figure 
himself, with a criminal record – had made his reputation by transforming 
his gangster-dominated constituency, Gorakhpur, into a ‘safe’ Hindu ter-
ritory and, I would suggest, into a ‘monopolistic mafia raj’.11 Monopolistic 
mafia raj are regimes that present a centralised and authoritarian form of 
racketeering. In the case of Gorakhpur, majoritarianism has been com-
bined with Adityanath’s youth force organisation, the Hindu Yuva Vahini, 
its vigilante practices and ‘encounter killings’.12 While it is certainly too 
early to assess if and how the ‘Gorakhpur model’ will be replicated across 
UP,13 there is certainly evidence from daily news that ‘the mafia raj’ is 
still alive and is now camouflaging itself under ‘saffron scarfs’ (Lal 2017, 
Chauhan 2017, Talukdar 2017).14 This masquerade allows key players to 
keep breaking the law and maintain impunity – much in the same manner 
as the SP supporters did for the previous five years. In the locality under 
study, the key Thakur and Jat bosses have now conveniently joined the 
BJP (cf. Michelutti forthcoming). The result is that in Jaganpura the local 
criminal/political leadership has remained intact despite the change of 
power. If anything, under the new Thakur Chief Minister, Rajput bosses 
feel emboldened (Alam 2017; Sharma 2017). Since Adityanath’s appoint-
ment, caste riots (and encounter killings) rather than communal riots 
have been rampant in Western Uttar Pradesh and reported by the press 
(see for example Kishore 2017). The Thakurs are out to get revenge 
against the Dalits and backward castes and their criminal Muslim ‘compa-
nies’. It should also be noted that despite 15 years of government by lower 
castes, Thakurs still hold a disproportionate share of political representa-
tion across the state. Crucially, they also remain the second most affluent 
caste. I shall return to the nature of Western UP ‘mafia raj’ and the entwin-
ing between caste sovereignty, kinship and criminal political capital in the 
concluding section, after exploring the sand and oil mafia assemblages.
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The sand (baloo) mafia assemblage
The main actors
The boom in the construction business in the NCR coupled with the 
lack of an alternative to river sand has made illegal mining a lucrative 
economic activity in Western Uttar Pradesh. Over the past two years, 
sociologists of crime have shown how India’s sand mafias have devel-
oped into sophisticated organised crime groups (Rege 2016; Rege and 
Lavorgna 2017). In 2013, during my fieldwork, two cases brought to 
the limelight the spoils of mafia syndicates in the region under study. 
These events highlighted the brutality of this criminal sector as well 
as the ecological disasters that it is causing. The first case involved the 
famous don-turned-politician, Raghuraj Pratap Singh, alias Raja Bhaiya. 
In 2017, the ‘Raja’ was elected as an assembly representative for Kunda 
for the sixth consecutive time. The criminal career of this Thakur boss 
is mired in controversy. By 2002, he was reported to have 44 criminal 
cases registered against him, including serious charges such as attempt 
to murder, dacoity and abduction, and in March 2013 the don was 
accused of ‘criminal conspiracy’ in the killing of a police officer who was 
allegedly investigating the local sand mafia before he was murdered. 
The case was processed by the CBI. Raja Bhaiya was acquitted on the 
charges in August 2013.
This case brought to national and international attention the kind 
of violent capitalist accumulation that Uttar Pradesh riverbeds are cur-
rently generating. It also contributed to developing the spectral image of 
‘sand mafia’ and more generally of the mafia in this region. When I started 
fieldwork, I was surprised by how frequently the theme of ‘mafia’ (and in 
particular ‘land’, ‘sand’, and ‘oil’ mafia) cropped up in the everyday con-
versations of my informants. Newspapers, TV and social media report on 
‘mafias’ on an almost daily basis. These reports and their everyday discus-
sions contribute to popularising the term along with ‘mafia’ power in the 
collective imagination. Popular fantasies about their brutality and tight 
organisations contributed to reify them as unitary arrangements. It fol-
lows that in the field, it was impossible to separate analytically the mate-
rial fragmented reality of the sand and oil mafia assemblage from the 
unitary ‘mafia-idea’ that people often had. These are indeed two aspects 
of the same process and both equally important.15
After the Raj Bhaiya scandal, a few months later the suspension of 
Durga Shakti Nagpal, an IAS officer, hit the headlines and fuelled the 
daily conversations of my informants. Before she was dismissed, Ms 
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Nagpal was allegedly investigating illegal sand mining in the nearby 
district of Gautama Budda Nagar. Her suspension provoked a national 
outcry and much talk in and around Jaganpura. However, in the teh-
sil it was the killing of two young men caught transporting illegal sand 
on the Yamuna river that brought the materiality of sand mafia directly 
into my field notes. Coincidentally, at the time of these killings I was 
shadowing several local bosses, entrepreneurs and politicians who had 
become involved in the formal and informal ‘regulation’ of the incident. 
A number of these individuals are part of what locals refer to as the ‘big’ 
mafia, ‘the Cartel’ or ‘the Lobby’ or ‘the Crime Mafia’.16 To elaborate, it 
all started on a summer morning in 2013 when I went to observe the 
darbar of a prominent local political figure, popularly known as Thakur 
Dabang. When I arrived at his house I immediately realised that some-
thing was not right. TV and newspaper reporters were present in large 
numbers and Thakur Dabang was nowhere to be seen. His brother-in-
law was doing his best to deal with the demands of journalists. I was 
soon told that early that morning two young men who belonged to 
Thakur Dabang’s village in Jaganpura tehsil had allegedly been killed 
by the police for not paying ‘the tax’. The two boys were transporting 
sand in their tractor. According to the brother-in-law, the police did not 
ask for the usual pre-agreed INR 200 ‘tax’ toll to cross the bridge on the 
Yamuna river; instead, they asked for more money. The driver and his 
colleague refused, a fight broke out and the two men died. A few hours 
later, a mob of people from the area attacked the local police station in 
protest. Consequently, four more people were also injured. The police 
officers in charge of the local thana (police station) were immediately 
suspended on charges of administrative lapses (but not of extortion). 
The first two days after the murder were critical for understanding how 
apparently distant and unconnected individuals and groups formed an 
integral part of an inter-state ‘sand mafia assemblage’. It should be noted 
that in this area sand-lords mainly engage in speculation rather than 
actual sand extraction. Money is made purely by moving sand around, 
marking up the price, and trying to eliminate competition and avoid 
a price increase. In the bordering districts of Rajasthan and Madhya 
Pradesh, these bosses and their companies, syndicates or groups are 
known as ‘the UP mafia’. In these areas, villagers have been roped in as 
commission agents who collect sand, provide storage and sell it to the 
Jaganpura bosses. ‘The UP mafia’ then transports and sells the sand in 
Uttar Pradesh cities and in the National Capital Region.
***
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A big panchayat meeting was called on the same day of the murder 
and a second one followed a few days later. This type of meeting is locally 
called Bayalishi (gathering of 42 villages) and is part of the informal struc-
ture governing the local Thakur caste. Thakurs are divided into two groups 
in this area: Gaurua Thakurs and Jadon Thakurs. The latter are considered 
higher in rank and related to the Raj of Alwar in Rajasthan while the former 
are often described as ‘impure’ Rajputs of Muslim descent and belong to 
different clans: Khacchwas, Jasawats and Sissodiya. The panchayat meet-
ing brought together representatives of all the main clans and lineages. 
Such gatherings are usually used to settle disputes and arrange compen-
sation outside the courts, but I would suggest that they are also contexts 
in which the social relations of ‘mafia business’ are cultivated and brother-
hood solidarity is nurtured among potentially violent competitors.17 ‘Blood 
money’ is often sanctioned by these caste/community panchayats. Local 
bosses often act as adjudicators. In the literature much emphasis has been 
placed on the role of informal adjudication processes in enforcing caste 
and gender-specific behaviour, such as honour killings, ordered by khap 
panchayats (extra-legal caste/community courts) in particular in cases 
involving the Jat community.18 However, less attention has been devoted 
to investigating the adjudication of murders and violent crimes related to 
the local Wild East forms of capitalism. The settlement of the two boys’ 
deaths by the Thakur panchayat provided a window to explore the com-
plexity and interconnection between caste, kinship, territory and ‘mafias’. 
Importantly, it revealed the role that Thakur and Jat caste sovereignties 
have in structuring and controlling local illegal economies and related 
inter-state rackets. Jaganpura – a backwater rural tehsil – has given birth to 
three powerful local bosses. Two belong to the Rajput community and one 
to the Jat community. The latter is popularly known as ‘the don of dons’. 
The three bosses went to school together and are rivals but share common 
economic interests and businesses. What holds them and their businesses 
together is a willingness to seek control of and defend their territory and 
operational base for their illicit activities and, crucially, as immunity hubs. 
They share an interest in staying out of jail and acquiring and maintaining 
impunity.
Varieties of sands and sand ‘businesses’
In Jaganpura, people are involved in multiple sand supply chains – each 
with different degrees of profitability and each requiring different lev-
els of protection. The structure is, however, not simplistically vertical, as 
the concept of chains assumes; at each point of the chain there are also 
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horizontal forms of competition. It is truly an ‘assemblage’ rather than a 
‘chain’. The inter-state sand racket that I will describe involves three types 
of sand and a myriad of actors and dispersed groups.
The most prestigious sand is called banas and is mined on the 
banks of the Banas river in Sawai Madhopur in Rajasthan, approxi-
mately six hours by car from Jaganpura. Sawai Madhopur is known 
for Ranthambore, a wildlife reserve. The southern part of the district, 
with its large stone quarries, is known for its nexus of crime and dacoit- 
contractor-politicians and bonded labour. In 2013, the market price for 
banas was INR 40 per cubic foot. The second most profitable sand was 
mined from the Chambal river in Morena district in Madhya Pradesh. 
This area lies about four hours by car from the core organisational centre 
of Jaganpura.19 Morena is notorious for illegal sand and stone mining. In 
March 2012, the killing there of IPS officer Narendra Kumar made the 
national headlines. The officer was murdered while he was trying to stop 
the driver of a tractor carrying illegal sand (see for example Singh 2012). 
In 2016, another police constable was killed in a similar fashion when he 
tried to stop a vehicle carrying illegally mined stones. Finally, the local 
Yamuna river offers the cheapest sand (baloo). This was the type of sand 
being transported by the two young men murdered in Jaganpura.
In all three districts Thakurs play a pivotal role in the sand economy. 
Morena is well-known for the power of Thomar Rajput clans, which have 
historically produced famous Robin Hood-type dacoits and have for centu-
ries been key protagonists of the ‘bandit-economy’ of the Chambal region. 
Sawai Madhopur is instead a well-known Meena tribal area but Thakurs, 
Gujars and Jats govern and dominate the local criminal political econo-
mies. It follows that a regional Thakur kinship network links Jaganpura 
to the neighbouring state’s economies. This is not only a trans-border 
area ideally suited for the illegal sand market but also the territory where 
Thakur marriage exchanges and alliances usually take place. Thus, we have 
a situation in which business and profit-driven connections overlap with 
kinship and caste ties. The kinship structures of the Thakurs (and also Jats) 
have traditionally been connected with territoriality. These two castes both 
claim Kshatriya origins and have a lineage view of caste.20 Paramount to 
this structure is a preferential hypergamous marriage system which oper-
ates at a regional level.21 I suggest that their horizontal cluster-type organ-
isation and marriage systems have an elective affinity with the inter-state/
regional economies (legal and illegal ones) studied here. In particular the 
use of kinship, family and locality ties, more than caste per se, provides a 
fertile group for cooperation, trust, loyalty and the secrecy needed to pro-
tect and enforce illegal operations.22
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The mining of baloo, banas and chambal sand occurs in environ-
mentally protected areas where there is a blanket ban on sand mining. 
The sand ‘mafia assemblage’ presents both highly structured and well- 
established organised groups based on enduring membership together 
with more fluid and amorphous groups, with members joining and 
leaving according to their needs and opportunities.23 At some levels, 
there is no controlling family, no boundaries separating members from 
non-members. At the time of this fieldwork, people who worked in the 
sand mafia sector usually singled out four sets of material arrangements 
that interrelate and at times overlap.
At the top, we find ‘the baraa (big) mafia’, ‘the Cartel’ or ‘the Lobby’. 
This is a fluid core management group involved not only in sand mining 
but also in a variety of other illegal activities, for example oil pilferage 
and adulteration, as I will discuss in the following section of this chap-
ter. It is run by local violent entrepreneurs, many with important polit-
ical seats and mainly belonging to the Thakur and Jat communities, as 
explained earlier. This core group does not coordinate all the activities 
of the assemblage but rather it protects its most profitable and violent 
components. Their involvement in the sand business is motivated by the 
pursuit of profit and power.
The second level of the sand mafia assemblage was referred to using 
the term baloo mafia or the baloo ‘syndicates’ (see also Witsoe 2009). 
These are groups of 10 to 15 people (but some reach up to 45 members) 
that usually own their trucks and machines. The bosses of these syndi-
cates are often in real estate and are sometimes related in kinship terms 
to members of ‘the big mafia’. Locally, these syndicates are also mainly 
dominated by Thakurs and Jats.
The third level is populated by what locals call the baloo tekhe-
dar (sand contractors). These are small-scale entrepreneurs. They are 
usually individuals who are keen to take risks and accumulate money 
quickly. They work independently and usually transport sand from 
the Chambal and Banas rivers and re-sell it in the NCR or nearby Uttar 
Pradesh towns. For example, Sunil (40 years old) belongs to this cate-
gory. He has been doing this work for the past five years. He has three 
tractors and one truck. Usually, independent freelance contractors do not 
own their own vehicles. They often prefer to hire trucks and dumpers and 
sometimes also hire drivers on a daily/weekly basis. However, Sunil has 
his own truck. He usually employs two or three labourers – according to 
his needs. Sometimes he works for the baloo mafia but mostly he works 
solo. He does about three trips per month and sells his ‘product’ on the 
highway as all the other contractors do. At night, the highway transforms 
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itself into a sand market. Alternatively, contractors can also use interme-
diaries. These brokers are usually the owners of tal (local shops that sell 
construction materials).
To recap, we have ‘the big mafia’, the syndicates and the independ-
ent contractors. The sand mafia assemblage also has a further layer com-
posed of the villagers who traditionally engaged in sand mining. They 
usually employ camel trucks and extract baloo sand from the Yamuna 
and use it for personal/village consumption.
How profitable is the illegal sand business? Table 6.1 and Boxes 6.1–
6.3 sum up the relative variable costs and profits to be made by extract-
ing, transporting and selling different types of sand in winter 2014 in the 
cross-border tehsil and area under study. The range of returns (Table 6.1) 
was estimated by members of the syndicates and should be regarded as 
indicative. This is also the case for the data presented in Boxes 6.1–6.3. 
Thus, a dumper/truckload which can be filled with seven tonnes of chambal 
sand was selling at INR 25–30,000 in December 2014. The costs for the driver 
and labour amounted to INR 5,000, while the cost for ‘protection’ was about 
INR 4,000 (for the police and for RTO (Regional Transport Officers)). The total 
costs amounted to INR 17,500, which allowed for a net profit of INR 17,500 per 
truckload. It is estimated that around 300 dumpers were filled in the area daily.
The highest single cost component in this business consists of the 
‘protection’ fees. It is this extorted money that goes to feed ‘the big mafia’ 
coffers and directly and indirectly sustains local political machines. 
Firstly, the police need to be paid. Every police station located on the 
sand commodity chain path, i.e. near a place of extraction and/or along 
the route of transportation from brokers to the final buyers, needs to be 
bribed. The syndicates usually pay the thanas on a monthly basis. They 
also need to pay ‘the big mafia’ to operate with impunity. This is also usu-
ally done on a monthly basis. By the same token, the police must pay ‘the 
big mafia’ in order to protect their extortive relations with the syndicates 
Table 6.1 Indicative revenues from selling sand, 2014
Type of sand Ranking 
(demand & profit 
to be made)
River Place of mining Profit (%)
Banas I Banas Sawai Madhopur 
(Rajasthan)
100–50
Chambal II Chambal Morena
(Madhya Pradesh)
100–25
Baloo III Yamuna Western UP 75–125
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Box 6.1 Banas sand business (Rajasthan), 2014
BANAS
A truck of banas sand from Sawai Madhopur district (capacity 1,400 cubic 
feet).
Cost paid for mining banas sand (equipment, rent of equipment, mainte-
nance): INR 6,000
Cost of fuel (from Sawai Madhopur to Jaganpura): INR 4,000
Average expenses paid for protection (RTO/police/checkpoints): INR 5,000
Labour (drivers and labour used for loading and unloading the sand): INR 
5,000
Cost price (CP) = 6,000+4,000+5,000+5,000 = INR 20,000 (One trip with 
a capacity of 1,400 cubic feet of sand)
Selling price (SP) to the tal = INR 30 x 1,400 cubic feet = INR 42,000
Profit = SP−CP
Profit = 42,000−20,000 = 22,000
Profit% = Profit/CP x 100 = 22,000/20,000 x 100 = 110%
A syndicate with 4 trucks which makes 5 trips in a month can earn 22,000 
x 5 x 4 = INR 440,000 per month
Earning per year = 440,000 x 12 months = INR 5,280,000 or US$88,000
Source: Fieldwork 2014/2015
and independent contractors. Unlike the syndicates, the independ-
ent contractors pay the police only when they are caught. Paying ‘the 
tax’ on a regular basis, however, is cheaper in the long run and hence 
more profitable. In addition, it also allows operations in broad daylight. 
Without regular payments, mining operations and transport need to be 
hidden and confined to the night. Out of all the groups and individuals 
involved in the sand sector, the local villagers who still mine with camel 
trucks are the biggest losers as they do not have protection. They must 
pay when they are caught by the police. Most of the time they end up in 
jail because they do not have the money for ‘the tax’.
However, the highest protection fee cost is charged not by the police 
but by the Regional Transport Officers (RTO), who play a large role in 
the studied sand mafia assemblage as they rely mainly on cross-state 
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Box 6.2  Chambal sand business (Madhya Pradesh), 2014
CHAMBAL
A truck full of chambal sand from Morena district (capacity 1,400 cubic feet).
Cost paid for mining chambal sand (equipment, rent of equipment, mainte-
nance): INR 6,000
Cost of fuel (from Morena to Jaganpura): INR 2,500
Average expenses paid for protection (RTO/police/checkpoints): INR 4,000
Labour (payments made to driver, helper and labour used for loading and 
unloading the sand): INR 5,000
CP = 6,000+2,500+4,000+5,000 = INR 17,500 (One trip of capacity 1400 
cubic feet sand)
SP to the building material shop (tal) = INR 25x1,400 cubic feet = INR 35,000
Profit = SP−CP
Profit = 35,000−17,500 = INR 17,500
Profit% = Profit/ CP x 100 = 17,500/17,500 x 100 = 100%
A syndicate with 4 trucks which makes only 5 trips in a month can earn 
17,500 x 5 x 4 = INR 350,000 per month
Earning per year: 350,000 x 12 months = INR 4,200,000 or US$70,000
Source: Fieldwork 2014/2015
transportation for their revenue. Like the police, RTOs are also paid by 
the syndicates on a monthly basis. How does it work? RTOs have devel-
oped partnerships with the owners of dhabas (roadside restaurants) and 
created a systematic way of collecting ‘the tax’. Truck drivers transporting 
illegal sand need to purchase ‘stickers’ at selected dhabas and then place 
the stickers on the front of their windshields. The sticker signals that they 
have paid ‘the toll’ and that nobody should stop them while they pass 
through the district and various state borders. In this way, RTOs collect 
‘the tax’ in a safe, systematic and organised fashion from the dhabas and 
manage to collect revenue across three states. The owners of the dhabas 
receive a cut.
In addition to the police and the RTOs, the musclemen (goons) 
who run the chungis (check points) also charge fees. Their fee is usually 
proportional to the capacity of the vehicle used to transport the sand. 
According to the size and load of the vehicle, it could be somewhere 
between INR 100–1,000. At times, local ‘muscle’ also needs to be paid by 
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Box 6.3  Yamuna river sand business (Uttar Pradesh), 
2014
BALOO
Baloo sand is comparatively cheaper than banas and chambal sand.
Baloo is mined at the local level and is required for the construction of small 
buildings. It is mainly used for plastering house walls.
Baloo is mined using tractors, bullock carts or camel carts (not with lorries and 
drilling machines).
A tractor containing 120 cubic feet of baloo sand is sold for around INR 1,500.
Which means that the cost of 1 cubic foot of baloo is INR 12.50
Source: Fieldwork 2014/15
the contractors to operate on the river sand beds. Thus, there are at least 
four entities that need to be paid to extract criminal revenues from sand 
with relative impunity: the police, the RTO, the big mafia and the local 
musclemen at check points and in the areas where sand is extracted and 
loaded.
Besides protection, the other significant cost component is labour. 
Casual labourers are used to extract and load and/or store the sand. 
Workers are usually paid on a daily basis. They are at the bottom of 
the hierarchy of the sand mafia assemblage. The labour force is mostly 
composed of Dalits, often women, who are paid INR 300–500 per day. 
It is heavy work and in 2014 it paid relatively well compared to agricul-
tural labour, which pays around INR 200 per day. Moving up the labour 
hierarchy we encounter the drivers. Drivers are usually young, other-
wise unemployed men who come from middle or upper castes. They 
are paid about INR 10,000 per month or, if they do it on a casual basis, 
around INR 600 per day. The syndicates take good care of the drivers 
and protect them. Good and loyal drivers, and more importantly fear-
less drivers, are an essential part of the business. If they are caught the 
syndicates usually try to keep them out of jail. The same protection is 
not granted to the casual labour, however, who when caught are usually 
not helped.
A multiplicity of actors contribute to illegal sand extraction and 
commercialisation; however, how much they receive for their labour var-
ies wildly. Such inequalities reflect enduring caste-hierarchical patterns. 
The core organisational structure of the syndicates is mainly Thakur/Jat 
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while the casual labour is Dalit. The former are relatively well protected 
from law enforcement, possess authority and accumulate wealth and 
power. This core ‘elite’ group also governs other criminal economies in 
the area, such as the oil mafia.24
The oil (tel) mafia assemblage
The Mathura Refinery was built in 1982 to meet the demand for petro-
leum products in the North Western region of the country, which 
includes NCR. The refinery is strategically located along the Delhi–
Agra National Highway about 154 km from Delhi (Indian Oil n.d.). In 
India, oil is heavily regulated and many petrol products are also state 
subsidised. Like other state-owned industries, the refinery has its town-
ship with its own colonies, schools, hospital and recreational activities 
on the outskirts of the city. In the available literature, refineries have 
often been the sites where the materiality of oil and pollution has been 
studied. These analyses have shown how hydrocarbon politics deeply 
affects local political economies.25 Equally, metal structures such as 
pipelines have been used to reflect on the relations between materiality 
and politics (Barry 2013). Pipelines are said ‘to form part of dynamic 
assemblages in which the expertise of engineers, metallurgists and 
other material scientists’ come together critically (Barry 2013, 10). And 
it is precisely this mix of expertise that is also required for large-scale 
oil pilfering. As in the case of the criminal economy of sand, the oil 
mafia assemblage also has multiple components, each offering differ-
ent degrees of profit and involving different types of crime, risks and 
protection. A multiplicity of actors, groups and networks  populate the 
illegal oil market: some deal with pilfering, some with transport and 
 smuggling, some with storage and others with adulteration and distri-
bution via petrol-pumps. They are all connected directly or indirectly. 
At the top, the most profitable and risky oil business is direct pilferage 
from pipelines.26 Siphoning crude oil and oil products from securely 
monitored pipelines requires a great deal of engineering skills. The 
groups with the capacity to drill and steal oil are called ‘gangs’/‘rackets’ 
(English terms are used). These groups are usually composed of 5 to 10 
individuals. To steal oil from pipelines, high-level technological exper-
tise and skills are required. Gangs also need to possess a developed 
inter-state network to distribute and sell large quantities of oil prod-
ucts. They also need the cooperation of a variety of players: tankers, 
ration shop owners, Civil Supplies Department officials, the police, the 
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villagers where the drilling is taking place and the protection of the ‘big’ 
mafia. As with the previously discussed case of the sand mafia, protec-
tion is one of the most important and expensive costs in the criminal oil 
economy. As a criminal lawyer explained:
Without political protection the oil mafia does not exist. One can 
have all the skills in the world. It is mafia protection that is the inte-
gral ingredient of this criminal activity. Skills are necessary, but 
they are also relatively cheap to buy and even cheaper to extort. To 
ensure police protection is more difficult. One needs the protection 
of a politician. (R.K. Pandey, lawyer, 50 years old)
Brutal killings of Indian Oil corporation workers, government officers 
and crime reporters have made it clear to the local villagers and refinery 
employees alike that the oil gangs make ‘offers which cannot be refused’. 
While documenting these dynamics locally, I bumped into the Jaganpura 
‘protectors’ and ‘the don of dons’. Many Jaganpura bosses own petrol 
pumps or their relatives do.
Pilferage
It is the Mathura–Jalandhar pipeline that is generally targetted by local 
syndicates. Indian Oil Corporation reported more than 50 instances of oil 
theft in 2015, 59 in 2014 and 42 in 2013 (see Kumar 2017). A criminal 
lawyer told me that the incidence of pilferage has increased significantly 
since 2005. The IOC lays its pipelines with security devices to avoid 
thefts. For example, it was explained that the Jamnagar–Mathura pipe-
line is coated with optical fibres that send out signals in case of theft or 
tampering with the pipelines. The oil mafia, however, have devised ways 
to defeat such anti-pilferage measures.
During my fieldwork, there were four major cases of pilferage in the 
area. These events allowed me to explore the complexity, heterogeneity 
and brutality of the illegal oil economy. Generally, informants did not 
talk so openly about the criminal life of oil as they did about sand. When 
comparing the two criminal activities, they all seemed to agree that the 
oil mafia was ‘real’, ‘proper’ and ‘serious’ organised crime. In popular 
lingo ‘organised’ also often means ‘dangerous’. In November 2012, dur-
ing my first month of fieldwork, hundreds of mini-oil refineries were dis-
covered across the Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan border, many of them in 
the Jaganpura tehsil itself. When I discussed the discovery with people 
from the area, my attention was invariably directed to a murder that had 
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happened the previous year. A young man was killed for allegedly hav-
ing informed the police about a number of ‘oil safe houses’ under the 
protection of ‘the don of dons’ who at the time was a state minister. The 
police lodged an FIR (First Information Report) against the local boss 
and his alleged associate Mr H.H. While collecting data on petrol adulter-
ation H.H.’s and his protector’s names came up again and again. H.H. was 
described as the main strategist and leader of the largest and most pow-
erful oil syndicate in the region. H.H. openly ran his business from one 
of his seven petrol stations. Local criminal reporters seemed reluctant to 
report on his activities, as did the police. In short, H.H.’s petrol racket 
was a public secret. Everybody seemed to know about it. H.H. was even-
tually arrested in 2017 and accused of orchestrating one of the biggest oil 
thefts in Indian history, soon labelled as ‘The great INR 100 crore Indian 
oil steal’. He is currently in jail. The racket involved petrol pump own-
ers, political bosses and police officials from Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, 
Haryana and Delhi.
This interstate operation involved a meticulous plot, as a journalist 
explained in great detail:
Investigation revealed that the gang members had started working 
on it about two years ago. First, they purchased a plot in the ATV 
Colony situated down the national highway that passes through 
Mathura city. The Mathura-Jalandhar pipeline from which oil was 
stolen passes through this colony. They constructed a room on the 
plot… The gang members started digging a tunnel from inside the 
room to connect with the pipeline which was running about 100 
metres away from the room… Pipeline is running 15 feet deep 
under the surface and they constructed the tunnel at the same level 
so that it could connect to the pipeline. They had installed lights 
and fans to provide air and lighting inside the tunnel… About 100 
tankers were pressed into service to transport the stolen oil from 
the pipeline to different petrol pumps… The tankers had fabricated 
bodies and forged chassis numbers. (Kumar 2017)
This operation had run undetected for the previous three years. But 
despite the spectacular and sensational titles in the press and on televi-
sion, locally nobody seemed surprised. This is because, as I mentioned 
above, everybody seemed to know what was going on. The interesting 
question to ask then is: Why were the police asked to intervene only in 
February 2017? Why was H.H. arrested only in March 2017? The timing, 
I suggest, is certainly not random. He was accused during the 2017 Uttar 
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Pradesh state election campaign and arrested during the first month of 
rule by the newly appointed government. At the time newspaper head-
lines highlighted how the new Chief Minister Adityanath was out to pun-
ish the ‘oil mafia’.
Election campaigns are unstable times for ‘mafias’. It is worth being 
reminded that bosses’ authority is always provisional (Michelutti et al. 
2018). Their businesses’ survival and prosperity always depend on a 
negotiated lack of law enforcement. Elections are arenas where impu-
nity is often negotiated. State and national elections can trigger changes 
regarding who protects whom. Thus, at the time of elections, the main 
aim of criminal political formations is to do whatever is possible to main-
tain the integrity and continuity of their businesses. However, there are 
instances, like in the case of H.H.’s arrest, when such integrity is chal-
lenged. Informants speculate that H.H.’s protection was withdrawn. 
However, they also noted that by contrast his alleged business part-
ner-cum-protector ‘the don of dons’ had smoothly changed party, saved 
his skin and gained political authority in a different party.
Smuggling and adulteration
Large-scale spectacular robberies are, however, not the only element of 
the local oil criminal economy. Oil is stolen not only through pilferage 
but also through everyday, routinised forms of smuggling by ‘legal’ and 
‘illegal’ tankers: the so-called ‘tanker mafia’. Drivers and owners of tanks 
populate this level of the oil racket and through my fieldwork I have come 
to know many of them. In the district, there are entire neighbourhoods 
that have been sustaining themselves since the early 1990s through the 
transport business and illegal smuggling and adulteration of refinery 
products. Such activities are said to have boomed over the past 15 years. 
In the tehsil under study the protagonists of this economy are the tanker 
drivers, the ration shop owners, the Civil Supplies Department officials 
and the police. The nexus that links them facilitates the adulteration of 
oil and the sale of subsidised kerosene and adulterated oil in the open 
market. The easiest way to adulterate petrol and diesel is to add kero-
sene. Other popular methods are the mixing of naphtha or a solvent. The 
factors that encourage adulteration are the following: 1) the existence 
of differential tax levels for the fuel and the adulterating substance; 2) 
differing prices of fuels and adulterants on the market; 3) lack of moni-
toring and consumer awareness; 4) lack of mechanisms and instruments 
to check fuel quality on the spot.
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Adulteration is conducted in a variety of ways and places. It is 
done in ‘safe houses’ where stolen oil is stored. Usually such houses are 
located in rural and deserted areas and the operations are carried out at 
night. The tehsil under examination is often used. Adulteration is also 
conducted during transportation from IOC to the destination. This often 
takes place at selected dhabas along the highway. As with the sand mafia, 
dhabas play an important role in the oil mafia assemblage. Drivers stop 
to eat and while they consume their meal, oil is extracted from the tanks 
and adulterants added to compensate.
The tanker mafia needs kerosene and other adulterants and indirectly 
creates the ‘kerosene mafia’. Ration shop and PDS outlet owners play a big 
role in hoarding state-subsidised kerosene rations. Kerosene is allotted to 
registered ration card holders. The ration shop owners usually fix the num-
ber of days when kerosene is distributed in the area. While people queue to 
get their quota, the shop owner often announces that the stock has run out. 
I witnessed this scene again and again. The kerosene is then sold to the ‘oil 
mafia’. Ration shop owners usually give a cut to Civil Supplies Department 
officials who are supposed to check the card holders and keep a record of 
what they receive. Flying squads conduct regular mock raids and walk 
away after receiving their ‘tax’. Similarly, Octroi (municipal entry tax) 
officers facilitate the transport of kerosene by not verifying the required 
documentation. They are usually paid monthly for not doing their duty.
Conclusion: inter-state rackets and the political economy 
of impunity
Describing cross-border illegal activities in Chad, Roitman (2006: 249) 
explained that ‘Ultimately, while viewed by most as illegal, unregulated 
economic activities and violent methods of extraction are also described as 
legitimate; most often, these alleged exceptional practices are elaborated 
by local people as rational or reasonable behaviour’. Jangapura presents 
similar patterns and understandings. While pilfering from pipelines is con-
sidered by many ‘a crime’, the smuggling and adulteration by tankers is 
considered a normal practice and hence an illegal but licit ‘way of getting 
by’ while earning a massive profit. In the previous sections, I showed how 
the oil mafia assemblage is composed of the ‘oil gangs’, ‘the tanker mafia’, 
‘the kerosene mafia’ and a variety of entrepreneurs, administrators, engi-
neers, police officers and petrol pump owners (who are also often politi-
cians). Similarly, the sand mafia assemblage is formed by a complex mix 
of syndicates, individual entrepreneurs, casual labourers and contractors.
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I have illustrated how these two illegal sectors are populated by 
multiple actors, dispersed groups, networks and organisations that 
extract illegal revenues from sand and oil at different levels of the ‘com-
modity chains’. I have attempted to untangle the relations between these 
different components and in the process identified the presence of what 
locals call ‘the big mafia’, ‘the Cartel’ or ‘the Lobby’, whose role is alleg-
edly to control the supply of protection to a variety of illegal activities in 
the region. Looking at the intersection of the criminal life of sand and 
oil from a border district allowed me to observe the marked degree of 
flexibility and dispersion of mafia enterprises as well as the presence of 
a hierarchical component and a ‘managing core’ that accumulates cap-
ital at the top and in a particular place. Contrary to an economic (but 
also sociological) analysis that places emphasis on different tax rates 
as the main engines of cross-border criminal economies, my material 
suggests that it is instead the search for immunity that drives criminal 
economies in border areas. To elaborate, Desmond Arias (2016) recently 
argued that the extent to which illicit capital accrues in a place is critical 
to understanding micro-level muscular economic regimes of governance. 
Illicit entrepreneurs accumulate resources and can spend these funds on 
a host of activities. Some of this might involve further developing their 
business, but their activities are likely to cross over into legal activities 
as they seek to launder money and develop legitimate business interests. 
In the case of Jaganpura, a great deal of resources seem to be invested 
outside the actual tehsil. Bosses are known to own hotels, restaurants, 
transportation companies, petrol pumps and estate development agen-
cies in nearby wealthier towns and cities in the NCR or in other parts of 
India and abroad. By contrast they invest locally in strengthening their 
political careers and/or the ones of emerging local leaders as strategies 
to cultivate immunity. The prerogative is to keep their residential ‘terri-
tory’ secure. As the sociologist of mafias Federico Varese argued: ‘unlike 
many business executives, (mafiosi) do not migrate unless driven to do 
so by circumstance: police surveillance, pending prosecution, internal 
disputes and gang wars, or as the unintended consequence of state man-
dated relocation’. (Varese 2011, 190–1). As Machiavelli famously said, 
‘The Prince has to reside among his people’.
Remaining in place enables them to keep an eye on each other, 
apprehending and punishing misappropriations of capital, embez-
zlement, or rogue pursuits that attract police attention. They are 
also heavily dependent on local knowledge collecting reliable infor-
mation, engaging in gossip and communication and on extensive 
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networks of friends and accomplices, many in the political and 
criminal justice systems, who must be cultivated through memo-
rable face-to face encounters. (Schneider and Schneider 2011, 13)
For the local Jaganpura bosses, it is of paramount importance to invest in 
an environment that they can trust and that protects them. This is explic-
itly executed by supporting and grooming young leaders in the local 
government authorities, primarily through the colonisation of the Zila 
Parishad (district council – ZP). This local layer of ‘mafia raj’ is extremely 
understudied. ZP are almost totally ignored by social scientists, which is 
quite remarkable since ZP office-bearers often wield more power than 
other elected representatives. Crucially they are more embedded in the 
region with other public organisations than MLAs or MPs. The impor-
tance of ZPs lies in the fact that they are a point of convergence for local 
politics, economic institutions and the bureaucracy or the main institu-
tion that links the state with local society.27 It should be noted that the 
chair of the ZP is also the head of the district board, of which all the ZP 
members, MLAs, MPs, MLCs, Block Pramukhs and Gram Pradhans are 
members. Controlling the ZP means keeping a check on economic and 
political competitors on the rise. But impunity is not only achieved by 
putting into elected positions trusted key people who are able to transfer 
officers and cover investigations if in need. What these local ‘mafia state’ 
structures provide are also extra-legal forms of justice that avoid the 
police and the courts altogether, as the above description of the caste/
community panchayat showed. Finally impunity is further maintained by 
grooming connections in the bordering states. It is achieved by securing 
hiding places – in case absconding becomes a necessity – in nearby Rajast-
han, Haryana and Madhya Pradesh. These are worlds where in order to 
survive (and stay out of jail) people need to live in perfect ‘symbiosis with 
a myriad of protectors, accomplices, debtors of all kinds, informers, and 
people from all strata of society, who have been paid, bribed, intimidated 
or blackmailed’ (Falcone and Padovani 1993, 81). But it should also be 
emphasised that escaping police prosecution can also be an easy and sim-
ple affair. As stated in the introduction to this chapter, there is a complete 
lack of coordination between central and state police bodies. It follows 
that by simply crossing the border with Rajasthan or Madhya Pradesh 
or Haryana a person who commits a crime in Jaganpura can easily avoid 
being investigated, caught and prosecuted. Crossing the inter-state bor-
der means disappearing. Thus, for many Jaganpura residents immunity 
is a simple five-minute ride away. Inter-state border crossing is a well-
tested and effective way of avoiding the law. The simplicity of this act 
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is quite astonishing and, in many ways, reinstates how at the heart of 
the Wild East criminal economies have a state that both passively and 
actively allows ‘mafia assemblages’ to operate and thrive. In recognition 
of this weakness, over the past year attempts have been made to set up 
a new police body (the Inter-state Crime Coordination Committee) to 
ensure better coordination between state police forces in the National 
Capital Region and border areas. It remains to be seen whether the com-
mittee is ultimately implemented and how its work will shape the forms 
of impunity discussed by this chapter.
Notes
 1. Research for this article was conducted between March 2012 and February 2017. The names 
of subjects whose security could be compromised by publishing their identities have been 
changed. All translations are mine.
 2. For the purpose of this analysis I define a proto-typical ‘mafia raj’ as a system in which boss-
es/violent entrepreneurs (Blok 1974; Sidel 1999; Volkov 2002) and their entourages ‘assume 
both the political leadership and the monopoly of the economic and financial resources of the 
State’ (Armao 2015) (see the Introduction to this volume). These are systems of governance 
where ‘[even] the official is illegal’ (Gayer 2014: 39) and where nested criminal ‘official’ actors 
replace the ‘state’ as the privileged partners of capitalism. For a more in-depth explanation 
of this conceptualisation and its variety of ethnographic manifestations see Michelutti et al. 
(2018).
 3. See Li (2018) on ‘mafia system’ and oil plantation in Indonesia.
 4. See for example Van Schendel and Abraham (2005); Gellner (2013).
 5. On the usage of the concept of organised crime with regard to the exploitation of natural re-
sources see Van Solinge (2014).
 6. On assemblage see also Ong and Collier (2004).
 7. See, for example, Dreze and Khera (2000); Oldenburg (1992); Marwar (2014); on riots and 
communalism see Brass (1997).
 8. See Michelutti and Heath (2013; 2014) for a study of these dynamics in this area of Uttar 
Pradesh.
 9. See for example Vaishnav (2011); Banerjee and Pande (2007).
10. For a recent documentary on the Dabang of Uttar Pradesh see https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=cr2VK8I5xOY.
11. For a detailed exploration of this process see Chaturvedi, Gellner and Pandey (2019).
12. ‘Encounter killing’ is a term used to describe killings by the police or the armed forces, alleged-
ly in self-defence, when they encounter suspected gangsters or terrorists.
13. Vigilante groups like Hindu Yuva Vahini and Bajrang Dal are armed and dangerous, demon-
strating ganglike and ‘mafioso’ behaviour, yet, as Sen has shown, their mobilisation strategies 
and violent actions are usually not treated as gang actions. Among these groups ‘The boys use 
words such as “soldiers” (sepahi) instead of “gangs” and “war” (ladai/yudh) instead of “vigi-
lantism”, and they employ these categories to position themselves in (their impression of) an 
urban “warscape” – for them, the city is “war” (yeh sheher ek jung hain)’ (Sen 2011). What dis-
tinguishes these squads from gangs is the ambiguity among local authorities in relation to these 
groups – which are not treated as delinquents but rather as ‘social workers’ or ‘party workers’.
14. Saffron is the colour of the Hindu nationalist organisation – hence ‘saffron scarfs’.
15. On the mythical and aesthetic power of mafia raj see Michelutti et al. (2018).
16. ‘Crime mafia’ is taken to mean syndicates/groups whose main activity is enforcement.
17. Schneider and Schneider (2011: 9) discuss the role of banquets and hunting parties for mafiosi 
in Sicily.
18. On khap panchayats in India see Kaur (2010).
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19. Sand mining is banned in Morena district as it is part of the Chambal Ghariyal sanctuary. De-
spite the ban, mining has been rampant for the past five years. Legal mining started to be 
permitted from October 2016.
20. See Michelutti (2008: Chapter 4).
21. Castes related to a Rajput-like culture are said to ‘share a centrality of territorially defined 
lineal kinship in their lives which leads them to experience caste in ways both similar and, at 
the same time, different from caste as we know it generally, i.e. as a set of agnatic and affinal 
groups dispersed over a wide territory’ (Unnithan-Kumar 1997, 3). Similarly, the subdivisions 
of Rajput-like castes are of a different order than other caste communities. They generally 
have few ‘endogamous’ subdivisions and, on the contrary, are divided into numerous ‘lines’, 
‘branches’ and ‘clans’, which have an exogamous character. In such a system, status is ascribed 
not only to endogamous groups but also to exogamous groups.
22. Similar to caste, ‘ethnicity’ has often been considered in the mafia literature to be an important 
element of organised crime: for example Nigerians rely on tribal networks, Albanians and Kurds 
on extended-clannish families; kinship is also a pillar of the Calabrian-based ‘Ndrangheta.
23. See Rege (2016).
24. The criminalisation of politics is often explained as a by-product and an effect of the rise of the 
lower castes and Dalits in politics and rising political competition (Jaffrelot 2002). My findings 
suggest, however, that the criminal economy and with it wealth and criminal capital are still very 
much in the hands of the upper-castes despite 20 years of backward and Dalit rule in the state.
25. See, for example, Watts (2008); Auyero and Swistun (2009); Campbell (2005).
26. Examples of such pipelines include the Mathura–Delhi Pipeline (MDPL), a 147 km-long pipe-
line transporting petroleum products from the Mathura Refinery to Bijwasan in Delhi; the 
Mathura–Tundla Pipeline (MTPL), a 55 km-long separate pipeline which runs from Mathu-
ra to Tundla; the Bijwasan–Panipat Naphtha Pipeline, a 111 km-long pipeline from Bijwasan 
in Delhi to Panipat transporting naphtha from the Mathura Refinery to Jalandhar; and the 
Mathura–Bharatpur Spur Pipeline, an 8-inch diameter, 21 km-long product pipeline from the 
existing Mathura station of Mathura–Tundla Pipeline to the Indian Oil terminal at Bharatpur. 
There are also pipelines that carry crude, such as the Salaya–Mathura Pipeline (SMPL).
27. One of the few available studies on ZP is an unpublished Masters dissertation by Rajkamal 
Singh (2016).
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‘Red sanders mafia’ in South India: 
violence, electoral democracy and 
labour
David Picherit
This chapter offers insights into the material assemblage of red sanders 
smuggling, extending to its recruitment and labour processes and the role of 
electoral democracy in determining hierarchies and structures of power. By 
following a number of smugglers/politicians’ career trajectories, it explores 
how electoral politics and the red sanders mafia are entangled in relations 
of intreccio. It also reveals how the regulation of red sanders smuggling is 
deeply entrenched in the economic, cultural and political history of Rayala-
seema. The latter is further illustrated by the ways the mythical figure of 
Veerappan is used to negotiate labour, violence and justice in the region.
Background
The 2014 parliamentary elections in the state of Andhra Pradesh (South 
India) were preceded and followed by a series of reported murders in the 
Seshachalam forest in the region of Rayalaseema. Six months before the 
election dates, nine woodcutters were found dead along with two forest 
officials, whose genitals had been cut off. Seshachalam forest is the only 
place in the world where a particular species of sandalwood, known as 
red sanders, grows. This wood was listed as endangered in 1995 and 
protected by international conventions in 1998.1 From the early 2000s 
onward, local and small-scale red sanders smuggling has become glo-
balised traffic. Importantly, it has become a major source of political fund-
ing in the region. Highly valued on international markets, red sanders are 
cut, moved by sea, air and roads, and sold to global destinations, China in 
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particular. A year after the 2014 parliamentary election, the Red Sanders 
Anti-Smuggling Task Force (RSASTF) – implemented by the new Chief 
Minister, Chandrababu Naidu (from the Telugu Desam Party) – killed 20 
woodcutters. According to police sources, ‘smugglers linked to Veerap-
pan’ – the iconic South Indian sandalwood and ivory smuggler killed by 
police 10 years ago – were killed in an ‘encounter’.2 A number of investiga-
tions led by a Special Investigation Team (SIT) from human rights organ-
isations (such as the National Campaign for De-notified Tribes’ Human 
Rights (NCDNTHR)), however, came up with a different account. Their 
report describes the labourers as ‘poor’ and ‘passive victims’ and shows 
that the task force killed ‘20 poor migrant tribal woodcutters brought by 
middlemen from the neighbouring state of Tamil Nadu’.3 Other media 
suggest instances of torture (Janardhanan 2015). The killings were fol-
lowed by a wave of arrests of the alleged smugglers between 2015 and 
2016. More than 7,000 people were arrested but the conviction rate was 
only 1 per cent in 2017 (Umashanker 2017). Significantly, three days 
after the mass killing, the Chief Minister argued for lifting the ban on sell-
ing red sanders and removing it from the international list of endangered 
wood (Vadlapatla 2015). His plan was to allow the state to sell red sand-
ers at global auctions in order to finance his populist promises to farmers, 
and to improve the finances of the new state of Andhra Pradesh after its 
bifurcation from Telangana.4 These two subsequent events indicate how 
political control over state violence and market regulation are central to 
the structuring and making of the red sanders illegal international trade.
Changing laws and altering regulations, defining and re-defining 
what is legal and what is illegal in the sandalwood business, is a process 
dating back to the colonial times (Raj 2014). A major step in such recon-
figurations was the 1998 decision to ban the red sanders trade. What was 
initially designed as a law to control deforestation contributed instead to 
creating a burgeoning illegal trade fostered by high international demand 
for red sanders. For Rayalaseema’s politicians-cum-business executives 
this new source of profit quickly became the new El Dorado: a source of 
criminal capital to be used to finance electoral politics as well as to make 
personal fortunes. It follows that by the mid-2000s, the struggles to con-
trol (and run) the business politically started to become very heated and 
violent. By then all the logistic operations related to the traffic – from 
the cutting of the wood to its transportation to major ports in Chennai, 
Calcutta, Kochi and Mumbai and then shipment abroad – required the 
pro-active intervention of Rayalaseema politicians and state agents, and 
a level of impunity that could be achieved only by an electoral victory. The 
concept of ‘mafia’, defined as the product of the encounter between prof-
itable violent criminal activities and politics (see the Introduction to this 
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volume), captures the entanglement (intreccio) of electoral politics and 
the criminal economy that I will go on to describe in this chapter,5 specif-
ically the local red sanders mafia developed by building upon vernacular 
forms of democracy (Michelutti 2008) and the structure of the informal/
illegal economies that are typical of the region. Far from being identical 
across the world, informal/illegal economies reflect assemblages of local 
cultural, political and social elements. More specifically the development 
of the red sanders mafia is the product of the transformation of deeply 
entrenched cultures of political factionalism and related ideas and prac-
tices of leadership, as I will explore below. In addition, the importance of 
the socio-cultural context in shaping the international traffic in local red 
sanders is further illustrated by the mobilisation of the Veerappan myth. 
Veerappan was a sandalwood smuggler who allegedly killed 120 police 
officers and kidnapped famous cinema megastars. He was murdered by a 
Special Task Force in 2004. For the police he was a criminal, while parts 
of the local tribal population viewed him as a ‘social bandit’. Veerappan 
used to control entire forests on the Tamil Nadu and the Karnataka bor-
ders, thanks to police and political protection. While his fame flourishes 
across India and beyond, through cartoons, movies and even global com-
mercial branding, he carries on shaping the representations (and work-
ings) of regional criminal political economies. Throughout this chapter 
I will pay particular attention to the social and political mobilisation 
of this mythological figure and the ways it is currently deployed by the 
police to criminalise labourers and justify their killings. This, together 
with an exploration of the careers of key violent criminal figures cur-
rently involved in the red sanders mafia, will offer insights into the mate-
rial organisation of the red sanders smuggling organisation, recruitment 
processes and the role of electoral democracy in determining internal 
hierarchies and structures of power. This paper relies on ethnographic 
fieldwork on criminal politics and businesses conducted in the district of 
Chittoor between 2012 and 2017. It combines methods like participant 
observation, informal and formal interviews and secondary sources like 
media and NGO reports.
The emergence of the red sanders mafia
The history of Rayalaseema, and its representations in the media, movies 
and music, is characterised by a focus on the violent struggles between 
faction leaders. From the paregallu (‘the ones who rule’) who emerged 
after the fall of the Vijayanagara Empire in the sixteenth century and 
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maintained their dominance by keeping their own armies, to the con-
temporary democratic faction politics, Rayalaseema has been mainly 
studied through a political lens (Subrahmanyam 1986). The recent polit-
ical history of Andhra Pradesh is shaped by the opposition between two 
landowning castes: the Reddys, portrayed as a caste of politicians, and 
the Kammas, a caste of business people. Both castes benefitted from the 
agrarian reforms in the 1960s and used it to reinforce their political and 
economic dominance in Rayalaseema. They were also able to diversify 
their activities and branch out into the arms industry, the construction 
sector, the illegal alcohol trade and the management of petrol pumps, 
the latter being seen as a cash cow. While the Reddys could rely on their 
domination over the Congress party to control state resources, the Kam-
mas contested their political power by joining the Communist party and 
then by launching their own caste-based political vehicle, the Telugu 
Desam party (TDP), in 1982. Success was immediate: they won the 
state elections in 1983. Since then, the two political parties (Congress 
and TDP) have alternated in government (Prasad 2015). The regional 
political landscape changed after the death in 2009 of the Congress Chief 
Minister, the charismatic leader Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy (known as YSR). 
His son, Jagan Mohan Reddy, allegedly one of the most corrupt Indian 
politicians and a famous figure in the criminalisation of Indian politics 
(Still 2018; Vaishnav 2017),6 then launched his own political party, the 
YSR Congress party. In the 1990s, this criminalisation was also made vis-
ible by the emergence of violent politician-businessmen from the Kamma 
and Reddy communities who partially challenged political dynasties. 
Murders, kidnapping and rackets were tools used to climb the political 
ladder and make huge profits in sectors such as mines, quarries and for-
ests. Elected as MLAs, they could exercise control over state resources, 
transfer bureaucrats, command local police forces and use licensed and 
unlicensed violence against opponents. Political violence was routinised. 
It is said to have led to 1,800 deaths over the past two decades. But Reddy 
and Kamma faction leaders are not only a provincial story. It should be 
noted that nine of the twelve Chief Ministers of the former (and united) 
state of Andhra Pradesh came from Rayalaseema (Picherit 2018).
Accounts of Rayalaseema political history have often neglected the 
economic aspects of faction politics. This illustration of the development 
of the red sanders mafia will highlight the role of the economy in shaping 
political violence and electoral politics in this part of the world. While 
small criminals – loosely related to political parties or the Maoist guer-
rilla – entered into the red sanders business at the end of the 1990s, the 
real big business developed after the election of YSR as Chief Minister in 
198 THE WILD EAST
2004. Nevertheless, it is his son Jagan, known for the fortune he made 
during his father’s term, who has often been credited for scaling up the 
red sanders traffic. After YSR’s death, Jagan lost the parliamentary elec-
tions with his new political party; his political opponents, Kiran Kumar 
Reddy (Congress party) and his brother Kishore Reddy, became major 
actors in the red sanders traffic. Controlling the red sanders business 
guarantees funding not only for henchmen, party workers and for politi-
cal campaigns but also for private accumulation. Indeed, as I will detail, 
many of the conflicts that from the outside may be seen to be moved by 
‘politics’ were actually closely related to the red sanders economy. All the 
politicians I have mentioned so far have their constituencies in the vicin-
ity of the Seshachalam forest.7 The forest’s spatial and political proximity 
to these figures could partly explain the silence and fear surrounding the 
red sanders business in the district of Chittoor, in stark contrast with the 
ways political violence is usually routinely and openly discussed. Most 
of my informants attempted to discourage any research: ‘The brother of 
Kiran Kumar Reddy [ex-CM of Congress party] is involved. The brother of 
the CM! He lives 50 kilometres away. Nobody will dare doing something. 
This is too dangerous.’ Another stated, ‘Nobody will talk about red sand-
ers. This is power, everybody fears them.’ Another party worker men-
tioned, ‘You should stop asking questions. The son and the brother of the 
two last Chief Ministers were involved. Now it is the turn of Chandrababu 
Naidu [leader of the TDP]’, one warned me. ‘No one can make a direct 
link between red sanders’ criminals and politicians: they use their party 
workers, their henchmen but they never involve directly.’
Smugglers’ careers
I will now start to unravel the linkages between politicians and the red 
sanders business by exploring a number of smugglers/politicians’ career 
trajectories, beginning with Kollam Gangi Reddy.
Kollam Gangi Reddy, a.k.a the Junior Veerappan
The role of electoral politics in shaping the red sanders mafia became 
clear a few days after the 2014 election results, when Kollam Gangi Reddy 
(KGR), a major player in red sanders traffic, had to escape to Dubai, Sin-
gapore and then Mauritius. The 2014 elections sanctioned the victory of 
Chandrababu Naidu – one of KGR’s public enemies. The criminal career 
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of KGR dovetails with the history of red sanders smuggling and faction 
politics, and is similar to the biographical trajectories of many other 
political figures in the region. He was born in a village in the Kadapa dis-
trict of Rayalaseema, a few kilometres away from YSR and Jagan Mohan 
Reddy. KGR began his career as a muscleman. His violent reputation 
was cemented in 1987 when he led a violent campaign in support of his 
brother’s candidacy in the Mandal panchayat elections. Two years later, 
he attacked some of his rivals using homemade bombs. He allegedly mur-
dered an industrialist in 1992. He escaped a life sentence in 1999 and 
thereafter dedicated himself to extortion and illegal alcohol production 
and trade.8 At the same time he joined the Naxalite guerrilla and entered 
‘clandestine life’ in the forest. According to various sources it was dur-
ing this period that he became involved in smuggling. At that time he 
started a partnership with Sahul Hameed, who is allegedly one of the 
international bosses of the business today, as I will explore below. KGR 
became famous at the national level when he was accused of taking part 
in a bomb attack against the then Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu in 
Tirupati on 1 October 2003.9 This attack was allegedly funded by red 
sanders smugglers. Acquitted, KGR had gained a reputation for being a 
fearless ‘specialist’ in violence.
It was around 2004 that KGR moved his line of work from ‘politi-
cal violence’ to ‘economic crime’ by becoming a major actor in the red 
sanders mafia. Various media reports portray KGR as the master of the 
transnational transportation of red sanders, crediting him for introduc-
ing innovative smuggling methods and opening up new sea and terres-
trial routes (Times of India 2015a). The red sanders business made him 
a billionaire (Rangarajan and Venkat Sandeep 2015). He also became 
the owner of a barite mine in Mangampeta, a region of Kadapa where 
YSR, Chief Minister between 2004 and 2009, has illegally provided his 
supporters with mining authorisations. He also owns land and a variety 
of estates in the Rayalaseema region (Subramanyam 2015). It should be 
noted that politics has been central to KGR’s rise. Close to the Congress 
party, he greatly benefitted from the protection of YSR and then of Jagan 
Mohan Reddy, who carried on protecting the business after the death of 
his father. K. Gangi Reddy managed to secure his position when a for-
mer follower of YSR, Kiran Kumar Reddy, became the new Chief Minister 
in 2012. Despite the competition between Jagan Mohan Reddy (YSR 
Congress party) and Kiran Kumar Reddy (Congress party), one could 
suggest that there was an agreement to maintain the red sanders busi-
ness in the hands of the Reddys, as a caste.
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The position of KGR became insecure during the 2014 electoral 
campaign, when he was nicknamed the ‘Junior Veerappan’ by the 
Kamma candidate, Chandradabu Naidu. The first serious threat materi-
alised when police officers arrested him after the seizure of 2,000 red 
sanders logs (worth INR 5 crore) in Rayalaseema on 5 April 2014 – one 
month before the elections (Umashanker 2015). He was granted bail 
by the high court on 16 May 2014 and escaped to Mauritius with a fake 
passport. Just a few days after his election, Chandrababu Naidu wrote a 
letter to the governor to urge him to arrest KGR. This enmity was prob-
ably related to the 2003 bomb attack. On 24 February 2015, KGR was 
arrested in Mauritius and extradited to India. His arrest brought to light 
the entangled complicities of state officials and politicians in the red 
sanders business. According to the Andhra Pradesh police investigations, 
several Rayalaseema police inspectors and deputy superintendents had 
been bribed with money, gifts and villas in exchange for impunity. In 
short, the rise and fall of Kollam Gangi Reddy shows the trajectory of a 
criminal career that started by offering ‘muscle’ in the context of violent 
faction politics and then gradually shifted to the running of an illegal 
global trade. His biography illustrates how criminals do not necessarily 
enter directly into politics by contesting elections but rather often rely on 
the protection of politicians to carry on their illegal activities.
Peddireddy Ramachandra Reddy: from contractor to minister/
smuggler
KGR’s career trajectory is not the only path to red sanders smuggling. 
Unlike KGR, Peddireddy Ramachandra Reddy (PRR) was a small contrac-
tor directly involved in politics. For a long time, getting access to public 
contracts has been a successful route to financial accumulation and enter-
ing politics in this part of the world. Many regional politicians started their 
careers as small contractors in the construction, mines and alcohol sectors. 
An exploration of PRR’s ‘contractor’ career shows that it is very difficult 
to distinguish between business and politics – the two activities are fused 
together. After starting his career by contracting illegal alcohol, in the late 
1970s he became a civil contractor for irrigation projects. In 1978, he con-
tested the MLA state elections in Pileru constituency, located close to the 
Seshachalam forest. He lost the elections but by contesting them he con-
solidated his name and reputation on the local political/business map.10 
In 1989, he again contested and finally won the elections. His new polit-
ical position allowed him to further expand his subcontracting activities 
to road construction, railways and then mining, mostly granite. Despite 
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another defeat in 1994, his company, PLR Projects, continued to grow, and 
became a major asset for his subsequent electoral victories in 1999 and 
2004 in the Pileru constituency. However, this source of funding was not 
enough to maintain his elected post in the long run. In 2009, following 
the merging of two constituencies, the ticket for Pileru was given to his 
local Congress party enemy, Kiran Kumar Reddy. Kiran Kumar Reddy’s 
family is extremely influential locally. His father was a minister in P.V. 
Narasimha Rao’s cabinet between 1971 and 1973. PRR had then to move 
to Punganur – 50 kilometres away – to be elected again as MLA in 2009. 
Eventually he managed to become Minister of Forests and Environment in 
2010. It is common knowledge that this is the perfect political position to 
exploit forests resources and ‘make money’. As the Minister of Forests and 
Environment he expanded his red sanders smuggling activities by offer-
ing protection. This phase of his career was brief, however. The then Chief 
Minister resigned, and his enemy Kiran Kumar Reddy was elected in 2012. 
As a consequence, Kiran Kumar Reddy’s brother, N. Kishore Kumar Reddy, 
emerged as the new leader of the red sanders business. It is at this point 
that PRR left the Congress party to join Jagan Mohan Reddy and the YSR 
Congress party. The transition was not peaceful. The struggle between N. 
Kishore Kumar Reddy and PRR started in 2011 and spilled into a series 
of non-investigated murders in the Seshachalam forest. The murders were 
related to red sanders activities. Varaadi, a Tamil close to Kishore Kumar 
Reddy, was allegedly killed by forest officers who were allegedly controlled 
by PRR at the time. This murder was followed by the killings of two wood-
cutters (also Tamil) in December 2012. These murders were allegedly car-
ried out to stop red sanders resources falling into the hands of PRR.11 The 
use of legitimate state force to regulate faction politics and criminal econ-
omies is not new in Rayalaseema. The CM, Kiran Kumar Reddy, in June 
2013 replied to the murders by implementing a task force, which killed 
another labourer in 29 January 2014.
Exploring the life of PRR unveils the importance of local politics in 
the organisation of the red sanders mafia. What we witness is the use of 
licensed and unlicensed violence and related political electoral manoeu-
vres between the Congress party (Kiran Kumar Reddy) and YSR Congress 
party (Jagan Mohan Reddy). The situation changed after the 2014 elec-
tions with the victory of Chandrababu Naidu and the TDP. PRR, whose 
assets rose from 4 to 63 crore between 2009 and 201412, won the YSR 
Congress party seat in his constituency. He also helped other local MLAs 
to be elected, like in Madanapalle where I met him, and aided his own 
son to become a member of parliament (YSR Congress party). However, 
PRR is now isolated. His second term in the opposition party reduces his 
202 THE WILD EAST
influence, and various informants told me that many of his henchmen 
and followers involved in red sanders traffic have now joined the TDP. 
This shift is explained by the number of arrests of smugglers who are not 
affiliated to TDP. As Venkataïah, the henchman of a YSR Congress party 
leader, explained: ‘P. Ramachandra Reddy is in the opposition and has no 
contracts anymore and no impunity. What to do? Going to jail or moving 
to TDP and continuing business?’
From small contractor to minister, PRR’s career highlights the entan-
glement of business, politics and violence, as well as the importance of 
electoral democracy for controlling and governing the red sanders mafia. 
The two different careers I have so far presented highlight varieties of 
relations between politics and crime: Kollam Gangi Reddy is a criminal 
related to politics while Peddireddy Ramachandra Reddy is a criminal 
politician-businessman. Both depend, however, on electoral politics to 
survive in the business.
The red sanders mafia organisation
‘Veerappan forest’: labour force, migration, intermediaries 
and transport
How can tonnes of illegally cut red sanders be transported by road across 
India and then by air and/or by ship to China without being stopped? 
Answering this question will further shed light on the red sanders mafia 
organisation. So far, we have explored the linkages with politics and the 
red sanders business. In this section we move on to explore the deep 
continuities of the red sanders mafia with the Indian informal economy. 
Smuggling red sanders requires a sophisticated organisation. It involves 
traders and a variety of agents and labour contractors who are capable 
of monitoring the collection of wood. Once the wood is cut, it is hidden 
in safe places and then loaded into vans or trucks with fake registration. 
Police checkpoints need to be crossed during transportation to the ports, 
and port customs need also to be passed. Finally, for transportation via 
sea, ships need to be found and managed. Importantly all these opera-
tions require the active participation of police and custom officers. Smug-
gling red sanders requires political support and control, and bureaucrats 
committed to getting things done for the ‘red sanders mafia’ (Nemana 
2015; NCDNTHR 2014).13 It requires woodcutters. The business relies 
heavily on male migrant labour from tribal and Dalit castes originating 
mostly (but not exclusively) from the Jawadi hills of the neighbouring 
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state of Tamil Nadu.14 These labourers are widely known to have the 
special skills needed to work with timber and are experienced working 
in difficult forest conditions. However, there are also other factors that 
explain the use of labourers from Tamil Nadu rather than local ones.15 
Firstly local labourers tend not to get involved in the wood cutting busi-
ness because they are aware of the dangers that working for the red sand-
ers mafia involves. As a local NGO leader I met near the Seshachalam 
forest explained: ‘Local labourers are aware of the consequences, the 
stakes and the tensions regarding red sanders smuggling. It has become a 
highly political issue and dangerous. Many local people refuse to work in 
the forest.’ Secondly Dalit and tribal migrant labourers from Tamil Nadu 
are considered ‘special’. They are viewed as fearless due to their alleged 
history of criminality and linkages with the famous Veerappan. It follows 
that labour contractors use the brand ‘Veerappan forest’ to promote the 
skills of their Tamil labourers and negotiate better wages for them. This 
branding, while being an advantage when negotiating labour wages, also 
facilitates criminalising migrants. The Veerappan myth has been used 
by the police to legitimise the killing of ‘smugglers’ who originate from 
‘areas previously controlled by the famous smuggler’. As of today, as I 
shall further explore in the next section, more than 2,000 Dalit and tribal 
labour migrant woodcutters from Tamil Nadu have been jailed (Janyala 
2018).
Going back to the red sanders mafia organisation, labour contrac-
tors are in charge of organising shelter, food and water in the hamlets 
and villages in the Seshachalam forest, and manage the working sched-
ules. The labourers cut the trees, then carry and hide the logs in the local 
ravines. Most labourers are paid by weight (between INR 20 to INR 40 per 
kg). They are paid when they return to Tamil Nadu. In the Seshachalam 
forest labourers are extremely isolated from the surrounding areas. In 
Chandragiri, a small town close to the forest, one activist mentioned: 
‘We never see them, we never meet them. They come at night and stay 
isolated in the forest.’ The invisibility of migrant labourers is common 
in India; however, in the case of the red sanders mafia it is even more 
pronounced due to the illegal dimension of their activities.
The red sanders criminal economy is similar in many ways to how 
the Indian construction sector is organised (Picherit 2009). The isolation 
of labourers, the existence of multiple middlemen, the inter-state charac-
ter of the labours, and the ways their payment is delayed until they are 
back in their villages of origin are not unique features of the red sanders 
sector. Similar to the case of the construction business, the recruitment 
of migrant labourers by labour intermediaries has a major advantage: 
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labourers know who their liaison is and respond only to his authority, but 
they often have no idea about who their real employer is. This structure 
is even more critical in the red sanders criminal economy, where there is 
an extra need to impede the circulation of information and prevent single 
individuals from having a clear view of the different layers of the mafia 
organisation. This model is very useful because it prevents anyone from 
giving information to the police. This is particularly important in the 
transportation phase of the business. Transportation requires major logis-
tics and the organisation of drivers, 4x4s and lorries, impunity at forest 
check posts and police check posts. It requires good quality and updated 
intelligence. Members of the organisation need to be directly connected 
to the officers who are in charge of monitoring transport to major Indian 
ports, such as Chennai, Calcutta, Mumbai or Kochi. Sources from human 
rights organisations and/or the police have documented some of these 
organisational aspects. For example, once the wood is loaded a first pilot 
on a motorcycle drives ahead to check that there are no police and for-
est patrols along the way and keeps the truck driver informed by mobile 
phone. In case of problems, another car with an agent is always ready to 
intervene with money and bribe police or forest guards if necessary. ‘One 
fellow spends INR 5 lakh to give it to the next fellow, who spends another 
INR 5 lakh until the next stage, and so on so a lot of money trickles down,’ 
declared the Chief Forest Officer in the Seshachalam forest in the local 
media. ‘They’re so organised that the drivers don’t know the identities of 
who they’re working with. So even if we catch them we can’t get to the 
other links in the chain.’ (Nemana 2015).
Transnational smugglers
There is a lack of substantial information about the international dimen-
sion of the business and its linkages with local politics in Rayalaseema. 
Discussions with informants reveal more about the fabric of rumours, 
fantasy and fictions of power than factual knowledge of the transna-
tional organisation. There is also a huge gap between the very detailed 
and pervasive analysis of how the red sanders business is embedded in 
Rayalaseema politics postulated by journalists who are not silenced by 
the landscape of violent and criminal political economies and the con-
tradictory and spectacular news about the global dimension of the busi-
ness.16 It is known from police investigations that before reaching their 
final destination, red sanders logs are stored in godowns or in farmhouses 
near major ports (M.K. Kumar 2014). The entire operation relies on the 
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complicity of police and customs agents who facilitate the smuggling by 
affixing government seals to containers, thereby making them ‘legal’.17 
Smugglers are then said to register the containers – with fake informa-
tion about the product to be exported – and have the final seal approved 
by the Customs and Central Excise Department. The containers are then 
taken to the godowns. In one case near Pune, on the road to Mumbai port, 
it was reported that once the containers were marked with customs seals, 
smugglers opened and loaded them with the red sanders. They then sent 
the wood back to Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust in Mumbai and got clear-
ance to export their produce on cargo ships as ‘agricultural products’ (or 
plywood, rubber mats or other material in other cases).18 Even should the 
police manage to seize the smuggled wood, negotiation remains possible. 
Twenty tonnes of red sandalwood worth INR 3 crore were seized by the 
Local Crime Branch (LCB) Officer of the Pune rural police, but instead of 
arresting the smugglers, police officers allegedly demanded INR 1 crore 
from the smugglers (Kulkarni 2013).
According to environmental NGOs such as TRAFFIC, the smug-
gling of red sanders is part of a wider illegal trade in sandalwood 
within India and also in Africa and Australia (International Animal 
Rescue Foundation 2013). Those organisations tend to insist less on 
the everyday working of the trade than on the ‘spectacular’ elements 
and believe that red sanders smugglers use techniques deployed in 
the illegal drug trade, like painstakingly strapping a small container 
loaded with red sanders to the underside of a ship. These methods 
involve constant adjusting to ever-changing regulations, routes and 
new business opportunities, such as the recent implementation of 
Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the area. The SEZ in Kochi exem-
plifies the possibilities offered by later forms of capitalism to the 
local criminal economy. As mentioned in the official website of the 
SEZ, ‘The Cochin [Kochi] SEZ is a foreign territory in India. Legally, 
it stands outside the customs territory of India. This positioning per-
mits both fast project approvals in the SEZ as well as a hassle-free 
environment for running units in the SEZ.’19 Yet the directorate of rev-
enue intelligence (DRI) complains that the work of the police in this 
SEZ is seriously hampered by this legislation. In these ‘zones’ smug-
glers can practise their illegal operations without being harassed. The 
rare seizures of containers illegally shipped from the port to various 
parts of China look like police operations mainly performed for the 
media. In addition, arrests seem to have a limited deterrent effect. 
There is no confiscation of the assets of smugglers and smuggling is 
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not a non-bailable offence (see Kollam Gangi Reddy, mentioned pre-
viously) (Reddy 2014b).
Police investigations highlight some of the profiles of smugglers at 
international levels and the ways they play with borders and roads, draw-
ing new maps across and within the interstices of official ones. Shahul 
Hameed is one of these big traffickers. He is said to have taken the lead 
in the business after A.T. Maideen, a gang leader who smuggled out red 
sanders to China and Hong Kong via Dubai, was arrested (Reddy 2014a). 
But not much is known about Shahul Hameed. A Singaporean citizen, 
he used to operate from Chennai, where he was arrested in 2004 by cus-
toms officials. However, when released on bail, he escaped and started to 
operate from Dubai. In 2011, the DRI seized his red sanders containers in 
Kochi port. Hameed is also believed to fund Kollam Gangi Reddy’s career. 
Hameed’s name featured in the press in May 2015 when 100 smugglers 
from Tamil Nadu and AP flew to the UAE to attend his daughter’s wed-
ding, even though the Chittoor and Tirupati police tried to stop them at 
the airport (Reddy 2015).
Despite the limited information, a number of crucial dimensions of 
the workings of red sanders international trafficking can be extrapolated. 
The first is the changing scale of the business in Rayalaseema and a shift 
from faction politics to regional criminal economies to transnational crime. 
The second point relates to the organisation of the business: the red sanders 
mafia necessarily builds on a strong state able to guarantee the circulation of 
trucks, the shipping of the wood logs and the control of the customs. State 
agents are omnipresent in the trade, implying the need to have politicians in 
key positions who are able to control and command bureaucrats and ensure 
the smooth collection and transportation of the red sanders.
The ghost of Veerappan and the criminalisation of labour
A striking point of the red sanders mafia is how a dead smuggler like 
Veerappan haunts and pervades the representations and practices of 
this criminal economy, from labour organisation and police investigation 
to public opinion. As Moffat argues (2018, 180), some dead ‘appear as 
active interlocutors in ongoing political struggles’ and have important 
potential in contemporary politics. Veerappan is a powerful element in 
the local cultural repertoire of models of authority. A Robin Hood figure 
(Seal 2009) and protector of forests for some, the figure of Veerappan in 
South India epitomises the dangerous criminal for the state and the police 
forces. In doing so it also contributes to legitimising the criminalisation 
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of labourers and the use of state violence against labour in the context of 
the red sanders criminal economy. Therefore, Veerappan is mobilised by 
various actors involved in the business in a variety of ways – as an asset, 
as proof of guilt or innocence.
But the career of Veerappan also mirrors the changing alliance 
between politics, markets and violence in later forms of capitalism. These 
dynamics can be seen in two events in April 2015: the massacre of 20 
labourers by the Red Sanders Anti-Smuggling Task Force, followed by 
the decision to remove red sanders from the endangered list to make 
the business easier (Vadlapatla 2015). As early as July 2014, the Andhra 
Pradesh government was ready to sell red sanders at auction through 
global tenders (Economic Times 2014). In October and November 2014, 
the government prepared the first phase of the e-auctions of 4,000 tonnes 
(seized by police) to be sold at an average of INR 25 lakh per tonne. The 
change of rules in the business cannot be dissociated from the massacre 
of woodcutters. It is the combination of the private use of state violence 
with the manipulation of market regulations that unravels how electoral 
democracy is crucial in determining who is ruling and controlling the 
business. What we are witnessing from 2014 elections is not the end of 
smuggling but rather the emergence of a new leadership: the TDP (and 
the Kammas) have now entered the market. By changing the law, Naidu 
has stopped a solid source of finance for his own political opponents from 
the Congress party.
Smugglers vs. labourers
The categorisation of woodcutters as ‘smugglers’ has serious implications 
and Veerappan is the point of reference through which a variety of actors 
(from police to NGOs) seem to interpret, compare and evaluate red sand-
ers labourers. The ‘fact-finding report’ drafted and released in 2014 by 
the National Campaign for De-notified Tribes’ Human Rights (NCDN-
THR) highlights the conditions of workers, the roles of the Kammas and 
the Reddys in the organisation of the smuggling activities, and the ways 
labourers have been killed and jailed by the government.20 The attention 
paid to labour derives from the fact that woodcutters are the only ones 
killed and/or jailed in the red sanders economy: ‘About two thousand 
Tamilians are in Andhra jails because of the cases booked against them 
for red sanders smuggling’, according to a lawyer from Kadapa.21 He 
traces the history of the recruitment of the labour force and explains that 
the majority of the Tamilian coolies originate from areas surrounding the 
Jawadi hills, between Vellore and Tiruvannamalai districts (bordering 
208 THE WILD EAST
Chittoor district of Andhra Pradesh). He links their recruitment to the 
death of Veerappan: ‘These villages were once under the influence of 
notorious red sanders smuggler Veerappan. After the death of Veerap-
pan, the poor people who used to work for him were rendered jobless. 
This provided an opportunity for the Andhra smugglers to recruit them 
easily at cheap wages.’
The NCDNTHR’s narrative stresses historical continuities with 
Veerappan – despite the fact that Veerappan was not active in this part of 
Tamil Nadu. If the report does not support Veerappan, in other articles, 
tribal and Dalit Tamil woodcutters are, condescendingly, portrayed as 
poor, passive and ignorant tribal victims of a traffic organised by upper-
caste Andhra politicians (Narasimhan 2014). In this narrative they are 
exploited because of their tribal identity and they are killed and jailed 
because they are Tamil:
Those killed are only coolies engaged by contractors to cut trees at 
night under the cover of darkness. They are not smugglers. Young 
tribal men from Jawadi hills in Tiruvannamalai district of Tamil 
Nadu are lured by brokers with offer of fancy wages and pressed 
into extracting red sanders from the forests. (Rajappa 2015)
As mentioned above, the mafia can rely on the participation of labourers 
who do not know who’s who in the trade. Such lack of knowledge helps 
to protect the organisation. Human rights organisations contest the crim-
inalisation and the mass killings of labourers by the state by emphasis-
ing this aspect. By contrast police forces argue that labourers are active 
‘mafia’ workers coming from villages historically under the influence of 
Veerappan: ‘Top police officials based in Rayalaseema said that labour 
gangs employed by Veerappan to chop down sandalwood trees in the 
Satyamangalam forests are taking part in the red sanders smuggling in 
Seshachalam forests,’ states one source (Deccan Herald 2014). Police por-
tray them as active smugglers and rational followers of Veerappan and 
insist on their deep, historical and undercover engagement with him. As 
a police officer said: ‘These woodcutters are experts and after death of 
Veerappan in 2004 they were silent for few years. For the past five years 
they are coming to Andhra Pradesh and cutting the red sanders heav-
ily.’ This police perspective turns woodcutters into smugglers. Their geo-
graphical origin, their skills in woodcutting and their abilities to remain 
silent after Veerappan’s death are elements ‘top’ police officials attempt 
to link to each other: labourers are smugglers and mafia members. This 
view is reinforced by the alleged structural similarities of the methods of 
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red sanders smugglers to those employed by the late Veerappan. Another 
top police official said: ‘The supply chains, the intermediaries and the 
other methods used are exactly the same as with Veerappan. Most of 
the gangs are from Tamil Nadu and are intruding into AP. The issue is of 
serious concern as the smugglers are turning violent’ (Raghavan 2013). 
Whether as passive victims, followers or active smugglers, labourers are 
blamed for their alleged links with Veerappan, who continues to haunt 
red sanders smuggling over activities a decade after his death.
Mass killing of labourers
The Veerappan ‘brand’ came into force in public media when two forest 
officials were killed in the forest on 15 December 2013.22 Local newspa-
pers announced ‘Veerappan-style smugglers attack Tirumala rangers, 2 
officers stoned to death’ (Raghavan 2013). Other newspapers reported 
that the officials were stoned and hanged to death; others asserted that 
their genitals were cut off. Ultimately, woodcutters were portrayed as sav-
age and brutal. However, the association between smugglers and Veerap-
pan was popularly viewed with suspicion. ‘Will they go unarmed in the 
forest on their own, without any orders? They are not stupid,’ stated an 
informant. Others declared the necessary involvement of politics: ‘This is 
faction politics, elections are coming. Nothing to do with labour or forest 
officials.’
The representations of the state, democracy and politics among the 
local population often converge around a central position: it is impos-
sible to imagine the state and the police forces acting without political 
intervention. Bosses do give orders and the killings of tree cutters are 
necessarily related to power relations. As one bureaucrat stressed: ‘Forest 
officials do not go in the forest on their own; they knew electoral cam-
paigning was coming.’ These narratives highlight the interpretations of 
killings in terms of faction politics and echo official reports: ‘We suspect 
these two officials were not killed by the tree cutters and this is a handy 
work of the corrupt forest and police officials, in connivance with key 
smugglers and political bosses’(Raghavan 2013).
The visible criminalisation and killings of woodcutters contrast 
with the limited and less publicised investigations on the relations 
between smugglers and politicians. As mentioned, most of the top smug-
glers who have been charged were able to secure bail and escape. Those 
who are in jail still benefit from political support and receive visits from 
YSR Congress leaders like Midhun Reddy, member of parliament and son 
of Peddireddy Ramachandra Reddy. The mass killing of labourers had a 
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huge impact on the media (Nichenametla 2015). Police stated that the 
RSASTF had spotted a gang of 100 woodcutters from Tamil Nadu on the 
night of 6/7 April. When challenged, 20 of the woodcutters threw stones 
at them. The task force responded by shooting the 20 dead (Fact Finding 
Team 2015). Another report argues ironically about the unreality of 
the police version: ‘Kantha Rao’s men deserve President’s police medal 
for the accuracy they have shown in identifying the 20 stone-throwing 
woodcutters out of 100 in the dead of night without any night vision 
equipment.’ (Rajappa, 2015). RSASTF is also silent on what happened to 
the other 80 in the gang.
The use of licensed violence and state forces has long been a priv-
ilege of bosses and a major way of redefining the business map. What is 
striking is that this task force has worked as a private army for Naidu. 
Like paramilitary forces, they have full impunity and attacked only non-
TDP smugglers. Whatever the involvement of the leader, this conveyed 
a strong warning to YSRCP and Congress bosses involved in smuggling 
activities. Men like Peddireddy Ramchandra Reddy have a reputation 
that reaches far into villages and towns. They inspire fear and respect. 
A henchman said: ‘If you meet him, you should never turn your back 
and eat in his house. If something goes wrong, you will get poisoned. 
Everybody fears him.’ With the rise to power of Chandrababu Naidu and 
his uses of the task force, the fear has changed direction: ‘Even Peddireddy 
Ramchandra Reddy is scared now.’ The denial of any rights, the disposal 
of the labour force and bodies and the complete lack of protection are the 
crude extension of informal economies (Shah et al. 2017).
Conclusion
This chapter illustrates how current criminal economies, based on 
alliances between markets, politics, state and violence, have led to a 
criminalisation of labour and a marked shift from political violence to 
economic violence in Andhra Pradesh, South India. The history of red 
sanders traffic highlights the transformation of the local sandalwood 
economy into a criminal, international mafia-like activity. I showed the 
crucial role of electoral democracy (and criminalisation of politics and 
politicisation of crime) in shaping the governance of the red sanders 
mafia and also stressed how its regulation is deeply entrenched in the 
economic, cultural and political history of Rayalaseema. The latter is 
further illustrated by the ways the mythical figure of Veerappan is used 
to negotiate labour, violence and justice in the region. Local criminal 
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economies are further entrenched in the local socio-political contexts 
through the logics of intermediation typical of the local informal econ-
omy. Such dynamics help to maintain the silence and secrecy necessary 
to protect the workings of the red sanders mafia. Lastly, I showed how 
the red sanders business is unstable and always dependent on electoral 
politics and changes in the laws. However, these uncertainties are also 
the basis for the making (or losing) of personal fortunes and for making 
the red sanders business a ‘gamble’ worth hundreds of crores.
Notes
 1. Red sanders is protected under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
(CITES) of Wild Fauna and Flora (1995) and has been listed as endangered by the Internation-
al Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) since 1998.
 2. ‘Encounter’ reflects the licence delivered to police and army forces to kill unarmed civilians 
with impunity, notably alleged ‘Naxalites’ in Andhra Pradesh.
 3. For the report see NCDNTHR 2014.
 4. The state of Andhra Pradesh separated from the Telangana region in 2014.
 5. See also P.S. Jha, quoted in the Introduction.
 6. During his father’s term, his fortune rose from 10 lakh in 2004 to 72 crore in 2009, and to 400 
crore in 2014 (Vaishnav 2017, 28).
 7. The constituency of the ex-Chief Minister YSR and his son Jagan is located in Kadapa district, 
100 kilometres from the Seshachalam forest; the constituency of the ex-Chief Minister, Kiran 
Kumar Reddy, and his brother Kishore is adjacent to the forest in Chittoor district. Chandraba-
bu Naidu, the 2014 elected CM, is also based in Chittoor district.
 8. To follow the details of the case, see Indian Kanoon (1999).
 9. Chandrababu Naidu was Chief Minister between 1995 and 2004 and then from 2014 to the 
time of publication.
10. P. Ramachandra Reddy contested elections for the Janata party in 1978 and for the Congress 
party in 1985 and lost on both occasions.
11. For a detailed list of woodcutters killed see M.K. Kumar (2014) and NCDNTHR (2014).
12. For official details, see National Election Watch (n.d.).
13. See also Vadlapatla 2015.
14. A detailed report published in 2014 (M.K. Kumar 2014) states that ‘woodcutters come from 
Thrivullaur, Vellore, Krishnagiri, Thiruvannamalai, Kancheepuram, and Villupuram of Tamil 
Nadu and are supposedly brought by middlemen from Thiruvannamalai and Salem districts’. 
A detailed news report published in Frontline mentions they are mostly ‘Vannyars and Malayali 
Scheduled Tribe hailed from the border districts of Salem, Dharmapuri, Krishnagiri, Tiruvan-
namalai and Vellore in Tamil Nadu’ (Rajasekaran 2015).
15. The characteristics of Indian informal labour markets are well known (Breman 1996; Har-
riss-White 2003; Basile and Harriss-White 2010), usually presenting strong segmentation by 
caste, class, gender and geographical origins. Often labour migration is used to reduce man-
power costs and to avoid the application of labour laws. Generally economic sectors present 
multiple layers of intermediation and of subcontracting. Therefore, in this economy it is com-
mon to observe migrant labourers, often of a specific caste and/or region, brought by labour 
intermediaries to work sites.
16. The silence of the population about the red sanders mafia contrasts with the possibility for 
some journalists to cover and expose the red sanders mafia.
17. It remains unclear if they used duplicate seals or brought customs officials in to affix the seals.
18. According to media coverage, this information came to light during questioning of the customs 
clearance agent-turned-smuggler. The directorate of revenue intelligence (DRI) had earlier 
arrested him in 2010 for allegedly smuggling red sanders worth INR 5.03 crore to Dubai. He 
was released from jail in August last year.
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19. See the official website at http://www.csez.com/softwares/cedis.htm (accessed 12 February 
2018).
20. The committee was made up of advocates, tribal leaders and intellectuals from Andhra 
Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, convened to ‘investigate the death and arrest of thousands of mem-
bers of de-notified tribes from Tamil Nadu during the anti-smuggling operations by the police 
in Andhra Pradesh’ (NCDNTHR 2014).
21. See also Times of India 2015b.
22. A few examples of press headlines: ‘Veerappan Gone, But his Group Still Active in Seshachalam 
Forests’ and ‘It Bore Veerappan Mark’.
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The ‘land and real estate mafia’, West 
Bengal, East India
Tone K. Sissener
In this chapter, forms of ‘small-scale’ land grabbing in urban West Bengal 
shed light on the workings and methods of local ‘land mafias’ and their 
entanglement with state officers, the police, judges and politicians. The 
chapter uses the concept of ‘blurred boundaries’ to explore local manifesta-
tions of intreccio, particularly mastan raj (rule by thugs/enforcers). In the 
process, the field research reveals how the reach of the state as the provider of 
justice is limited by at least two factors: first, by an inefficient court system, 
and second, by corrupt state functionaries and politicians. Ultimately, the 
chapter shows that the justice system is deeply bound into a nexus of party 
politics, crime and business, a nexus that is essential to the working of the 
criminal economy.1
Since the early 2000s India has experienced what has been termed ‘a 
spectacular real estate boom’ (Searle 2016: 5). Developers have built 
new shopping malls, five-star hotels, office and education complexes and 
high-rise apartment buildings in India’s major cities and have bought hun-
dreds of thousands of acres of farmland in order to build more (ibid.: 5). 
Because of the high demand for and limited supply of land, commonly 
due to geographic limitations and political restrictions, prices have ‘sky-
rocketed’ (Weinstein 2008: 22) enabling developers to make fortunes, 
which in turn has encouraged land speculators and pushed land values 
even higher as they bid for parcels (Chakravorty 2013; Searle 2014; 
2016).2 Kolkata, capital of West Bengal and one of India’s major cities, 
was witness to this building frenzy and to rising real estate prices, while 
the number of land speculators soared – although perhaps not as much 
as in cities such as Mumbai and Delhi (Weinstein 2008; Searle 2016). 
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From the early 1990s, and in the wake of economic liberalisation in India 
making private and foreign investments in real estate possible, all sorts of 
enterprising agents and agencies, both public and private, have taken an 
interest in the real estate market, hoping to make a quick profit.3
In this building frenzy and race for profits, land becomes a scarce 
commodity and researchers have pointed out the costs and consequences 
of displacing people in the name of development:
In India, the government has been the primary coercive agent, 
assisting corporations in accessing cheap land, and so scholars have 
documented the experiences of people caught up in state projects, 
particularly those torn violently from their homes and pushed to 
the urban fringes through flawed slum demolition and resettlement 
projects, as well as farmers dispossessed of their land for SEZs4 and 
other corporate projects. (Searle 2016, 8)5
While such large-scale government land acquisition, which in turn 
gives rise to resistance and political mobilisation, has been extensively 
researched (Shrivastava and Kothari 2012; Nielsen 2014; Das 2016), 
small-scale ‘land grabbing’6 in urban areas, which can shed light on the 
workings and methods of local ‘land mafia’ and the role of the state, 
remains to be explored. In Mumbai, Liza Weinstein has followed the rise 
and transformation of Mumbai’s major organised crime groups (OCGs) 
since the 1950s,7 arguing that their recent entrance into land and prop-
erty development is ‘a product of the liberalisation and globalisation of 
the Indian economy’ (Weinstein 2008: 23). By following OCGs and seeing 
their entrance into real estate as a way of sustaining and financing them-
selves locally and globally, Weinstein finds that, although the majority of 
Mumbai’s major property developers do not have connections to OCGs, 
their increased participation in and influence on the development indus-
try has led to the criminalisation of land development. While my findings 
can be seen to support the view that land development is subject to crim-
inalisation, the approach is different. Except for occasional references 
to state practices of corruption and neglect, Weinstein does not really 
localise ‘the state’ and electoral politics. In her discussion she seems to 
suggest the breaking down or shifting of boundaries between formal and 
informal governance, between state and mafia; however, she does not 
provide any illustrations of such shifts. Rather, what she does show is 
how these OCGs seem to operate in cooperation with, but still separate 
from, the state: enterprising slumlords taking advantage of the political 
dilemma of a central government pursuing a strategy of state-supported 
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industrial development that causes migration but includes no accompa-
nying strategy for housing a growing population. In this policy vacuum, 
OCGs were allowed to operate – undisturbed – ‘by registering the new 
residents to vote for local politicians and paying bribes to police and 
officials in the Bombay Municipal Corporation’ (Weinstein 2008: 26). It 
is hard not to see the relationship between the state and OCGs, as dis-
cussed by Weinstein, as one of binary opposition, with the state on the 
one side and OCGs on the other,8 and not, as suggested towards the end, 
one of shifting or blurred boundaries (see Gupta 1995) or intreccio (see 
Introduction to this volume). To avoid presenting the state as a unitary, 
centralised entity that is separate from society, I find Veena Das and Deb-
orah Poole’s Anthropology in the Margins of the State (2004) useful. In 
the introduction to this rich collection of essays, Das and Poole propose 
that we explore the state margins, that is, ‘the places where the state law 
and order continually have to be re-established’, because state power is 
always unstable, ‘something best seen when one moves away from the 
center’ (Asad 2004: 279). They go on to identify three ways in which the 
state’s margins may be imagined. I, however, am interested mainly in 
the second, described as ‘spaces, forms, and practices through which the 
state is continually both experienced and undone through the illegibility 
of its own practices, documents, and words’ (Das and Poole 2004: 9). 
This approach allows us to see what is included and what is excluded in 
state practices and, as I see it, enables us to understand both what it can 
and cannot or even will or will not achieve, which is to say its governing 
limitations as well as potentialities. In the cases discussed in this chap-
ter, the reach of the state as provider of justice is limited by at least two 
things: first, by an inefficient court system, and second, by corrupt state 
functionaries, including the police, because the government ‘allows’ it, or 
does not control or constrict its functionaries, allowing us to talk about a 
mafia state – a mastan raj.
A short background
Kolkata is the oldest and the third largest metropolis in India, after Mum-
bai and Delhi. Located in the state of West Bengal, it now extends over 
1,854 km2 on both banks of the Hooghly river and has a population of 
over 15 million. The Kolkata Metropolitan Area (KMA) comprises three 
municipal corporations, several small- to medium-sized municipalities, 
many small and medium-sized cities, and numerous towns and villages. 
However, the core area of the city, on the eastern bank of the river, also 
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known as the Kolkata Municipal Corporation area, covers about 184 
km2 and is home to 4.85 million people. The projected population for 
the KMA in 2025 is 21 million, with most of the increase taking place in 
the outer districts of the metropolitan area, as growth within the cen-
tral neighbourhoods has been almost stagnant in the past decade (Chen, 
Wang and Kundu 2009).
The private real estate business in Kolkata is dominated by the 
Marwaris. The Marwaris are arguably the wealthiest and most successful 
business and industrialist community in India. For over three hundred 
years, migrant merchant traders have travelled from villages scattered 
over Eastern Rajasthan to towns and cities across Northern and Eastern 
India, Bangladesh and the wider South East Asian region, as well as to 
Russia and central Asia. Although these migrant traders belonged to 
a variety of trading lineages and identified themselves by various sub-
castes as well as by religious labels such as Hindu and Jain, by the late 
nineteenth century these traders had also acquired the multivalent 
and largely unwanted ethnic tag of ‘Marwari’. The Marwaris rose to 
prominence, mainly in Bengal where they quickly became a formida-
ble economic ruling class under colonial rule; this was even more the 
case in independent India (Hardgrove 2004). Even today, the Marwaris 
are behind most large-scale and high-profile development projects in 
Kolkata, commonly organised as joint enterprises of the government of 
West Bengal with names such as the Shrachi, Emami, Sureka, MKJ, JB, 
Merlin and Nahata Groups. As mentioned on the website of one of their 
latest projects, Urbana, intended to construct Kolkata’s tallest towers: 
‘Over the last couple of decades, these names have been associated with 
most of the city’s landmark buildings and complexes’ (including the South 
City Projects (Kolkata) Ltd.9). Besides the mostly Marwari-controlled, 
large-scale real estate development projects there can be found small-
er-scale local developments taking place all over the city: the real estate 
‘on the margins’ that will be the focus of this chapter. The material for 
this chapter was collected during one year of fieldwork in Kolkata from 
2013 to 2014 and during short visits in November 2014 and April 2017. 
Field-based observations, informal discussions and interviews with key 
informers (people involved in forced takeovers, lawyers, journalists, 
industrialists, developers, brokers and promoters) are supplemented 
by secondary sources such as newspaper and magazine articles, police 
reports and legal documents.
In the following, I will first explore in some detail the process of buy-
ing and developing properties in Kolkata, facilitating an understanding 
of the present-day real estate market. Through illustrations I will go on to 
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explore what it means in practice to take a property by force in a mastan 
raj, and the risks and multiple layers of violence and corruption involved 
in the business. Next, the legitimacy of the mastan raj will be discussed. 
At the end, I will discuss the impact of party politics and suggest blurred 
boundaries between the present-day government and its machinery on 
the one hand and the syndicate raj/land mafia on the other that make it 
difficult to know the one from the other, furthering acceptance and pro-
liferation of the mastan raj.
Understanding the real estate market
A developer that I met through a friend explained (in English) the process 
of buying and developing properties in Kolkata. As he runs a reputable 
business, he said, many brokers and landowners approach him offering 
plots, but he mainly undertakes joint ventures – partnerships where a 
landowner supplies the land and the developer provides the capital to 
develop the property. The profit is shared between the landowner and 
developer, with each making money from the finished product:
Suppose there are four floors and four car parking, then on a 50/50 
sharing basis he gets two floors and two car parking, and we get 
the balance; two floors and two car parking. The sharing of proper-
ties, sharing with the vendor, is a very popular concept in Calcutta 
and in other parts of the country also. Ratio of the sharing depends 
on the location, the viability, the market rent, etc. We normally 
do joint ventures with good landlords. Otherwise, we don’t do it. 
Sharing means, like getting married; potential problems, but when 
you share with good people things can be sorted out amicably. 
Otherwise, you may end up fighting.
The other way is to buy out properties, but either way the process is sim-
ple, he said. After identifying a plot among the many being offered by 
both brokers and landowners, a commercial evaluation of that particular 
plot is made:
Suppose we are buying this place and the landlord is asking this 
much of money. So, we buy out this property, at this price, if you 
buy out at this price, then how much will be the construction, enti-
tlement of that, how much will be the construction cost, what cat-
egory of building we need to construct, and then, ultimately, what 
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will be the selling price. So, after doing a proper research on the 
entire cycle, if it is found positive, we buy out the property. Now, 
for buying out the properties, first step is locating the property, as 
per our liking, second is finding out the commercial evaluation, and 
third is after finding both location and evaluation positive, we say 
yes to the landlord and then the legal process start.
All the papers are sent to their solicitor, who will discuss the legal mat-
ters with the landlord’s solicitor. When all papers are found in order, they 
buy the property and do the registration. When I asked about disputed 
properties, he laughed and said, ‘No, dispute, you know Ma’am, this is a 
very interesting subject’. In cases of disputed properties, they would first 
consider the ‘depth of the dispute’:
A dispute, which is not solvable by the landlord or the person who 
is selling, can sometimes be solved by myself. We make a point of 
good bargain. Suppose he is having a tenant who is going for a legal 
case with the landlord, maybe a good friend of mine. He is willing 
to sell the property as it is (with the problem with the tenant). I say 
that x is your price and if I buy the property, x is the market price 
and I will pay you x minus y (for the tenant). So, we bargain with 
the tenant and then we settle with the property and later on I also 
jungle up with10 the same guy, the same tenant. The person who 
sold the property probably sold at a lesser price, but he laughs at his 
end because he gained some interest part.
The landlord is rid of the problem and has made money on the sale 
instead of spending his resources on a court case. The developer said 
that he would consider very carefully before deciding on a property 
that had potential problems with tenants, but that he sometimes gets it 
wrong. Here follows an extract from a conversation between me and the 
developer:
Developer: So, travelling through this system, the process of evict-
ing a tenant might take as much as 8 to 10 years, or more. As a 
developer, as a businessman, we always prefer settling across the 
table by a mutual consent or resolution. But sometimes, just to put 
the mental pressure on them, we have to file a case. We normally 
avoid that, but we also have to do that sometimes.
Anthropologist: OK. So, you will tell them that you are taking 
legal steps?
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Developer: I will send them a notice, a legal notice, then I will file 
a case and they will be served the notice, so they have to run to the 
court. At times this makes them feel to come to a settlement, but if 
they are difficult people, then again, they can fight the case. They 
can also empower a lawyer to do it.
Anthropologist: OK. That means that if you have to wait for 
the legal system to work, then your investment will be blocked for 
years. That could be the case.
Developer: That is the case. That is the case and at times it 
happens.
Anthropologist: It happens and that’s the part of your business I 
would think then, that you have to (interrupted by developer).
Developer: You see, we take a view and we buy a property. We 
consider an adjustment period, but at times it crosses that. Market 
is regulated by a particular scenario. There is a price and there 
might be a 10 to 15 per cent escalation in the price or there can be a 
recession also, but you know that when we do business or when we 
invest: from that particular day we start calculating the interest fac-
tor. Even if it is our own money, not borrowed money, we, as a busi-
nessman, should calculate the interest. So now with the passage of 
time, the investment and the interest is piling up and it is coming 
close to the profit margin. Cost of construction is also increasing. So 
if a project after procurement is delayed, then in that case it might 
so happen that we’ll end up entering a loss. It’s a risky business and 
it’s a business with a lot of headache. The developers are normally 
thought of like they’re goons, they’re anti-socials, not much respect 
by the government.
Anthropologist: How did this reputation come up, as goons and 
(interrupted).
Developer: The case is, suppose there are say ten thousand devel-
opers in India, so there are also bad people among them. So, these 
bad people have made this business, a tag, and not a very good 
thing. But now there are also some very good developers in this city. 
Like where your kids study, South City, it’s a big group and like our-
selves we are reputed. So there stands the goodwill of the builder, 
which ultimately makes them earn more than the other. Suppose 
I have a buyer and because of my goodwill they come, and blind-
folded they buy the property from me. So, they know that I might 
charge a hundred rupees more, but it is acceptable to them because 
they want peace of mind. But even after buying the property and 
starting construction, some person might come up, claiming a right 
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in my property, out of the blue. So, he can file a case. This mainly 
happens in the suburb properties, which is not in the proper city but 
in the fringes of the city. So, we have to fight it out.
Anthropologist: And again you have to put the project on hold?
Developer: That depends. If the court finds the filing of a case 
strong enough, then it might go to the extent of stopping the project. 
Otherwise, it is called lis pendens;11 one is litigation, the other is lis 
pendens. For example, we are making a ten-storied building some-
where in Gariahat [a retail market and main road in the Ballygunge 
area in South Kolkata]. We bought a property, our lawyers and our 
solicitors gave us the go-ahead, and we started the construction 
for a ten-storied building. After the construction of six stories, we 
got a notice. We opened the notice and we gave it to our lawyer for 
inspection. It turned out that there was a tenant 20 years back. All 
of a sudden, or after seeing the developments there, he filed a suit 
in the court, probably with the intention in his mind to get money.
Anthropologist: But he moved out 20 years ago?
Developer: 20 years ago, and he doesn’t have any case, but he 
has framed a case against us that has been accepted by the court 
and we have to fight it. He is not in a position to do anything to 
our project, our project is moving, but we have to monitor the case. 
Senior advocates are engaged to deal with it, but we have to go for 
consultation. What is that tenant’s intention? To get money from us. 
That is one sort of litigation.
Talking about tenants claiming rights to properties and getting cases 
accepted in the court, he said ‘only in West Bengal’, due to the former com-
munist regime’s policy of offering security to tenants (and thus of secur-
ing the vote bank). ‘Now there are amendments, there are betterments’, 
he said, ‘but the situation is still such that tenants, especially old tenants, 
follow the property and have to be included in any development plans’.
Now it is controlled by the rental control act and in the rent act 
there is a limitation. If you are paying less than, let’s say, seven or 
eight thousand rupees, then you are guided by the West Bengal 
Premises Tenancy Act, which has been amended now so that you 
can be evicted by proper cause of law, but who wants, Ma’am?
As explained, pending lawsuits and litigations take time and resources, 
obstruct the completion of a project and put the investment at risk. If, 
as in some cases, the project is put on hold for too long, the investor 
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loses out on their return. In other words, the stakes are high, margins 
less and  there is no time to waste on disputes. Another approach is to 
grab and sell or build and keep the case pending indefinitely. In the case 
presented below, there were several deeds to the same property, some of 
which had to be false. According to a high court lawyer, the property was 
registered in Mumbai for a price you would not get for the same plot of 
land anywhere, ‘not even in the Sundarbans’:12
Whoever registered that property in Bombay should at least set 
the price that is available over here. You can’t buy a property of 17 
katha13 for 10 lakh rupees in Calcutta, not now and not then. There 
would be a queue from here and right up to high court of people 
waiting to, at that price, to take part in the “lottery” to be allotted 
that land! (Personal communication in the high court lawyer’s 
Kolkata chambers, April 2017)
His point was that people trying to grab properties do it openly and do 
not even try to conceal their actions by making it look real. According 
to him, in the property case to be discussed, which started as a dispute 
over ownership, there was no sale in the first place. Someone claimed 
power of attorney, but it was never registered, and the property was 
‘bought’ for a ‘throwaway price’ that was not even paid to the owner. He 
said it was a false claim but to establish that in court would take years, 
even as many as 25 or 30. Rather than trying to take over the property 
through false court cases, which anyway would take years to prove, it 
was grabbed by force. It was known that the property was disputed and 
presided over by a woman and her old and sick uncle; it was considered 
an easy grab.
Taking a property by force
The setting
Mr Sen owned a property in central Kolkata. When he died in 1946, his 
two sons inherited the property, which was divided into two equal parts: 
A and B. The son who inherited portion A was married and had one son, 
who died. The other son had two sons and portion B was divided into B 
and C. When the owner of property A died, his wife, who lived in portion 
B, inherited portion A, which was rented out. What happened to portion 
A after the widow took over became a matter of dispute. One version was 
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that it was sold to a company with a power of attorney granted by the 
widow in 1999 and that the sale was legally registered in Mumbai. The 
other version was that the two daughters of the son who owned prop-
erty B (after it was divided into B and C) inherited property A from their 
great-aunt when she died in 2003 and sold it in 2010 to a tenant who had 
been registered on the property since the early 1970s. He still occupied 
the property together with his ‘niece’ who also ran an international play-
school there.
Located in the middle of the city and being of some substantial size, 
the Sen property was considered of high value. In 2010, a Marwari indus-
trialist took an interest in the property. Talking to him about it during an 
interview in June 2014, he told me that he was looking for a centrally 
located property to build a new family house. When words got out that he 
was looking for a property, he was approached by brokers. Among them, 
one who claimed to have the title deed of a portion of the Sen property. 
The price was set at INR 8.5 crore (INR 80.5 million or US$1.3 million 
at the 2014 exchange rate) and the money was paid on the condition 
that the sale be registered, and the property handed over to him within 
a year. The industrialist said he knew the property was disputed but that 
the broker had promised to have the dispute settled and the property 
vacated. After two years he still did not have access to the property, and 
he bought another property. He told the broker, but the broker claimed 
the sale had gone through and that the property had already been re-reg-
istered. However, it was still occupied.
After March 2013, the industrialist said he was no longer interested 
in the property because it continued to be disputed and had not been 
vacated as promised. According to various other sources (the media and 
interviews with a journalist, lawyers and one of the tenants), the prop-
erty was caught up in a number of legal tangles. Since 2010, many com-
plaints had been made at the local police station and other police and 
government offices: against the company claiming to have bought the 
property from the Sen family; against its directors and others related to 
or representing the company; and against the Sen family and tenants – 
but all to no great effect. In 2011, the two Sen daughters challenged the 
industrialist’s claim to the property in the high court, seeking exclusive 
property rights on behalf of the tenant to whom they said they had sold 
the property. The lawsuit contested the company’s property rights and 
claimed ownership on the basis of an unprobated will of the widow who 
owned the property. The industrialist had filed an eviction case against 
the tenants but realising the legal muddle the property was in and that 
the tenants remained on the property, he lost interest and wanted out.
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The broker handling the deal was known to target litigated prop-
erties as a way of making money on real estate. In this case he claimed 
that he had no interest in the property or the company trying to sell it but 
had agreed merely to mediate the sale. The industrialist confirmed that 
he came to him as a broker. The broker’s relation to the company sell-
ing the property is not clear, but it was registered at the same address as 
his own real estate company in Kolkata, assumingly established for that 
particular property deal and expected to be liquidated after the property 
had been sold with a good profit. And thus, after the property was sold 
to the industrialist, the company was no longer active. There were three 
listed directors from September 1997 to October 2010 of whom one also 
appeared as Director of 17 other companies, mostly Mumbai-based, all 
between 2010–13. The broker’s name was not among the listed, but 
he was believed to be the one making money on the deal (The Times of 
India, 14 November 2013). When I discussed the case with the broker’s 
wife (who was Joint Managing Director of the broker’s real estate com-
pany) in November 2014, she said her husband first made a deal with 
the tenant in 2010 believing he was the owner of the property and paid 
him INR 85 lakh (8.5 million). After having paid the money he discov-
ered that the tenant was not the owner of the property, but the money 
was never returned, and the tenant remained on the property. He then 
bought the property from the company and sold it to the industrialist in 
2010. After that she said they had nothing to do with either the property 
or anybody connected to it.
The media reported on a link between the broker and the tenant, 
questioning also the latter’s integrity, claiming that he had taken money 
from the broker to vacate but then stayed on the property. According to 
the niece, there were no such connections or deals, and they never had 
any plans to vacate the property. On the contrary, she said, they were 
preparing a lawsuit against the broker, but then everything changed. The 
broker decided to take the property by force.
The case
When I came to Kolkata for a year of fieldwork in August 2013 my chil-
dren aged 3 and 6 were admitted to the international school on the dis-
puted property. The dispute was not known at the time and the school 
was recommended as the best international playschool.
On a Sunday afternoon in September, when the school was closed 
and the principal (the aforementioned niece) was away for the weekend, 
there was an incident on the school property. One newspaper reported 
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it as vandalism by a gang forcing their way into the compound, trash-
ing the school, beating up the uncle, his aide and the school caretaker, 
and tearing down the school signboard replacing it with a company sign-
board (The Telegraph, 16 September 2013). Another newspaper, under 
the headline ‘Goons ransack school at gunpoint’, reported that after 
holding the caretakers at gunpoint, one of the intruders was said to have 
shouted ‘Yeh jagah tum logon ko khali karna parega (You have to vacate 
this place),’ and before leaving, ‘Aj sirf chaunakaya hai, agla din fod denge 
(We have only threatened you today. We will beat you up tomorrow)’ 
(Times News Network, 16 September 2013).
At a school meeting with the parents after the incident, the prin-
cipal confirmed that there was a property dispute and that the attack 
had been a warning, but that they and the school were not going any-
where. School security was strengthened, and the school continued as 
usual until there was another attack in November 2014. Later we heard 
that in the period between the two attacks the principal had received 
daily telephone threats; somebody calling her to say that unless they 
left, they would be removed by force. She repeatedly informed the police 
and asked for protection but got no response. They stayed on and the 
threats were put into practice. In the dark of night, a group of 21 men 
and women, mostly fit young men sent by a private, unregistered security 
agency, made a forced entry. On advice from police, lawyers and others 
she had talked to about the threats, the principal kept her uncle’s old fire-
arms available. Surrounded by intruders, she and one of the caretakers 
started firing in the air, hoping to scare them away and attract the atten-
tion of the police stationed at the police commissioner’s house next door. 
She had tried calling the local police station, but they refused to respond. 
When no police came, she ran to the police commissioner’s house des-
perate for help. By the time the police finally arrived several rounds of 
ammunition had been fired. In addition to some less serious injuries, two 
bouncers were found dead in one of the playhouses. The police arrested 
everyone, including the principal and her helpers. Three days later the 
police also arrested the broker at the airport on his way to Mumbai. The 
media speculated that he was trying to escape on a one-way ticket.
The broker was singled out as the one behind the attack, but law-
yers and named company directors were also arrested and charged 
with trespassing, unlawful assembly and criminal conspiracy. Two 
months later, the police arrested another bouncer said to have ‘dab-
bled in the world of crime’ and whose arrest led the detectives to 
‘unearthing a gang that helped various builders to illegally occupy 
land belonging to others’ (Times News Network, 8 January 2014). The 
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bouncer was believed to have been instrumental in convening at least 
eight of the several other bouncers who had entered the premises in 
September, vandalised the property and attacked the uncle, his helper 
and the school employees. A senior officer from the local police sta-
tion was also arrested and charged with neglect of duty. The principal 
had lodged several complaints against the broker, but no action had 
been taken. She said the police had been paid not to interfere and she 
had also made complaints against the local police station. She tried 
to lodge her complaints higher up the hierarchy but was constantly 
referred back to the local police station and to the same senior police 
officer. She believed he was just ‘small fry’ and that he must have had 
support ‘from above’, from superior police officers and politicians. The 
name of a Trinamool Congress leader from the ruling party was men-
tioned, also in the press, as the broker’s political ally, but his alleged 
involvement was not disclosed.
The mastan raj
Upon the arrest of the senior police officer, he told the press that he 
had acted on ‘instructions from his superior’ and the press speculated 
that ‘more heads are likely to roll’ in the police (Ghosh 2013c)  – but 
the case never really developed into one concerning police corruption 
either. Evidently, the broker had initially asked two of his aides to ‘get 
the local cops on their side’ and later paid out between INR 30 to 65 
lakh to officers at the local police station to ‘hush up the role of the real 
culprits of the shooting’ (Ghosh 2013b).14 The newspaper claimed that 
the senior police officer knew what was going on as he had been seen in 
a restaurant a few days before the November attack talking to those later 
accused of ‘conspiracy to crime’. It was also reported that call records 
showed that the police officer had called them several times between 
2am and 6am on the night of the attack, and that not only were the 
police aware of the takeover bid that day, they had actually tipped off 
the goons that there would be no police patrol at the time. Allegedly, 
the duty officer had been told to ‘divert force’ on that November night 
(Ghosh 2013c). According to media reports, other complaints against 
the same police officer had been filed within the same year and had been 
supressed. Apparently, officers from the local police station had been 
‘under the scanner for inaction on the series of complaints and counter 
complaints filed since 2010 and their delayed reaction’ (Ghosh 2013c) 
but nothing had been done about it.
Obviously, many were involved and there was much uncertainty 
about who played what part. Court cases are pending but the broker 
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was believed to have planned and orchestrated the attack so as not to 
lose out on his investment. When the industrialist was asked if the bro-
ker was unwilling to pay him back the rest of the money, he said he was 
not unwilling, that he would return the money as soon as possible. The 
money he had taken had gone to other ‘investments’ but the sale would 
bring in more than enough to repay in full. However, the property was 
occupied and he was not able to get the tenants out.
According to various sources, the broker had made a lot of 
money on litigated properties. When he was taken into police custody 
after his arrest, the principal said she overheard him saying, when the 
police were trying to handcuff him, ‘You are putting handcuffs on me? 
You know that I am a guy of 500 crores!’ The press also estimated his 
fortune at several hundred crores, but this could not be confirmed. 
What was confirmed to me by business people who knew him was 
that he was considered to be a man of considerable assets, that he had 
close connections with a local political leader and the local police, 
and that he was regularly seen socialising with a section of Kolkata’s 
business elite. When he appeared in court after his arrest, The Times 
of India wrote ‘In blue shirt, black trousers and boots, he looked very 
much a corporate honcho. He was seen exchanging greetings with 
family, friends and even other accused’ (Ghosh 2013a). According to 
his wife, he was not at all as the press was portraying him and he had 
nothing to fear because he had done nothing wrong. On the contrary, 
she said, he was a hardworking, honest and generous man regarded 
highly by business associates and colleagues, as well as by everyone 
who knew him.
However, his name came up in relation to several upmarket, lit-
igated properties in Kolkata. Appearing as the Director of 23 unlisted 
companies and the Managing Director of a listed export-import company, 
the broker’s ‘penchant of acquiring litigated properties seems unsur-
passed,’ claimed a reporter (Sen 2013). Even his own company’s head-
quarters were said to be co-owned by three persons against whom banks 
had initiated legal proceedings for an estimated INR 36 lakh default. 
The property in question appeared as only one among several litigated 
properties that he had gone after for a quick profit. As expressed by the 
principal’s lawyer dealing with the property case, legal tangles may put 
off an average buyer, but not this one, asserting that, ‘his modus oper-
andi is to acquire litigated properties in rich neighbourhoods in Kolkata 
at throwaway prices and make a killing by selling it later’ (interviewed 
on 8 June 2014). A female real estate developer (interviewed on 26 June 
2014) told me that she was fighting the broker in high court for a 16 
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katha property valued at around INR 20 crore that she claimed owner-
ship to and that the broker claimed to have bought for INR 36 lakh. She 
said she also used to develop properties (build apartment buildings and 
sell flats) in Kolkata but that she had moved her business to another, 
up-and-coming city in West Bengal. She said she had bought the prop-
erty in question in central Kolkata in 2002 and registered it to one of 
the three real estate companies that she owned. In her case, the bro-
ker took an interest in the same property and paid government people 
for new documents (a title deed in his name) and the Calcutta Electric 
Supply Corporation (CESC) for proof of residency (electricity bill issued 
in his name). When she received the bill, her name was no longer there, 
and she understood that he had paid off the electricity company for the 
service. She went to the local police station, but he had paid them off 
too and they were not interested in listening to her, never mind doing 
anything for her. She filed a court case and in 2012 he was arrested for 
false registration of property but was granted bail by the court after 45 
days in custody. She said that this is his business: litigating properties 
and making money on them. In five years, she claimed, he made INR 
300 crore on similar business deals, falsifying title deeds and other offi-
cial documents claiming ownership and making money on illegal sales. 
She mentioned one case where he had sold apartments in a building he 
claimed to be constructing. He even persuaded a journalist from Kolkata 
TV to buy an apartment, taking money for an apartment in a building 
that never materialised. For that project alone he was paid between a 
few hundred lakhs to 1 crore in rupees for each apartment sold. ‘A lot of 
people lost their savings and he is a big-time swindler,’ she said. ‘There 
are many operating like him, selling properties they don’t even own, but 
he is the worst,’ she claimed. She said he had threatened her on a num-
ber of occasions and even sent goons with guns to her apartment build-
ing. Security guards were present but when they saw the weapons they 
ran away. One time he even had her picked up by the police and arrested 
in public on false grounds. She came out of a meeting and was walk-
ing towards her car when the police arrested her: ‘He pays off anybody 
willing to take his money and help him get away with his scams’, she 
said, ‘including the police’. Instead of arguing with the police she had 
taken him to court, which is the only way – provided you have the best 
lawyers, she told me (with a little laugh). For the past 12 years, she had 
been coming to Kolkata every month to fight the case in court, which 
consumed a lot of resources. She even bought an apartment to have a 
place to stay whenever she had to appear in the high court and spend 
days at a time in the city.
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Legitimacy of the mastan raj
A journalist interviewed about recent urban developments said that land 
is scarce, particularly in Calcutta,15 because the city has not spread out like 
Bombay and Delhi. ‘We’ve not expanded and therefore what’s happened 
is that the value of even small plots has kept soaring because ultimately 
everybody is eying that property,’ he explained. Even for large develop-
ments, the associated infrastructure is not in place. Rajarhat, for instance, 
located on the North Eastern fringes of the city and part of the fast-grow-
ing planned satellite city of New Town, is considered by city people to be 
outside Calcutta. New Town mainly consisted of huge acres of cultiva-
ble lands and water bodies that has been developed into a new informa-
tion technology and residential hub. However, while this area could be 
developed in a planned manner because of government land acquisition 
policies under the leadership of the then Chief Minister of West Bengal 
Buddhadeb Bhattacharya (Communist Party of India-Marxist, CPIM) in 
the late 1990s, the present Trinamool government (from 2011) has prac-
tised a hands-off policy regarding land, preventing forced acquisition and 
adhering to the Urban Land Ceiling Act. Without large holdings, develop-
ments are small and, without government involvement, negotiating for 
land is left to the private market, which is presently pushing prices up – 
astronomically. Meanwhile, the present government is doing nothing to 
stop these developments, the journalist told me. What he was saying was 
that without government intervention and political ambitions to control 
development, it all comes down to money and power. In the city, he said, 
‘land is scarce and possibilities for making big money on land are limited. 
As you step out of the city, however, land values are increasing as the city 
is expanding. There you find the mafia, profiting from the booming real 
estate market by taking possession of land by force and making money on 
illegal land deals’.
Although largely undocumented except for some media coverage, 
Rajarhat New Town is seen as ‘an area notorious for its syndicate goons’ 
(Frontline, 3 August 2016). Less visible are the struggles over properties 
going on in the city, where land is scarce and development possibilities 
are limited, restricted also by the governments ‘hands-off’ policy enforced 
through the Urban Land Ceiling Act (ULCA). The ULCA was introduced in 
1976 with the intention of preventing the concentration of urban land in 
the hands of a few, preventing profiteering and seeking to ensure the equi-
table distribution of land for the benefit of the entire population (The 
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976). The Act prescribes the 
limit on vacant land in urban areas as 7.5 katha (one-eighth of an acre or 
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500 m2). Industry players claimed that this limit stood in the way of imple-
menting projects in the urban area and the government was put under 
pressure to repeal the Act. In 1999, the central government repealed the 
ULCA, prompting other states to rescind the Act. Gujarat, for example, 
followed the central government and abolished the Act, but West Bengal 
did not. In 2006–7, the CPIM-led state government made similar efforts 
but failed to convince its allies. Since Trinamool Congress came to power 
in the summer of 2011, it has been under pressure to repeal the Act but 
has made it clear that it will not reconsider its refusal to do so (Business 
Standard, 30 December 2013). In practice, the restrictions are seen to pro-
mote abuses of power, as expressed by the interviewed journalist:
In our city, a large section of plots around the EM Bypass, as you go 
towards the south, which is towards Gariahat, as you go towards 
that area, a large section is owned by somebody who is now a min-
ister in the government. Now, we have something called the Land 
Ceiling Act, which allows you to own, I think it would be not more 
than 7 kothas, but he has acres through benami properties, that 
means not in my name, but in my son’s name, in my niece’s name, 
my wife’s name or some other, even my employees, I raised the 
plots in their names. Some plots I don’t register at all. So when you 
have somebody like him, who holds a ministerial position and owns 
such tracts of land, what do you call him, a minister or a mafia? 
(Interview in Kolkata, 13 November 2014)
As this journalist says, even ministers are believed to hold land illegally 
and beyond government control. Even when cases are brought to the 
courts for mediation, there is no certainty when, or even if, a case will 
come to an end and be decided, due to the endless appeal system. A law-
yer friend told me that once in 1988 he had been in court to defend a case 
for a client. While waiting for his case to come up, he suddenly heard the 
judge shout, ‘Enough is enough!’ The judge, who was hearing a dispute 
case between a tenant and a landlord, told the tenant he was giving him 
six months to vacate the property. From 1952 he had been filing one peti-
tion after another. ‘Mind you’, he told me, ‘the landlord in 1952 had won 
his case in the supreme court, but to evict the tenant?’ They had fought 
the matter for 35 years and avoided the process of eviction. ‘So, for 35 
years he had remained on the property after the Supreme Court said to 
give it up, but that is the law’, he mused. According to him, the principal 
and her uncle could simply have used their position as tenants to stay 
on the property indefinitely. In that sense, the claimed ownership was 
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not important: under the Tenancy Act, if you sell a property, the tenants 
become your tenants. You cannot buy a property and say, ‘“Sorry, but 
that man sold the property and you have to get out.” You cannot do that,’ 
he explained. ‘You buy the property with the tenants. Should the uncle’s 
sale not be held valid, the property reverts back to the original owners, 
but both he and his niece would remain tenants.’ He continued:
Now, her rights flow from the fact that her mother had got this ten-
ancy 40 years ago. She had rent receipts from one family for this and 
from another family from this, the one room over here (illustrating 
on a piece of paper). [The uncle] had another room over here and 
he was also a tenant. Now, very often tenants buy out the property. 
That is what [the uncle] did, but as far as [the niece] is concerned, 
after her mother’s death, Mrs Sen transferred the property to her 
and made her the tenant. She has rights. You cannot throw a tenant 
out except by process of law.
But this is what is happening in Kolkata. The West Bengal Tenancy Act of 
1997 provides strong protection for tenants from eviction, and owners 
seeking to evict a tenant legally to repossess their property may end up 
in an apparently never-ending appeal process, as described above and 
seen in numerous other cases.16 In 2011, The Telegraph reported on a 
civil servant ‘locked in a seemingly endless legal combat with his tenant’. 
Ten years earlier, he had filed an eviction suit at the city civil court but 
‘thanks to appeals and countersuits filed by the tenant, the issue is now 
entangled in complex legal procedures’ (The Telegraph, 15 June 2011). 
As explained by the developer cited before, when they consider buying a 
property for development, they also have to consider the situation with 
tenants and the likelihood of reaching agreements and settlements with 
them, as well as with the owners. Also the lawyer in the school case said 
that if they wanted to develop the property they should have offered as 
much space in a new building as they were occupying in the old – but the 
buyer wanted the property to himself and they had to be evicted; oth-
erwise, the buyer was not interested. Even if the sale had been legal it 
would take years to establish that claim.
In some cases, even just the threat of litigation when occupying 
a property can be enough to force a settlement. The lawyer told of a 
case where a man had taken a flat by way of salaami (a type of long-
term lease),17 an agreement where he paid 8 lakh in advance to take the 
flat. He had just retired; the payment was made in cash and the amount 
was documented. They also signed a written agreement stating the 
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conditions and that he and his family were entitled to keep the flat for as 
long as he lived. Usually, if you are a salaami tenant you can transfer the 
agreement to someone else if you move out, in which case 33 per cent of 
the new salaami goes to the landlord and the tenant keeps the rest. In this 
case, when the tenant died, the owner of the property asked his family 
to move out and hand over the flat. By then, the salaami for the flat was 
believed to be between 60 and 80 lakh and the tenants asked the owner 
to pay them 50 lakh to move out. The owner refused, and the family told 
him that if he wanted the property back, he should settle or spend the 
next 25 to 30 years trying to get possession from the courts: appeal court, 
high court, supreme court, and after 30 years he may still not have suc-
ceeded. In the meantime, tenants will be present, occupying the property 
(original tenant and/or his descendants). ‘Wouldn’t it be better to settle 
outside court than hanging on for 20 or 30 years like that?’ the lawyer 
reasoned – and he is not alone in his way of thinking.
In suburban Kolkata, walled-in vacant plots of land bearing name 
signs and with just a guard or two watching are a common sight. Owners 
may be biding their time waiting for an acceptable offer to sell, dealing 
with potential builders to develop the property, or busy disputing prop-
erty rights. On every undeveloped land there is a risk of land grabbing 
or forceful takeover. In the story of The Godfather of Bangalore (Carney 
2008), it took a gang of marauders only a minute to overpower the guards, 
overrun the premises and paint over the name sign stating ownership. By 
the time the police arrived, the sign was just a memory and the attackers 
had achieved their goal. Thanks to the convoluted rules surrounding land 
ownership, the removal of the name sign throws the owner’s claim into 
question and the dispute is ‘no longer just a criminal matter of a gang of 
outlaws taking over a piece of ground; now it’s a civil issue that will have 
to be mediated in the courts. This kind of legal battle, with its near- endless 
appeal process, could easily last 15 years’ (Carney 2008). If the owner 
wants to develop or sell the plot during that time, ‘he’d be better off just let-
ting his assailants have the property in exchange for a fraction of its value’ 
(Carney 2008). According to my journalist friend, giving similar examples 
of land grabbing and forced takeovers in Kolkata, the land mafia clears the 
way and the legal system keeps it open. Even Kolkata’s wetlands, protected 
by multiple domestic laws and an international convention, are openly 
sold off in parcels to make space for high-rise housing, malls and offices.
What is happening, a very deadly thing, is that we have to the east, 
just beyond the Bypass, we have what is known as the East-Kolkata 
wetlands. It’s a Ramsar site. Ramsar is the international convention 
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for protection of wetlands, internationally recognised wetlands; 
it’s a UN convention. These wetlands are used for fish farms. You 
have these large water bodies, but they are not very deep, they are 
about 4 to 4.5 feet deep, and they are being filled up. You have fifty 
fishermen working over there. All you need to do is to offer these 
fishermen, who would earn maybe 50,000 rupees or one lakh in 
a year, you give them a 10 lakh rupees check. It’s a windfall. So, 
50 of them and 10 lakh each; 5 crore in total.18 Then you develop 
a huge building, containing 300 flats sold for 1.5 crore each. So it’s 
like that. That is what’s happening to the east of the city, but not 
only there… Behind Ruby Hospital, you also have this huge school 
called Heritage. That school is built entirely on wetland and that 
school’s owners have already acquired several water bodies in that 
locality. So they purchase the wetlands, drain out the entire water 
and build walls around in broad daylight. They do not seem fearful 
of anything and why should they?
If litigated at all, by the time cases are even brought to the courts (less 
still by the time the courts have reached a final decision) the land has 
been sold, developed and changed forever. Had the forced takeover of the 
school property gone as planned, the occupants would have been evicted 
and the property sold and developed into a luxurious villa or a modern 
housing complex. Sending in a group of goons, the mastan raj, can be 
an effective way of taking possession of a property when the police are 
either directly or indirectly involved, making sure nothing is done to stop 
the takeover in light of a court system taking as much as 20 to 30 years 
to settle disputes. People seeking justice are left waiting by the open but 
guarded door for the rest of their lives, like the protagonist in Kafka’s The 
Trial (Ferme 2013: 958).
Conclusion
As mentioned earlier, there have been and still are many building activi-
ties in Kolkata itself: large-scale complexes (housing, malls and offices), 
mostly on the peripheries of the city (Rajarhat New Town and lately 
around E.M. Bypass) but also centrally (South City), mainly built by 
well-known Marwari business families19 although not exclusively. The 
focus of this chapter has been on real estate ‘on the margins’ where, on a 
daily basis, properties are illegally and sometimes also violently captured 
and sold without anybody necessarily taking notice or doing anything to 
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prevent it from taking place. As has been seen in this chapter, the gov-
ernment is heavily involved through its functionaries, who regulate, doc-
ument, sanction, etc., as well as through neglect.
In 2016, under the headline ‘Shock to the syndicate mafia’, Frontline 
(3 August 2016) reported that Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina 
had called West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee on behalf of a 
friend in Kolkata ‘who was being harassed by Anindyo Chatterjee’ (sen-
ior Trinamool leader and Municipal Corporation councillor) over build-
ing issues. According to the magazine, ‘At long last Mamata Banerjee’s 
Trinamool Congress government in West Bengal has woken up to the 
increasing menace of the “syndicate raj”, a euphemism for extortion-
ists and other criminal elements operating in the private housing and 
infrastructure industries in the State. It has begun to crack down on the 
groups by arresting (as of July 26) 49 persons’ – including Mr Chatterjee. 
Concurring with what I was told by political commentators in the field 
(both former political activists and social scientists), the magazine also 
claims that the ‘syndicate raj’ took root during the previous regime under 
the Left Front, but while the Communist Party of India (Marxist), ‘with 
its structured and disciplined network of cadres had kept the syndicates 
in check and they were confined to certain areas’, syndicates have prolif-
erated all over the state since the Trinamool government came to power 
in 2011. The assumed growth of syndicates, the ruling party’s perceived 
links with criminal organisations and the way they have been allowed to 
carry out their operations have ‘made the Trinamool Congress practically 
synonymous with “syndicate raj”’.
When I was back in Kolkata in April 2017, this was a much-debated 
theme. It was generally acknowledged that the reasons for the growth 
and strengthening of syndicates are that they have funded and secured 
votes for the Trinamool and that they have provided a source of income 
to unemployed youth. According to the magazine, the decision to take 
on the syndicates came as ‘a bit of shock to the thousands of young peo-
ple and syndicate workers who have been the loyal foot soldiers of the 
Trinamool army and a pleasant surprise to urban middle-class voters 
who had all but lost hope of ever being delivered from the clutches of the 
syndicate goons’ (Frontline, 3 August 2016). The magazine also made a 
number of suggestions as to why the Chief Minister could afford to make 
such a decision at that particular time (including the party’s huge win in 
the 2016 assembly election and the weakness of the opposition parties, 
the desire to clean up the party’s image and win back the confidence of 
middle-class voters tired of being harassed by syndicate goons, and the 
ambition to be a key player in national politics) but also indicated that 
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the trend might not be forever, or even totally sincere, as there is much 
at stake, such as money and power. Frontline concluded that ‘It remains 
to be seen whether Mamata Banerjee, after consolidating her political 
supremacy in the State, will focus on good administration and continue 
to clamp down on the syndicates or stop with a token gesture of good 
governance by arresting some small fry’ (and by removing the small fry 
consolidating the bigger ones in a long-term plan to streamline this ille-
gal industry). And what are a few arrests anyway? All the people arrested 
in the school shooting case were out on bail within the first year after the 
incident where two young men were shot dead and, years later, the trial 
is still pending. In the meantime, they all go about their lives as usual, 
including the principal, who runs several educational centres in and out-
side Kolkata, teaching full time, and the broker, who continues running 
his real estate business much as before.
When discussing Chief Minister Banerjee’s position during my last 
visit, the general feeling was that she has little or no control over party 
cadre and administration. She may be able to call for a few arrests to 
be made, but do away with the syndicates? Besides, if syndicate bosses 
and members (or at least their political allies) are now in government, 
as widely believed,20 and courts can be managed, who or what is to be 
done away with, and how? Are we talking mafia and syndicates on the 
margin of the state or a state on the margin of law and order, of legal/ille-
gal? Following Gupta (1995), seeing the state ‘as an inherently translocal 
entity, which localizes itself in particular sites, and at particular times’ 
(Ferme 2013), enables it at the same time to be seen as legal/illegal, law 
and order/corruption and disorder, just/unjust, all at once instead of one 
or the other; boundary unmaking instead of boundary making, because 
it – the state – is not a coherent unity of ‘practices, documents, and words’ 
(Das and Poole 2004: 9). In this case, where the government ends and 
the syndicate raj/land mafia begins is difficult, if not impossible, to deter-
mine, and the terms mafia state or mastan raj appear as a suitable way of 
describing the practices explored in this chapter.
Notes
1.  I am greatly obliged to friends and interlocutors in India for making fieldwork possible and for 
sharing their lives and stories with me. I would also like to thank Lucia Michelutti and Barbara 
Harriss-White for careful reading and thoughtful comments.
2.  According to Liza Weinstein, property prices in Mumbai’s business districts reached record lev-
els in the mid-1990s, with the districts ‘becoming, for a brief period in 1996, the most expensive 
real estate in the world’.
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 3. For more on the social and relational aspects of recent urban property developments, see De 
Neve and Donner (2015).
 4. Special Economic Zones. For a critical view of SEZs in India, see Sampat (2008).
 5. For more on how capital accumulation has been made possible through the state’s role as land 
broker see Harvey (2003) and Levien (2012, 2015) on ‘accumulation by dispossession’; Batra 
and Mehra (2008), Dasgupta (2003) and Doshi (2013) on slum demolition and resettlement 
projects in Delhi, Kolkata and Mumbai; and Levien (2012, 2015), Majumder (2010, 2012), 
and Shrivastava and Kothari (2012) on farmers dispossessed of their land for SEZs and other 
corporate projects.
 6. Following Gardner and Gerharz, I am using ‘land grabbing’ according to its temporal associa-
tion; as imagery depicting land that is apparently ‘suddenly and violently seized’ (Gardner and 
Gerharz 2016: 6).
 7. For studies of mafia and OCGs in Italy and Russia, see Diego Gambetta (1993) on the Sicilian 
mafia and Federico Varese (2001, 2011) on the Russian mafia and mafia on the move (see also 
the Introduction to this volume).
 8. Like the distinction between state and civil society or, as in Partha Chatterjee’s case, state and 
political society (Chatterjee 2008), which is hardly observable in practice.
 9. South City is a 31.14-acre (126,000 m2) complex of buildings in Kolkata, India, construct-
ed between 2004 and 2012. It is situated in Prince Anwar Shah Road close to the Jodhpur 
Park and Tollygunge areas of the city. Most of the recent real estate developments in Kolkata 
have taken place in the E.M. Bypass area, New Town and Greater Kolkata, but the South City 
complex is located in the heart of the city. It features a residential complex, which includes a 
number of recreational facilities, as well as a school, hospital, shopping mall and social club. 
Filmmaker Ranu Ghosh made a documentary featuring the sacrifices made to build South City, 
Quarter Number 4/11, which is ‘a ground zero perspective of urban real estate development, 
as witnessed by director/cinematographer Ranu Ghosh and narrated through the plight of an 
ex-factory worker Shambhu Prasad Singh, a victim of this development in Calcutta’s South 
City, a residential complex-cum-shopping mall-cum-school for the wealthy. It is about one 
man’s lone, long, losing fight to hold on to his ground where he was born, grew up and earned 
his living. It is the narrative of a man who is being forced to evacuate his ground to make space 
for “development”’ (film synopsis).
10. By ‘jungle up with’ he means have trouble with later.
11. Lis pendens is Latin for ‘suit pending’ and is a written notice that a lawsuit has been filed con-
cerning real estate, involving either the title to the property or a claimed ownership interest 
in it. Recording a lis pendens against a piece of property alerts a potential purchaser or lender, 
as well as the general public, that the property title is in question, which makes the property 
less attractive to a buyer or lender. Once the notice is filed, anyone who purchases the land or 
property described in the notice and takes possession of it is subject to the ultimate decision of 
the lawsuit.
12. The Sundarbans are a mangrove forest area in the southern part of West Bengal in the river 
delta on the Bay of Bengal.
13. A katha (also spelled kattha or cottah) is a measure of land used in Bangladesh, India and Ne-
pal. It is still in use in much of Bangladesh and India, though the size connoted varies. In West 
Bengal 1 katha is equal to 720 ft2.
14. Estimates of the pay-outs varied, but one suggested that 65 lakh was paid in three installments, 
‘one of which was of INR 30 lakh on September 27, 12 days after the first failed attack on the 
property’. The senior officer claimed he only made INR 5 lakh and that the rest was ‘distributed 
among others’ (Times of India, 15 December 2015).
15. Calcutta was the official name of the capital of the Indian state of West Bengal until 2001, 
when it changed to Kolkata; the old name is nonetheless still in use.
16. Particularly to tenants paying less than INR 6,500 as monthly rent for residential premises in 
Kolkata (usually tenants who have stayed for a long time, even through generations).
17. Salaami or bhada salaami is a rental agreement where rent is paid in advance, usually in cash, 
and the lease is inheritable from father to son and does not have an expiry date. The rent is low 
because of the advance arrangement. Another word for similar practices elsewhere in India is 
pagdi (literally ‘turban’).
18. To get them out of the way and not to cause any trouble.
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19. There is something to be said about business and communities, and the fact that the big indus-
trialist who bought the school property in the case discussed earlier was a Marwari and the 
broker wanting to sue him was a Gujarati, but that is another story.
20. During fieldwork, I often heard statements similar to Frontline’s claim that ‘syndicate operators 
got the party ticket to contest civic elections and also got to hold key party and administrative 
posts’.
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Politics, capital and land grabs 
in Punjab, India
Nicolas Martin
Engaging critically with the concept of ‘political society’, this chapter exam-
ines the issue of land grabbing in Punjab, and focusses in particular upon the 
systematic small-scale encroachment on village communal land in a rural 
Punjab district. It shows how politicians often help farmers to continue occu-
pying village common lands illegally, doing so for electoral gains not neces-
sarily consistent with the logic of ‘the market’ or of capital. In these cases, 
politicians seem to be driven by political motives related to electoral calcu-
lations rather than solely by financial ones. However, the chapter illustrates 
how these clientelistic bargains ultimately serve politicians and local elites 
more than they do those facing the prospect of dispossession.
This chapter offers an ethnographic perspective on land grabs in Punjab, 
focussing in particular on processes of appropriation of village common 
lands in rural Punjab: land that should in theory be available for rent 
to the highest bidder and of which a third is reserved for members of 
the Scheduled Castes (SCs). I argue that the processes at stake are some-
what different to those emphasised in the growing literature on land 
grabbing, which focusses on how capitalist accumulation by elite interest 
groups dispossesses the poor (Whitehead 2008; Adnan 2013; Springer 
2013). This literature tends to draw on David Harvey’s (2004) notion 
of accumulation by dispossession and sees land grabs as the result of 
over- accumulated capital seeking new opportunities for profit. As such, 
it tends to focus on ‘land grabbing’ projects that displace thousands of 
villagers or urban dwellers in order to make space for Special Economic 
Zones or real estate developments (Adnan 2013; Levien 2011; Sampat 
2010; Cross 2014). In this chapter, however, I focus principally on more 
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routinised and small-scale processes around encroachment on village 
common lands in a rural Punjabi district. As Geert De Neve (2015) has 
argued, ‘large scale state-led land grabs and mass displacements do not 
form the only – and perhaps not even the main – form that [primary] 
accumulation takes in post-reform India’.
Partha Chatterjee (2008) has argued that in post-liberalisation 
India, politicians are more than ever subject to the hegemony of corpo-
rate capital; corporate capital flows rather than electoral mobilisation are 
increasingly dominating politics, he argues. This is because state-level 
leaders are competing with each other in order to attract the capital that 
is necessary to generate economic growth. Corporate capital is gradually 
pauperising small farmers, small shopkeepers and indigenous commu-
nities. Corporate land grabs are one of the many ways this is happening. 
The concentration of capital also means that large retail and agribusiness 
companies can put small shopkeepers and small farmers out of business 
through the use of economies of scale and/or loss-leaders which under-
cut their prices. Civil society and the judiciary, he argues, are complicit in 
these processes. The middle classes, as Baviskar (2011) also shows, are 
tired of the messy reality of electoral politics. For example: the world of 
politics is the reason why, in their view, urban landscapes are blemished 
with illegal slums. It is politicians who allow people illegally to occupy 
land because they obtain votes in exchange for favours. The middle 
classes want the law to be implemented and the slums to be cleared.
The ad hoc illegal arrangements that prevent squatters from being 
evicted are the defining characteristic of what Chatterjee calls political 
society. The sphere of political society is one that operates on the margins 
of or even outside the law; it is a sphere in which politicians circumvent 
or break the law in order to appease popular pressures. For Chatterjee, 
political society has the merit of, for example, providing slum dwellers 
with a place to live, even though it might not give them the secure legal 
rights to settle permanently. Were politicians to stick to the letter of the 
law, slum dwellers would find themselves on the street. As such, he has 
argued that what he calls the sphere of political society is in fact the prin-
cipal sphere of activity where resistance to capital and to primitive accu-
mulation takes place. Its main achievement is to prevent the dispossessed 
from turning into ‘dangerous classes’ who have nothing to lose and are 
therefore potentially revolutionary.
In this chapter however, I show how so-called ‘political society’ can 
also be complicit in processes of dispossession. The dynamics around 
land grabbing that I describe here – particularly in the case of village com-
mon lands in rural Punjab – bear the imprint of political meddling that 
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is informed by the prerogatives of electoral politics rather than, strictly 
speaking, those of corporate capital. But what this chapter shows – ech-
oing previous work (Martin 2014) – is that the ad hoc clientelistic bar-
gains characteristic of political society can overwhelmingly benefit local 
elites at the expense of subordinate social groups (Dalits in particular). 
Moreover it illustrates how the frequently partisan nature of clientelistic 
interventions means that they further benefit some people at the expense 
of others. This makes these interventions a cause for conflict and social 
division, and therefore prevents people from getting together in order to 
find genuine political solutions to protecting their livelihoods.
The material presented is based on 15 months of ethnographic 
fieldwork starting in 2013 in villages around a tehsil (sub-district) head-
quarters within Patiala district, together with some research in the urban 
tehsil headquarters itself. Much of the material presented is based on 
interviews with interested parties in a number of land disputes. Given 
the hotly contested nature of these disputes, and that everyone has their 
own version of events, I attempt to triangulate people’s different versions 
and points of view. I begin with the broader picture of land grabbing at 
the state and tehsil level and its relationship with politics, and then move 
on to examine three case studies of village-common land grabs. In these 
case studies, politicians often intervene in order to allow supporters to 
continue possessing village common lands illegally against the logic of 
the market – much like Chatterjee’s politicians who help slum dwellers to 
continue encroaching upon land that does not belong to them. Were ‘the 
logic of the market’ to prevail, this land would go to the highest bidder, 
and prices for the lease of village common lands would rise significantly. 
Based on these case studies I try to determine whether it is in fact, as 
Chatterjee seems to suggest, the poor and lower caste who most benefit 
from these interventions. Moreover, I examine whether and how these 
political interventions succeed in preventing the popular unrest that 
arises out of the dispossession that accompanies the expansion of capital 
in agriculture.
Shiromani Akali Dal: ‘Goonda Raj’ and property grabs 
in Punjab
During the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) party’s two terms in power in Pun-
jab, people frequently claimed that it had instituted a reign of goonda 
raj (thugs) that was just as bad as the one in Bihar under Laloo Yadav 
Prasad. People – even lifelong Akalis – frequently claimed that corruption 
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and criminality in the Punjab was at its worst. Everywhere people told 
me that tehsildars (revenue collector at the tehsil level), Block Develop-
ment Officers and police Superintendent House Officers (SHOs) were 
forced to provide tens of lakh1 every month to their local MLA. While 
this was nothing new – as Robert Wade’s (1985) work on the market 
for public office in India illustrates – people claimed that the extent of 
these exactions was unprecedented. In the tehsil headquarters, I mostly 
heard about police exactions. Transporters complained about incessant 
harassment. People also complained about an SHO nicknamed ‘Dabang’ 
because he acted and behaved like a gangster. One local transporter told 
me that Dabang had asked him to gift him a new motorcycle.
Many informants alleged that in the past corruption in the state 
happened only at the highest levels. Congress leaders in the state, they 
claimed, only took money from big business, whereas the Akali govern-
ment – then in its second term – took money from everyone. The party 
leadership allegedly had shares in every business in the state, from media 
outlets to dhabas (roadside restaurants) and bus services to commer-
cial property and industry. Businessmen who refused to pay tribute to 
the party leadership faced bureaucratic hurdles that caused their busi-
nesses to shut down. Police officers harassed transporters by asking them 
to produce documents that they were unlikely to possess. In the tehsil 
headquarters, the leader of the Tempu (light transport vehicles) Union 
described a protection racket whereby the Ministry of Transport issued 
SAD party membership cards that essentially gave Tempu drivers immu-
nity from police harassment. Cardholders paid INR 150 per month, which 
was allegedly distributed among local police officers who consequently 
let them go without checking their documents, and who even let them 
get away with transporting illegal liquor and drugs. Likewise, a lucrative 
dhaba might find that if it did not pay tribute, its licence might be with-
drawn, or that the police might discourage customers from patronising 
it by not allowing them to park near it. On a more sinister note, people 
claimed that the ruling coalition controlled organised crime in the state. 
The Congress-leaning English-language press in the state often reported 
on the misdemeanours of Youth Akali Dal (YAD) leaders. The YAD was 
essentially the strong arm of the SAD and was used to harass opponents, 
rig elections and, it appears, distribute drugs – principally bhukki (poppy 
husk) – to purchase votes during elections. A close relative of the Chief 
Minister controlled the outfit and there were widespread rumours about 
how he used them as a sena (private army) in his home constituency. 
Throughout the state YAD youths used their police immunity to settle 
personal vendettas and to make money through drug trafficking and the 
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capture of disputed properties. In 2013–4 one of the main stories domi-
nating the press related to allegations that the head of the YAD was also 
the lynchpin of the drug trade in Punjab. These allegations came to light 
after a notorious drug smuggler was captured and interrogated by the 
police (Sehgal 2014).
Moreover, the SAD politicians stood widely accused of involve-
ment in a variety of land grabbing schemes. One of the SAD’s manifesto 
pledges was to build motorways linking all major cities in Punjab. The 
process of acquiring land from farmers to build these motorways was 
murky, and well-connected Akali politicians were widely believed to 
have amassed significant amounts of money through it. The farmers who 
had to sell their land to make way for these projects felt cheated. There 
were stories, for example, about Akali middlemen buying land from 
farmers at low prices and then reselling it to the government at much 
higher prices (Vasudeva 2016). Farmers in one village alleged that influ-
ential people had spread false rumours to the effect that the middleman 
in question was going to pay them more than the government would be 
willing to pay. The rumours even suggested that the government might 
not give farmers any compensation whatsoever so that it was best to 
accept the middleman’s offer. There were also plenty of stories about 
land grabs around expanding urban centres. Land prices around cities 
such as Chandigarh, Ludhiana, Patiala and Bathinda have skyrocketed in 
recent years. There were stories about moderately prosperous Jat farm-
ers becoming  multi-millionaires because their farmland happened to be 
located in urban peripheries that were being incorporated into the cities. 
High land values led to a scramble for land located on these peripheries. 
I also read and heard about a number of cases in which politically influ-
ential people were alleged to have somehow managed – using both their 
influence and bribes – to register portions of village common land in their 
names and then sell it on to urban developers.
Land values in the tehsil headquarters where I carried out my field-
work may not have shot up to the same level as in Punjab’s major cities, 
but they also rocketed and were subject to speculation and disputes. The 
most notorious land grabber here was the president of the Youth Akali 
Dal, and a village Sarpanch (elected village headman). The young man, 
whom I will call Gurbachan Singh, started his political career during his 
college days when he was a kabaddi (a muscular Punjabi contact sport) 
player. During those days he proved his worth in several fights against 
rival student groups and eventually defeated rival contenders to the 
student union leadership. People who knew him from college days told 
me that he was always getting into fights and that he had already had a 
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number of cases filed against him back then. However, the feat that estab-
lished his notoriety was his capture and subsequent sale of a widow’s val-
uable urban property. The wealthy widow, from the Bania urban trading 
community, was being harassed by relatives who wanted to gain control 
over numerous assets, which included a bottling plant, several shops and 
a couple of urban residential properties. She asked Gurbachan to help 
her intimidate her relatives and he eventually moved into a wing of her 
house as her permanent bodyguard. The story goes that it was only after 
he had gained her full confidence that he turned on her. People claim that 
he managed to get her to put her large residence in the centre of town in 
his name; some claim that he did so through persuasion and cunning and 
others that he did so through threats. Gurbachan eventually took control 
of the property, kicked the widow out and then used it to host drinking 
parties before transforming it into a commercial property and selling it 
off for 3 crore. One of his relatives said that Gurbachan constantly had 
college girls visiting him there, and even that he started ‘providing’ girls 
to politicians and wealthy businessmen.
Speaking with lawyers I learned that while property and land grabs 
had always happened, the incidence had increased as a result of soaring 
land prices in the last 10 years. Everywhere people told me that up to 10 
years ago property speculation had been a comparatively muted affair; 
people mostly bought property to farm or to live on, not as a speculative 
investment. Many farmers told me that they regretted selling land back 
in the day when an acre of farmland was worth only 2 lakh, and others 
regretted not buying land when it was still affordable. Now an acre in 
rural areas is worth up to 40 lakh.
First the rise in land values brought in speculators from as far as 
Chandigarh. Being outsiders, some such speculators were allegedly 
duped by locals, in collusion with local government officers, into buy-
ing plots without the consent of the actual owners. Government officers 
in charge of verifying people’s identity would fraudulently attest that a 
person was the owner of a plot and wanted to sell it when the person was 
in fact just a dummy. The dummy would sell a plot that was not theirs to 
sell and then share the proceeds with the officers, while the actual owner 
and the buyer were left to fight protracted legal battles. A young man 
who had been involved in such a transaction told me that duped buyers 
rarely got all of their money back, particularly if the kabza group (prop-
erty grabbing group) was well connected politically.
Today it is more difficult to pull this sort of scam off because the 
government has introduced more stringent identity checks including the 
use of Aadhaar (ID) cards and photographs of the parties involved in land 
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transactions. While more difficult to carry out, fraud is nevertheless still 
possible, but according to people in the know it is now increasingly lim-
ited to large transactions involving huge sums of money, and for which a 
tehsildar near retirement might be willing to risk suspension and a pro-
tracted legal battle. The way it is now done is that people obtain other 
people’s land records, scan them onto their computers and then, using 
image manipulation software, replace the owner’s name with theirs. 
They then come to some sort of an agreement with the tehsildar, who 
will somehow enter the amended title into the system. The person who 
told me about this, a young man who earned his livelihood from disputed 
properties, told me that a tehsildar would do this sort of thing only for 
sums of money above at least 10 crore and that they would also generally 
only get involved in such a venture if they were close to retirement and 
thus in any case about to lose their job. He said that if a tehsildar man-
aged to pull this off, his earnings from the fraudulent transaction would 
far outweigh the potential loss of income due to being suspended as well 
as the costs of having to fight a protracted legal battle.
In urban areas today the most common type of property scam 
involves speculators with some political clout – such as Gurbachan 
from the YAD – investing in disputed properties. Here fraud is not as 
obvious, but muscle power and political connections are indispensable. 
Speculators buy disputed properties for a third of their value, sort out 
the dispute with the help of money and/or force, and then sell them off 
for their full value. Disputes most commonly arise when a tenant who 
has proof of long-term residence at a property refuses to pay rent and/
or vacate it. Because of laws protecting tenants it is difficult and in some 
cases even impossible to evict them. For this reason many owners try to 
prevent their tenants from accumulating proof of long-term residence, 
and many owners even try to keep their tenants’ electricity and water 
bills in their own names. In Chandigarh, the state capital, as throughout 
much of Punjab, many property owners would rather leave their prop-
erties vacant than lease them out. Moreover, the issue has gained politi-
cal salience because many wealthy non-resident Indians (NRIs) who live 
abroad in the UK, Canada and Australia are unable to regain possession 
of properties captured by locals – often relatives – in their absence.
The reason why investors in disputed property need some political 
clout is to be able to evict the people occupying the disputed properties 
they purchase. While some may accept money to vacate, many others do 
not. In these cases disputed property speculators need to use force, and 
for this it appears that some degree of complicity from the police, and 
the administration more generally, is required. Gurbachan of the YAD 
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appears to have this necessary support. Lawyers in the sub-divisional 
court complex tell me that while Gurbachan has a couple of cases against 
him dating from his student days, he had no cases registered against him 
during the Akali Dal’s tenure in government; he had the full protection 
of senior politicians in the party. In his lounge I saw pictures of him with 
very high-ranking leaders – who his relatives tell me call him on a regular 
basis – and with the local MLA and Minister, whom he regularly meets. 
Among the reasons why Gurbachan had political support were that he 
helped mobilise crowds for SAD rallies, he intimidated and harassed 
regime opponents and he captured ballot booths during local elections.
Rural land grabs
In many of the above cases, politicians and their intermediaries and cro-
nies were principally involved in land grabs for financial gain. The logic 
of these land grabs was that of capital. However in the case of village 
common lands, politicians facilitated small-scale land grabbing princi-
pally for electoral gain. The logic of these land grabs was therefore closer 
to that of political society: the sphere in which, according to Chatterjee, 
resistance to capital and to primitive accumulation takes place.
The issue of control over village common lands needs to be under-
stood within a rural context where politically-connected farmers, often 
associated with the state government, controlled village politics and were 
able to appropriate the greater bulk of government resources—including 
common lands—in their villages (see Martin 2015). They often did so at 
the expense of their village rivals aligned with opposition parties but also 
at the expense of the Dalits (or Scheduled Castes – SCs). As a result, con-
trol over village common lands was a highly divisive issue. And if political 
society and patronage benefitted anyone in this context it wasn’t the Dalits, 
those who formed the most disadvantaged sector of Punjab society.
Despite their rising independence and assertiveness, members of 
the SCs still do not wield significant power at state or village level in 
Punjab. SCs may have become less submissive and they may be flock-
ing away from Jat-dominated Sikh institutions and to deras;1 they may 
be pressing for a greater share of government resources (Jodhka and 
Prakash 2003) and they may be avoiding agricultural work under the 
command of exacting, dominant-caste Jat farmers (Gupta 2005). Yet my 
observations suggest that because they remain politically dependent on 
the dominant-caste Jats who control panchayats (village councils) they 
continue to be deprived of a wide variety of government entitlements.
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Most notably, politically connected Jats continue to control village 
common lands and also land that should technically be managed by Dalit 
cooperatives. The latter is known as Nazool land: land that once belonged 
predominantly to Muslim evacuees who left for Pakistan at partition 
and which was meant to be handed over to Dalit cooperatives. Jat-caste 
farmers often illegally occupy Nazool land. Farmers with political con-
nections – usually in the ruling party – have likewise captured the larger 
share of shamlaat zameen (village common land), including the share of 
it reserved for Dalits. Village common land belongs to villages as a whole, 
and village panchayats are meant to lease it out to the highest bidder in 
open auctions and on a rotational yearly basis. Decades ago, this land 
used to be used for grazing livestock. However, the growing demand for 
agricultural land has meant that it has gradually been turned over to 
growing Punjab’s staple crops: wheat and rice. The landless have, in the 
process, been deprived of land to graze their livestock, and fewer now 
own livestock (see Jodhka 2014).
Some villages have almost no common land, but others can have 
hundreds of acres of it. The money generated from the lease of this land 
is meant to go to panchayats to be used for village development projects. 
Villages with lots of common land should in theory generate significant 
income from it. A village with 200 acres should, for example, be able to 
generate up to INR 8 million per year. Furthermore, one-third of village 
common land is reserved for Dalits. This should in theory allow them to 
grow some cash crops or fodder for cattle. It should also provide them 
with opportunities to gather firewood, and also – if farmers deny them 
access to their fields – with a place to go to the toilet.
In practice however village common lands have tended to generate 
little income for villages, and both ordinary farmers and Dalits are rou-
tinely deprived of their rightful share in it. In some villages that I visited, 
village common land tended to generate little income because much of it 
was under the kabza (capture) of both rich and poor Jat farmers. In some 
cases the land had been under the kabza of a single family for decades 
and generated no income for villages at all. Such families felt entitled 
to the land because they had worked hard to improve it: levelling sand 
dunes, clearing scrub forest, and investing in tube wells for irrigation. In 
other cases it generated little village income because politically influen-
tial farmers were paying far below market prices to lease the land. I found 
that in a number of villages people were paying no more than INR 8,000 
per acre annually while prices for the lease of irrigated agricultural land 
in Malwa had reached an unprecedented INR 40,000. Moreover I found 
out that a black market in village common land had developed in at least 
 POLIT ICS,  CAPITAL AND LAND GRABS IN PUNJAB,  INDIA 249
one village. Village common land was being traded but at rates far below 
the market rate for private agricultural land since it was not possible to 
obtain legal ownership over it.
It was often the case that panchayats, in collusion with panchayat 
secretaries and senior politicians, failed to hold the stipulated kulli boli 
(open auctions) for the lease of village common lands. Sarpanches and 
their allies were able to encroach upon village common lands by holding 
these ‘auctions’ in the privacy of their homes without publicly notifying 
villagers. In practice this meant that only Sarpanches and their support-
ers were given the chance to make a bid. Dalits, but also farmers from 
rival political factions often found that they were denied the opportunity 
to lease village land. Senior politicians were often complicit to the extent 
that they failed to take administrative measures to redress the situation, 
particularly when it benefitted loyal party workers and supporters. As 
will be illustrated below, they also sometimes actively tried to prevent 
encroachers from being evicted.
In order to get around the provision that a third of the land was 
reserved for Dalits, Sarpanches used dummy candidates to make their 
bids. The dummies were often their own farm servants. Thus, on paper 
the land was allotted to a Dalit, but in practice it was that Dalit’s master 
who actually cultivated the land.2 Dalits did not always protest because 
they did not have the tools to farm with and because panchayats had 
failed to equip village lands with tube wells. This meant that only farm-
ers who owned tube wells on land adjacent to particular plots of village 
common land could actually cultivate it. During my fieldwork, Dalits in 
some villages that I visited blamed the government for failing to provide 
them with the equipment necessary to farm, and for failing to invest in 
tube wells that would allow them to irrigate plots of village land.
During fieldwork in 2013–4 many Sarpanches were involved in 
lengthy court cases aiming to clear village common lands of encroach-
ers. The ostensible aim of this legal procedure was to boost village 
revenues. The government had an interest in the process too, because 
roughly a third of the income generated was to go into state coffers. 
These cases were highly contested. The left-leaning Dakonda farmers’ 
union, for example, strongly opposed this clearance because it risked 
depriving farmers of land that they had improved and cultivated for 
decades – some since Independence. It also opposed clearing village 
common lands of encroachers on the grounds that the rule of the mar-
ket would dramatically raise the price for leasing village common land 
and would put it beyond the reach of ordinary small farmers who could 
barely make a living. Village-level Dakonda Union leaders also alleged 
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that the government was making way for corporate agriculture, although 
the extent to which this was the case was unclear. Pointing to a perhaps 
more immediate threat, they asserted that the policy did not necessar-
ily do away with the malpractices associated with village common land 
and that it was frequently implemented in ways that harmed the interests 
of those in the political opposition. The following three cases illustrate 
some of these dynamics, and also how politicians often protected some 
encroachers at the expense of others and thus ultimately hampered the 
emergence of a workable joint solution to the issue of control over village 
common lands.
Case I: Daroli
The case of Daroli illustrates how the issue of control over village com-
mon lands was a source of conflict and acrimony, and also demonstrates 
the role of politicians in exacerbating these conflicts and acrimonies. It 
illustrates how politicians, with their ad hoc interventions, could fail to 
effectively protect people from dispossession.
In this village, Kuldip Singh Kombhoz initiated the process of clear-
ing village common land of encroachers when he was Sarpanch from 
2008–13. He claimed to want to improve the 60 acres of common land 
in order to increase village revenues for development. However, his 
detractors claimed that he merely wanted to evict his political rivals from 
the land and redistribute it to his supporters. A local newspaper even 
reported that Kuldip had cleared village common lands of encroachers 
merely to replace them with his friends, relatives and supporters. He 
denied this, claiming that the newspaper in question had fabricated the 
story. They had purportedly blackmailed him by telling them that unless 
he paid them some money they would fabricate a negative story about 
him. Whatever the case may be, he was able to evict the encroachers who 
had taken hold of 36 acres of village common land in 2012. He was proud 
of his achievement, and claimed that thanks to his efforts the village had 
earned INR 1.2 million from its lands.
His policy had, however, proven to be highly divisive and in 2014 
villagers were reluctant to place any bids on village common land, 
because doing so risked antagonising those who had traditionally cul-
tivated particular plots of land but who had been evicted. The Dakonda 
Kisan Union had become involved on behalf of the farmers and its mem-
bers had clashed with the police when the latter had come to remove the 
farmers from the land they were occupying.
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Kuldip Singh claimed that the Minister for Panchayats and Rural 
Development had initially supported his initiative, but when the minister 
had seen that it might cost him party votes he had not only backtracked 
but also turned against him. He claimed that the minister had first started 
supporting the farmers by helping them obtain court stays that allowed 
some of them to remain in possession of the land for an extra year. He 
also claimed that the minister was in all likelihood responsible for the 
fact that the construction of an electrical line through the village com-
mon lands had been halted. Without electricity he would not be able to 
install tube wells on the land and village revenues from village common 
lands would not rise. This, he explained, served the interests of the farm-
ers because they would be able to continue renting village common lands 
at the lower rate for unirrigated land. He also claimed that the minis-
ter had once told the farmers that if he – Kuldip – continued to insist 
on the issue that they would give him a good beating. The minister had 
apparently said this during one of his meetings with his constituents at 
his mansion outside Patiala. Kuldip even claimed that the minister had 
encouraged the farmers to fabricate a case against him and supported 
them in the endeavour. So he was taken to court for allegedly building a 
part of his house on village common land. The case was spurious, and it 
failed, but it worsened village level animosities.
Balvinder Singh, the owner of four acres of land, confirmed that 
the minister had supported the ‘encroaching’ farmers, and helped some 
of them obtain temporary stay orders from the court. He and his parents 
and grandparents before him had cultivated five acres of village common. 
His grandfather had cleared the land of tibbas (sandy hillocks) and made 
the land cultivable. The land was irrigated with water from a polluted 
river that ran past the village, but he claimed that the dirt in the water 
meant that he did not have to use much fertiliser to obtain good crops. 
He rejected Kuldip’s claim to the effect that he was an encroacher. He said 
that he had always paid to cultivate the land but that he could not pro-
vide full proof of this because Kuldip, while he was Sarpanch, had never 
provided him with receipts for his payments. He had relatives who were 
close to the minister; they had got the minster somehow to intervene in 
the court case on his behalf, and he had obtained a stay order. However 
the minister’s intervention was merely ad hoc and temporary and he was 
eventually forced to vacate the land and forgo half of his income.
The issue of village common land polarised the village, and those 
who didn’t want to get embroiled in the conflict were reluctant to place 
their bids on land that others had improved and cultivated all their lives. 
The current Sarpanch was an SC who had obtained the post because it 
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was reserved. He told me that he did not want to get involved in this con-
tentious issue, and that as a Chamar he could not afford to antagonise 
anyone. It was a highly contentious issue because people’s incomes – and 
some people’s very subsistence – depended upon the village common 
land that they had encroached upon. One Jat whom we interviewed 
told me that the politicking of village leaders had ruined him. He had 
cultivated some 10 acres of village common land his entire life and now 
because of Kuldip he had almost nothing left. However, he also blamed 
the ruling Akali Dal for letting it happen and claimed that the minister’s 
efforts to help them obtain a stay order were not particularly helpful: that 
he had made a token gesture out of political expediency. The Jat owned 
only one and a half acres, which was not enough to live from. On top of 
that he was unable to work due to back problems and did not know how 
he would make a living.
Case II: Tullewal
The case of Tullewal likewise illustrates how the most senior local Akali 
politician ended up supporting encroachers because he feared the polit-
ical fallout that would result from evicting those illegally encroaching 
upon village common lands. Again, however, he ended up supporting 
one faction at the expense of another and thus contributed to further 
dividing the village into two irreconcilable camps. As in Daroli, he exac-
erbated village factional rivalries and thereby contributed to preventing 
villagers from finding a joint solution regarding the control and use of 
village common lands.
Harpal, the village Sarpanch until 2013, had initiated a judicial pro-
cess against encroachers and had managed to clear some 56 (of roughly 
90 total) acres of village common land. He had also managed to obtain 
six tube wells from the government to irrigate some of it. The process 
had, Harpal claimed, been expedited by the Minister of Agriculture and 
Rural Development. Harpal’s chief village rivals, Malvinder and his sup-
porters, had allegedly placed spurious corruption cases against him in 
response, because his actions threatened them. Malvinder had captured 
four acres of village common land and Sukhvinder – an ally and farmer 
union leader – had allegedly captured 13 acres. Despite his efforts how-
ever, Harpal was not able to have either evicted because the minister had 
prevented the police from doing so despite court orders. He claimed that 
the minister was ‘playing politics’ because he feared that by evicting them 
he would lose votes. He had become ‘frightened’ when he had seen that 
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the farmers’ union had gathered a large number of people in protest; he 
worried that it would cost him not only the support of the Tullewal villag-
ers but also that of the broader public, because news of the protests had 
come out in the newspapers.
Partly as a result of all the unrest caused by the clearing of the 
village common lands, Harpal lost the 2013 panchayat elections to 
Malvinder, his chief rival. Harpal had been very close to the minister, 
and he had many pictures to prove it, but the relationship had somewhat 
soured after the minister had started supporting the encroachers. Later, 
after Harpal had lost the 2013 elections, the minister started collaborat-
ing with Malvinder – and was doing so even though Malvinder was not 
a loyal Akali. He did so, according to Harpal, because that was allegedly 
the way of politicians: they knew no loyalties, and all they cared about 
were votes. Harpal, and five others who were there on one of the occa-
sions when I interviewed him, told me that Malvinder had held the lat-
est auction for village common land in the secrecy of his home. He said 
that Malvinder had bribed the Block Development Officer in order to do 
so, and that he had the support of the local Akali Minister. As a result, 
none of those present had been given the chance to place their bids and 
obtain some land. On the other hand, Malvinder and his friends had all 
obtained land and had secretly agreed to ensure that the leasing price 
for any plot should not rise above INR 20,000. Harpal complained that 
the panchayat should in reality be obtaining over INR 35,000 per acre for 
that land because almost all of it was now irrigated with the tube wells 
he had obtained from the government. Sukhvinder, one of Malvinder’s 
allies, seemed to give this latter claim some credence when he told me 
that he was paying INR 22,000 per acre. Moreover, Harpal claimed that 
Malvinder was technically banned from renting village common land 
because he was a defaulter: he had, over several years, failed to pay a sin-
gle cent for the four acres of village common land that he had cultivated. 
In order to circumvent this hurdle, Malvinder had entered the name of 
his Dalit farm servant as the new tenant for that land.
Sukhvinder and Malvinder obviously had an entirely different 
perspective on the issue. Both accused Harpal of initiating the clear-
ance of village common lands through the courts – not because he was 
interested in augmenting village revenues but rather because he bore 
a grudge against them as a result of their longstanding political rivalry 
at village level. They also suggested that if he was interested in increas-
ing village revenues it was merely in order to be able to steal more from 
the panchayat. Malvinder accused Harpal of gross corruption, and had 
placed a case against him for embezzling over INR 400,000 during the 
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construction of a stretch of road and some associated drains. Malvinder 
said that Harpal had stolen far more than that during his tenure but that 
he did not have the evidence necessary to take him to court for all of 
the corruption cases. The case against Harpal was successful at the tehsil 
level, and he was ordered to pay a INR 355,000 fine. But Harpal subse-
quently placed an appeal and was eventually exonerated.
Case III: Fatehpur
The case of Fatehpur likewise illustrates the socially divisive nature 
of political interventions in the issue of village common lands, and 
most clearly illustrates the extent to which the complicity of politi-
cians could benefit the few at the expense of the rest. The case is dif-
ferent to those of Daroli and Tullewal to the extent that in Fatehpur 
the clearance of village common lands was complete by the time I fin-
ished fieldwork in 2014. As a result of the implementation of public 
auctions, village common lands had become subject to market values 
and leasing them had become more expensive. This, as the Dakonda 
farmers’ union leaders had feared, meant that poorer farmers ceased 
to be able to lease village common land.
Legal disputes for control over village common land in Fatehpur 
started in 1986 when Nirmal Singh took Khem Singh to court for captur-
ing 86 of a total of 180 acres of village common land. Both Khem Singh’s 
rivals and his supporters told me that Khem Singh’s family had controlled 
that land for several decades thanks to their political connections, and 
had worked to improve it. Khem Singh and his two brothers only owned 
four acres of land, and it was widely agreed that they had been able to 
build a large house with all the modern domestic appliances and to pur-
chase two new four-wheel drive cars and also a new tractor thanks to 
their control over those 86 acres of village common land.
Khem Singh had been involved in court cases against Nirmal 
Singh and other rivals over this land for over three decades. Nirmal 
Singh, and a friend of his, eventually landed in jail for the murder of a 
woman who he had purchased some land from. His successor as faction 
leader, Naib Singh, alleged that Nirmal Singh was innocent and that 
it was Khem Singh who had set him up with the help of his police and 
political contacts. Despite the court cases against him, Khem Singh’s 
family had been able to continue cultivating at least some of the village 
common land and in 2013 he and others told me that he was renting 30 
acres at INR 20,000 per acre.
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Aligned with the ruling SAD, Khem Singh won the 2013 local elec-
tions. The previous Sarpanch had been a Dalit Mazhbi Sikh – aligned with 
the Congress party and with the Nirmal Singh faction in the village – who 
had not been able to complete his term because Khem Singh who had 
close relations with the local Akali leader had had him suspended. The 
Dalit Sarpanch had apparently performed the auction for the village com-
mon land in the privacy of an allied Jat farmer’s home without advising 
anyone but his own allies, and on a Sunday when none of the concerned 
block-level officials could attend. This blatant and blundering act – in the 
words of his own allies – got him suspended, and Khem Singh finished 
his term for him before going on to win the 2013 local elections. While 
not entirely denying that there had been irregularities in that auction, 
one member of Nirmal Singh’s faction said that the only reason why the 
Sarpanch was suspended was that he and his supporters were affiliated 
with the Congress party at the time of an Akali government. He claimed 
that there was always some ‘little irregularity’ in village common land 
auctions, but that the Akalis only turned it into an issue when it was 
members of the opposition who were responsible for these irregularities.
Once in power, Khem Singh was said to have performed village com-
mon land auctions according to the rules, and everyone who wanted to 
had managed to place their bids, but the cost of renting village common 
land shot up dramatically. One of Khem Singh’s supporters, an impover-
ished Jat who collected and sold milk, told me that he used to rent three 
acres of village common land but that he could no longer afford to do so. 
He had rented the land at INR 10,000 per acre, but the price had shot up to 
INR 45,000. Naib Singh cited the same numbers and told me that although 
he still cultivated village common land it had become too risky for him to 
continue to do so. If crops failed for some reason, he would make a loss. 
Various people told me that the rental price had risen so much that only 
the richest farmers could now cultivate village common land. One person 
told me that roughly since 2012, only 20 people cultivated village common 
land: all of them wealthy farmers. Prior to 2012, however, over 40 peo-
ple had cultivated it. Nevertheless, Khem Singh paid only INR 20,000 per 
acre while everyone else was paying INR 40–45,000 per acre. One of his 
supporters said that the reason for this was that the land in question did 
not have any tube wells on it. However, Naib Singh told me that the land 
did not have any tube wells because Khem Singh had intentionally avoided 
placing any on that particular area of land in order to be able to lease it 
at half the rate. But in fact, the land was irrigated because Khem Singh 
possessed two tube wells on his own four adjacent acres, and used them to 
irrigate those 30 acres. One person even alleged that Khem Singh was, in 
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fact, not paying any rent at all for 10 of those 30 acres, but there was – as 
with many of these allegations – no way for me to confirm this.
Some people also had mixed views about what Khem Singh had 
done with the money that was flowing into the panchayat’s coffers. The 
village was earning roughly INR 4.5 million from its village common 
lands, and Khem Singh had used this money to fix all the village gut-
ters and pave its alleyways with cement bricks. However, many of his 
Congress party opponents alleged that he was appropriating a share 
of the new revenue stream. They believed that even more works could 
have been carried out in that village with those revenues and that Khem 
Singh was undoubtedly taking a share. They claimed, however, that it 
was difficult for them to confirm their suspicions because Khem Singh 
kept the village panchayat records in his home. Local government regu-
lations stipulate that these records should be freely available for public 
scrutiny; in practice Sarpanches tend to keep them in the secrecy of their 
homes. Moreover, they claimed that no one was willing to place a Right 
to Information (RTI) request because people believed it would be futile 
and potentially dangerous. Futile because the Akali government would 
botch any investigation against a party loyalist; dangerous because the 
Akali government might help Khem Singh place fabricated and spuri-
ous police charges against those seeking to investigate him (see Martin 
2015, 2018).
Last but not least, there was further cause for acrimony because 
Khem Singh had allotted some village common land for subsidised gov-
ernment housing plots. This had given rise to yet another legal dispute 
because the land granted was almost entirely cultivated by Khem Singh’s 
opponents. These opponents alleged that Khem Singh had purposefully 
sought to harm their interests. They told me that they had proposed an 
alternative, ‘better place’ for those plots, but that Khem had insisted on 
putting them on land that they cultivated. In 2014, the plots were already 
demarcated and 11 persons had moved in and built houses. However, 
many people – mostly landless Dalits – were hesitant to move in and build 
their houses, saying that the legal dispute about the placement of those 
plots meant that their legal status was unclear. Those who had already 
moved in told me that they had not yet been granted land titles, and 
that without land titles they could not hook up to the electricity supply. 
Moreover, they complained that they could not defecate in adjacent fields 
because those fields belonged to the very Jats who had issued the legal 
challenge against those five marla plots.3 One Chamar woman told me 
that the Jats had hurled abuse at her and threatened to beat her and her 
husband up if they ever dared make use of their fields again.
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Conclusions
The first thing to emerge from these case studies is that political soci-
ety may protect some people from the expansion of capital, but not all. 
The context described is one in which politicians bend and break the law, 
often – but not always – for members of an already comparatively priv-
ileged class. Many of those for whom they bend, break or simply fail to 
ensure the application of the law are even very privileged. In this pro-
cess, the most disadvantaged – namely the Dalits – have been and con-
tinue to be deprived of their lawful share of village common land. The 
argument could nevertheless be made that these case studies illustrate 
how the operations of political society do, nevertheless, put the brakes on 
processes of accumulation by dispossession. Besides large-scale farmers, 
a number of smaller farmers were seemingly able to sustain their liveli-
hoods thanks to the fact that politicians didn’t press the administration to 
apply the law and evict encroachers.
As members of the Dakonda farmer’s union warned, and as villag-
ers in Khanpur confirmed, allowing open and market-based auctions for 
village common lands placed village common lands beyond the reach of 
all except the richest farmers. In other words, allowing the market to rule 
would contribute to the gradual expansion of capital and to the dispos-
session of petty capitalists.
The above case studies certainly suggest that there is some truth to 
the idea that the ad hoc arrangements of political society put a break on 
dispossession. However because of the frequently partisan nature of how 
this is done, it is a divisive practice that prevents farmers from getting 
together to find a solution to the issue of village common lands. In all of 
the three cases above, political interventions had benefitted one faction 
at the expense of another, and had contributed to exacerbating existing 
rivalries.
As I have argued elsewhere (Martin 2018), the Akali Dal governed in 
a highly partisan manner. It protected supporters, regardless of whether 
or not they were corrupt, and it harassed political opponents on the basis 
of both real and fabricated corruption charges and allegations. Thus in 
the case of Tullewal described above, the minister allegedly intervened 
on Harpal’s behalf to help him escape corruption charges. As already 
noted in the first section, accusations to the effect that the government 
supported its corrupt intermediaries were common. Gurbachan  – the 
YAD thug and Sarpanch discussed above – was, for example, widely 
believed to have full police cover for his activities. This became crystal 
clear to me when I saw him capture a polling booth in full view of the 
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police during the 2013 local elections. The police did nothing as he and 
his comrades barred Congress supporters’ entry into the polling station 
and then attacked them with sticks, swords and stones.
Other cases were perhaps less clear but accusations at the very 
least point to the fact that people believed that Akalis had impunity. In 
Fatehpur, for example, people believed that it would be futile to inves-
tigate Khem Singh for corruption because the administration would not 
be responsive. Some even feared physical harassment at the hands of 
either thugs or the police. When on the other hand people were opposed 
to the minister or to his party, they were harassed. In Gurbachan’s village, 
Congress party opponents who tried to resist Gurbachan’s capture of the 
polling booth ended up facing attempted murder charges. In Daroli, 
when Kuldip obstinately pursued the clearing of village common lands, 
the minister allegedly helped manufacture a spurious case against him.
As I have argued elsewhere (Martin 2018) such partisan political 
interventions in village affairs exacerbated village-level disputes and 
animosities. These interventions had the effect of fuelling and escalat-
ing disputes that may not have otherwise flared up. Everywhere, people 
told me that it was politicians and political parties that caused people 
to fight, and that made village life unbearable. An opposition Congress 
party worker put it this way:
Politicians don’t resolve disputes; they aggravate them. If someone 
asks me to help resolve some dispute, I’ll approach the opposing 
party and try to engineer a samjhota (compromise). An Akali party 
worker will, on the other hand, use his power to get the police to 
bring charges against the opposing party and, as a consequence, the 
parties will never speak to each other again.
What consequence did political meddling have for farmers’ prospects of 
finding a workable solution to the issue of control over village common 
lands? In this context, the effect of the ad hoc political meddling – char-
acteristic of political society – was to keep farmers fighting each other 
and trying to kick each other off village common lands, not to ensure 
that all of their livelihoods were shielded from the expansion of capital. 
Lack of unity meant that – in the end – farmers were sometimes unable to 
resist the clearing of village common lands. The process had been com-
pleted in Khanpur and the Akali minister’s attempts to obtain a stay order 
and to stop the police from evicting encroachers in Daroli was merely a 
stopgap measure.
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Finally, I would like to suggest that there is a sense in which these 
ad hoc measures to facilitate illegal encroachment were in fact ultimately 
exploitative. Both politicians and Sarpanches could exploit the legal 
uncertainty of these arrangements for electoral gain. The case of the five 
marla housing plots in Fatehpur clearly illustrates how this worked, and 
how the precariousness of extra-legal arrangements could serve to cre-
ate semi-captive vote-banks. Khem Singh had granted people land over 
which there was a legal dispute, meaning that the possibility of putting 
those plots in their name was uncertain. Members of the opposition 
Congress party faction had mounted a legal challenge to keep control of 
that particular area of village common land because they had been culti-
vating it for decades. A number of villagers asserted that Khem Singh – in 
collusion with the MLA – had purposely put the prospective plot own-
ers in this precarious position, claiming that if he had given them secure 
land titles he would have had no guarantee that they would vote for him 
the next time round. As it was, however, Khem Singh could claim that it 
was his opponents who were preventing the SCs from getting the housing 
plots, and that their only chance to secure their property titles was by 
rallying behind him.
A similar dynamic seemed to underwrite the capture of village 
common lands. People aligned with the local Akali minister and his 
local allies were more likely to be able to continue illegally controlling 
and cultivating village common lands than were members of the polit-
ical opposition. The latter were the ones most frequently evicted from 
village common lands while those with government support seemed able 
to maintain their grip on village common lands even when they paid little 
or nothing to cultivate them.
However, their hold over that land was contingent upon the con-
tinued good will of Akali politicians and upon the latter’s willingness to 
prevent the Ministry of Panchayats from taking action against them, and 
even upon Akali politicians’ willingness to hold the police back when 
courts had ordered their eviction. Were they to suddenly start opposing 
the SAD by joining – for example – the Congress party, their semi-legal 
hold over village common lands would likely be subject to sudden legal 
scrutiny. In other words, the legal precariousness that is an intrinsic part 
of informal arrangements in political society allowed politicians to hold 
citizens to account for their political loyalties and even arguably for their 
electoral choices.
So even if politicians did sometimes help to put a temporary brake 
on accumulation by dispossession through ad hoc and clientelistic 
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favours, they were at least partly responsible for the lack of an adequate 
solution to the problem of village common lands. Ultimately however it 
is important to keep in mind that they were crucial parties to processes of 
accumulation by dispossession. The literature on land grabs cited above 
shows that in Punjab – as in other states in India – it is politicians who 
are brokering land deals for local and international corporations. This 
is particularly true in the context of post-liberalisation India, where – as 
Kanchan Chandra (2015) has argued – state-level political corruption 
revolves around brokering land deals for big money. As indicated at the 
outset, it is also often politicians themselves who are involved in acquir-
ing land – through occasionally dubious means – for their own purposes.
Notes
1. Frequently non-denominational religious institutions centred around holy men.
2. This, and the capture of Nazool land, led to the emergence in 2013 of a movement called ‘Zam-
een Prapti Sangarsh Committee’ in the district of Sangrur. The movement seeks to ensure that 
Dalits obtain their rightful share of village common land and that Nazool land is handed back 
to them. More ambitiously, the movement also hopes to reduce the ceiling on landownership 
to 10 acres.
3. One marla is roughly the equivalent of 25 square metres, but marlas have been defined differ-
ently in different periods and regions of the subcontinent.
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The politics of contracting 
in provincial Bangladesh
Arild Engelsen Ruud
This chapter explores Wild East forms of criminal economies by investigating 
tender and contracting processes and the roles of the media in contemporary 
provincial Bangladesh. Here, the ‘mafia’ is described as a syndicate of mas-
tans (enforcers) that work in collaboration with local politicians and police. 
This mafia syndicate controls certain local resources: milk, sand, shrimp 
farming, real estate, bus routes, infrastructural contracting and a host of 
other business opportunities. In Barisal an extractive system that feeds off 
government budgets is revealed. The chapter confirms the complexity of legal 
and formal procedures that surrounds local criminal political economies. 
Without law, crime does not pay. The complex contract and tender system 
that is uncovered is marked by rules and counter-rules whose manipulation 
helps to cover, hide and camouflage illegal activity.
Introduction
This chapter explores the elaborate system of mutuality, services and 
networking that helps to extract funds from the local state in provin-
cial Bangladesh. While factories and industry are the main vehicles for 
money generation and rent-seeking in the capital and in the textile hubs 
of the country, in the provinces it is the local state and its financing of 
local infrastructure that performs this role. In this system contractors and 
contracting play a vital role in the networks and operations that centre on 
the major politicians in the region.
One of the main drivers behind this system is the cost of everyday 
politics and election campaigns. There is no legitimate source of funding, 
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and yet the demand is huge. As a university professor who was running 
for parliament in a district just north of Dhaka explained in some detail:
In this constituency the population is four lakhs. We have more 
than 200 villages, hamlets and markets that need to be covered, and 
then the town. In each village or neighbourhood I need a group of 
activists. They need material, a stall, tea and food, money for their 
mobiles, money for petrol, then the mikes and the platforms, and 
the activists need rented offices. I need to travel to each campaign 
stall, and to Dhaka, I travel with my advisors and my protection. 
And buses for big meetings [to transport the audience].
He then went on to explain that if his rival has mastans (goons) he would 
need some too. A little later in the conversation he hinted that he was 
prepared and had an armed group of some 20 to 25 mastans. In addi-
tion to the various running costs he mentioned, there was the election 
campaign itself. A campaign will consist of speeches in front of as large 
an audience as possible: as large as the local activists have managed to 
mobilise. Then there are the walkabouts, shaking hands with as many 
people as can be reached. But behind the stage, and just as important, is 
the reputation that you as a candidate create through lending your assis-
tance to anyone requesting it. Individuals or representatives will ask for 
your intervention: the owner of a small private school needs an official 
certificate; the local shop-owner association has a problem with a band of 
criminals; a group of villages has been asking for a better road for years – 
and on it goes. As a prospective MP seeking votes and support, you need 
to convince everyone that you have the contacts and the means to solve 
such problems. To be successful in politics, you need not only money but 
connections too. My interlocutor continued:
I don’t have money. I am a university professor. So how will I get 
money? I get money because people help me. Business people. They 
give me a car to use, money for petrol, they organise buses, some-
one gives me one lakh, someone else two lakhs. And someone ten 
lakhs. And if I am threatened, my toughs will show my power. With 
all of this, I show off how efficient and useful I will be. (Interview, 
Narsingdi town, September 2006)
Money is necessary in politics, both to run a campaign and to operate 
in a way that will satisfy your extensive network of allies, the goons and 
so on that you must hire for intimidation and protection – and to ensure 
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you are re-elected. As Jha has pointed out (see the Introduction to this 
volume), the absence of public funding for political parties in India has 
created a situation whereby illegal money is procured through backroom 
deals. The situation is no different in Bangladesh (Jahan and Amundsen 
2012; Amundsen 2012; Chowdhury 2013). The university professor run-
ning for office had been involved with his party for many years and knew 
what he was getting into. He hinted at the web of debts that he was accru-
ing and that would need to be repaid later: ‘They are businessmen. They 
invest’, he said. In addition, goons are required in local politics, to fight 
off your opponents’ goons but also to intimidate the recalcitrant business 
owner who will not pay, and to protect those who will.
This web of debts is a straightforward intermeshing of politics and 
business. Another way that business and politics join hands is in the con-
venience of business for people in politics. A business operation helps 
finance their political engagement. ‘As a politician’, a former student 
leader turned businessman explained, ‘you depend on people who per-
form tasks for you – your henchmen, your mastans, your associates, the 
corruptible police officer who has arrested one of your men’. To feed the 
constant need for more money, the easiest and most legitimate way to 
obtain funds is to have a business operation. A business operation may 
generate money, but even if it does not it allows you to hide a variety of 
incomes or mask illicit transactions as business deals. Moreover, the rela-
tionship between politics and business also works the other way around. 
A student leader-turned-businessman explained that ‘As a businessman, 
you will need to be involved in politics because you will need protection, 
you will need contacts in the right offices, and you will need influence 
over government decisions – such as permits. So, you need to be involved 
in politics.’ This need to be involved indicates a deeper engagement, an 
entanglement (intreccio; see the Introduction to this volume). We will 
return to this a little later. For now we note that this close collusion of 
business and politics is not a marginal phenomenon in Bangladesh. Four 
of every five MPs in the 2014 parliament described themselves as ‘busi-
nessmen’ (Liton 2015). The number rose from 63 per cent in the preced-
ing parliament and 51 per cent in the 2001 parliament.
This chapter is about the nexus of money and politics in Bangladesh 
and draws material from Barisal, a provincial city in the south.1 In this 
nexus more or less stable yet competing networks encompassing criminal 
gangs, local political elites, the local police, legitimate enterprises and 
businessmen (mostly contractors) and government officers have formed 
to usurp the flow of government funding. These are all ‘men in the mid-
dle’ in Nikita Sud’s terminology, intermediaries performing different 
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and necessary tasks for the whole (Sud 2014). In the specific business 
of contracting in provincial Bangladesh, the central character is the local 
politician and his network of intermediaries of various kinds. The system 
revolves around contracting for local government works, mainly con-
struction works, but also involves ‘items’ such as permits and licences, 
and every so often a request to the police or government office to turn 
‘a blind eye’ to certain aspects of a business operation. Increasingly, the 
system has also come to include the local media, which is more a political 
tool than a political watchdog. This chapter investigates these networks 
and how they enable this distribution of money and influence.
The collusion of muscle, money, activist politics and political party 
hold over the state machinery has combined to create a perpetual self- 
serving regime that benefits the local political and economic elites. In 
some ways the nexus of politics, criminals, bureaucrats and business forms 
a pax mafiosa. It is generally accepted that political power over the state 
apparatus, including the police, is solid in Bangladesh. The term ‘partyar-
chy’ has been used to characterise the near monopoly of power that the 
ruling party enjoys (BRAC 2006). The collusion with business and crimi-
nals is less explored in the literature but hinted at in the proportion of MPs 
who identify themselves as businesspeople and, for instance, in the use of 
crime and violence as tools in student politics (see, for example, Andersen 
2013; Ruud 2014; Klem and Suykens 2018). The nexus of politicians and 
businesspeople has clear similarities with what Varese (Varese 2011) calls 
‘mafia’ – that particular situation in which a criminal and violent group 
enters into tacit agreements with members of the state. The killing of crim-
inals and undesirables by the police would be typical of a pax mafiosa state 
and in Bangladesh the number of deaths caused by so-called ‘crossfire’ by 
police or RAB forces is high and heavily criticised (Human Rights Watch 
2011). As the editors of this volume point out, criminal bands seeking 
profit in collusion with elected officials, the police or other members of the 
state can be found in much of ‘middle’ South Asia. Moreover, in South Asia, 
including Bangladesh, the term ‘mafia’ has come to denote business enter-
prises with political protection that monopolise certain trades through 
extra-legal means. In this sense a mafia is different from a pure criminal 
band. A South Asian mafia is a syndicate of mastans who work in collabo-
ration with local politicians and police, and this syndicate controls certain 
local resources: milk, sand, shrimp farming, real estate, bus routes and a 
host of other business opportunities.
The term ‘consociational mafia-owned democracy’ (Armao 2015 
coined for Latin America, Italy and other places is used to denote a 
regime based on cooperation between politicians, entrepreneurs and 
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muscle. However, much of the literature on armed criminal enterprise 
has been developed using material from Latin America and largely por-
trays criminal gangs as autonomous actors who enter into deals with 
political actors. But in provincial Bangladesh muscle is not an independ-
ent force. Even a generation or so ago, in the violent and chaotic decades 
following the bloody and disruptive war of liberation in 1971, armed 
groups were only rarely autonomous. Most of these groups functioned as 
the armed wings of political parties or as extensions of the reach of indi-
vidual local bosses (see, for example Jahan 2005; Ahmed 1984). Even 
in the democratic if conflictual 1990s and early 2000s, violent groups 
functioned as an appendix to politics – seeking protection as payment for 
performing services, all the while being allowed within limits to manage 
their own turf and income sources. Their patron-bosses (for the concept 
of bosses, see Michelutti et al. 2018) were almost invariably active play-
ers in the political field, and using armed gangs was subject to political 
calculation and manoeuvring (even if the hired gun often proved to be a 
loose cannon).
Thus, in many ways the situation in provincial Bangladesh is the 
reverse of Armao’s ‘mafia’: instead of the criminals controlling part of the 
state for profit, it is the politicians controlling the mastans and the police – 
for profit and, above all, to continue in power. Other ‘members’ of these 
provincial politico-business syndicates are activists, contractors, bureau-
crats and others. In short, the regional political economy is a clientelist 
state, where power is exercised through congeries of  relations between 
businesspeople, politicians, criminals and the police. At the centre, the 
politician-bosses act as CEOs of multi-pronged business enterprises 
(Ruud and Islam 2016). In the clientelist state formation of provincial 
Bangladesh, a number of smaller and larger syndicates operate in com-
petition with one another, each ‘managed’ by local leaders. In the local 
political landscape it is these political leaders who are the strongmen, 
the predatorial big fish, the bosses – referred to mostly as neta (leader), 
sometimes as ‘godfather’.
In their struggle to build and maintain power, these bosses rely on 
associates, including contractors, criminals, bureaucrats, police officers 
and political activists. Each needs to be kept happy and prevented from 
jumping ship and joining a rival syndicate. In addition, the local polit-
ical landscape is such that among the many rival syndicates are poten-
tial allies. These, too, need to be kept happy; in local political parlance, 
this is referred to as ‘balancing’. This balancing resembles the informal 
governance system in Russia that Ledeneva calls sistema and that, in her 
words, is about personalised power networks that ensure the distribution 
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of government largesse, privileges and kickbacks. Sistema is ‘linked to 
patrimonial rule and traditional forms of governance’ (Ledeneva 2013, 
1136). Whereas Ledeneva’s Russian sistema is a national system that cen-
tres on a crucial figure in the middle, the system in provincial Bangladesh 
is decentralised and elaborate. The party leader and Prime Minister may 
be powerful at the national level but in provincial cities the power radi-
ating from Dhaka is not felt acutely. The local landscape does not feature 
any particular dominant figure that represents Dhaka, or one single dom-
inant network. As noted above, the local political landscape consists of 
a range of political leaders, contractors, newspaper editors and bureau-
crats who together form crisscrossing networks of mutual benefit and 
antagonism – balancing. Fissures within the ‘PGP’2 constitute central ele-
ments in this environment and create the conditions that make balancing 
possible and necessary.
The term ‘balancing’ is used in local political vocabulary to denote 
the intricate play of actors in these large, shifting networks. The English 
term is used to describe the efforts local leaders engage in to maintain or 
enhance their position through alliance building. This may entail allying 
with someone from a rival political wing or party, or compromising one’s 
ideology orientation, reputation or even moral standing. The informal 
and behind-the-curtain negotiations take place in private, in the back-
room, at one another’s homes, on the phone or, in the case of Barisal, at 
the exclusive Barisal Club (see, for example, Piliavsky 2013). Balancing 
is a complex and continuous game at several levels. When in power, you 
can be inclusive and welcome rivals and potential allies, or exclusive to 
the extent that you rely much more on the local administration. But the 
local bureaucrats may be playing their own game and seek to influence 
your decisions with a view to life after you have fallen from power. Being 
involved is also risky, as any blemish on your reputation can be exploited 
later on by others – netas – in search of a favour or a media reporter in 
search of a story. Having a tarnished reputation is a mechanism central 
to the system, where a service received constitutes a debt. The exposure 
to legal vulnerability that involvement in deal-making entails is recreated 
into suspended punishment (Favarel-Garrigues 2011) by leaders who 
act as benevolent patrons. Legal vulnerability is essential to becoming 
an insider, while the suspended punishment ensures continued loyalty 
to the patron.
These large, elaborate and informal enterprises, these syndicates, 
have operations that are often illicit or straight-out illegal. Even close 
collaborators do not know all the different activities of the network or 
even who the other members of these informal networks may be. But 
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they do not need to. What they need to know is that the CEO-neta can 
get the job done: ensure the contracts, the deals, the permits and the 
acquiescence.
This chapter is an investigation into politicians and contractors in 
provincial Bangladesh making deals to extract funds from the local state. 
Whereas the struggle over government resources 20 to 30 years back 
tended to be violent, it has increasingly turned into ‘soft’ crime, with 
violence as a lingering threat that has receded into the shadowy back-
ground where it is used sparingly and is largely managed by the police 
forces. This chapter suggests a shifting focus from violent crimes to soft 
crimes, i.e. the criminal life of legal commodities – here, the allocation 
of government contracting works. This was made possible by the coun-
try’s significant economic growth as well as the official and World Bank-
supported decentralisation policy over the last three decades. More and 
more money was available locally from the central government’s alloca-
tions and from international development agencies, and implementation 
relied on local administrative processes and local contractors. These new 
tools and opportunities changed the game. Politics became about money 
and positions from which to influence its flow.
Provincial Bangladesh: Barisal
The politicians and contractors portrayed in this chapter are all born and 
bred in Barisal and are part of the city’s elite. In a city of some 400,000 
inhabitants, these are the rich and powerful, including the city’s mayor, 
MPs, major party leaders and business leaders, and often all of these 
rolled into one and the same person. These are the publicly known bosses. 
For example, when Kamal was mayor the municipal building displayed 
on its wall a huge poster of him, several metres tall, as a younger man. 
Now that the Awami League is in power, since 2014, posters featuring 
local strongman Hasnat pictured alongside the Prime Minister and the 
father of the nation, Mujibur Rahman, are ubiquitous.3 Over the last few 
years photos of Sadek, Hasnat’s son and possible heir, have also begun to 
appear, mainly in the streets around the central party office. When Hiron 
was mayor, his photo was everywhere, while BNP strongman leader 
Mojibur Rahman Sarwar’s photo is on all BNP posters. Lesser figures do 
not appear on posters so often, with the exception of election posters. 
These main bosses are very public figures, even if they do not appear in 
person in public. Hasnat, in particular, is known to be reticent (and is the 
MP of a neighbouring constituency).
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Less publicly known figures also belong to the elite and form part 
of the syndicates that feature below. They amass money through inti-
mate contacts with decision-makers in government positions. Some of 
them are contractors, others business leaders; some are political activists 
and others are relatives. Provincial Bangladesh is the country’s equiva-
lent of ‘Middle India’ (see Harriss-White 2015). These are the provincial 
outskirts of the country’s growing and increasingly globalised economy. 
Bangladesh has 16 to 18 provincial towns, each with a population of 
2–700,000, and around which much of the countryside’s economic life 
revolves. These provincial towns service a rural hinterland with their 
retail shops and bazaars, in addition to housing the district adminis-
tration, sometimes a local university and usually the district hospital. 
Industrial output in these towns is generally very limited. They are also 
crucial to the country’s political system as most members of parliament 
and the powerful district secretaries of the ruling party belong to the 
provincial rather than metropolitan parts of the country. Barisal, in the 
south of the country, is a good example of this kind of provincial town.4 
Its industrial sector is confined to a few textile mills and some metal pro-
duction for local consumption, and, although the retail business is vast 
because the city services a large rural hinterland and coastal communi-
ties, this sector consists mostly of small businesses and shops. The turno-
ver in this sector is limited, according to informants, as is profit. Beyond 
this the city has a moderate-sized port and also houses the administrative 
apparatus of the district and the division.5
It is the local government that constitutes the largest source of 
money for local entrepreneurs. Barisal City Corporation has a limited 
budget, and most of the money is tied in salaries and other fixed expenses. 
Tax revenue is also limited, so almost all of its budget comes from fixed 
state allocations. After salaries and other regular expenses are deducted 
there is practically no money left. Funds for any development work and 
most maintenance work have to be found outside the tax income and 
fixed state allocations. The most common sources for such funding are 
project funding from government ministries and departments, and some 
international development organisations (UN organisations, the Asian 
Development Bank, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), 
and others). These sources allocate funds mostly for individual projects 
such as sports stadiums, feeder roads, hostels and school buildings, 
street lighting, drainage, water supply pipes, municipal buildings, etc. 
In order to obtain funding, city corporations and municipalities apply to 
ministries or approach foreign donors with their plans. This application 
process involves outlining one’s needs and an estimated budget, but it is 
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very much a process that involves negotiations, networking and lobby-
ing. The city mayors are involved, along with the councillors, the local 
MPs and other officials and political leaders. To be successful a city needs 
to exploit whatever contacts it has in the relevant ministries or depart-
ments. This lobbying is a significant part of the job for elected represent-
atives at the various local levels and demands considerable skill. Local 
elected representatives spend much of their time in the capital. As a con-
sequence, elected leaders are central to the money flow into provincial 
towns; securing funds is how local politicians show their worth. The next 
step is to find a contractor willing to take the job and help the politician 
finance his or her politics.
Tender politics and licences
A good entry point into the role of political leaders is the practice of allo-
cating projects using tenders. There are aspects of the tender system for 
bidding for government jobs that have been designed to prevent cheating 
and ensure a fair process. There are two main kinds of tender calls: the 
open tender system and the direct tender system. The direct tender is for 
smaller jobs, often local jobs or for urgent works. ‘When we learn that the 
Prime Minister will come in two weeks to some function, we must repair 
that road or paint this building’, an official said. In such cases, there is no 
time for extensive tender calls and bids. The officer in charge will find a 
contractor or company they trust to be capable of doing the job satisfac-
torily and within the time available. To cite a typical example, a friend 
of mine was approached by a Medical Officer to obtain a particular kind 
of machinery for blood analysis for a government hospital. My friend, 
 Manik-bhai,6 had in his wide network an acquaintance who imported 
medical equipment and who could expedite the job. Manik-bhai himself 
also had a reputation for efficacy: ‘It helps to know someone, to have a 
good reputation’. Typically, a Chief Medical Officer or a Chief Engineer 
can allocate jobs or purchases worth up to BDT 5 lakh and the contractor 
will be entitled to a certain percentage.7
The other type of tender, open tender, is used for larger works. 
There are rules for which jobs can be given directly and which jobs need 
to be advertised. Very large projects advertised as open tenders are 
increasingly announced online, as a result of Bangladesh’s emphasis on 
e-governance. However, this is mostly the case in Dhaka or for very large 
projects on a national scale which would not be directed out of such a 
small place like Barisal. In provincial towns tenders are still on paper. 
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They are advertised in the local newspapers, the specifications are avail-
able on paper from government offices, and the submission of the tender 
must be put in a particular, physical box in a government office (or in 
some cases in one of several boxes).
There are many problems with these boxes, which is why donor 
agencies have insisted on e-governance. ‘Tender politics’ is a favourite 
source of income among party activists of the youth or student wings of 
the PGP. It consists of ensuring that only bids that are of interest can be 
submitted. The common practice is to place one’s mastans in front of the 
office where the tender box is placed to prevent unwanted bidders from 
placing their bid. This is very common (Ruud 2010). In February 2015 
a national newspaper reported the following incident that took place in 
Barisal:
The activists of Bangladesh Chhatra League and Jubo League 
clashed in Barisal city yesterday, each group trying to drive out the 
other during the submission of bids for a BDT 10 crore infrastruc-
ture development work in three upazilas [subdistrict].
Eight people were injured, including local photojournalist 
Suhad of the daily Kaler Kantha, when police and Rapid Action 
Battalion used batons to stop the hour-long fight.
Executive Engineer of Local Government Engineering Depart-
ment (LGED), Barisal Md Ruhul Amin Khan, said submissions were 
invited on December 31, 2014 for the BDT 10 core project, involving 
construction of roads and culverts, and yesterday was the deadline.
They were engaged in fist fights and pelting each other with 
projectiles. BCL city President Md Jasim Uddin, and General Secre-
tary Ashim Dewan took part in the clash, the witnesses said. (Daily 
Star, 5 February 2015)
Interestingly the two organisations involved, the Chhatra League and the 
Jubo League, are both organisational wings of the same ruling Awami 
League party. Typically all those involved deny that anything untoward 
happened. The Sub-Inspector of the police station said that ‘no such 
unpleasant incident occurred’; the party leader allegedly involved did 
not answer his phone, a student union leader said no one from his party 
was involved and the executive engineer said he knew nothing about the 
incident.
In order to ensure such incidents do not happen and to avoid the 
process being manipulated in this fashion, police officers can be posted 
next to the drop-box. The decision on whether to post the police officers 
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lies with local officials who, in many cases, will find themselves under 
pressure from local politicians. Few officials will be able or willing to 
withstand pressure from local politicians. Another requirement in the 
process is that the bidder hold a licence. These licences can be obtained 
by applying to a government office. But few in Barisal seem to know 
exactly what the requirements are or which office to approach, and the 
obvious reason is that these details do not matter. Licences can simply be 
‘borrowed’. People who have licences but are not using them might lend 
them or be coerced into lending them to someone else. A former contrac-
tor in Barisal explained the business of the licences. When I spoke with 
him he had retired after several decades as a relatively successful entre-
preneur in the construction business, and was running a small medical 
store in the centre of the city in addition to devoting much of his time to 
his religious life.
Once I had 14 licences. But when I left the business, the political 
leaders of the ruling party began to ask me to give them the licences 
so that they could get the work order or contract in my name. 
This created so many problems for me that I have cancelled all my 
licences except one. That one I have to keep because of tax author-
ities. But to keep it I have to pay some taxes because I lend it to 
political leaders [when a licence is used a tax is automatically due]. 
MPs borrow the licence saying that their brother will take the job.
The journalist through whom I had made contact with this somewhat 
reticent retired contractor told the same story rather differently: ‘They 
force him to let them use his licence. For many years they have been forc-
ing him.’ The people who make use of his licence are former associates. 
They are well connected politically. He knows that they can create much 
trouble for his medical store if he does not comply. In general, he does 
not lose money from this and they cover his taxes. But he is asked to sign 
papers and every now and then he is required to appear at meetings and 
on occasion even in court.
The politics of bidding and of subcontracting
There are of course dozens of tenders every year for municipalities and 
several dozens for larger city corporations such as Barisal. In order to 
prevent the undue influence of force or intimidation, a number of meas-
ures are regularly implemented to ensure that the bidding process is 
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done in a transparent and accountable manner. For instance, the selec-
tion committee will have a large number of members, representing both 
the administrative and the elected wings of the local government, includ-
ing technical staff. Boxes where the paper bids are to be deposited are 
placed in more than one office and, if needs be, police officers are posted 
to guard against activists. Moreover, as a general rule, the job should be 
awarded to the lowest bidder. And, as another general rule, in order to 
ensure real competition, there must be at least three bids for each job. 
If three bids are not received, a higher authority may decide to award 
the work discretionally but normally the job will be re-advertised to a 
wider audience. One important condition of the general rules has to do 
with quality. It is important that the bidder can ensure quality and this 
requirement puts extra emphasis on paperwork. References, bank state-
ments and audit reports need to be enclosed with the bid. The licence too 
needs to be enclosed. A senior officer in the district administration said 
that the system is foolproof, but does not work:
We put the boxes [for the bids] in different places, we place police 
to watch over the boxes, we appoint a committee of many people, 
we grant the job to the lowest bidder, all to ensure that no irregu-
larity occurs. But it does not help: the contractors negotiate among 
themselves before dropping the bid.
It is a very simple move. When work is advertised, a senior contractor 
explained, the contractors will sit down together and negotiate among 
themselves.
The man who will do the work will give the other participants of 
the bidding an amount of money. As the tender has been nego-
tiated [beforehand], there is no competition. The contractor can 
place a bid for a higher sum of money than he otherwise would 
have been able to. Through negotiations the contractors reach a 
sum that is then shown to the government [the work is allocated, 
and eventually] money is released. The political leader who nego-
tiates the tender takes a chunk of money for that. The political 
leader, such as the mayor, needs the money, although he may also 
be thinking of the quality of the works.
Sometimes the officials are also involved: ‘The officials who make the 
estimates and issue the work order in favour of some contractor, they too 
will take a portion of the allocated money’.
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The actors engaged in negotiations beforehand are aware of the 
need to adhere as closely as possible to the formal requirements of the 
tender process. There are two elements to this process. The first is iden-
tifying the players involved. Someone will take an initiative, a contractor 
for instance, and he will invite others to talk. Some will be his old allies, 
and others people he will need. A neta is also invited or may hear of the 
initiative and will want to weigh in: ‘I will send my man to help you’ – as 
if the friendly gesture was without ulterior motive. But as one of the con-
tractors said, ‘If you do not have political power you cannot drop the bid’. 
In the negotiations the neta’s agent will lay out the conditions on which 
the bid – any bid – will be successful. The second element is for the others 
to agree on a deal. The need to adhere to the formal requirements is clear, 
and hence at least three bids will be submitted. It is cumbersome to have 
to re-advertise and go through the entire process again. Besides, it delays 
the distribution and the work by months and possibly a year. Because 
there must be three bids, there will be three bids. As one minor contrac-
tor with good political connections said, ‘If there had to be a hundred 
bids, there would be a hundred bids’. But above all, at that early meet-
ing they will agree on who should submit the lowest and hence winning 
bid. The two other bids will be higher, and not serious: The contractor 
concluded that ‘… if we agree that you should get the bid, then you will 
get the bid. To cheat the system is very simple.’ As an official in the city 
corporation explained:
Say there is a job, and it is worth one crore. The three of us are con-
tractors [indicating himself and two friends]. We agree that I will 
get the job. So my bid will be BDT 1.1 crore. And his and his will 
be 1.3 crore, 1.4 crore, like that. No one else will be allowed to bid. 
Naturally I will get the job. And some of the profit I will give to them.
This is the bottom line: the profit is shared. A contractor who had taken 
part in many such negotiations and deals explained that the sharing is 
decided on before the bids are submitted, and that occasionally political 
leaders and chief engineers are part of the deal.
Say there is this 1 crore job. The chief engineer will say it is a 1.1 
crore job and that is how it will be advertised. The contractors will 
get together, you and you and me [pointing to the three of us in the 
room], and we decide that I will do the job. So I hand in a bid of 1.3 
crore. You hand in a bid of 1.4 crore, you 1.5 crore. 1.3 is the lowest I 
can go, but because it is the lowest I will get it. You get 10 lakhs [0.1 
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crore], you get 10 lakhs, and the chief engineer gets 10 lakhs. Then 
the political leader gets 20 lakhs. And I do the job so I will have 30 
lakhs. So how much remains? Fifty lakhs. That is how much [the] 
job will be done [for]. Even less!’
I asked him how money is handed over from one person to the next. He 
said smaller sums of 10 or 20 lakh may be handed over in cash or in an 
envelope – ‘Openly!’
In some cases the neta or his right-hand man is directly involved in 
the negotiations, and in other cases the neta is himself a contractor and 
negotiates with the others. But whoever submits the lowest and win-
ning bid will depend on the assistance of other contractors and entre-
preneurs. Much of the job and sometimes the whole job is passed on to 
others, as subcontracting. The winning contractors are often not real 
contractors and even if they are they are not entrepreneurs. They rely 
on good contacts both with real contractors, who will be able to write 
the bids and do the actual job, and with politicians to be selected for 
the job. Submitting a tender entails complicated and technical paper 
work which requires specialised knowledge. Tender invitations are 
often quite detailed and the contractor submitting a bid for the contract 
needs to be quite specific when meeting both technical and financial 
requirements.
These hurdles are easily circumvented, however. I was a little sur-
prised that Manik-bhai, whom I met sporadically over the years, could 
submit bids for complicated construction works, including feeder roads. 
In 2014 this had become his main source of income as a contractor – 
and he claimed to have a turnover approaching 1 crore per year. When 
I first met Manik-bhai some years earlier he had been a student leader 
not particularly interested in his studies (international relations). He 
had no education in engineering or management studies or anything 
else that might have been remotely relevant to a later career as a con-
tractor. What he did have was many years of experience as a student 
leader. ‘What about the technical details?’ I asked, ‘and the certificate 
and auditing?’ But he never bothered about these matters: ‘No, no, I have 
someone who does that for me, someone I work with’. Contractors do 
not necessarily own the machinery required for mixing cement or laying 
the tarmac on a road, and very often they do not even have any experi-
ence with the particular work. In order to construct a building or a road, 
they hire in expertise or machinery in different fields. Subcontracting is 
a common feature of contract work all over the world. The speciality in 
Bangladeshi Subcontracting is to let the entire job be done by someone 
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else. ‘Sub-contracting in the Bangladeshi sense’, said a medium-scale 
contractor in Barisal, ‘means that you buy the work order from the con-
tractor who got the work’. Subcontracting is particularly interesting 
when it comes to building alliances and maintaining networks and ties. 
Projects are invariably distributed among contractors who are politically 
connected. Some of the contractors are political leaders themselves. If a 
contractor gets a major job, he is expected to share with his colleagues. 
An elderly contractor explained that when a tender is awarded to some-
one, ‘then the contractors who did not get the work … will come to you 
and tell you to give them a share’. The obligation to share is generally 
accepted. It is a matter of mutual benefit and understanding, and consti-
tutes a tradition that has evolved over time: ‘Next time it is you who will 
need to ask me for a small sub-contract’. The elderly contractor continued
The contractors also have associates in the [government] offices. 
And the offices take care of contractors who have not received any 
commission for a long while. We contractors maintain good rela-
tions among ourselves to maintain our position. Some contractors 
may be solvent and have good personal relations to important lead-
ers, but not all. Normally contractors do have relations with politi-
cians. And some contractors are party men … . But for the others 
it is not difficult to get work because you can purchase work from 
other contractors who do get jobs.
Often the subcontracting is negotiated and agreed before the bid is 
handed in. There is the practical side to subcontracting, which has to do 
with expertise, equipment, etc. But there is also the mutual support. The 
senior contractor claimed there are samaj (associations of contractors) – 
and that there is an element of solidarity among contractors (for the role 
of identity, family and dynasties in shaping these il/legal economies see 
Singh and Harriss-White on coal (Chapter 1) and Michelutti and Martin on 
caste/clans (Chapter 6 and Chapter 9)). If a contractor is down on his luck, 
others may help him by giving him subcontracts, it was claimed. However 
active these loose associations for mutual benefit among contractors may 
be, they constitute webs of relationships that stretch to include members 
of  the administration as well, from clerks to high-ranking officials and 
medical officers or engineers. At the centre is the indispensable political 
leader who can influence the awarding of the contract. He will have his ear 
to the ground and will know that other contractors are getting together to 
bid for a particular job. He will smooth the process for a certain percentage 
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but he will also ensure that his allies are awarded subcontracts. Maintain-
ing that web of relations is the neta’s main job; it keeps him in in a position 
of power and enables him to exercise that power.
Veiled violence
There are many stories about violence marking a distinction between pol-
iticians on the one hand and criminals on the other.
I gave up the business about 20 years ago. In those days politicians 
did not control the tender business in the same way as they do 
today. In those days terrors [using the English word, in the sense of 
people who instil fear, violent extortionists and criminals] extorted 
money after we got government jobs. We feared violence and so we 
paid them.
The extortionists did kill people, but most narratives of murder in Barisal 
tell of associates being killed or the extortionists killing one another 
rather than the contractors or political leaders being killed. ‘The netas 
often used muscle power to control the tenders and contracts’ informants 
say. Both business people and political leaders maintained a number of 
armed retainers in order to further their interests, to extort, or to protect 
themselves and their investments, in particular machinery at building 
sites. So to some extent it seems to have been a matter of hired goons 
being killed by other hired goons.
There are several stories of people being killed, including one that 
revolves around the large Barisal contractor Gulzar and his brother 
Mehedi. Mehedi was known as a bit of a rogue, a ‘terror’, and was close to 
Kamal, the city BNP president at the time. At some point in 2006 Mehedi 
was killed ‘in crossfire’ by RAB, the elite police force. This was the first 
‘crossfire’ incident in Barisal. The term crossfire refers allegedly to a 
shootout between the armed forces and criminals, but more often than 
not it is the extra-judicial killing of known criminals or other undesira-
bles (see Human Rights Watch 2011). It is alleged that Sarwar ordered 
the killing, to get rid of a troublesome mastan and send a strong signal to 
his political and business rivals.
A significant change over the years is that violence has become 
less visible. In the old days individuals could be hunted down and killed 
at night. Sometimes there would even be a dramatic hunt through the 
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backstreets with shots fired from illegal firearms and the next morning 
a bloody body would be found in the gutter. Or perhaps individual busi-
nessmen and their families received threats, as the elderly contractor we 
met above put it:
For example one day your daughter comes from school and says 
someone on a motorcycle has followed her. And you look out the 
window and see them. They are just standing there. Two, three 
men, smoking. After a while they go away. Then you pay.
As murder and bodies in the gutter have become rarer, ‘disappearance 
has become more common’. When a goon disappears, no one really 
knows whether he has been paid off and gone into hiding or if he has 
been killed and dumped somewhere at sea. The general consensus seems 
to be that when the body is missing it is probably a disappearance. Stories 
of someone encountering ‘the disappeared’ later on confirm the notion 
that not as many people are murdered now as in the past. One such story 
is that of Rafik. He was the right-hand man of a BNP-affiliated contractor, 
but after a few months of tension between this contractor and a rival, also 
in the BNP, Rafik suddenly disappeared. This weakened his employer and 
the employer and his rival put their differences aside. My interlocutor 
told me, however, that he had met Rafik in Chittagong many years later: 
‘Is it you, Rafik? Yes, it is I. And we talked for a while’. When dealt with 
properly, disappearances can be as effective as murder in terms of estab-
lishing a reputation or weakening a rival. To avoid the sullying effect of a 
police investigation, bothersome mastans can be got rid of using the law 
enforcers themselves. One such case is the story of the disappearance of 
Sarwar’s right-hand man.
Santu was a mastan and a youth leader. He was known to be violent 
and very efficient. He was an important part in Sarwar’s set-up because 
of his efficiency and because he helped maintain Sarwar’s reputation as 
someone not to be crossed. However, during the 2007–8 caretaker gov-
ernment, Sarwar was put in prison and Santu lost his protection. One 
evening he was picked up by RAB, the elite police unit. The same evening 
and over the following days, his friends and fellow party activists went to 
the RAB offices looking for him. RAB denied any knowledge of his where-
abouts. He was never seen again. The inside story, which is common 
knowledge, is that it was Sarwar’s rivals in the party that took advantage 
of Sarwar being in prison to get rid of his right-hand man. They allegedly 
paid BDT 25 lakh to a RAB officer who organised the arrest and killing. 
Allegedly three intra-party rivals of Sarwar were behind the plot.
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There are violent pockets in Bangladesh still today, such as the city 
of Narayanganj or the port of Chittagong. But Barisal and most other 
places are comparatively peaceful because violence no longer serves a 
purpose. Local politicians have figured out that negotiations and deals 
are a better mode of operation than mastans and violence.
Nowadays none of the main party leaders wants to be involved in 
clashes. To be associated with clashes is bad for their reputation. 
Today the media is very important. If they are in clashes, the media 
will report this and the voters don’t like it. So, all leaders nowadays 
try to avoid clashes. Nowadays, vandalism is no more than break-
ing some windows of some buildings. Previously clashes could be 
deadly.
This development is linked to the new media landscape in Barisal and the 
country. Even newspapers with political leanings find it impossible not to 
report on violent clashes. The emergence of a new and privately owned 
mediascape after the 1990s changed the game of politics. It shifted to 
a new arena, with new rules, and now violence has become less inter-
esting to the ambitious. In the more mature and media-saturated era of 
contemporary Bangladeshi democracy, a clean reputation untainted by 
disruptive activities plays a larger role. And thus ownership of newspa-
pers becomes interesting. But while the new media landscape has helped 
bring down violence as a political weapon, it has expanded the field of 
deal-making by bringing in more actors and opening new opportunities 
for the adventurous entrepreneur.
The provincial mediascape
The provincial mediascape has changed tremendously over the last few 
decades and has influenced the practice of politics considerably. In the 
1980s there was only one local newspaper, and although the national 
dailies had local stringers, and still do, national reporting on provincial 
matters is sparse at best. However, from the 1990s onwards the number of 
local dailies rose and in 2014 it stood at 15. The majority were relatively 
simple, comprising a four-page-long single sheet of folded paper, such as 
Barisaler Katha, Satya Sangbad, Bhorer Alo, Ajker Barta, Dakshinanchal, 
Matabad and Paribartan. The quality of print was not particularly good, 
with only one of the local papers, Ajker Barta, printed in colour (‘The 
only colour newspaper in Barisal’ was in fact its slogan).
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This large number of dailies could easily be mistaken for an active 
mediascape, but an old-school journalist and former reporters’ associa-
tion activist dismissed them all as dhaincha (weeds). He also pointed out 
that in spite of the lack of industry and big businesses able to fund papers 
through advertisements, etc., provincial Barisal still featured this large 
number of newspapers – each with 10 to 15 or more reporters, photogra-
phers, subeditors, office staff and offices.
But it is as an extension of politics rather than as an independent 
news source working outside politics that this mediascape has grown. Two 
decades ago there were incidents of political leaders threatening reporters 
with imprisonment and violence. This has changed and the local media 
has become an extension of political deal-making. Newspapers are often 
owned by political leaders or contractors. One of the main political figures 
of Barisal, Hiron, was behind the four-page Dakshinanchal. Hiron earned 
money as a contractor and was an active political leader who became 
the mayor of Barisal and then went on to become an MP. He had plans to 
establish another newspaper when he died prematurely in 2014. Another 
interesting illustration of the business–politics divide is the city’s ‘only 
colour newspaper’, Ajker Barta, owned by Kazi Babul. In the 2000s this 
was the largest local paper. Its editor was a contractor formerly aligned 
with the BNP when it was in power and then with the Awami League as 
power shifted. His son and wife had also been involved in the BNP, the 
wife as a councillor, the son in the youth wing, but both later shifted to the 
Awami League. Both son and wife ran their own newspapers, and the son 
dabbled as a contractor and was known as a terror. He ran a brothel and 
had had bombs thrown at his house. He regularly carried a gun, which he 
showed me with some pride. Both father and son used their newspapers as 
a ‘shield’, according to a local journalist, to protect their unorthodox busi-
ness careers, political alliance building and private lives.8
Newspapers were versatile tools in the hands of contractor-editors, 
used to protect themselves and forward the interests of their allies. The 
curious thing pointed out by this local journalist was that the majority of 
the local papers did not pay their reporters. Instead, reporters were given 
ID cards identifying them as reporters and the opportunity to have their 
material printed in the newspaper if approved by the editor. Apart from 
this potential income, most reporters were left to fend for themselves. 
They earned their money, a retired reporter said with a smile, ‘in their own 
ways’. Mostly they received payment from whomever they chose to write 
about in the paper. This Bangladeshi version of ‘paid news’ is so common 
that all government offices have funds set aside for ‘media money’.
 THE POLIT ICS OF CONTRACTING IN PROVINCIAL BANGLADESH 281
The organiser or the office or the organisation behind an event has 
an allocation for the journalists who cover it. After the event the 
journalists are paid a certain amount of money. It could be 5000 
taka [in total], and it is distributed among those present. TV jour-
nalists get a greater share and local journalists a little less. The 
money is only given at the end of the function. In the meantime the 
journalists gather in a corner and wait. You may wonder why they 
are not leaving after the speeches but they will wait until they have 
received the money. One hundred taka, two hundred, three hun-
dred, or a larger sum for them to distribute among themselves. The 
money is mostly given in envelopes, but quite openly. No shame.
When the money has been handed over and the amount is deemed good, 
the journalist will publish the report, with a photograph; the report will 
be phrased in a neutral tone or given a positive spin. But if the sum was 
insufficient, the news story might be published with a different twist. It 
may be a smaller report, on one of the inside pages, possibly without a 
photo, possibly with a quote from rivals.
Another significant source of income is ‘blackmailing’.
They find some problem or irregularity, and then they talk to the 
person who is to be blamed with whatever error or fault they have 
unearthed. This person will then pay the reporter and the editor 
money in order to save his social standing or respect.
Such information is potentially rewarding. Reporter and editor will often 
choose to sit on it until the person accused is informed (allegedly so as to 
offer a ‘right to respond’). To have allegations of serious misconduct pub-
lished even in a small local newspaper can be detrimental to a political 
career because such stories are quickly picked up by larger newspapers 
or even national dailies. In 2014 a case was filed by the national Anti- 
Corruption Commission (ACC) against a minor contractor for substand-
ard quality work done at the Barisal docks. I read the news in the national 
press and asked a local reporter why this was not in the local press. ‘That 
contractor is not the main villain’, he said.
The main villain is Shamsul [a contractor], who got the job and 
subcontracted. But Shamsul is a friend of all, including my editor. 
We will not run the story. No one here will. And where will be the 
proof? The man accused by ACC will pay a fine, that’s it.
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Only on rare occasions are allegations against major political leaders 
published. Mostly the neta and the editor will reach an agreement, or the 
editor may decide that the story is not worth the risk. ‘You do not publish 
such stories. Not against people in power’, said one editor. Smaller lead-
ers or low-ranking officials may be targetted, but again they mostly come 
to an understanding rather than having their names brought into the 
limelight. The volume of corruption cases and deal-making in provincial 
towns such as Barisal may be very high, but the number of reports in the 
numerous local news media is correspondingly low. Occasions for black-
mailing individual leaders are hard to come by, of course, because the 
proof of malfeasance is not something people will talk about. Nonethe-
less, there are numerous occasions for allegations and suggestions, and 
these might be sufficient to prompt the media personnel and the officials 
in question to work out a relationship sufficiently generous to maintain 
the number of newspapers and reporters.
Balancing
Although the number of incidents of violence has reduced considerably in 
Barisal politics and contracting business, the threat still lingers. And there 
are many other forms of use of force, mostly hidden. A political leader 
may demand money directly from contractors, irrespective of any bid-
ding. A contractor who needs to stay in the good books of a party leader 
will pay up (the term often used is ‘donate’) or at least try to. A contrac-
tor who had had years of dealings with city politics, including with the 
strongman, former MP and former mayor Sarwar, put it like this:
So Sarwar will call you one evening. He will say, “I need four lakhs”. 
With more words, better words. Sarwar is very persuasive. He will 
not demand money from you, he explains his needs. Then you offer 
to help and he is grateful. “I will send my man over tomorrow.” So 
you manage to get hold of three lakhs and you give it in an envelope 
to Sarwar’s man. Then you call Sarwar’s brother [bhai], not Sarwar 
himself. “I am so sorry. I could only manage this little. I have had so 
many expenses.”
It is a complicated game. Sarwar was well-known as courteous, exceed-
ingly well connected and dangerous. He was a former bodybuilding 
champion, former trade union leader famed for muscular politics, and 
is alleged to have been involved in a few murders. If the contractor 
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contacted by him had not done his bidding, the contractor would be out 
of favour the next time around. He might find that his suppliers are not 
as forthcoming as they once were or that certain trade union leaders are 
making a fuss. He might even find that machinery on one of his construc-
tion sites is damaged. Some years earlier, when Sarwar was MP and his 
party was in power (2001–6), he had been the most powerful man in the 
division.
Sarwar then fell from power but continued to operate as a con-
tractor and as someone powerful. ‘But Sarwar is still powerful!’ The 
contractor almost leapt out of his chair in order to emphasise his point. 
His party has been out of power since 2006 and he himself has spent 
time in prison (during the caretaker government 2007–8). And even if 
he was still MP, because his party was out of power nationally, he was 
marginalised and powerless. He did not appear in government offices, 
was not asked to sit on committees or boards, and people did not know 
him. Nonetheless, he continued to operate as a contractor. After years 
out of power, he was still known as ‘the biggest contractor in Barisal’, 
or one of the biggest. The contracts were not in his name – they may 
have been in his brother’s name or the name of an associate – but no 
one doubted that it was Sarwar who was the real man. The contractor 
who insisted that Sarwar was still powerful had been in the business 
for several decades and had had many dealings with the city’s netas. 
He explained that Sarwar’s loss of formal positions of influence had not 
severely affected his work as a contractor.
Sarwar could continue as such because of several features of how 
business and politics are conducted in Barisal and in Bangladesh. A cru-
cial reason for Sarwar’s continued prominence as a contractor was cross-
party alliances – his ability to ‘balance’, as it were. A main ally was Hiron, 
for years mayor of the city and an Awami League leader. ‘They are like 
old friends’, a BNP leader said, laughing: ‘when they meet, they embrace 
warmly’. This may have been exaggerated, but they did accommodate 
each other’s needs. Hiron, as mayor, shared some contracts with Sarwar 
and his men, even though they belonged to rival political parties. A local 
leader belonging to Hiron’s party was very upset by this arrangement.
Hiron …  has basically embezzled a lot of money. That is the rea-
son we started in the Awami League! [To fight corruption.] Hiron 
was first with Jatiyo Party and then he came to us. But he shows no 
shomman [respect]. He is not a good leader. He shows no respect to 
people who have been in the party long, who have sacrificed for the 
party. Instead he is a friend of Sarwar.
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He complained that Hiron gave government work to Sarwar’s people 
instead of to people who had spent a lifetime in the Awami League. For this 
he deemed Hiron disrespectful. A respectful leader gives government con-
tracts to his own party’s people, not to others. In reality this was not always 
the case. A journalist and correspondent for one of the large national dai-
lies explained the situation in simple terms. Public works jobs are mostly 
distributed among contractors somehow close to the ruling party.
But the ruling party doesn’t entirely deprive the contractors who 
have a close tie with the opposition. Contractors who are with the 
opposition have to pay more.
Another journalist, also a senior correspondent, said that the ruling party 
(PGP) will reach ‘a balance’ with the opposition. They will keep most 
works for themselves but will share a portion with the opposition, because 
it is prudent to have allies on the other side: ‘Next time, you will be out 
of power, and I will give you some contracts.’ Such political connections 
across party lines are not confined to government works contracts. In the 
endless political game, your enemy’s enemy is your friend and someone to 
be treated with care. This was seen as the main reason for Barisal being rel-
atively quiet during the troublesome months leading up to the 2014 elec-
tions – when the capital and some provincial cities saw bus-burning, bombs 
and mayhem.9 The opposition leader insistently called on her party leaders 
and activists to take to the streets, and yet the traditionally BNP-supporting 
Barisal was quiet. The ritualised early-morning demonstrations under the 
leadership of Sarwar, sitting MP, were not going to scare anyone. It was 
held that Sarwar was going quietly because of his relationship with Hiron. 
Sarwar was hedging his bets, and so was Hiron. The outcome of the unrest 
was uncertain and it would pay to have an ally on the winning side.
Conclusion
In contrast with Latin America, inter alia, provincial Bangladesh does not 
exhibit autonomous violent groups that conquer or enter into alliances 
with representatives of the state. Nor is provincial Bangladesh quite the 
South Asian mafia-owned democracy in which armed and violent groups 
dominate certain trades in collusion with members of the state. What 
we have encountered in Barisal in this chapter is an extractive system 
that feeds off government budgets. It has politicised crime along with all 
interesting parts of the state apparatus. Representatives of the clientelist 
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state – netas, bosses, patrons – have entered into collusion with non-state 
representatives such as businesspeople, criminals and representatives of 
the media, as well as non-elected state representatives such as bureau-
crats, police officers and judges. These elaborate and delicately inter-
twined networks of illicit deal-making centre on political leaders and 
draw their sustenance from their important alliances with contractors. 
Combined with the other actors, who may be willing or otherwise, they 
weave networks that allow government money to be siphoned off to sus-
tain themselves in politics – which is a costly business.
The small pond that is provincial Bangladesh is easily stirred up 
by larger, national forces such as elections, and no matter how locally 
entrenched they may be these provincial networks are never immune 
from the waves created at higher levels. Nevertheless, largely semi-au-
tonomous as they are, these networks operate in partial isolation from 
the national centre of power. A national election victory creates new 
opportunities while a defeat wreaks havoc – but not entirely; not for the 
clever boss. The never-ending internal rivalry coupled with the constant 
outside threat to one’s position makes ‘balancing’ a necessary element 
in a sound survival strategy. The deal-making involves criminals per-
forming certain irregular tasks, but as contractors, business executives, 
entrepreneurs and bureaucrats have adapted to the realities of a violent 
climate, actual violence has to some extent been replaced by make-be-
lieve violence, such as disappearances, and by threats.
For the individual contractor, activist or bureaucrat, participating 
in the network involves becoming entangled in a mutually supportive 
system that keeps you safe while in power but augments the risks of a 
backlash after falling out of power. It is primarily connections via a neta 
in power, or closely aligned with someone in power, that will ensure sus-
pension of the punishment. The development of a mediascape in which 
papers are numerous and yet for sale has increasingly helped solidify 
this extractive system by making defection dangerous, because it means 
exposure to potential blackmailing and no protection.
Notes
1. Interviews were carried out in Barisal during annual visits between 2012 and 2017. Most in-
terviewees have preferred to remain anonymous. I talked with journalists, activists, present 
and former politicians from all major political parties except the Islamist Jamaat, members of 
the civil service, NGO staff, and contractors and other businessmen. I am greatly indebted to 
Md AbuBakar Siddique for his vast experience and assistance during my fieldwork.
2. ‘PGP’ connotes ‘Present Government Party’ – a cynical, inside joke among journalists, officials 
and other observers of Bangladeshi politics.
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3. This is also a family portrait, since Hasnat is Sheikh Hasina’s cousin (Prime Minister 1996–
2001 and 2008 to present). Hasina is the daughter of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, 
whose photo is found everywhere, and Hasnat is Mujibur’s nephew. On these photos others too 
will appear with some regularity, such as Hasnat’s father, who was Mujibur’s brother-in-law, 
and various other family figures. Many of them feature in the national history of the liberation 
(1971) and the bloody coup (1975) that killed then President Mujibur and most of his family – 
including Hasnat’s father.
4. Barisal used to be a municipality, but due to its strategic importance and status as the largest 
town in this part of the country it was elevated to a city corporation in 2000, and granted city 
status in 2003. It has a population of about 300,000 and houses a university, a large divisional 
hospital, municipal, district and divisional administrations and other state services, besides 
having a modest industrial sector and a large retail sector.
5. Bangladesh is administratively divided into eight divisions, each comprising several districts 
(zilla or jela). The district is again divided into upazilas, which are the administratively more 
significant unit. Although there is an approximation, upazilas and national parliament constit-
uencies do not necessarily overlap.
6. Names have been changed.
7. BDT 5 lakh equals INR 3.8 lakh or USD 5,400.
8. Kazi Babul is alleged to have been a razakar, providing the Pakistani army with prostitutes 
during the 1971 war of liberation. Razakar, used in the sense of collaborator, is probably the 
worst label one can have in contemporary Bangladeshi politics.
9. The opposition BNP, supported by the Jamaat Islami, demanded the reintroduction of the 
caretaker government system. This had been introduced in 1996 and entails a politically neu-
tral cabinet taking power three months before a general election. It was introduced to ensure a 
fair election. It was abolished in 2012 on the grounds that it was undemocratic. The opposition 
wanted it reintroduced because it did not trust the sitting government. The boycott failed and 
the election went ahead without the opposition participating.
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Putting out the Baldia factory fire: 
how the trial of Karachi’s industrial 
capitalism did not happen
Laurent Gayer
In this chapter the network of connivance between the provincial bureau-
cracy and local industrialists is traced. It describes the symbiotic relations 
between the criminal economies of local ‘industrial capitalism’, Karachi’s 
turbulent urban environment and a state torn between the strength of the 
law and the ‘justice’ of the powerful. This intreccio is explored through a 
detailed documentation of trials following the Baldia textile factory fire. 
They reveal the routinised coercive exploitation of the workforce and the 
systematic bypassing of labour laws and safety regulations, non-compliance 
with which had evidently become widespread in the industrial zones of the 
economic capital of Pakistan. It also shows how immunity develops and 
operates, and the role of crime-friendly law in facilitating it.
On 11 September 2012, 259 people were killed and more than 100 
injured in a textile factory fire in the Baldia area of Karachi (see Fig. 
11.1). This was the deadliest industrial fire in world history and the 
worst industrial disaster in the history of Pakistan. The judicial proceed-
ings that began in the following months had a considerable impact on 
the country and, as the testimonies of survivors and various investiga-
tive reports started piling up, Karachi’s unbridled capitalism was put in 
the dock. These investigations revealed practices of coercive exploitation 
of the workforce and a systematic bypassing of labour laws and safety 
regulations, which had evidently become widespread in the industrial 
zones of the economic capital of Pakistan. And because the company in 
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Figure 11.1 The remains of Ali Enterprises, Baldia Town 
(August 2017 – Photograph by Laurent Gayer) 
question was working mainly for a German group (KiK) and had received 
an SA8000 certificate of ‘social accountability’ from the Italian inspection 
company RINA, the trial threatened to involve international companies 
and monitoring authorities. The law suddenly seemed to have caught up 
with global supply chains and their regulatory regime.
Soon enough, however, the judicial machinery went awry. Instead 
of singling out the illegalities of Karachi’s industrial capitalism, it threat-
ened to put the city at large on trial. Because of the sheer scale of the 
disaster, as well as how poorly it had been managed, the Baldia factory 
fire case brought the city’s ‘ordered disorder’ (Gayer 2014) under the 
microscope. And while doubts persisted about the exact origin of the 
fire – largely because of the lack of resources of the investigators, as they 
themselves admitted – what is commonly referred to in Pakistan as the 
bari sarkar (‘deep state’ – namely the army and its intelligence agencies) 
invited itself to the bar and gave a new political twist to the case. On the 
basis of the alleged confessions of a suspected hit man, the paramilitary 
Rangers succeeded in reorienting the trial against the party dominating 
Karachi’s political life, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), which 
was accused of having set the factory on fire as part of a racket deal. 
What had started out as a judicial probe to find those responsible for the 
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tragedy became an instrument of political repression and repositioning 
of the Rangers on the local scene, one that targetted criminal practices 
and in particular the economy of bhatta (protection), set up by local 
political parties in the 1980s (see Box 1).
Through a detailed study of these judicial proceedings and their 
successive bifurcations, this chapter aims to grasp the relations of inter-
dependence between a distinctly unbridled blend of capitalism, a turbu-
lent urban environment and a state torn between the strength of the law 
Box 11.1 Karachi’s violent entrepreneurs
The first illicit enterprises to have emerged in post-colonial Karachi were 
related to smuggling, and primarily involved ethnic groups with transnational 
connections, such as the Baloch and, later on, the Pashtuns. Baloch smugglers 
operating from the inner-city neighbourhood of Lyari provided the wholesale 
markets of the Old City with the bulk of illegally imported goods. Following 
the ban on alcohol and gambling in 1977, Lyari’s burgeoning criminal econ-
omy received a shot in the arm. However, it was only with the development of 
the heroin trade during the 1980s that a large-scale criminal economy devel-
oped in Karachi.
The main operators of this new criminal economy were Pashtun tribes 
(Afridis, in particular) controlling transport routes and fleets between Afghan-
istan and Karachi. The profits of the emerging drug trade were reinvested by 
criminal entrepreneurs into the unofficial land market, and the city’s new 
slumlords imposed a reign of terror that disrupted patterns of occupation and 
inter-ethnic relations in the city’s unofficial settlements. In 1985–6 a series of 
riots and massacres centred on this new slum economy contributed to making 
ethnicity the dominant framework for socio-economic conflicts and political 
mobilisations in the city at large.
The new political forces that emerged from these ethnic conflicts 
promptly developed their own criminal enterprises. The Mohajir Qaumi Move-
ment (MQM, later renamed the Muttahida Qaumi Movement), in particular, 
which became the predominant political force in Karachi during the second 
half of the 1980s, became notorious for its institutionalisation of bhatta, or 
protection rackets. This market of protection was inspired by the so-called 
‘goonda tax’ levied by petty criminals in the city’s bazars. The MQM took these 
practices to a whole new level, however, by extending them to virtually every 
economic actor (from industrialists to traders, and from shopkeepers to hawk-
ers) and by systematising the collection of bhatta (through regular contribu-
tions as well as through more exceptional donations, such as at the time of 
Eid, when the retainers of the party were expected to contribute in cash or 
kind – with animal hides, in particular – to the party’s finances).
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and the ‘justice’ of the powerful. From its inception, during the so-called 
‘decade of development’ of 1958–68,1 Karachi’s industrial capitalism was 
characterised by a propensity for various types of illegalities. Tax fraud, 
unfair labour practices, violations of health, safety, building and envi-
ronmental regulations, illicit procurement of water, as well as the use of 
goondas (thugs) to crush attempts at unionisation have all been key to the 
operations – and the profits – of the manufacturing sector, especially in the 
textile industry. At the same time, these industries never operated entirely 
beyond the reach of the law. Industrialists also encouraged the develop-
ment of legal conventions that both strengthened their domination and 
regulated it.2 Karachi’s industrial capitalism can thus be characterised as 
an irregular production system – a type of organisation of the manufac-
turing economy resorting heavily to various illegalities without completely 
evading legal norms and the regulatory action of the courts. Rather than 
by its outwardly criminal nature, this mode of organisation of the economy 
is thus characterised by its uneven relationship with the law.
Besides their documentary value, the judicial proceedings consid-
ered here provide an opportunity to think through the irregular nature of 
this production system, and more particularly to reflect upon the force of 
the law in a society where it is constantly undermined by the illegalities 
of ‘delinquent elites’ (Lascoumes 2014), extrajudicial forms of coercion, 
During the years 2011–13, the MQM’s gradual loss of authority over 
the city translated into a deregulation of the market of protection. The gangs 
of Lyari (which, under the patronage of the Pakistan People’s Party grew to 
be a force to be reckoned with, with considerable firepower), as well as the 
Pakistani Taliban, were new entrants into these protection rackets. While the 
extortion activities of the Taliban were limited to the sectors of the economy 
controlled by Pashtuns (such as the transport sector or the marble industry), 
the gangs of Lyari competed with the MQM for the role of ‘protectors’ of the 
city’s traders, builders and industrialists.
Even as they disrupted the activities of entrepreneurial classes, the Lyari-
based gangsters of the People’s Aman Committee (PAC) or the petty criminals 
associated with political parties also helped industrialists maintain discipline 
in their factories. Some were appointed as labour officers and entrusted with 
the surveillance of the workforce, in order to prevent any attempt at organi-
sation on its part. This practice of recruiting goondas for union-busting activi-
ties dates back to the early years of Karachi’s industrialisation process (which 
began in the late 1950s). However, after the launching of a new paramilitary 
operation in the city in 2013 this task was entrusted to the Rangers, who now 
play a prominent role in the policing of industrial areas.
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and the ubiquity of informality. Taking as a starting point the reflection 
of E.P. Thompson on the law as a double-edged sword (Thompson 1975), 
before engaging with a series of works discussing the social and politi-
cal uses of the law (namely, the literature on legal mobilisation theory 
and cause lawyering3), this case study also aims to assess the extent to 
which the most vulnerable sections of Pakistan’s society can expect jus-
tice in such a context. In the face of a society and economy where the dis-
play of might is generally deemed to prevail over the assertion of rights, 
Thompson’s work is a useful reminder that the effectiveness of the law 
as an instrument of domination in the service of the powerful rests on 
its apparent universality and impartiality – and ‘it cannot seem to be so 
without upholding its own logic and criteria of equality; indeed, on occa-
sion, by actually being just’ (Thompson 1975, 263).
This contribution is part of a larger, ongoing investigation of 
Karachi’s irregular capitalism, for which I have already spent four 
months in Karachi (March 2015; July–August 2016; July–August 2017). 
The data collected during these fieldtrips mainly include legal docu-
ments (labour courts awards and judicial proceedings of several civil and 
criminal cases), as well as interviews with approximately 80 industrial-
ists, workers, labour activists, lawyers and members of law enforcement 
agencies. Considering the sensitive nature of the topic – which covers 
various forms of illegalities on the part of industrialists, practices of col-
lusion between public enforcers and private entrepreneurs, as well as 
resistance tactics under scrutiny from the state and corporate security 
departments – I guaranteed anonymity to most of my interlocutors. As a 
result, the names of interviewees quoted in the text have generally been 
withheld. The only exception to this rule concerns Faisal Siddiqui, the 
legal counsel of civil society organisations representing the families of 
the victims of the Baldia factory fire. He agreed to his name appearing 
here and, given the prominence of the case, it would have been impossi-
ble to hide his identity anyway.
Trial by fire: the revelatory effect of the Baldia factory 
disaster
At the instigation of the provincial authorities of Sindh, the owners and 
managers of Ali Enterprises were initially charged with murder under 
section 302 of the Pakistan penal code, while government officials were 
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charged with criminal negligence. Parallel to this criminal case, which 
was registered with the additional district and sessions judge of West 
Karachi, a civil case for compensation was filed by a collective of labour 
and civil society organisations (including the National Trade Union Fed-
eration and the Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and Research). 
Through a constitutional petition,4 these organisations sought direc-
tions for judicial enquiry, compensation for the victims’ families, and 
enforcement of labour laws in the industrial sector.5 The fact that labour 
organisations and their legal counsel could not convince a single victim’s 
family to file a case for compensation reflected the intimidation exerted 
by industrialists over their workers.6 This benefitted the owners of Ali 
Enterprises, as under Pakistani criminal law only victims and their fami-
lies can assist the prosecution.
On paper, these various cases were independent of one another. 
However, especially after the accident was re-qualified as an act of ter-
rorism, the civil case became increasingly dependent upon the criminal 
case, with those judges hearing constitutional petitions asking directions 
from the trial court while examining criminal evidence on their own. 
Moreover, both criminal and civil cases relied upon the investigation con-
ducted, on the one hand, by a group of high-level police officials headed 
by a superintendent of police (SP),7 and on the other hand by two teams 
of investigators acting independently of the local police – a tribunal of 
enquiry constituted at the request of the Sindh Home Department and a 
Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) team.8 The findings of these investi-
gators were largely convergent. All of them came to the conclusion that 
a short-circuit was the most probable cause of the fire, especially as the 
factory was working on overload at the time of the incident, consuming 
318 kW electricity, as against the 210 kW for which it had been given per-
mission.9 But even as they ruled out any foul play, investigators could not 
establish the cause of the fire with any degree of certainty; the margin 
of doubt that remained in their conclusions led to much speculation and 
contributed to the politicisation of the trial, as we shall see later.
Ali Enterprises was the property of Abdul Aziz Bhaila and his 
two sons, Rashid Aziz and Shahid Aziz. Like many other industrialists 
in Karachi, especially in the textile industry, the Bhailas belong to the 
Memon community, a mercantile ethno-linguistic group tracing its roots 
to the current Indian province of Gujarat, which played a prominent 
role in the industrialisation of Karachi during the 1950s and 60s.10 The 
Memons of Karachi are a tight-knit community, structured around pro-
fessional and philanthropic organisations, as well as around centres of 
worship doubling as educational and welfare centres (known as jama’at 
294 THE WILD EAST
khanas). The prominence of Memons among Karachi’s industrialists 
translates into their over-representation within the city’s professional 
bodies. Thus, at the time of the Baldia fire, A.A. Bhaila was a mem-
ber of both the Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industries (KCCI) 
and the Pakistan Readymade Garments Manufacturers and Exporters 
Association (PRGMEA). In other words, the Bhailas were not black sheep 
resorting to exceptionally ruthless practices: on the contrary, they were 
prominent and rather typical members of the local business community. 
Similarly, their malpractices were not exceptional, and the various legal 
cases opened against them revealed the banality of these illegalities and 
the collusion between local industrialists and public officials that made 
these systematic violations of labour laws and safety regulations tenable 
in the long run.
As the investigation of these cases began, various public insti-
tutions were summoned before the courts. What they revealed was a 
vast network of connivance between the provincial bureaucracy and 
local industrialists. The provincial Labour Department commenced by 
informing the judges that Ali Enterprises was not even registered with 
its department, and that in any case, any kind of violation of law under 
the Factories Act (1934) was punishable with a maximum penalty of PKR 
500 (5 euros). The Sindh Employees’ Social Security Institution (SESSI) 
and the Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Institution (EOBI) followed suit and 
informed the courts that most employees of Ali Enterprises had not been 
registered over the years (only 200 workers at Ali Enterprises, of a total 
of 3,000, were registered with EOBI, and 268 with SESSI). Like most tex-
tile and garment companies,11 the Bhailas resorted to the so-called ‘third 
party’ system of labour recruitment, through which recruiting agents 
(known locally as contractors, or thekedars in Urdu) provide industries 
with cheap, casual workers who are not entitled to any form of social 
protection.
The contracts of these temporary workers are renewed every three 
months, contravening the existing labour laws, which require employ-
ers to provide permanent contracts to those workers they aim to keep 
on after a three-month probationary period. This system of outsourcing 
allows employers to lower their production costs significantly by avoiding 
monthly contributions towards their employees’ social security and pen-
sions. Outsourcing also allows employers to avoid any legal responsibil-
ity in case of accidents and deters workers from organising, as it is even 
more difficult for contract workers than for permanent ones to unionise. 
Meanwhile, using various contractors within the same factory further 
divides the workforce and discourages workers from uniting on a single 
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platform. It is also easy for employers to dismiss those workers trying to 
unionise; they simply refuse to renew their contracts. In fact, such flexi-
bility in recruiting/terminating workers is one of the primary incentives 
of the third-party system for employers, besides its economic benefits. 
Significantly, there was no union at Ali Enterprises, although a handful 
of workers were members of the Sindh Hosiery, Garment and General 
Workers Union, a general union of textile workers.
Meanwhile, the regulatory body overseeing the patterns of land 
occupation and factory construction plans in the Sindh Industrial 
Trading Estate (SITE, the factory district where the Bhailas’ factory was 
located), known as SITE Ltd, claimed that it was not its responsibility 
to ensure that individual factories complied in practice with health and 
safety regulations. The director and chief engineer of SITE also acknowl-
edged that any violation of the construction plan of a given factory (such 
as the construction of an additional floor or the absence of fire escape 
provisions) could be regularised after the payment of a minimal fee. The 
officials of the civil defence, who are theoretically responsible for moni-
toring the safety of the country’s factories, claimed that they had not vis-
ited that particular factory because it was not registered with the Labour 
Department. Taking advantage of this situation, the Bhailas had not even 
installed the most basic emergency facilities. The statements of workers 
who survived the blaze suggested that emergency exits were often locked 
from outside and that fire extinguishers were not in working order, even 
though a fire had already broken out in the warehouse of the same fac-
tory a few months earlier.12 For the owners of Ali Enterprises, regulat-
ing the workers – whether to prevent theft or coerce them into working 
longer hours than they were supposed to – took precedence over their 
safety. Both the police Investigation Officer (IO) and the FIA emphasised 
that three of the four gates of the ill-fated building were closed perma-
nently, mainly to prevent pilfering, while the few CCTV cameras installed 
in the building that were in operating order were oriented towards the 
surveillance of the workers rather than towards the mitigation of safety 
hazards.13 Sub-Inspector Jehanzaib Khan, the second IO assigned to the 
(criminal) case, went as far as comparing this intensely coercive factory 
environment to a jail.14
The investigation also revealed the dismal state of the inspection 
regime in Sindh (which is no exception in this regard: while there are 
more than 100,000 factories in the country, there are only 541 labour 
inspectors, of whom 17 are female (Mansoor 2016)). EOBI officials 
claimed that they repeatedly tried to inspect the factory but were denied 
entry by the management (Kamal 2012). Labour inspections have been 
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suspended in Sindh since 2003. This decision followed a similar move 
by the provincial authorities of the Punjab, the country’s other major 
industrial hub, and was encouraged by a prominent textile industrialist 
operating from SITE, Zubair Motiwala, who at the time served as an eco-
nomic adviser to the Chief Minister of Sindh.15 Even when inspections did 
take place, they were utterly ineffectual. The limited human and financial 
resources of these services made it highly improbable for a given factory 
to ever be inspected, and this risk was further neutralised through bribes. 
As a last resort, workers would be instructed to lie about their wages and 
working conditions to inspectors – a practice which has become system-
atic when facing local or foreign auditors, as explained by a supervisor 
in his 30s who oversaw 20 workers at a garments factory located in the 
industrial area of Korangi:
When some auditors visit from bahar (outside/abroad), they just 
come and go. They tell the workers, “Come on, tell us the truth, is 
the food OK here?” The workers always lie. If they told the truth, 
they would be fired immediately. (…) A few days in advance, the 
administrative officer hands over a paper to everyone, with instruc-
tions about what to say. (…) It says that the workers are entitled 
to bonuses, that the food is excellent, that they are allowed to take 
vacations, etc. As a result, everything they tell the auditors is a 
pack of lies. (Hasan, garments factory supervisor, interviewed in 
Karachi, July 2016)
All in all, what early investigative reports revealed was a production pro-
cess relying upon systematic breaches of the law. This is made explicit in 
the Alavi tribunal report, which does not mince its words to denounce 
these practices:
We would indeed hold that collectively the entire system of Karachi 
is responsible for the cause of death as at each and every stage; 
from the setting up of the factory and drawing up of a drawing plan, 
for meeting the high standards of safety and precautions, to the 
architects who do not create fire escapes and who compromise on 
these safety factors for reasons best known to the approvers of the 
drawing plan and their nonchalant attitude towards basic details, 
to the owners of the factory who try to fit in the maximum num-
ber of machinery into the minimum space without bothering about 
the provisions of law which require at least breathing space, to the 
law itself relating to the factories and the labour working therein 
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which is totally defective and needs to be updated on a war foot-
ing, to the several departments who are existing purely and simply 
for serving the cause of the factories and the labour who pay lip 
service to the law on several grounds including non-availability of 
staff, to the system which does not provide for adequate staff for 
sustaining and servicing a running industry, to the helplessness of 
the Civil Defence System who show that total lack of facility as the 
main cause of failures to provide relief and rescue in times of emer-
gencies, to the inspectors of all departments who for a petty amount 
compromise on quality, to those who have fatalistic approach and 
feel that nothing is going to happen, to the entire system and the 
laws relating thereto which hampers progress and effective working 
of a factory or a business concern. (…) To the powers of discretion 
that enshrines each and every act that is promulgated which retards 
effective implementation of law.16
Karachi on trial: urban disorder as an amplifying factor 
of the disaster
The Alavi tribunal report extrapolates that, besides a particularly exploit-
ative system of production, it is the entire political and economic system 
of Karachi that is to blame for this disaster. The city, here, is much more 
than a context for the catastrophe. It is party to the crime and, as such, is 
directly indicted by investigators and prosecutors. As always in Karachi – a 
megalopolis that still lacks a mass transit system and where the regula-
tion of road circulation is at the heart of the struggles for the city (Gayer 
2016) – traffic and its disruptions were held responsible for the scale of the 
disaster. Thus, according to the FIA report, the dispatch of backup vehicles 
by the fire brigade was delayed by the dismal state of the road network in 
SITE: ‘The dilapidated condition of roads in SITE might be a contributing 
factor. Due to the road condition it takes a long time for vehicles to reach 
from one point to another.’17 The Alavi tribunal report also suggests that 
the ‘pathetic traffic conditions’ in the city contributed to the fire brigade’s 
relatively late arrival on the scene of the fire. This provides an opportunity 
for the author of the report to indict political and economic elites, whose 
convoys regularly disrupt traffic in the city: ‘It would not be out of place 
to mention here that traffic jams created due to VIP movements on the 
main arteries of Karachi have repeatedly resulted in precious loss of lives.’ 
At this point (as in several other parts of the report), Justice Alavi makes 
himself the spokesperson of the denizens of Karachi, allegedly brutalised 
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by corrupt and insensitive elites. This posturing was consonant with the 
particular brand of judicial activism that had emerged in the preceding 
years around Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry (Gayer 2009). 
This mobilisation had reached its acme the preceding year during the 
so-called Karachi law and order case, which saw a special bench of the 
supreme court indict politicians, public servants and even security officers 
for the dismal state of affairs in the country’s largest city. The overall tone 
of the Alavi tribunal report and its lament for a city betrayed by its elites is 
revealing of this particular moment in the history of the Pakistani judici-
ary and its relations with civilian authorities.
The controversy around the role of the fire-fighters during the acci-
dent is exemplary of this extension of the trial to the city at large. During 
the fire itself, ‘there was a tremendous altercation between the public and 
fire engine personnel as there was not enough water in the fire engines’.18 
Critiques of the Fire Brigade Department only increased after the 
catastrophe. The Bhailas claimed that they had informed the department 
right after the fire broke out, but that the fire brigade had taken an hour 
to reach the site; that it had not sent enough fire tenders and that it had 
taken excessive time to refill once the water was exhausted. The Chief Fire 
Officer of Karachi, who appeared in front of the Alavi tribunal, defended 
his services, claiming that his personnel arrived at the site within 10 to 
15 minutes after first receiving information about the incident. TV foot-
age suggested that the first fire tenders reached the site less than half 
an hour after Lyari fire station was first informed of the incident, thus 
invalidating the claim of the owners.19 However, it is clear that the fire-
fighters were completely unprepared for a catastrophe of this magnitude. 
At first, only two fire tenders were sent to the scene and they soon ran 
out of water. In the next few hours, nearly all the fire vehicles available 
in the city (45)20 were brought on site, with reinforcements including fire 
tenders from the navy, Karachi Port Trust, Defence Housing Authority 
(DHA – an elite residential area), the cantonment board, etc. Meanwhile, 
the Edhi Foundation, Pakistan’s most respected philanthropic organi-
sation, which manages the largest fleet of ambulances in Karachi, had 
difficulties reaching the site. According to a prominent member of the 
organisation, who was part of the rescue team, Edhi’s ambulances were 
initially denied access to the site by gun-toting MQM activists, who tried 
to monopolise rescue operations through their own welfare branch, the 
Khidmat-e-Khalq Foundation (KKF).21
The forensic division of the Karachi police also came in for criticism 
during the investigation. Justice Alavi complained that the division had 
failed to deliver any useful information and suggested that ‘in the absence 
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of and lack of any competent facility and persons available to carry out 
complete modern forensic investigation which is available throughout the 
world perhaps this Division might as well close down as no tangible pur-
pose is being served’.22 Even the Edhi Foundation was accused of adding 
to the confusion. As usual in Karachi, the bodies of the victims were taken 
over by the foundation and stored in the Edhi morgue pending their iden-
tification – a process delayed and complicated by the condition of some 
of the corpses. As a report by the police surgeon deplored three months 
after the incident, Edhi staff were not qualified for such an arduous task, 
which according to the surgeon considerably disrupted the work of foren-
sic experts. In its conclusion, the report notes that:
i. Dead bodies identified after DNA test with same Tags/PM num-
bers are found in Edhi Cold Storage.
ii. On one stretcher two or more than two dead bodies were lying 
leading to mixing of papers & body fragments due to large number 
of dead bodies and the short space of the cold storage.
iii. As information obtained that some Dead bodies taken away by 
relatives without legal formalities and buried by them. But after 
DNA test identification another dead bodies [sic] were received by 
claimants.
iv. As staff working at Edhi Cold Storage is not educated that’s why 
mixing of Tags and PM numbers incorrect disposal of bodies had 
happened.23
The lack of coordination between these various actors – a characteristic 
of Karachi’s governance often decried by the political class as well as by 
urban planners – also complicated relief efforts and subsequent investi-
gations. This is made explicit in the Alavi tribunal report, which suggests 
that ‘too many agencies have jumped in to investigate the cause of fire 
and the loss of lives. To our mind there has been a great tampering of 
evidence’.24 Finally, the lack of technical expertise within the Fire Brigade 
Department and the Sindh police forensic division seriously hampered 
the work of investigators and prevented them from reaching a definitive 
conclusion about the cause of the fire. According to the FIA report:
It must also be mentioned here that no expert opinion in this regard 
was available from the fire department or the Sindh Police Forensic 
division. It appears that there is lack of expertise on fire and arson 
investigation. (…) Absence of expert opinion in the relevant fields 
made reaching a definite conclusion extremely difficult.25
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This indictment of the city at large in the tragedy had important legal 
consequences and, especially in the case of the Alavi tribunal, was not 
devoid of ulterior motives. However critical it may seem of the powers 
that be, the Alavi tribunal report did not come as a threat to political or 
economic elites. Within the legal fraternity, Justice Alavi was reputed 
for his docility, particularly when adjudicating cases involving members 
of the business community. The elitist background of this retired judge 
from the Sindh high court may explain this leniency. Alavi, who was 
born in 1941, belongs to the old elite of Karachi (he hails from the Bohra 
family that gave Karachi its first Muslim mayor, Hatim Alvi). Over the 
years, he headed numerous government-appointed commissions, which 
earned him the reputation of being pro-establishment. Within the legal 
fraternity, his reputation has also been tainted by his chairmanship of a 
regulatory body reputed to be one of the most corrupt in Sindh province, 
the Sindh Land Committee, which oversaw the process of regularisation 
of illegally-occupied lands. According to Faisal Siddiqui, legal counsel for 
civil society organisations acting on behalf of the victims, the Alavi tribu-
nal report was consistent with the past record of its chairman. By ‘divid-
ing the anger all over the place’ and introducing contradictory evidence 
regarding the responsibilities of the owners – in particular by questioning 
the assumption that most of the exits of the factory had been closed at the 
behest of the management – he helped them obtain bail and paved the 
way for their gradual exoneration of all charges.26
Enter the security state: the politicisation of the Baldia 
factory fire case
Whatever their ulterior motives may have been, the reluctance of investi-
gative agencies to pronounce a clear verdict on the cause of the fire pro-
vided an opportunity for the military to divert the judicial process and turn 
the whole exercise into a political trial. This diversion occurred during the 
spring of 2015, after the paramilitary Rangers used the confession of an 
alleged ‘target killer’ of the MQM to requalify the Baldia fire as an act of 
terrorism. This whole enterprise relied upon the testimony of Muhammad 
Rizwan Qureshi, alias ‘Pringle’, a 55-year-old Mohajir who was suspected 
of leading a double life: a sanitary sub-inspector at the Saddar Town branch 
of the Karachi Municipal Corporation (KMC), Qureshi allegedly confessed 
to his involvement in dozens of murders and kidnappings dating from the 
mid-1990s onwards, as the head of an MQM ‘death squad’.27 Qureshi was 
arrested by the police of Karachi’s South District in 2013 and, in view of 
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the high profile of the case, was investigated by a Joint Investigation Team 
(JIT) comprised of representatives from the Karachi police, the Inter Ser-
vices Intelligence (ISI), the Intelligence Bureau (IB), the Rangers and the 
FIA. The JIT was conducted on 22 June 2013 under the supervision of the 
Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) for District South. However, the JIT 
report was only presented in court on 6 February 2015. By then, the config-
uration of Karachi’s political scene had drastically changed. In late Septem-
ber 2013, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced a massive crackdown 
on militant and criminal groups in the city. The paramilitary Rangers were 
entrusted with operations on the ground, which paved the way for a re-en-
gagement of the army in Karachi’s politics.
Like their counterparts in the Punjab, the Sindh Rangers are a par-
amilitary force placed under the authority of the Federal Home Ministry; 
however, because they are commanded by top officers of the Pakistan 
army (their Director General is systematically a serving major general), 
they tend to evade civilian control and serve the designs of the military. 
While the mandate of the Rangers was initially focussed on protecting 
Pakistan’s eastern border with India, they were called in to support the 
police in Karachi at the end of the 1980s. They never left the city and 
now, with 13,000 officers (against 26,000 police), they currently play 
a prominent role in law enforcement and regulating the city’s political 
economy. Over the course of time, the Rangers have developed their own 
economic activities, both licit (shooting clubs, petrol stations, printing 
presses, canteens, public model schools, cement factories, etc.) and oth-
erwise (in collusion with the so-called ‘water mafia’, they have taken con-
trol of the water hydrants and the tanker service supplying water-starved 
localities).28 These economic activities have brought the Rangers closer 
to the city’s business community, which relies heavily upon the paramil-
itaries for its security – while the Rangers have been deployed in every 
industrial area, they sometimes provide an additional layer of security 
for a fee, through the private security company that they set up in 2012, 
the Rangers Security Guards (RSG). Besides patrolling these areas and 
monitoring video-surveillance installations, the Rangers frequently 
intimidate labour activists and workers trying to organise themselves. 
Industrialists openly acknowledge their contribution to the maintenance 
of corporate order. As a former chair of the KCCI told me during a focus 
group discussion at the Pakistan Employers Federation in July 2017:
We give less importance to the ministers [than to the Rangers] … 
Because they are deterrents … So that we go to our industries in 
such an atmosphere that, you know, there will not be a labour … 
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[he takes it back and only continues after some hesitation] … a law 
and order issue. Because a violent mob, or any kind of morons, they 
can attack the factories. Now they are afraid to do that openly. So 
they are a deterrent for us, like the nuclear bomb that we have, oth-
erwise Indians and others would come and attack us.29
It is in this context of strengthening ties between the holders of capital 
and the wielders of coercion that the Sindh Rangers and the army started 
intensifying their operations in Karachi, with a focus on the so-called 
‘militant wing’ of the MQM. The JIT report was a key part in this polit-
ical offensive, which aimed to downsize the MQM at large and deprive 
it of its prominence in Karachi’s politics. While previous investigations 
had ruled out the possibility of foul play, the JIT report laid the blame 
for the fire squarely at the door of the MQM and its extortionists. Dur-
ing his interrogation by the JIT team, Qureshi allegedly revealed that a 
‘well-known party high official’ from the MQM had tried to extort PKR 
200 million, ‘through his front man’, from the owners of Ali Enterprises. 
Following their refusal, the sector-in-charge of the MQM in Baldia, Reh-
man Bhola, with the support of ‘unknown accomplices’, allegedly ‘threw 
chemical substances which creates fire in factory’ (sic).30 On the basis 
of these ‘revelations’ (which were merely based on what a suspected 
criminal had allegedly heard from fellow party workers), the provincial 
Home Ministry constituted a new JIT under the supervision of the dep-
uty inspector general (DIG) of the central investigation agency (CIA), 
with representatives from the Karachi police, the ISI, military intelli-
gence (MI), the IB and the FIA. On 29 March, the SITE superintendent of 
police (SP), Sajid Ameer Sadozai, was tasked by the JIT to reinvestigate 
the case. During the course of this investigation, this police officer – who 
acted under tremendous pressure not only from his own hierarchy but 
also from the army and its intelligence agencies – concluded that ‘this 
kind of fire cannot be caused by an electric short circuit’. The progress 
report of the JIT presented in the court of the additional district and ses-
sions judge of West Karachi, Maqbool Memon, in 2016, thus concluded 
that Rehman Bhola and his accomplices had set the factory on fire after 
the Bhailas refused to hand over PKR 250 million (the inflation of this 
sum from the 200 million mentioned in the previous JIT report was never 
explained). Allegedly, the owners of the factory were ready to settle for 
PKR 10 million, but this arrangement would have been refused by Bhola 
and the ‘party high official’ on whose behalf he acted. The report claimed 
that Bhola and his men set fire ‘to the godown [warehouse] and several 
other places’  – a claim which contradicted all previous investigations 
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as no evidence suggested that the fire could have broken out from dif-
ferent points. The report added that the pressure by MQM top officials 
on the owners of the factory did not stop there, and that these officials 
continued to ‘terrorise’ the owners and tried to extort money from them 
after the fire. Under pressure from the MQM as well as from the courts, 
the Bhailas would finally have agreed to transfer PKR 50 million to an 
MQM account in Hyderabad, where the money would have been used to 
acquire a plot of land.31
The evidence put forward was circumstantial at best and mainly 
relied upon testimonies from an accountant at Ali Enterprises who 
claimed that the fire had engulfed the whole building within minutes, 
despite the efforts of the workers and the owners to extinguish it. The 
value of this testimony was itself questionable, especially as earlier inves-
tigations had revealed that the owners had in fact fled the site after the 
fire broke out. This would remain a controversial claim, especially since 
the workers who attested it later on retracted their statements, most 
probably under pressure from the police. Meanwhile, if the experts of 
the Punjab forensic science agency (PFSA)32 recruited by the JIT con-
cluded without hesitation that the fire was ‘a clear case of arson’, their 
report was not made public.33 The members of the JIT did not really care 
about the weakness of their case, however. They knew that their version 
of the story coincided with the dominant interpretation of the events in 
public opinion. This is not to say that they cynically tried to manipulate 
the public: most of the members of the JIT were firmly convinced of this 
interpretation of events, which sometimes pitted them against their more 
sceptical colleagues. By an ironic quirk of fate, a senior police officer who 
had taken part in the JIT was subsequently posted to the same depart-
ment as some of the participants in the FIA investigation team who had 
suggested in their report that the fire was probably accidental. It did not 
take long for this police officer to confront his colleagues, asking them if 
they did not feel any shame for having exonerated mass murderers. ‘I was 
really angry. How can you condone the murder of 260 people? How can 
you be a police officer and be so shameless?’ this officer asked me rhetor-
ically during an interview, with a voice shaking with anger.34
However weak the new ‘evidence’ brought to the fore by the JIT 
might have been, it concluded that ‘the factory fire was a planned ter-
rorist activity and not an accidental fire’. The response of the media, the 
judiciary and political authorities was largely sympathetic to this con-
clusion and did not question its veracity. Similarly, for the general pub-
lic, it confirmed what everyone already thought: that the MQM was the 
main culprit. This is precisely what the owners of Ali Enterprises had 
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suggested all along, and this revised version of the facts worked in their 
favour. Here, the interests of the owners (and of their supporters among 
Karachi’s business community) clearly converged with those of the 
state security apparatus. The new political ambitions for Karachi of the 
Rangers and the army merged with the interests of a group of industrial-
ists on the defensive, and this convergence led the Baldia factory fire case 
to take a new course. However, in this context convergence did not imply 
similar interests, as while the Rangers and the army were determined to 
discredit and cut the MQM down to size, industrialists aimed to ward off 
the threat of labour reforms.
On the basis of what was presented as new evidence to the judiciary 
and in the court of public opinion, the members of the JIT requested of 
the Sindh government that the original first information report (FIR) – 
on the basis of which the Bhailas had been charged with murder – be 
cancelled, and that a new FIR be registered against Rehman Bhola and 
his accomplices under the Anti Terrorism Act (ATA). Despite the protests 
of the petitioners’ legal counsel, a new investigation team was appointed 
and placed under the direction of the Sindh Inspector General of Police, 
A.D. Khawaja, an officer reputed to be close to the army. This investigative 
team started preparing a new charge sheet, which was finally submitted 
in August 2016. While the owners (who had left the country) as well as 
some factory employees had initially been charged with murder and crim-
inal negligence, this time they were exonerated of all charges and were 
made to appear as prosecution witnesses. Two MQM cadres, Rehman 
Bhola and Hammad Siddiqui, as well as ‘3/4 other unknown accused per-
sons’, were charged under the anti-terrorism law.35 On 27 August 2016, 
the additional district and sessions judge of West Karachi, who was hear-
ing the criminal case against the Bhailas and others, decided to transfer 
the case to the administrative judge of the Anti Terrorism Courts (ATCs), 
after observing that it was a case appropriate for an ATC and not a regu-
lar court because the charges were framed under the Anti Terrorism Act, 
1997. On 5 September, the administrative judge of the ATCs transferred 
the case to the ATC-II for a regular hearing. But then something unex-
pected happened, which – momentarily – disrupted the new course of 
the trial. Despite pressure from security agencies and civilian political 
authorities, the sitting judge of the ATC-II refused to accept the charges 
brought by the police. More specifically, the judge argued against the 
exemption of the Bhailas from any form of prosecution, by recalling that 
‘serious allegations are levelled against the owners that they had locked 
emergency gates which resulted in 259 deaths of workers’.36 Three 
months later, however, the same judge had to back down after presumed 
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arsonist Rehman Bhola was arrested by Interpol in Bangkok and extra-
dited to Pakistan, where he allegedly confessed to having set the factory 
on fire – yet another ‘revelation’ paving the way for the indictment of the 
MQM and the exoneration of the Bhailas.
As of May 2018, the trial of Bhola and his alleged associates is yet 
to begin. It may well never happen. According to a close observer of the 
case, the main reason for this delay would be dissension within the secu-
rity apparatus. While the Rangers would press for a quick trial to further 
weaken the MQM, the ISI would delay it, seeking to exonerate Hammad 
Siddiqui. After being indicted by the police in the third and fourth charge 
sheets presented in August 2016 and January 2017, and after Bhola 
allegedly confessed to having set the factory on fire on Siddiqui’s order, 
everything was set for their prosecution. But in March 2016, Siddiqui, 
the former head of the MQM’s tanzeemi (organisational) committee, was 
instrumental in the creation of the Pak Sarzameen Party (PSP), a rival 
group set up by MQM dissidents and allegedly supported by the ISI. The 
fact that Siddiqui has not been arrested yet, even after the ATC-II issued 
a non-bailable arrest warrant against him, tends to validate the assump-
tion that the security state itself has become divided over the possible 
political repercussions of these judicial proceedings.37
The law of the strongest? Capital and coercion 
in the Baldia factory fire case
The various investigations and litigations that followed the fire gener-
ated their own coercive forces, which added to the suffering of the sur-
vivors. As the owners of the factory strove to obtain bail, their former 
workers suddenly started changing their statements in favour of their 
former employers.38 On 14 September 2012, Muhammad Omer, a former 
machine operator at Ali Enterprises, had told the police of SITE-B that, 
while trying to escape from the building under fire, he had found three 
exit doors locked from outside.39 Two months later, he retracted this state-
ment and claimed that it was made under duress, after he was detained 
in the SITE police station for four days (from 14 to 18 September):
During this period (…) some other officer [than Zafar Iqbal, the 
IO] came and directed me that I have to give statement to the effect 
that doors were locked from outside. I informed them that due to 
intense heat and smoke I was not able to reach to the door, there-
fore I cannot say the doors were locked from outside. The police 
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officials informed me that I will be released only when my statement 
is recorded before Magistrate as such during this period I remained 
at the police station SITE-A. (…) I say that on 18.09.2012 I was 
taken to the court of Magistrate and police informed me that I have 
to state before the Magistrate along with other details that the exit 
doors were locked from outside. I was made to believe that unless 
I give statement as directed by the police I shall not be released. 
I was under tremendous mental pressure due to the incident and 
remaining at police station and for that reason gave statement 
before Magistrate as desired by police.40
Other witnesses who had testified that the doors of the factory were 
locked from outside later on retracted this testimony and claimed that 
they were coerced into making such statements so as to strengthen the 
case of the police against the owners. Nazeer Ahmed, a clerk in the 
Accounts Department of the factory, registered an affidavit in November 
2012, where he claimed that:
on 14.09.2012 around 7 a.m. police party headed by Choudhry Zafar 
Iqbal came at my residence and started shouting at me and my family 
members, they even extended no courtesy towards women and used 
abusive language extended threats and demanded Cell phones of 
every person in the house such demand was also made to the ladies. 
(…) Thereafter police party took me to (…) police station, there also 
I was inhumanly treated and was not even allow to answer nature’s 
calls which was very painful and torturous in my age which is 67. 
(…) I was kept in wrongful confinement for about one week.41
Several elements in these accounts suggest that these witnesses were 
pressured to change their earlier statements in favour of the owners. 
Contrary to earlier investigative reports, which suggested that the own-
ers had fled the scene and abandoned entrapped workers to their fate, all 
these affidavits were given in favour of the Bhailas and claimed that the 
latter did everything they could to quell the fire, that fire extinguishers 
were both present in large numbers and in working order, and that it was 
essentially the delay in the intervention of the fire brigade and its lack of 
professionalism that resulted in a disaster. This coincided with changes in 
the version of the story given by the police. Whereas the original FIR and 
the preliminary charge sheet accused the owners of murder and crimi-
nal negligence, subsequent charge sheets prepared by the Investigation 
Officer (IO), Sub-Inspector Jehanzaib, withdrew the murder charge (qatl-
i-amd, which comes under section 302 of the Pakistan penal code) and 
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replaced it with involuntary homicide (qatl-bis-sabab, an offence which 
comes under section 321 of the penal code and which does not provide for 
jail sentences). The alteration of the charge sheet made it easier for judges 
to succumb to the pressures inciting them to grant bail to the Bhailas, even 
before the Rangers started shifting the blame onto the MQM.
What is unclear in the statements of these former employees of Ali 
Enterprises is not so much whether they were coerced into giving state-
ments coinciding with the version of the police, but rather at which stage 
of the investigation they were coerced. It is probable that the owners’ rep-
resentatives and the police themselves – who, under a new IO, insisted 
on exonerating the Bhailas of the charge of murder – pushed these wit-
nesses to testify in favour of the owners’ bail application. Faisal Siddiqui, 
the legal counsel of petitioners demanding compensation on behalf of the 
victims’ families, claims that the owners used two tactics to deter their 
former workers from testifying against them: through middlemen, they 
distributed food to their families while simultaneously threatening them 
using the infamous ‘gang war people’ (gangsters) of Lyari.42 Gang mem-
bers would have visited these families and openly threatened them to dis-
suade them from going to court.43 The support extended to the Bhailas by 
the ‘industrialists’ lobby’, or what is identified as such by Faisal Siddiqui, 
also explains why the owners of Ali Enterprises managed to go free despite 
all investigations pointing unequivocally at their having been involved 
in the worst industrial accident in Pakistan’s history. On 29 December 
2012, the KCCI requested that Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf inter-
vene in favour of the ‘wrongly accused’ owners of Ali Enterprises. These 
industrialists claimed that the implication of the Bhailas in a murder case 
was a clear example of ‘misuse of state power’, which carried the risk of 
‘scaring away new investment’. Thus, it was now the ‘duty’ of the state to 
revoke the FIR and to absolve these entrepreneurs of the charge of mur-
der so that they could soon resume their activities while sending a posi-
tive message to the whole business community of Karachi (Chambers of 
Commerce 2012). To this the Prime Minister replied, during his speech, 
that ‘Authorities should reinvestigate the case and provide justice to the 
employers of Ali Enterprises if a wrong case has been registered against 
the factory owners under section 302’. Shortly thereafter, the Finance 
Minister announced on behalf of the Prime Minister that the murder 
charge against the owners of Ali Enterprises had been withdrawn – a 
public announcement that provoked moral outrage across the country, 
leading the Prime Minister to backtrack and announce that the case was 
only being reinvestigated (as we saw earlier, this was merely a damage 
control operation, and the charge of murder would indeed be withdrawn 
by IO Jehanzaib in the next charge sheet). Commenting upon this PR 
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fiasco, a group of advocates at the supreme court and the high court later 
on suggested that the matter should have been handled more cautiously, 
and informally, by the Prime Minister:
A more careful and balanced approach would have been that Prime 
Minister should have been taken into confidence and through whisper 
in the ears asked if Railway accident takes place and large number of 
passengers are killed, have the Chairman or Chief Executive Officer of 
those Airlines been charged for murder. It goes without saying, that if 
the industrialists are charged for murder only because there has been 
a fire in the factory resulting in death of large number of workers, this 
does not necessarily mean that the intentions of the employers was to 
kill or murder his workers. (Ghani, Ghani and Faisal 2014, 86–7)
While the legal professions were divided on the issue, the so-called 
‘business community’ of Karachi gave a remarkable display of unity. 
This solidarity was reinforced by the ethnic ties that bound the Bhailas 
with the powerful Memon community, as well as by their membership 
in various professional organisations. As mentioned earlier, A.A. Bhaila 
was a member of the KCCI and the PRGMEA. Even if he never occupied 
any position of leadership in these organisations, it was enough to make 
him a respected member of Karachi’s business community – membership 
in professional associations and in multi-sectorial trade associations or 
chambers of commerce is an important marker of status among Karachi’s 
entrepreneurs. Besides its symbolic value, membership in these organi-
sations ensures privileged access to state regulators, as these organisa-
tions – especially the KCCI and the trade associations linked with each 
of the city’s industrial estates – are the main interlocutors of provincial 
and federal authorities, both civilian and military, in their dealings with 
Karachi’s business community.
The show of unity around the Bhailas largely transcended their 
individual case, however. Local entrepreneurs, especially in the textile 
and garments sector – which is the most prone to violations of labour 
laws and safety regulations44 – were aware that, beyond the fate of the 
Bhailas, what was at stake was their own autonomy from the law and 
from state regulators. By expressing their solidarity with the Bhailas and 
mobilising all their resources to put pressure on the government and the 
judiciary, they simultaneously voiced a collective sense of belonging and 
defended their private interests against potential government interfer-
ence in their affairs (through a resumption of inspections, for instance). 
Bailing out the Bhailas was therefore essential for these industrialists, 
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and the day the court finally succumbed to pressure they celebrated their 
victory, as advocate Faisal Siddiqui recalls:
On the day they were granted bail in court, the entire … I mean, 
what was amazing was that … 255 people have been burnt alive 
so you would imagine that the court would be full with victims and 
their families. But the entire court room … There were about 50, 60 
people in the courtroom, and they were all industrialists and sup-
porters of these people. And they were clapping … (Faisal Siddiqui, 
interviewed in Karachi, July 2016)
Later on, when the blame started shifting from the owners of the factory 
to the MQM, many industrialists rejoiced – so much so that F. Siddiqui 
suspects that it was these industrialists who ‘pushed this story forward’, 
so that the owners would become complainants in the FIR.45
The legal and political developments sketched out above suggest 
three things. First, coercion, here, is an integral component of the legal 
process. Law enforcement agencies resort to coercion in order to reduce 
the uncertainty of legal proceedings. Second, the power relations medi-
ated by the law unfold on the margins of court procedure. They involve 
unofficial practices – whether coercive or collusive in nature – that con-
tribute to the informalisation of judicial processes and largely untie the 
latter from the formal institution of the tribunal. Members of the legal 
professions themselves participate in this informalisation through various 
kinds of background deals. Third, while the law, as an apparatus of dom-
ination, can be the terrain of an apparent convergence of capital (here, 
law-breaking industrialists) with coercion (here, law enforcement agen-
cies with a political agenda), this convergence is not a given and is prone 
to contestations and adjustments. As a result, despite all the elements 
pointing in this direction, the law cannot be said to be simply a symbolic 
and strategic weapon in the hands of dominant elites. Whether this insta-
bility opens the way for the law to provide some sort of comfort to the 
most vulnerable sections of society is another issue, to which I turn now.
The ‘anarchy of the law’ and the quest for justice 
on behalf of the victims
In July and August 2016, I spent some time at MCAS & W Law Associ-
ates, a prominent law firm based in Karachi, which was founded by some 
of the most renowned lawyers of the country, including Munir Malik, a 
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key leader of the Lawyer’s Movement of 2007–8 and a former attorney 
general of Pakistan.46 A staunch critic of military regimes, Malik has been 
joined by other advocates with a penchant for cause lawyering – that 
is, for political uses of the law from a perspective of activism (Sarat and 
Scheingold 2001; Gaïti and Israël 2003). This was the case, in particular, 
of Faisal Siddiqui, currently one of the most prominent human rights law-
yers in the country, who made a name for himself by specialising in pro 
bono human rights litigation. After we first met at the office of the Paki-
stan Institute of Labour Education and Research (PILER – Pakistan’s most 
prominent think tank and advocacy group for labour rights, of which he 
is a board member), I spent several days (and nights) at Siddiqui’s firm, 
going through the files of the so-called Baldia factory fire case. Every now 
and then we met to discuss the case and more generally the status of the 
law in the regulation of Pakistan’s politics and society. In August 2017, 
we pursued this discussion in light of the recent developments; by then, 
Siddiqui was no longer involved in the case and he could reflect on its 
larger implications with more serenity.
Siddiqui received a BSc in sociology from the London School of 
Economics (LSE) and has retained a keen interest in the social sciences 
from his student days, as well as an institutional affiliation with the 
LSE (he is a former Visiting Fellow at its Centre for the Study of Human 
Rights). After I discussed my project with him, he made several sugges-
tions that significantly oriented the course of my research, especially 
by encouraging me to revisit E.P. Thompson’s argument on the ‘dou-
ble-edged sword of the law’, which he found particularly relevant when 
assessing the role of the law in contemporary Pakistan. My research on 
the Baldia factory fire case was therefore coproduced with a legal prac-
titioner, and it reflects his own hopes and occasional disillusionment 
regarding the potentials of legal activism in Pakistan.
Throughout the summer of 2016, one of the recurrent themes in 
our discussions was what Siddiqui referred to as ‘the anarchy of the law’. 
According to him, the state of disorder prevailing in Pakistan was, at large, 
reflected in its legal system. And while this often complicated his work, it 
also played in his favour. Thus, the way Siddiqui and the petitioners he 
represented approached the issue of compensation was legally dubious: 
Nobody files compensation cases through constitutional jurisdic-
tions. According to [Pakistani] law, every victim has to come to 
court and prove his claim. There’s a very elaborate structure of pri-
vate law which guarantees that no victim [ever] gets compensation. 
Nobody can really check whether [petitioners] have received their 
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pensions, whether government compensation has been dispersed … 
Very early on, we realised that we could not mobilise 255 people, 
filing their individual claims. So we took the gambling route. It was 
really a gamble: you get a good judge, [then] you get good orders … 
It’s really the Wild Wild West form of public litigation … So we 
have been able to achieve about 18,000 dollars per victim, within a 
period of two years, whereas a normal civil claim would have lasted 
between fifteen to twenty years. (Interview with Faisal Siddiqui, 
Karachi, July 2016)
Later in our discussions, Siddiqui elaborated upon this theme of the 
‘anarchy of the law’. For him, Pakistan faces a huge disjunction between 
‘the law in books’ and ‘the law in practice’ – a disjunction which, in his 
view, ‘creates anarchy about interpretation and application of the law’. 
In the Pakistani context, the law would not be a rational architecture of 
legal norms bringing about certainty in matters of government and in 
the dispensation of justice, but a source of unpredictability benefitting 
the shrewd and the mighty. This vision of the ‘anarchy of the law’, as 
opposed to the rule of law, finds an echo in some works on organised 
crime, particularly on the mafia in Italy, where according to this litera-
ture ‘the uncontrolled proliferation of laws and regulations’ would only 
be matched by ‘the arbitrary way in which they are applied’ (Lyttelton 
1994). These writings pertain to what J.-L. Briquet refers to as a ‘par-
adigm of degeneration’ (Briquet 2007, 20), which laments the politi-
cal and moral decay of democratic institutions in order to call for their 
reform and renovation47 – a position which raises a number of issues, if 
only for its normative claims (what is the benchmark of an ‘authentic’ 
rule of law?). Within the legal field, Siddiqui’s denunciation of the ‘anar-
chy of the law’ may also seem to resonate with those indictments of legal 
formalism that end up perpetuating a positivist reading of legal norms as 
coherent and univocal (Israël, Sacriste, Vauchez and Willemez 2005, 5). 
Once we shift our attention from Siddiqui’s representation of the legal 
system to his actual engagement with the law, however, a different image 
starts to appear: one where, far from being constrained by their juridical 
culture and normative presumptions, jurists engage creatively with the 
legal arsenal at their disposal, for personal or political sakes. These tac-
tical uses of the law on the part of lawyers and judges generally imply a 
strict literalism, such as that displayed by judges resisting authoritarian 
regimes (Osiel 1995). Siddiqui’s legal activism is of a different kind, how-
ever, and instead of being constrained by the existing legal framework, 
aims to exploit its alleged ‘disorder’:
312 THE WILD EAST
When you have this disjunction between “the law in books” and 
“the law in practice”, that creates a space for anarchy and the rich 
take advantage of it. Not because of their money but because they 
are organised. So the strategy we adopted was to organise ourselves 
to get the same advantages. If you [judges] had taken a strict view 
of the law, some compensation should not have been granted. But 
since there was legal confusion, we took advantage of it, without 
resolving that confusion. In a civil court, most of them [victims’ 
heirs] would have ended abandoning their claims and I don’t think 
even a generous judge would have granted them more than 5 or 
6,000 dollars. (…) So, this anarchy of the law, it’s wrong to say 
that only the powerful take advantage of it. It is people who are 
organised that take advantage of it. I’ve gone against very powerful 
people, and I think the key element has been how organised and 
‘strategised’ you are. It’s something we used in this case. It worked 
very well. (Interview with Faisal Siddiqui, Karachi, July 2016)
As Siddiqui himself highlighted, the main reasons for this success were 
twofold. First of all, as we already briefly saw earlier, the Baldia factory 
fire case unfolded at a peculiar historical moment, as far as the politics 
of Pakistan’s judiciary were concerned. This catastrophe happened in 
the wake of the so-called Lawyers’ Movement, and Siddiqui – who was 
himself an active member of this movement – engaged with judges who 
‘had realised that they had to change the basis of their legitimacy, from 
constitutional legitimacy to public legitimacy’. If high court judges took 
up this case so ‘aggressively’, it was essentially to redeem themselves of 
their past compromises with military regimes, in order to consolidate 
their position as an autonomous institution whose power would rest with 
its public legitimacy.
Besides these unique historical circumstances, Siddiqui emphasised 
the contribution of one particular judge, who exemplifies in his eyes the 
role of individual agents in collective struggles, judicial and otherwise. 
Maqbool Baqar was a widely respected member of the legal fraternity 
who was confirmed as judge of the Sindh high court in 2003 and then 
appointed chief justice of the province in 2013. Baqar was among the few 
judges who had refused to take oath under the Provisional Constitutional 
Order (PCO) enforced by General Pervez Musharraf in 2007; he main-
tained his stand against military rule by refusing to be reinstated after 
Musharraf restored the deposed judiciary in March 2009. Besides his 
commitment to democracy and the rule of law, his liberal stance was 
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acknowledged by all, including by the Pakistani Taliban, who attacked 
his convoy in June 2013 – an attack which he survived but which left 
eight security personnel dead. According to Siddiqui, Justice Baqar was 
determined to provide justice to the victims of the Baldia fire and their 
families and it was he who passed most of the orders in favour of the 
petitioners.
The conditions in which the protective bail of the Bhailas was 
revoked, in October 2012, also suggest that economic and political 
elites are not alone in exploiting legal loopholes or circumventing the 
law altogether.48 Indeed, the decision of the judges to allow petitioners 
to interfere with the criminal case was legally dubious because NGOs 
are normally not allowed to interfere with such cases. This is because 
the expectation is that the initiative should come from the victims’ fam-
ilies – who, for obvious reasons in this case, were reluctant to do so. As a 
result, the owners of Ali Enterprises were arrested and briefly sent to jail. 
According to Siddiqui, the judge in the trial court at that time was ‘a rela-
tively independent person’ and there was ‘a lot of pressure from the Sindh 
government to do something, to deflect their own criminal negligence’; 
these two factors momentarily converged against the owners. However, 
as we saw earlier, the mobilisation of Karachi’s industrialists soon dis-
rupted this configuration, to the benefit of the owners of Ali Enterprises, 
who were all freed by early 2013. This led the petitioners and their legal 
counsel to change their approach. As F. Siddiqui told me,
Very early on, I realised that you had to use the same tactic that the 
owners used with the victims to get the victims to come forward. It 
had to be both carrot and protection – I wouldn’t say “stick” … What 
we did is that we tried to make this case high profile, then we got 
them [victims’ families] compensation. Then they realised that they 
could benefit from these people, from these NGOs, and they got out 
of their fear, also. They understood that these people could protect 
them. Then, for the last couple of years, we were able to mobilise 
these victims. (Interview with Faisal Siddiqui, Karachi, July 2016)
But as Siddiqui himself acknowledges, this tactic came at a cost:
We made a strategic mistake. We got bogged down in money mat-
ters. By trying to get this compensation, we really didn’t concen-
trate on other things [e.g. the passing of a new safety law or on the 
resumption of inspections in factories]. The monetisation of the 
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entire struggle was a big mistake. It had a very bad effect on the 
victims, also. It really limited their consciousness to the sole issue 
of money. Really, we played on the wicket of the enemy. They were 
willing to give us money if we gave up all other rights – the right 
to accountability, the right to labour rights enforcement … That 
was the deal. I think we fell into that trap. (Interview with Faisal 
Siddiqui, Karachi, July 2016)
This self-criticism echoes the frustrations of other legal activists fight-
ing similar cases in the region and beyond. In Bangladesh, for instance, 
the activist group called Activist Anthropologists has filed a public inter-
est litigation (PIL) in the country’s high court to demand justice for the 
victims of the November 2012 Tazreen Fashions factory fire. And as the 
court and industrialists colluded to promote compensation as the sole 
response to the tragedy, these activists came to realise that ‘public recog-
nition of suffering and the rights of compensation that it entails remains 
a largely ad hoc affair and generates a political program for compensa-
tion that keeps particular demands for structural change at bay’ (Sumon, 
Shifa and Gulrukh 2017).
Overall, Siddiqui is not a fetishist of the law. His legal activism – that 
is, his inclination to ‘talk law to power’ (Abel 2001) – cannot be isolated 
from his larger commitment to social reform, a project in which the law 
certainly has a role to play but where it should not take precedence over 
political mobilisation:
The legalisation of social struggles is another dangerous road to 
take. The law should always be seen, at best, as a tactical weapon, 
and sometimes, in the right circumstances, as a strategic weapon. 
It should never be the main weapon. The major reason why this 
case ended up as a complete failure – because that’s how I see it – 
is because we have this obsession with the law. We think we can 
legalise these … I wouldn’t say these are political struggles … These 
are social struggles … We had an opportunity to a certain extent to 
mobilise people in the textile sector, and we lost that opportunity … 
(…) We thought we would enforce all rights and change the entire 
structure through the legal system. (Interview with Faisal Siddiqui, 
Karachi, July 2016)
Siddiqui’s account of the Baldia factory fire case and of his own role in 
this legal battle was often puzzling for me. Part of this confusion had to 
do with his tactics of ‘ethnographic seduction’ (Robben 1996), and in 
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particular with the way he punctuated his account with sociological ref-
erences that seemed somewhat uncanny in the mouth of an informant, 
who obviously enjoyed confusing me by appropriating ‘my’ analytical 
language to reflect upon his own practice. What further confused me – 
and this unease grew even stronger after I started transcribing our taped 
conversations months later – were his apparent hesitations about the out-
comes of his struggle, and about the role of the law in it. If Siddiqui was a 
truly unusual legal activist, it was less for his influence and affluence than 
for his lack of faith in the capacity of the law to order the social world, 
convey its iniquities and propose solutions for its reform.49 Indeed, here 
was a cause lawyer who presented his legal successes as political defeats, 
who expressed scepticism about the politics of rights50 and who, instead 
of mobilising for an extension of the domain of the law (and its profes-
sionals), claimed that the ‘fetishism of the law’ (Comaroff and Comaroff 
2006) had done a disservice to his cause.
Conclusion
The successive changes of course of the Baldia factory fire case kept 
returning me to the tensile equilibrium that has been the trademark 
of Karachi’s politics since the mid-1980s at least. All around, disor-
der reigned supreme: in the systematic violations of labour laws and 
safety regulations by local industrialists; in the traffic jams that delayed 
the response of emergency services; in the blatant amateurism of phil-
anthropic organisations and law enforcement agencies in the face of a 
catastrophe of unprecedented magnitude; in the bungling by political 
authorities of an ‘accident’ that could not even be qualified as such with 
certainty; in the about-turns of victims and police officers called on in 
court; in the shift of the accused to the status of prosecutors; in the jubi-
lant engagement of a legal practitioner with the ‘anarchy of the law’. But 
disorder was not all there was to this case. Behind the apparent chaos, 
several forces capitalised on the disorder and to some degree contained 
it at the same time. The forces of capital, in the shape of the business 
community, reorganised themselves and succeeded in securing their eco-
nomic interests by containing the threat of a resurgent state regulator. In 
the process, the Bhailas were gradually rehabilitated through ‘restorative 
rituals’ that compensated the stigmatising impact of judicial proceed-
ings, minimised their responsibility and ruled out any intentional wrong-
doing – a process of restoration that generally protects delinquent elites 
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against the forms of degradation reserved for less privileged offenders 
(Lascoumes 2013).
This restoration process, which beyond the individual case of the 
Bhailas exonerated Karachi’s industrialists at large, operated through 
a requalification of the incident and a redistribution of responsibili-
ties. However deadly they had proven to be, the illegalities upon which 
Karachi’s manufacturing industries thrived were gradually overshad-
owed by the wrongdoings of the so-called ‘extortion mafia’ associated 
with the MQM and its racketeers-turned-arsonists. In the process, the 
army, the paramilitary Rangers and the ‘agencies’ succeeded in side-
lining the party that had ruled over Karachi as a personal fiefdom for 
almost three decades. The MQM was not eradicated but it was reduced 
to a shadow of its former, terrifying self. Decades of militancy and polit-
ical strife were replaced by a new agenda of ‘security’ that promised to 
be no less coercive and that, at least momentarily, seemed to overlap 
with the irregular capitalism that brought both wealth and death to the 
city. And finally, between and betwixt these forces of capital and coer-
cion, mediating their tensile relations, was the law. That blunt, rusty, 
double-edged sword of the law, which as E.P. Thompson famously – and 
at the time, at least for orthodox Marxist historians and social scien-
tists, controversially – argued, is never entirely subsumed in the insti-
tutions of the ruling class (Thompson 1975, 260). Of course, the status 
and creative appropriations of the law in contemporary Pakistan have 
little to do with those of eighteenth-century England. But it is precisely 
because of its apparent weaknesses and internal disorders that the role 
of the law in the adjudication of political and economic disputes in con-
temporary Pakistan is so intriguing. For all its circumventions, abuses 
and informalisation, it remains a common ground and a common lan-
guage – Thompson would say a common ‘ideology’ – for various social 
forces struggling for power, wealth and dignity. This is particularly true 
for the issue of labour rights – a cause which has largely disappeared 
from the public scene since the trade union movement and larger social 
struggles were brutally crushed by successive democratic and military 
regimes from the early 1970s onwards. As the perspective of collective 
mobilisations and the visibility of workers in the media receded, the 
courts became the last site to publicise labour issues and adjudicate 
workplace conflicts.
As Thompson underlines, this common ground of the law is essen-
tially a terrain of conflict, for it is in the nature of this medium to frustrate 
the ambitions of the ruling classes who had turned to it ‘for their own 
self-defence’ (Thompson 1975, 264). What the Baldia factory fire case 
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also exemplifies is that the outcome of these battles can never be taken 
for granted. Even as they serve the strategies of domination of the power-
ful and generate their own forms of coercion, as well as their own illegali-
ties, legal proceedings always retain a contingent part – the historical and 
individual ‘circumstances’ evoked by F. Siddiqui – which introduces some 
indeterminacy in the game and, as such, contributes to its reproduction. 
This was exemplified in the Baldia factory fire case by a handful of law-
yers and judges who, in the name of social justice, did not hesitate to 
bend the rules. The limited and contested successes of these jurists with a 
cause were therefore obtained less by applying the law by the book – thus 
entrapping the dominants into their own rhetoric of self-preservation, as 
Thompson would suggest – than by twisting the law in order to deliver 
justice. While legal mobilisation theory, for its part, generally insists on 
the creative appropriation of legal norms by social movements and the 
jurists helping them ‘talk law to power’ (McCann 2004), the present case 
study led us to uncover a less literalist use of the law by a group of activist 
lawyers and judges, whose complicity was itself the outcome of a political 
mobilisation of the legal fraternity.
Even as it underlines the resilience of the rule of law as a shared 
language and terrain of conflict in contemporary Pakistan, this case 
study speaks volumes about the ability of local economic elites to neu-
tralise it, whether in their day-to-day operations or in more dramatic 
situations, when their illegalities suddenly come under public scrutiny. 
While questioning the power of the law, these illegalities and the rela-
tive impunity guaranteed to white collar criminals raise the question of 
the dissolution of state authority in a situation of industrial dis/order 
based on the selective application of the law. The judicial proceedings 
analysed here undoubtedly reveal the limited capacity for intervention 
of state regulators in the day-to-day operations of Karachi’s industries. 
At the same time, the very existence of these judicial proceedings, as 
well as the various turns of the investigation, attest to the persistent 
role of state actors in delimiting the horizon of possibilities for these 
economic actors. Even if the state in question is a deeply fragmented 
one, torn between divergent logics of action, its capacities of influence 
and regulation – which largely operate through informal networks, 
upon which court orders themselves are dependent – are far from 
being negligible. As such, this case study is also an invitation to move 
beyond the dichotomy between strong and weak states while observing 
the penetration of polycentric societies by state forces, in particular by 
security establishments feeding upon various forms of disturbances to 
impose their own conception of public order.
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16. Tribunal’s Report For Ascertaining the Circumstances and Cause Leading to the Fire and Sub-
sequent Deaths and Injuries in the Incident That Took Place on 11.09.2012 in the Factory of 
M/S Ali Enterprises Located at Plot No. F-67 SITE Karachi, pp. 30–31.
17. Federal Investigation Agency, Sindh Zone Karachi, Enquiry Report. Fire Incident At Ali Enter-
prises S.I.T.E. Karachi On 11th September 2012, 3 October 2012, p. 10.
18. Ibid., p. 22.
19. Federal Investigation Agency, Sindh Zone Karachi, Enquiry Report. Fire Incident At Ali Enter-
prises S.I.T.E. Karachi On 11th September 2012, 3 October 2012, p. 10.
20. Karachi’s fire brigade has only 22 fire engines in working order; most of them are 30 years old; 
interview with Faisal Edhi, head of Edhi Foundation, Karachi, July 2017.
21. Interview with a prominent member of Edhi Foundation, Karachi, July 2017.
22. Tribunal’s Report For Ascertaining the Circumstances and Cause Leading to the Fire and Sub-
sequent Deaths and Injuries in the Incident That Took Place on 11.09.2012 in the Factory of 
M/S Ali Enterprises Located at Plot No. F-67 SITE Karachi, p. 16.
23. Office of the Police Surgeon Karachi, N°PSK/4305/6, 8 December 2012, p. 3.
24. Tribunal’s Report For Ascertaining the Circumstances and Cause Leading to the Fire and Sub-
sequent Deaths and Injuries in the Incident That Took Place on 11.09.2012 in the Factory of 
M/S Ali Enterprises Located at Plot No. F-67 SITE Karachi, p. 17.
25. Federal Investigation Agency, Sindh Zone Karachi, Enquiry Report. Fire Incident At Ali Enter-
prises S.I.T.E. Karachi On 11th September 2012, 3 October 2012, p. 20.
26. Interview with Faisal Siddiqui, Karachi, August 2017.
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27. In the high court of Sindh at Karachi, C.P. No D-3318/2012, Report of Pakistan Rangers 
(Sindh), 20 January 2015.
28. On the political history and economic activities of this force, see Gayer 2010.
29. Interview with a former chair of the KCCI and SITE Association of Industry, Karachi, July 2017.
30. In the high court of Sindh at Karachi, C.P. No D-3318/2012, Report of Pakistan Rangers 
(Sindh), 20 January 2015, p. 6.
31. B’adaalat Janaab Joint Additional District & Sessions Judge Sahab vs Karachi West, Progress 
Report (in Urdu), 2016.
32. The PFSA is a newcomer on the (burgeoning) forensic science scene in Pakistan. It was es-
tablished in 2007 under the Home Department of the province of Punjab and claims to have 
solved 280,000 cases in less than 10 years. See Sharif 2017.
33. I was never able to see a copy of this report despite repeated requests to police officers who had 
access to it.
34. Interview with a senior officer of the Sindh police and former member of the JIT, Karachi, 
August 2017.
35. Charge Sheet No. 238-C/2012, SITE-B Police Station, Karachi West, 19 August 2016.
36. In the Court of Judge, Anti Terrorism Court No. II, Karachi Division, Order 16.09.2016.
37. Interview with a close observer of the Baldia factory fire case, Karachi, August 2017.
38. The testimonies of most witnesses were not presented in court because successive alterations 
in the charge sheet delayed the formal opening of the trial. According to the legal counsel of 
the petitioners acting on behalf of the victims, most of this evidence (to which he did not have 
access) might have been destroyed by Investigation Officer Jehanzaib.
39. Statement U/s. 161 Cr. P.C., 14 September 2012, PS SITE-B.
40. Criminal Bail Application No. 1208 of 2012 (Arshad Abdul Aziz & Another vs The State) in the 
high court of Sindh, affidavit of Muhammad Omer, 8 November 2012.
41. Criminal Bail Application No. 1208 of 2012 (Arshad Abdul Aziz & Another vs The State) in the 
high court of Sindh, affidavit of Nazeer Ahmed, 8 November 2012.
42. Lyari is Karachi’s oldest working-class area. This decaying inner city area gave birth to a spe-
cific criminal scene in the course of the 1990s, leading to a series of deadly ‘gang wars’ in the 
following decade. Until recently, these gangs were rumoured to be patronised by the Pakistan 
People’s Party (PPP); on the connivance of these gangs with the economic and political elites 
of Karachi, see Gayer 2014, chap. 5.
43. Interview with Faisal Siddiqui, Karachi, July 2016.
44. In Pakistan as elsewhere, the creation of value in the textile industry implies a policy of cost 
reduction which, in this labour-intensive sector, relies heavily on the compression of wages. 
This has led textile industrialists to circumvent labour laws in various ways, either by subcon-
tracting parts of their production to unregistered sweatshops or by resorting to ‘third parties’ 
to provide them with ‘contract workers’. In Karachi, the textile industry also colludes with the 
so-called ‘water mafia’ to procure water unofficially, at a reduced cost. The illegalities of the 
local textile industry also have to do with their mode of insertion into the global economy and 
with the still-limited constraints exerted by their foreign clients, as far as labour laws and safe-
ty regulations are concerned. The situation is markedly different in the pharmaceutical sector, 
where the creation of value is less dependent upon the exploitation of labour, where there is 
more emphasis on the development of human resources through the training of workers and 
where there is much greater impetus to conform to international production norms and health 
regulations.
45. Interview with Faisal Siddiqui, Karachi, July 2016.
46. On the political and professional trajectory of Munir Malik, see Gayer 2009.
47. In this perspective, ‘The Mafia can be seen as the logical extension and the ultimate degenera-
tion of a climate of clientelism, favoritism and the appropriation of public resources for private 
gains’ (Chubb 1996, 289).
48. The Bhailas escaped from the site on the night of 11 September 2012. The police never made 
any serious attempt to arrest them. They then obtained protective bail from the Lahore high 
court, which allowed them to travel to Sindh without risking arrest. They later on received 
protective bail from the Sukkur bench of the Sindh high court so that they could appear in 
front of local courts prior to the trial. They were subsequently arrested in October 2012 but 
were granted bail a few months later.
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49. On this profession of faith of cause lawyers, see Gaïti and Israël 2003, 30.
50. During an interview in August 2017, Siddiqui emphasised how the language of rights, with 
its moderating effect on political claims, had done a disservice to social reform in Pakistan. 
This was another departure from typical legal activists, who have made ‘rights consciousness 
raising’ a central aspect of their action; see Scheingold 1974.
References
Abel, R. 2001. ‘Speaking Law to Power: Occasions for Cause Lawyering’, in Cause Lawyering. 
 Political Commitments and Professional Responsibilities, edited by A. Sarat and S. Scheingold, 
69–117. New York: Oxford University Press.
Amjad, R. 2007. Private Industrial Investment in Pakistan, 1960-1970. Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press.
Briquet, J.-L. 2007. Mafia, justice et politique en Italie. L’affaire Andreotti dans la crise de la Répub-
lique (1992-2004). Paris: Karthala.
Chambers of Commerce. 2012. ‘Prime Minister Visits Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Indus-
try’, 29 December. http://pakistanpressreleases.com/prime-minister-visits-karachi-cham-
ber-of-commerce-industry/ (accessed 8 April 2019).
Chubb, J. 1996. ‘The Mafia, the Market and the State in Italy and Russia’, Journal of Italian Studies 
1 (2): 273–91.
Comaroff, J. and J. L. Comaroff, eds. 2006. Law and Disorder in the Postcolony. Chicago, IL: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press.
Gaïti, B. and L. Israël. 2003. ‘Sur l’engagement du droit dans la construction des causes’, Politix 
62: 17–30.
Gayer, L. 2009. ‘Le général face à ses juges: la fronde de la magistrature pakistanaise’, Critique 
internationale 42: 95–118.
Gayer, L. 2010. ‘The Rangers of Pakistan: From Border Defense to Internal “Protection”’, in Organ-
ized Crime and States. The Hidden Face of Politics, edited by J.-L. Briquet and G. Favarel-Gar-
rigues. London: Palgrave.
Gayer, L. 2014. Karachi. Ordered Disorder and the Struggle for the City. London: Hurst.
Gayer, L. 2016. ‘The Need for Speed: Traffic Regulation and the Violent Fabric of Karachi’, Theory, 
Culture & Society 33 (7–8): 137–58.
Ghani, M.A., F.M. Ghani and N. Faisal. 2014. No Light at the End of the Tunnel. Labour Laws to No-
where. Lahore: Pakistan Law House.
Israël, L., G. Sacriste, A. Vauchez and L. Willemez. 2005. ‘Introduction’, in Sur la portée sociale du 
droit, edited by L. Israël, G. Sacriste, A. Vauchez and L. Willemez. Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France.
Kamal, N. 2012. ‘Burning Questions: The Karachi Factory Fire’, Newsline (Karachi), October.
Lascoumes, P. 2013. ‘Elites délinquantes et résistance au stigmate: Jacques Chirac et le syndrome 
Teflon’, Champ pénal, Vol. X. https://journals.openedition.org/champpenal/8388
Lascoumes, P. 2014. Sociologie des élites délinquantes. De la criminalité en col blanc à la corruption 
politique. Paris: Armand Collin.
Lyttelton, A. 1994. ‘Italy: The Triumph of TV’, New York Review of Books, 11 August.
Mansoor, H. 2016. ‘Laws of the Devil’, Dawn, 1 May.
McCann, M. 2004. ‘Law and Social Movements’, in The Blackwell Companion to Law and Society, 
edited by A. Sarat. Oxford: Blackwell.
Naseemullah, A. 2017. Development After Statism. Industrial Firms and the Political Economy of 
South Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Osiel, M.J. 1995. ‘Dialogue with Dictators: Judicial Resistance in Argentina and Brazil’, Law and 
Social Enquiry 20(2): 481–560.
Papanek, H. 1973. ‘Pakistan's New Industrialists and Businessmen: Focus on the Memons’, in 
 Entrepreneurship and Modernization of Occupational Cultures in South Asia, edited by M. Sing-
er. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
PILER. 2009. Pakistan mein labour courts ki surat-e-hal. Survey report (in Urdu) (The situation of 
labour courts in Pakistan. Survey report). Karachi: PILER.
 PUTT ING OUT THE BALDIA FACTORY F IRE 321
Robben, A. 1996. ‘Ethnographic Seduction, Transference, and Resistance in Dialogues about Terror 
and Violence in Argentina’, Ethos 24(1): 71–106.
Sarat, A. and S. Scheingold, eds. 2001. Cause Lawyering and the State in a Global Era. New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Scheingold, S. 1974. The Politics of Rights. Lawyers, Public Policy, and Political Change. New Haven: 
Yale University Press.
Sharif, S. 2017. ‘Assessing Forensic Science Landscape in Pakistan’, MIT Technology Review 
 (Pakistan), 4 May. http://www.technologyreview.pk/assessing-forensic-science-land-
scape-pakistan/ (accessed 8 April 2019).
Sumon, M.H., N. Shifa and S. Gulrukh. 2017. ‘Discourses of Compensation and the Normalization 
of Negligence: The Experience of the Tazreen Factory Fire’, in Unmaking the Global Sweatshop. 
Health and Safety of the World's Garment Workers, edited by R. Prentice and G. De Neve. Phila-
delphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Thompson, E.P. 1975. Whigs and Hunters. The Origin of the Black Act. London: Penguin Books.
322
Epilogue
South Asian criminal economies
Barbara Harriss-White
By way of conclusion this chapter reviews the findings of the book along four 
dimensions: first, the project’s contribution to scholarship on the crime- 
business-politics nexus; second, the meaning of ‘wildness’; third, contribu-
tions of micro-economic and anthropological studies to macro-level models 
of the criminalisation of politics and the politicisation of crime; and last, the 
thorniest question: of what is to be done.
Part one: the crime–business–politics nexus
This book is an exploration in political economy and field economics, 
and in anthropology and ethnography, focussing on the day-to-day social 
realities of the criminal economy. While it has been years in the making, 
formally since 2012, with most of the 12 contributors spending months 
in the field, its actual genesis covers a much longer period, since research-
ers returned to familiar places which they had often studied over many 
years in the past. The case studies all find local economies that are dom-
inated by forms of capital that ignore state regulative law or selectively 
manipulate it to their advantage. These formations control party politics, 
simultaneously depriving the state of resources while plundering it of 
the resources it receives from others; they control the sectors they invest 
in, using violence wherever necessary. Accumulation then runs through 
political parties and individual criminal organisations and families. 
Bound to these criminal organisations are extensive networks involving 
both bonded and/or migrant wage labour and small-scale self-employed 
workers in the sector concerned, as well as the police, officials in revenue 
administration and other state agencies, and party politicians. A mul-
titude of other activities is also required to co-ordinate these economic 
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and political transactions: fixers, protectors, middlemen, contractors 
and subcontractors, clientelist funders and money managers for political 
parties, lawyers, forgers and vigilantes. And these in turn are embedded 
in collective institutions, from political parties, chambers of commerce, 
business associations and trades unions to criminal syndicates and lob-
bies, illegal cartels, ‘rackets’ and gangs, clans and families.
Studies on the accumulation of billionaire wealth and the politics 
of apex public-private partnerships often ignore the systemic nature of 
the criminal economy (Gandhi and Walton 2012; Bernie 2012; Crabtree 
2018). To reduce its social relationships to ‘corruption’ or ‘rent seeking’ 
is to neglect the abundance of behaviours implicated in the system as 
a whole. Calling them ‘supply chains’ (as this project’s political econo-
mists initially did) does not convey their complexity or their manifold 
activities, objectives and uncertainties. Even the concept of a ‘sector’ fails 
to convey the close interlinkages between a series of commodities and 
areas of criminal endeavour. Ruud finds the concept of ‘syndicate’ useful 
(Chapter 10) while Gayer refers to a ‘network of connivance’ (Chapter 
11). Michelutti and Harriss-White call the messy bundle of social rela-
tions and variously structured components ‘assemblages’.1 Portfolios 
can be extensive in a criminal assemblage, mixing the criminal with the 
‘up-front legal’ and sometimes with accumulation from illegal commod-
ities (as happens in these three examples: i) fuel-oil, kerosene, oil adul-
terants, sand, real estate, hotels and transport in Chapter 6; ii) coal, iron, 
media, tourism and hotels, liquor, real estate, education and transport in 
Chapter 1; iii) illegal arms, illegal timber, illegal alcohol, quarries, con-
struction and control over petrol pumps in Chapter 7).
Our case studies of the supply of timber, oil, coal, procurement and 
real estate show how criminal organisations form a continuum both with 
the informal economy – activity under the threshold for regulation (or 
above it and covered by regulation which is not enforced) – and with 
the formally registered, state-regulated economy. Non-final demand for 
criminally supplied commodities and services also forms a continuum – 
ranging from workshop firms not eligible for state-regulated provisions 
(e.g. coal) to telecom’s corporate oligopolists, building contractors, dam 
builders and international timber businesses. Mafia houses – criminal 
families accumulating profit by using violence and politics in business – 
may be legally registered and may even declare and pay tax on some of 
their turnover.
Assemblages in which the mafia are the leading but not the sole pro-
tagonists are entwined with politics. Sectors such as coal and real estate 
are organised through a system of interlocking transactions – legal and 
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illegal, political and economic – all backed by licensed and unlicensed 
violence and threats, which bind the state and its agencies to the mar-
ket and its agencies. For this, Michelutti et al. (2018) have invoked the 
Italian concept of intreccio, signifying that the criminal economy and the 
actually existing state and politics are not separate worlds, but are fused. 
Under conditions of intreccio, the state as designed in law is unable to 
control the regulation or taxation of the market.
While it is widely accepted that qualitative research can generate 
higher-order generalisations about processes (Becker 2017; Flyvbjerg 
2006), our findings do not say anything definitive about the extent of the 
criminal economy in India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, nor its relation to 
democratic politics. Yet the authoritative intimacy with reality that had 
to be developed in all the fieldwork has made it hard not to see the find-
ings as part of wider patterns. Building arguments through analogies and 
examples, they include (following the order of the preceding chapters): 
a mafia state; mafia criminality; predatory, violent commodification and 
a pork-barrel state; a policy no-man’s-land, ethno-accumulation, and a 
politics of accumulation by corruption; a criminal caucus, business fused 
with politics in systemic plunder; goonda raj, competitive to monopolistic 
mafia raj; syndicate raj and mastan raj; internationalised criminal capi-
talism; a mafia state; and finally party-politicised legality and politicised 
predation.
Is it unwarranted to see these as general phenomena? Is the crimi-
nal economy confined to Gandhi and Walton’s ‘rent-thick’ sectors – which 
we happen to have researched – outside which the economy is legally 
compliant? In fact, Gandhi and Walton found that less than half of the 
Forbes list of Indian billionaires had actually accumulated their wealth 
in rent-thick sectors (2012, 13). The NCAER’s State Investment Potential 
Index Report for 2017 found that corruption was still the single biggest 
problem for ‘entrepreneurs’. Yet while for 56 per cent of Indian business 
executives corruption was more or less of a problem, 44 per cent of those 
surveyed in 2017 had ‘no problem with corruption’ (which of course does 
not mean they were not involved in corrupt practices) (NCAER 2017, 
9–10). How useful are the concepts of ‘rent-thick sectors’ or summary 
indicators like ‘corruption’, when we see here that the criminal economy 
is so much more complex and dispersed?
Are there ‘clean’ – or much cleaner – sectors that our research design 
has missed? Not the rapidly growing sector of waste, where the supreme 
court banned manual scavenging in 1993 and again in 2014. Yet, among 
the litany of waste-crimes, every year hundreds of ‘scavengers’ continue 
to be suffocated to death by methane in sewers that municipal authorities 
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have demanded they unclog (Harriss-White 2019). Food and agriculture 
are still the largest single employers and repositories of poverty. In an 
argument for reconfiguring welfare subsidies, Bhalla (2014) identi-
fied fraud and incompetence in the food economy, reporting that half 
the grain purchased for the public distribution system was ‘misplaced’ 
between the warehouse and ration shop and that a further 30 per cent 
was ‘left to rot in government storage facilities’. Meanwhile research on 
the regulation of land, agricultural markets and real estate confirms a 
‘political space’ in which tenancies are regulated by caste relations and 
not by law; agricultural wages are also stratified by caste, maintained 
below the legal minimum with Dalits worst paid. Crop sales face ille-
gally collusive agents. Meanwhile regulators are bribed to grant multiple 
licences for agri-processing and to enable pollution controls and quality 
standards to be ignored. Agricultural transport is ‘taxed’ using prepaid 
cards in return for illegal overloading. Every office peon is well versed in 
extortion. The law is ignored, is at the mercy of conflicts within the local 
capitalist class, or is flouted without sanction and buttressed by illegal 
private markets. Prakash (2017) has extrapolated from his field research 
to conceptualise the state as ‘hybrid’ – where multiple formal and infor-
mal institutions are intertwined in collusion, rent-seeking and rent-giv-
ing, simultaneous patronage and clientelage, in which control over this 
sector is distributed outside the formal state (2017, 182–4). So agricul-
ture and food can certainly not be assumed a priori to be ‘clean’.
Is there less crime in welfare? Rajshekhar’s (2015–2017) three-year 
pan-Indian ‘Ear to the Ground’ project reports widespread inadequacies 
in redistributive and welfare projects in which crime is one of many pro-
cesses of democratic failure.2 Fernandez’s meticulous study (2012) of 
the technologies of bureaucratic power at play in implementing a wel-
fare policy for poor tribal women shows a system replete with arbitrary 
manipulation, irregular procedural reinterpretations, retrospective 
legitimations, unauthorised improvements, abuse and fraud, delays, 
lack of coordination, underperformance and non-compliant targetting 
and selection of participants, such that apparently intended beneficiar-
ies become victims and vice versa (Fernandez 2012). To judge from 
Rajshekhar’s and Fernandez’s research, the field of welfare is consistent 
with intreccio, not separate from it.
Furthermore, many aspects of the criminal economy also have direct 
effects on welfare. Chapter 2, on fire, also shows the dangers to the wel-
fare of contracted mineworkers through the blatant disregard for health 
and safety regulations at work, while the more or less forced resettlement 
of Scheduled Tribal people at risk from subsidence and surface fire in 
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ready-made slums without social infrastructure, social entitlements or 
work is an affront to their welfare. Meanwhile the failure to regulate 
quality standards, as for fuel (Chapter 6), or the permitting of fuel to be 
self-regulated in criminally adulterated forms, together with the failure 
to prevent extortion on tenancies for private childcare (Chapter 8) and 
the failure to allocate property to entitled SCs (Chapter 9) – all reduce 
welfare.
So, is the criminal economy confined to certain regions? After all, 
epicentres of ‘severe’ corruption in India are said by the NCAER to be con-
fined to West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan, Punjab and Assam (NCAER 
2017). Three of these states – West Bengal, Tamil Nadu and Punjab – fig-
ure in our project, but so do other states: Arunachal, Andhra, Jharkhand, 
Uttar Pradesh and the metropolitan megacities. And, while the criminal 
economy is far from being confined to remote places and border areas, it 
most certainly crosses state borders, exploiting the impunities conferred 
by state boundaries. It uses SEZs in this way too. Other research on the 
informalisation of food policy and on labour regulation has shown that 
state boundaries can mean significant changes in the scope, practices 
and economic outcomes of government policies (Mooij 1999; Mahmood 
2017). Yet significant regionalised differences in a range of economic 
activities have been shown to have negligible relation to the frontiers of 
states (Fouillet 2011; Harriss-White et al. 2014; Basile, Harriss-White 
and Lutringer 2016). States are often arbitrary data-containers, and it 
is hard to believe that the criminal economies we have studied do not 
spill over into other places. It is also unlikely that our examples are not 
replicated elsewhere.
Our conclusions can thus be treated as hypotheses to be refuted. 
They are as follows: that the criminal economy is now normal. Where 
we have investigated it, it is pervasive and systemic. Popular fantasies 
about its tight organisation notwithstanding, it is also fluid, opportun-
ist and fragmented, but it is nonetheless durable; its heights are socially, 
economically and politically exclusive. While individuals may be scape-
goated and even fall, the system itself survives and thrives through shifts 
among ruling parties after elections (as shown in detail here for coal, 
sand, timber and public procurements). The criminalised state is not a 
failed state.
In addition, while macro-political conditions differ in Bangladesh 
and Pakistan, their criminal economies are similar to Indian cases. They 
invoke characterisations as Pax Mafiosa and ‘partyarchy’, a consocia-
tional mafia-owned democracy (for Bangladesh); and a paradigm of 
degeneration, ordered disorder, the anarchy of the law, of struggle and 
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convergence between civil and criminal law, unbridled capitalism and 
the ‘Wild Wild West’ (for Pakistan).
So, in the process of expanding and refining knowledge, immediate 
priorities for further research include answering these questions:
1. The extent to which, and conditions under which, criminal econ-
omy assemblages are alternatives to the state or are entwined 
with it;
2. The related question of whether intreccio and the mafia raj are to 
be understood as ‘normal’ capitalism and the ‘normal’ form of the 
state in South Asia;
3. Relations between the registered, formal economy and what 
are known to be larger informal and criminal components, and 
between legal and criminal behaviour inside capitalist firms and 
state corporates;
4. The extent to which our case studies are peculiar, state-specific, 
regional or at times perhaps sectoral variations in the forms taken 
by criminal economies. Are there less criminalised fields of eco-
nomic life and how do they, and their regulators, engage with the 
criminal economy?
These questions have implications for field methods. Clipboards/lap-
tops and pre-designed and coded multiple-choice questions will not 
yield answers to these questions. Ethnographic approaches are more 
appropriate.
Part two: the Wild East justified
While ‘Wild West’ capitalism is a term frequently used pejoratively to refer 
to Russia – and rule by oligarchs – and even China, connoting unfettered 
accumulation – how useful did the framework considered in the Intro-
duction, supplied by its two accounts of Wild West anarcho- capitalism 
and primitive accumulation, prove to be? Both narratives emphasise the 
establishment of the rule of law, either in the collective law-making of 
settlers or in the pro-capitalist, property-protective American state after 
Independence. Our case material by contrast explores the realities of 
long-established regulative law and its breaking.
In the Wild East, states clearly matter, and these differ in their capac-
ities to regulate and enforce the law – and in the extent of their reach 
and of their capture. Laws to protect labour are partially or completely 
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unenforced because most people do not see the labour laws as being bro-
ken, since they do not know these laws exist. Our case studies also show 
that the practice of law can be distorted in ways that are not criminal – for 
example policies may be retrospectively altered to make ad hoc exemp-
tions to benefit political cronies (as in telecom, Chapter 5; see also Bernie 
2012; Thakurta et al. 2017). The case studies also reveal a vast reper-
toire of pathways to criminal accumulation, including resource seizure 
(for example land, energy, etc.); labour displacement and eviction; the 
elimination of competition (between market and state, between sectors, 
scales, regions and castes); monopoly rents; preferential allocations of 
resources (such as subsidies, physical infrastructure, learning rents/priv-
ileged information); the under-pricing of resources (including labour); 
tax evasion; capital flight; the sabotage, capture and destruction of pol-
icy; the evasion of regulations (especially respecting environment, labour 
and licences); the formation of markets in physical protection (including 
the protection of non-criminals); and control over the means of social 
redistribution. Any attempt to bring order to this list would do injustice 
to the variety of ways in which they are mixed in the criminal economy.
Wildness in the rule of law
Evidently the rule of law is broken. How does this happen? The appendix 
summarises laws alleged or established to have been broken in our 11 
case studies. Despite the variation in detail, a number of features stand 
out.
The state: Law-breaking is not confined to criminal organisations 
with the complicity of the police and politicians. Many state agencies are 
extensively involved, at different levels, in failing to raise tax and non-tax 
revenue, diverting state resources to private uses, and failing to regulate 
the economy through law. These range from central government corpo-
rations and vigilance services, such as customs and excise, through state-
level corporations and most departments of government responsible for 
regulating the sectors we studied, down to local panchayat government. 
Some crimes, such as bribery, fraud and tax evasion, are pervasive; but 
some are specific (as in the case of the derecognition of eligibility for reha-
bilitation and resettlement for people threatened by underground fire).
Assemblages: Attempts in the appendix to identify and summarise 
single types of offender (as in ‘mafia’ or ‘state’) gloss over the clustered 
but differentiated social relations that characterise a criminal assem-
blage. Criminal dealings in legal commodities may be interlocked with 
dealings in illegal commodities (drugs, arms, types of liquor, sports 
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betting, trafficking), in which case the antagonistic individual and party 
politicisation appear to be a more prominent part of the assemblage – as 
do privatised protection and extreme violence.
Legal complexity: In South Asian societies where knowledge of 
legal processes is likely to be better developed than that of the law 
itself,3 each sector we researched is festooned in a legal complex 
likely to have been publicly debated only by legislators at its incep-
tion, if then. Many criminal assemblages cut through and ignore great 
swathes of legal complexes that lawyers themselves have difficulty 
mastering.
Corruption: Bribery is widespread and is a precondition for fraud, 
waiving regulations and sharing illegal profit, purchasing votes and party 
allegiance from workers, and purchasing silence. Cash is not the only 
form it takes; exchanges in kind are also common, sometimes codified at 
publicly known rates/prices. Despite its central role in corruption theory, 
however, bribery seems less important than other kinds of law-breaking 
unrelated to bribery, particularly defrauding the state – to which bribery 
has often been linked (Roy 1996; Bernie 2012).
Existence conditions: Finally, in the appendix we have also noted 
activity that is not criminal but does form part of the existence condi-
tions of the criminal economy. These are not confined to, but include: 
violation of customary ‘norms of violation’ (as in access to watercourses 
and forests, Chapter 4); clashes and power asymmetries between cus-
tom and law; preferential prioritising and practice of regulative policy 
(airwaves for example, Chapter 5); unregulated commodification (as 
in speculation in MoUs or disputed titles, Chapters 4 and 8); politicised 
media ownership enabling stage-managed reports, forced silence and 
blackmail (Chapters 9 and 10; see also Thakurta 2010); threats gener-
ating fear that leads in turn to self-censorship and silent complicity; and 
the deliberate casualisation and disenfranchising of the unskilled labour 
force, which deprives those workers – who are not necessarily toiling in 
ignorance – of any alternative to complicity (see the red sanders timber 
case, Chapter 7).
Why is economic law found here to be so difficult to enforce? Why is 
punishment so rare? The case studies suggest several reasons:
Resources: Resources (transport, computers, legal resources) may 
be scarce and personnel inadequately skilled or incompetent.
Complexity: Legal regulation can be technically complex (as the 
Kolkata real estate and Barisal procurement cases show in Chapters 8 
and 10). Complexity intensifies the difficulty of enforcement and the ease 
of criminal evasion.
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Crime-friendly law: Our field material suggests that certain kinds of 
law are crime-facilitating. By this we mean laws that are either deliber-
ately or through incompetence drafted to leave loopholes and incentives 
for crime (as is the case of MoUs in Arunachal, the environmental law 
concerning construction over water bodies and water courses in Chapters 
4 and 8, and police investigation procedure in Karachi in Chapter 11). 
Second, crime-friendly law features punishment for infringement so 
disproportionate to the ‘crime’ that it incentivises criminal evasion (the 
Antiquities and Art Treasures Act of 1972 being a famous example; 
Vaish and Marwahah 2015). Third, any law where the evidence needed 
for court cases is stipulated in forms and with a degree of detail that is 
exceedingly difficult to provide also incentivises criminal evasion (as 
we saw to be the case in compensation valuations in Chapter 4, ten-
ant protection in Chapter 8 and victim compensation in Chapter 11). 
Manifestly socially unjust law or law unable to prevent injustice is also 
crime-friendly (see the case of negligent resettlement and rehabilitation 
provision in the face of the threat from fire; Chapter 2). Finally, any law 
whose text shifts faster than the arrangements for its enforcement may 
also facilitate its own breaking (for example the 59 amendments to the 
Essential Commodities Act4). There may be many more kinds of crime-
friendly law.
Complicity: Under conditions where the costs of delivering services 
efficiently do not threaten criminal bureaucratic accumulation, the lat-
ter can co-exist with the former. But state employees – in the bureau-
cracy, the police and the courts – often benefit privately from failing to 
uphold or enforce the law, in contexts where their incentive to enforce 
is overbalanced by their incentive to fail to enforce. The latter incentive 
takes many forms – in kind (vehicles, even land) as well as cash, sourced 
from the state as well as provided by criminal organisations, and main-
tained through greed or fear. Fractions of the state behave as criminal 
businesses – sometimes alongside compliant public corporations, public 
service and administration. As shown in earlier research on the sociology 
of tax law and practice of commercial taxation in Tamil Nadu, cultures of 
non-compliance mean that, as a Tamil proverb has it, ‘an honest man is 
he who does not know how to live’ (Jairaj and Harriss-White 2006).
Order without law
Without any regulation at all, as in mining in Jharkhand (Chapters 1 
and 2), extractive activity is dangerous to the workforce underground, to 
people’s homes and lives at the surface, to public infrastructure, and – as 
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the chapters on fire, sand and timber illustrate so well – to what is left of 
the natural world including the atmosphere it poisons. In the neoliberal 
era if the only case for the state involved reducing such dangers, it would 
be a convincing case.
Substitutes for the law
Much of the criminal economy is ordered through forms of authority 
grounded in pre-existing customary and collective action. Chapter 4 
shows how the current criminal turn in Arunachal Pradesh represents a 
flouting of both customary norms – even the norms for responses to the 
violation of custom – and state law. The extensive informal economy is 
regulated through authoritative practices grounded in culture: patriar-
chy constrains the assets and occupational choices of (inferior) men as 
well as women; caste and ethnicity supply a corporatist ideology, struc-
ture access and define insiders and outsiders with whom transactions 
may vary; religions meanwhile supply collective identity and institutions 
to regulate accumulation and distributive activity. Business associations 
consolidate socially corporatist economies (Basile and Harriss-White 
2010). In the so-called neoliberal era, while law-making institutions and 
the protection of property and people are being privatised, sites of eco-
nomic authority multiply. However, the case studies indicate that, wher-
ever they operate, the mafia have paramount regulatory authority.
Intreccio
Illegal markets based on plundering state resources and illegal mar-
kets run by local mafias are not without order but are idiosyncratically 
meshed with legally compliant activity. The informal is meshed with the 
formal, and interlocked transactions form structures of control involving 
systems of taxation and tribute interwoven with those of the Revenue 
Department, policed by privatised and politicised forces.
It is remarkable that in an era of rampant and tightly defined nation-
alism, the unit of moral accountability in the criminal economy – clan, 
caste, dynasty, family – is so far removed from the banner of the nation.
Wildness as violence
As Marx wrote, force itself ‘is an economic power’ (1887, Chapter 31). 
Not all law-breaking is violent, but, in this book, the only case where 
the use of physical violence was not mentioned was crime in spectrum 
allocations, at the apex of the national economy. The Bangladesh case 
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(Chapter  10) tracks a move away from violent predations on the local 
state and on people to economic crime or soft crime – ‘the criminal life 
of legal commodities’ – and from the use of weapons to negotiations and 
deals. In most of this book however economic crime is not reported as 
being ‘soft’. On the contrary, in every case except spectrum allocation, 
criminal activity is policed by threats and intimidation; in many cases by 
extortion, by violent and abusive enforcement (often with private militias, 
goons, armies, in family vendettas) and by ‘structural violence’ (Galtung 
1969) permeating work conditions (with special oppression meted out to 
trade unionists). Order is enforced through physical assault and injury, 
mutilation and torture, kidnap, abduction and disappearances. Over half 
the case studies report murder as a weapon of regulation. While most of 
this violence reflects the power of patronage of criminals over the state 
and over economic and political rivals, in certain cases (as in the timber 
economy) the state’s own task forces kill suspected smugglers in ‘encoun-
ters’. The brutal treatment of labour as ‘smugglers’ also leads to questions 
about the political interests behind the marginalisation, oppression, 
mass imprisonment and slaughter of tribal labour (Chapter 7).
While the era of American primitive accumulation is said to have 
pieced together the wage labour force in a ‘discontinuous process’ (Baker 
1990), in South Asia, its ‘making’ remains violent and coercive as well 
as discontinuous. Labour has been co-opted into complicity in crime by 
money or force and by the absence of alternative livelihoods. Violence 
takes yet other forms in our research: the seizure of resources and prop-
erty using armed robbery; the vandalism of pipelines and infrastruc-
ture; the trafficking in, and destruction of, endangered species, riverbeds, 
water-bodies and beaches, geological/mineral resources, soil and slopes; 
and wanton air pollution. The natural world, victim of the criminal econ-
omy, can defend itself only in a Latourian way, when extreme events 
wreak havoc on society,5 without regard for virtue or criminality.
Victims
Those that lose from criminal economies are not always assetless work-
ers and dependent people. The exchequer is a major loser. Estimates 
of its losses from the fraudulent 2009 coal auction varied between the 
official US$30 billion and an earlier (leaked) US$210 billion, and the 
eventual re-auction raised US$33 billion (Crabtree 2015, citing a former 
comptroller and auditor general).6 Foregone resources of this magni-
tude might have been invested in hard or soft infrastructure in support 
of public and/or private accumulation, or in implemented policy for 
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redistribution. The  degradation and pollution of the environment also 
hits the middle and bourgeois classes even if the damage to health they 
cause is thought to be inversely related to class (PHFI 2017).
At the micro scale too, the losers through real estate swindles are not 
necessarily poor (Chapters 8 and 9); nor are the scions of mafia dynasties 
who fall victim to violent vendettas (Chapters 1, 2, 6 and 7). The zeal-
ous administrator, punished by re-posting – and occasionally by assassi-
nation – for seeking to root out mafia criminality is not poor. Workshop 
producers and consumers, sometimes unentitled to state provisions, who 
purchase products on black markets are also not necessarily poor.
In the hierarchies of patronage and clientelage and the fluid arrange-
ments of criminal assemblages, the most numerous victims of the crim-
inal economy are those who make it possible through their labour and 
those whose livelihoods are destroyed by its environmental impact. It is 
the victimised workforce that drives criminal growth and accumulation. 
Evoked in detail in Chapters 2 (fire) and 7 (timber), they are typically 
lowest-caste and tribal people, petty producers and traders, precarious 
and unfree wage labour, or migrants bonded to contractors, ignorant of 
other stages of the system in which they are embedded, ignorant of local 
languages. They do dangerous work in exacting conditions for poor and 
delayed pay, suffer poor health and early drop-out, are controlled under 
intense physical discipline, are victims of threats or violence and are tar-
getted for punishment by the state. Described in detail in Chapters 3 on 
sand, 4 on water, 6 on fuel, 7 on biomass and 8 and 9 on land, the victims 
of criminal economic activity are those denied their legitimate access to 
common property resources, to formerly clean and available water and 
soil; people whose air, water, soil and biodiversity are compromised and 
polluted. In the tense relationships between identity, citizenship and wel-
fare entitlements, they are also those most frequently excluded from eli-
gibility for state welfare and most dependent on informal parodies.
Resistance
Practically every case study bore witness to resistance to, or in, criminal 
economies. It is not that there is little resistance, or that it lacks access 
to the state, but rather that it is poor resistance, lacking effective coun-
tervailing power over states riddled with political-criminal complicity. 
Resistance to the local mafia is part of the discourse of competing parties 
ahead of elections. Winners may use moments of political change to pros-
ecute formerly immune criminal politicians or criminals formerly pro-
tected by rival parties (Chapters 1, 6, 7 and 10). But this is comparatively 
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rare, and the minute proportion who are sentenced find ways to secure 
bail or are reported as freed early (as in Chapter 5).7 Mafias are resisted 
by other elements in the criminal assemblage – in black coal these are 
syndicates and cycle wallahs (Chapter 1), as well as by labour organisers 
(Chapter 2), civil society organisations, movements of victims (Chapters 
8 and 9), social and political activists, students and exceptional journal-
ists and public interest lawyers (Chapters 3, 4 and 5). Expert commissions 
of enquiry have exposed crimes (Chapter 3). The judiciary has played an 
important role in identifying economic crimes and ordering the state to 
proceed against criminals – but it lacks enforcement powers (Chapters 3 
and 11). Of course much resistance – and to judge from the case studies, 
the most effective resistance – comes from criminal organisations and 
assemblages to challenges not from the institutions listed above but from 
labour, to the threat posed by reprisals due to political competition, and 
to hostile competition from rivals.
In the Braudellian terms of our Introduction here, has the notion 
of wildness helped the ‘interpretation of events’? To sum up our concept 
of wildness: the process of creating capital reported here is a highly con-
flictual and wasteful process. The case studies more resemble primitive 
accumulation than the Wild West’s anarcho-capitalism. Criminal accu-
mulation involves the coexistence and mutual dependence of capitalist 
accumulation (profit from wage labour invested in expanded reproduc-
tion) with primitive accumulation (seizure of resources for productive 
investment and separation of labour from their means of production) 
and with common or garden theft for non-productive ends. Our evidence 
allows for various interpretations of the concept of the primitive: cap-
ture of the state, plunder from the state (Harvey’s accumulation by dis-
possession (ABD)), under-priced/under-invoiced transactions, market 
transactions with varying degrees of violence, pillage, together with the 
creation and preservation of coercively controlled, unfree labour under 
conditions akin to slavery. A further distinctively South Asian character-
istic of criminal accumulation is the perpetuation of small-scale activity 
alongside vast criminal empires.
Evidently more research needs developing on several topics:
1. The balance between the roles of culture, political power and the 
logic of profit-making in criminal accumulation;
2. The politics and economics of law-breaking within the state appa-
ratus and public corporations, their internal victims and benefi-
ciaries, the roles of vigilance and punishment in public agencies 
and agencies regulating private markets;
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3. Sectoral and regional variations, pursuing the intense specificity of 
much of this behaviour inside South Asia;
4. The status and roles of compliant behaviour in cultures of 
non-compliance;
5. Explorations of crime-friendly law;
6. The varied social and political responses to crimes against the 
environment, property and persons of differing status;
7. The impact of fear and terror on economic behaviour in large and 
in small businesses;
8. Granular policy studies (after the method of Fernandez 2012) 
in sectors affecting, and affected by, the criminal economy, e.g. 
finance, the police and other regulators and vigilance agencies;
9. The politics of complicity.
Part three: macro and micro – contributions from field 
economics and anthropology
As it goes to press, this book joins other new contributions to a scholarly 
understanding of the neoliberal economy and its threat to democratic 
politics. We have space to sample three here.
Kapur and Vaishnav (2018) see the neoliberal democratic threat 
as a worldwide phenomenon in which India, the world’s largest democ-
racy, is embedded. India’s considerable election costs, many legitimate,8 
must be met either by candidates’ self-financing (Sircar 2018) or by busi-
ness funding to parties (a telling example being the cement industry) in 
return for favours. Alternatively, in the case of cash-strapped subaltern 
parties, symbiotic relations with larger parties in alliances involve cross-
party subsidies in return for sacrifices and compromises in the alloca-
tion of party candidates (Collins 2018). All three mechanisms constrain 
the entry and success of candidates. The complex business of political 
money sometimes flows multi-directionally; elsewhere the three ways of 
meeting election costs characterise different levels of electoral business 
politics (Bussell 2018). In the institution of the election commission, the 
state has acted with integrity but presides over poor quality election leg-
islation which political parties have no interest to reform. In Kapur and 
Vaishnav’s project, where flows of campaign money from politicians to 
voters are understood as gifts signalling exchanges rather than outright 
purchase of votes, where the black economy is argued ‘counterintuitively’ 
as capable of ‘generating positive consequences’ (growth, employment 
and social networks) (Bussell 2018, 27), the criminal economy itself is 
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not characterised as among the driving threats to democracy.9 Crime is a 
matter of ‘background’ or quantifiable ‘cases’, and mafias are hardly men-
tioned. Our book contributes to the ‘more research’ Kapur and Vaishnav 
call for, with accumulation at its heart.
Second, James Crabtree, a former economic correspondent for the 
Financial Times in India, has pieced together five years of access to the 
new billionaire class and the regulative and banking elite serving it, not 
only chronicling the unprecedented inequality it creates, its ballooning 
numbers, wealth (rising from US$176 billion in 2011 to US$500 billion 
by 2018) and its vast and globally conspicuous consumption, but also 
unearthing its politics (Crabtree 2018). At odds with a ruling party-po-
litical discourse extolling equality and anti-fraud, elections are found 
by Crabtree to be working through faction and patronage, funded by 
crony capital that is enriched in feedback relations of nepotism, unde-
tected political funding and corrupt state agencies. Decentralised to con-
stituent states, the pork barrel as described by Jeyaranjan (Chapter  3) 
is reinterpreted as ‘entrepreneurial municipal corruption’. Under the 
BJP, Crabtree sees a rebalancing of relations between politics and busi-
ness (using digital technology, public auctions, tougher loan conditions, 
etc.) and no reason why India should not move into a progressive era. 
Set beside Crabtree’s ‘journey through a gilded age’, our project is almost 
entirely underneath his navigation system, often in Ruud’s ‘provincial 
ponds’ (Chapter 10). Only two of our cases involve US dollar-denomi-
nated billionaires (in airwaves and in a portfolio built on timber, the lat-
ter not appearing among the 140 Indians on the Forbes lists). Our local 
case studies of the practice of crime may explain how the ruling party 
could appear in his eyes relatively distanced from the mafia (Crabtree 
2015, 2018), how the criminality of the neoliberal economy is not con-
fined to its apex but is systemic and how the move towards a progressive 
era is strewn with vast obstacles.
Third, Rajshekhar’s project for Scroll.in, ‘Ear to the Ground’ 
(Rajshekhar 2015–17), involved three years of field research from early 
2015 in six states, examining the biggest changes in a ‘nation in flux’ – 
flushing out the principal conundrum of widespread malfeasance against 
poor people, amid the Forbes Rich List’s egregious wealth. In 77 reports, 
this malfeasance ranges from failure to protect people from arsenic con-
tamination in Bihar through opaque party-political meddling and declin-
ing profitability in Gujarat’s milk cooperatives; informalising local ruling 
party political power over the police and revenue administration, thereby 
marginalising the elected representatives in Punjab; preferential con-
tracts for local ruling party workers, etc. Finding no single explanation 
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for such behaviour on the part of the state, he invokes poor revenues, 
fiscal conservativism and defective and withering competences in state 
bureaucracies, the understaffing of state services, and the overriding 
need to attract business. He finds ‘drift’ – path dependence and lack of 
manoeuvrability – and cannot avoid recording the damaging effects of 
the centralising and extractive tendencies of political parties. He sees the 
criminal economy, tax evasion and parallel politicised taxation systems 
as underlying the political and bureaucratic abandonment of the concept 
of public interest. He also finds no single convincing explanation for fee-
ble resistance to this behaviour. In our project, the centrality of crime acts 
as a complement to the centrality of the state in Rajshekhar’s.
What can be contributed by our cases’ two distinctive features:
1. Adding micro-level evidence on the nuts and bolts of the criminal 
economy and local democracy;
2. Applying insights from an ethnographic lens to the macro-level 
scenarios?
The mature clientelist state: criminals and politicians
Jha’s (2013) account, laid out in this book’s Introduction, of the evolu-
tion of what he calls the ‘mature clientelist state’ as a congeries of rela-
tions between business, politicians, mafiosi and the police has been 
broadly corroborated here. Our case studies show, however, that the 
justice system, the central focus of two chapters (Chapter 8 on tenancy 
and Chapter 11 on the perpetrators of a factory fire), is also bound into 
this nexus. Its roles are context-specific. For every instance of the courts’ 
marshalling expert evidence, nailing crime and meting out punishment 
(Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 9 and 11), there is other evidence of the court being 
avoided entirely (so quasi-legal settlements are made elsewhere or illegal 
ones are forced) or ignored (Chapters 3 and 9). Irregular investments 
are made to delay or suspend hearings and to determine judgments and 
their outcomes (Chapters 8, 9 and 11). Money power may yield to that of 
organised interests. Party political pressure can force legally unjustified 
interpretations of procedure and evidence, the non-appearance of wit-
nesses, threats to witnesses in court, etc. (Chapters 3 and 11).
Our material also shows that Jha’s ‘congeries’ involves much more 
extensive co-option and participation of non-corporate fractions of capi-
tal than he had space to describe – or Crabtree chose to investigate. Under 
the radar of census authorities, significant numbers of part- or full-time 
livelihoods are engaged in the criminal economy. Criminal assemblages 
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survive post-election changes in government and maintain profitable 
relations with politicians out of office as well as with election winners 
from whom paybacks are demanded. Mafiosi rarely form a 100 per cent 
criminal organisation and their reach varies. Meanwhile, the police are 
an important component of a large range of other institutions formally 
responsible for regulating society, economy and state. The informal econ-
omy, which limits the scope of the powers of these regulating agencies 
without breaking any law, is as necessary to their functioning as the 
criminal economy is necessary to privatised trajectories of wealth within 
these vigilance agencies. Immature new states (Jharkhand, Arunachal 
and Andhra in this project) are far from immune to colonisation by Jha’s 
‘congeries’ and bear signs of precocious maturity.
Criminals
Our cases show that criminal capitalists are lured into politics by the pos-
sibility of combining these prospects with immunity from prosecution for 
crime once elected.10 Professional managers of criminal protection and 
organisers of labour for criminal organisations have also entered politics 
themselves directly (see Chapter 1 on coal). Others control politics by 
funding parties and shaping their pre-election mixes of pork-barrel and 
private vote-buying activity, and their post-election allocation of prefer-
ential policies, subsidies, state resources and other favours (as in Chapter 
3 on sand). A criminal business executive may not need to enter politics 
directly but will profit from being a client of a politician and a patron of 
bureaucrats. Mafia control over labour and petty enterprises also supple-
ments direct plunder from the state and/or illegal production and distri-
bution as sources of criminal accumulation. Legislators are increasingly 
wealthy and facing criminal charges. Of the winning candidates in the 
2014 All-India elections, 34 per cent had outstanding charges for crimes, 
21 per cent for serious crimes (a 50 per cent increase on the previous 
election).11 From UPA-1 to UPA-2, the proportion of wealthy crorepati 
MPs doubled to 48 per cent. By 2014, 82 per cent of MPs were crorepa-
tis with average assets of INR15 crore.12 For such politicians it is most 
unlikely that politics is not a business.
Politicisation of crime, criminalisation of politics
In processes of double regulatory capture, independent regulators are 
captured by the criminalised state while the state bureaucracy, the man-
agement of public corporations supplying essential commodities and 
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infrastructure (whether hard like railways or soft like education) and the 
hierarchies of the judiciary are objects of capture by politicians seeking 
to serve their private interests. Flows of criminal tribute inside the state, 
not only from bribery but also from criminal systems of tax, subject the 
bureaucracy to intensely politicised pressure. Yet while in corruption the-
ory the category of politician is frequently fused with that of the official, 
our case studies (of sand, of timber, of rental markets) often show them 
as having discrete interests, so that threat or coercion will be deployed by 
politicians to secure the necessary concessions.
Impact on the economy
For Jha, the criminalisation of politics and the politicisation of crime have 
serious negative economic outcomes. These involve path- dependent 
inefficiencies due to maximising profit from suboptimal technological 
choices, dysfunctional delays, the perpetuation of subsidies and the frag-
mentation of state investments into capturable components, not to men-
tion the spending of plundered resources on private interests and capital 
flight (so such spending may be abroad). Our case studies supply sugges-
tive evidence of nepotism and cronyism in resource allocation unrelated 
to merit, efficiency, price or competence (see Chapter 4 on hydro-electric-
ity, Chapter 5 on spectrum, Chapter 10 on procurement). They also doc-
ument vast and extensive operational inefficiencies in state enterprises 
(e.g. coal in Chapter 1, in the (intermittent) regulation of sand in Chapter 
3 and in the management of land and water use in Chapters 4 and 9), in 
which technocratic discretion in the efficient running of state enterprises 
is subordinated to the profits of criminal organisations.13 As Rajshekhar 
stresses, and as our case material testifies by its absence, distributive pol-
icy is a very low priority in the arrangements we have studied, except 
when the distributions flow downwards for political advantage and 
upwards for protection and profit.
Several distinctive features of the economic impact of the crim-
inal economy stand out. One, we repeat, is the fusion of legal activity 
with crime. In the telecom case, the neoliberal ideology of ‘markets’ is 
kidnapped for ransom by big business cronies: wild behaviour is masked 
by layers of incentivist policy, discretionary support and bailouts.14 
Neoliberalism for the credulous.15 Does the criminal economy perhaps 
contribute to growth through its labour intensity? Not necessarily. For 
all its penumbra of petty scavenging, pilfering, small-scale criminal trade 
and services, criminal business can and does mobilise heavy machinery, 
large-scale transport (multiple ‘rakes’ for coal, for instance, or containers 
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for timber), and makes full use of access to the global banking system. 
While India’s growth is part-produced by such assemblages, they are 
invisible in the official record and in macro-scale political economy.
Some implications of intreccio for democracy
Scholars of current electoral politics have given it a profusion of critical 
labels: ‘weak democracy’, ‘immature democracy’, ‘democratic decay’ or 
‘decline’, ‘democratic deficit’, ‘erosion’, and so on.16 Our case studies of 
intreccio provide rich detail of the undemocratic practices flowing from 
tangled criminal-political transactions. When the electoral cycle is crim-
inalised, entry costs exclude poorer people and small parties and limit 
opposition to the process of domination of elites and dynasties. Electoral 
democracy survives alongside the privatisation, decentralisation and 
multiplication of relations of coercive control and with battles for cen-
tralised authority (Chapters 4 and 7). At one end of the scale, commod-
ified relations with voters become normalised, while at another, capital 
flight compromises the capacity of political elites to counter theft from 
the state – supposing they are inclined to. In rural regions where revolu-
tionary parties have mobilised support, operating at war with the state, 
the ‘terrorist’ cadres are routinely incorporated through cesses/levies 
and protection from attack into criminal economic assemblages, which 
at the same time assimilate the police and private militias (Chapter 1). 
All this is in sharp contrast to orthodox political analyses, in which the 
criminal economy is ignored or marginalised (Chapters 1 to 5). When 
the criminal economy drives politics, uncertainties result from the con-
tradiction in which the mafia’s penetration of all local parties provides 
them with stability, which in turn facilitates accumulation, while mafia 
houses also favour party-political instability because it protects them 
from prosecution.
The contributions of anthropology and ethnography
Anthropological reporting compensates for the complicity and silence of 
media (showing how it works; see Chapter 10) and reveals categories 
of behaviour neglected in official statistics. Our case studies show con-
clusively that ethnography is not to be parked in a pigeon-hole labelled 
‘non-economy’. Given that our ethnographies have covered multiple 
scales, they are also not to be regarded as excessively small-scaled and 
irrelevant to political economy. It is not simply a matter of the detail 
of criminal transactions, contracts and deals; the rich anthropological 
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chapters also show how the criminal economy requires, and is perme-
ated by, non-market exchanges – the reciprocities involved in the defence 
of class privileges, clientelist favours and the redistribution of criminal 
tribute (Chapters 6, 9 and 11). They reveal the criminalisation of politics 
through dimensions of politics not confined to those of class or of politi-
cal party. Culture, in particular, is embedded in economic crime, debunk-
ing the idea that, despite the compulsions of accumulation, crime has a 
simple economic logic or organising principle (see also Michelutti et al. 
2018). And while the criminal economy is overwhelmingly male, gender 
nonetheless matters. Women (and children) are visible not simply as par-
ticularly oppressed labour, scavengers and oustees (Chapters 2 and 7), 
trafficked commodities, victims of vendettas and battles over honour 
(Chapters 6, 9 and 11), but also as political agents: as consumers (Chap-
ter 5), as a major player in the scams and violence over the protection of 
tenancies (Chapter 8), as key political forces in the dynastic reproduction 
of mafia families (Chapter 1) and as activist lawyers (Chapter 3). Faction, 
kinship (real or symbolic) and patronage also structure criminal econo-
mies. Over and above the mobilisation of criminal political upper-caste 
caucuses to oppose and crush the emancipatory aspirations of OBCs, SCs 
and STs,17 intermediate/dominant caste rivalries – Thakurs versus Jats 
(Chapter 6), Kammas against Reddys (Chapter 7), Rajput Singhs among 
themselves (Chapters 1 and 2) – use the criminal economy for status and 
not merely for profit. Caste and ethnicity stratify the bureaucracy – ‘ver-
nacular netas’ (Kumar 2015, 5) – and permeates the politics of parties not 
overtly set up to further specific caste interests.
Jha uses the transaction costs of untraceable fundraising to explain 
dynastic politics in terms of efficiency. However, our ethnographies find 
other reasons for the dynastic politics that structure criminal assem-
blages. Mafia dynasties are units of trust, in which leadership, honour 
and displays of masculinity are valued. These qualities have other uses 
in the criminal economy. In Chapter 7 on timber, for example, we see the 
heroic and honourable status of the masculine, semi-mythical social ban-
dit, which informs popular imagery of the timber smuggler, influencing 
and justifying police brutality against vulnerable migrant timber labour.
In Bangladesh (Chapter 10) – where the macro-scale political econ-
omy is one of confrontational party political competition, and the ‘black’ 
or ‘shadow’ economy accounts for anywhere between 45 and 80 per cent 
of GDP – the regulation of violence, the criminalisation of state procure-
ment procedure and of plunder from the state proceeds regardless of the 
party in power and is structured through neighbourhood, friendship and 
threat, which override the rules of tendering. Pakistan (Chapter 11) is 
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ruled by (para)military factionalism in an economy suffused with military 
investment in natural resource extraction, agri-industry, the built envi-
ronment, finance and insurance – and illegal commodities. Nevertheless, 
our case study of a lethal factory fire shows how criminal prosecution was 
delayed, politicised and diffused through the lobbying of the elite capital-
ist class – tensely separate from the military but ultimately manipulated 
by them – and by conflicts rooted not just in aggressive relations between 
the military and paramilitary ‘security’ forces but also in ethnicity and 
neighbourhood. Ethnography reveals the social relational content of 
high growth, not only in India but also in Pakistan and Bangladesh – even 
if this content also prevents growth from being higher.
Possibilities for developing multi- and inter-disciplinary research into 
the feedback relations between macro and micro include the following:
1. Economic biographies of crorepati legislators in state and cen-
tral governments charged with serious crimes (a statistical base 
already exists, ready for ethnographic enquiry);
2. Power relations between politicians, bureaucrats and the police;
3. The judicial politics of politicised crime, of charges, of prosecution 
and sentencing and the roles of lawyers in these processes;
4. The political economy of law-breaking by law-abiding firms com-
pared with that of criminal organisations;
5. Crime and efficiency: the relation between, on the one hand, crim-
inal assemblages, crony appointments and the allocation of privi-
leges, transactions bidding, etc., on grounds other than either law 
or efficiency and, on the other hand, the co-existence of multiple 
technologies in sectors of the economy, their relative economic 
efficiency, safety and labour intensities, and the competence of 
their management;
6. Domestic politics and international relations of tax evasion.
Part four: what is to be done?
What is to be done if the agents of reform are agents in the criminal econ-
omy? How to expand inclusive development when the criminal economy 
is doing the same, busily irrigating the nutrient base of party coffers and 
political redistribution systems that gamble on buying allegiance – if not 
directly benefitting holders of high office? Quis custodiet ipsos custodes – 
who watches the watchmen and regulates the regulators? In setting the 
context for this final set of reflections there is no lack of suggestions from 
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others based on a range of approaches to South Asia’s political economies, 
business–state linkages and more or less expected neoliberal corruption. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers’ (2016) global economic crime survey examined 
in the Introduction exemplifies the corporate discursive approach to pol-
icy. Laws exist, therefore their enforcement failures need to be addressed. 
These failures are manifestations of weak institutions, incompetence, 
unskilled personnel inside businesses, the police and the judiciary. To 
restore the reputation of business and the legitimacy of states, poor recruit-
ment standards need reform, non-performing assets have to be corrected 
and capital flight must be prevented. Questions of agency and politics, so 
central to this book, do not arise. Kapur and Vaishnav (2018) argue for 
transparent funding, a realistic lifting of caps on election spending by indi-
viduals, greater disclosure and more powers for the election commission 
as sine qua nons to increase the accountability of Indian democracy. Else-
where Vaishnav sees the regulation of political finance and the abolition 
of black money in politics as urgent supply-side reforms to the political 
market place (2017, Chapter 8). Crabtree roots his suggestion that a com-
bination of corruption crackdowns and basic improvements in public ser-
vices will eventually ‘reassert’ good governance in analogies from America 
in the 1930s. Gandhi and Walton (2012) also see an analogy with the 
anti-trust movement (the popular movement against the robber barons 
in early twentieth-century America, backed by some of the executive and 
judiciary), although they fear that the Indian state lacks the capacity to 
manage the ‘rising corporate sector’. The political preconditions to this list 
of measures and mobilisations are not developed. But then there is ‘more 
privatisation’ (Shah 2018). Given the failure to reach an ‘optimal mix of 
incentives and sanctions’ and given the levels of plunder and criminal 
activity inside the state, further privatisation is a proposal grounded in the 
neoliberal logic of reducing inefficiencies – except that our evidence shows 
how dangerous it is to privatise the state’s regulative agencies. Other tech-
nocratic suggestions involve tighter, un-corrupt audit, exemplary punish-
ment for offences and digitisation, to enable the same data trail for politics 
as for the economy. Ghosh, Chandrasekhar and Patnaik (2017) see a need 
for reforms first to the tax administration, second to economic monitor-
ing (for example, for real estate transactions, over- and under-invoicing, 
movement of funds and defaulters abroad) and third to transparency in 
party-political funding. Kumar (2015) emphasises reforms to improve the 
professionalisation of the bureaucracy, the police and courts to strengthen 
their independence from political domination. In Kumar’s account greater 
technical competence is another necessary condition to break the nexus of 
criminality and politics.
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These suggestions, flowing from a range of theoretical approaches, 
all miss an analysis of the forces and institutions that need to be in place 
first to identify and then to counter opposition to such policies. Political 
will is the most notorious of several escape hatches. Jha (2013, 22), rea-
soning through the technical case for a state funding system for financ-
ing elections, admits that ‘no single reform of the political system has 
been proposed more often; and no proposal has been more consistently 
rejected’. His contribution explains why.
How is the (current) BJP government in India responding to 
this deluge of advice? The elimination of ‘corruption’ and the ‘black 
economy’ was a popular theme in the 2014 election. ‘I have come to 
cleanse politics’, said Narendra Modi (quoted in Vaishnav 2017, 282). 
Four years into his governing term, Prime Minister Modi used the 
Independence Day 2018 speech to promise a better quality of life for all 
citizens. But citizenship is a process (in a state like Assam, citizenship is 
threatened by the very mechanisms to deliver this promise: evidence of 
identity, which is required in the form of a crime-friendly inappropriate 
detail; see Hazarika 2018).18 Quality of life connotes not a dematerial-
ised state but a development process requiring resources evaded on a 
grand scale by the criminal economy described here. And the turn to 
welfare distracts attention from the failure of the BJP’s attempt to crush 
the criminal economy.
What has failed? While apex accumulation strategies are resilient to 
changes in government,19 the final reflection in this epilogue focusses on 
the BJP’s important intervention in the criminal economy. It shows two 
things: how many of the dimensions of criminality covered in this book 
were involved in the state’s own attack on it; and why, despite the trigger 
of surprise and the weighty lever of state power, the existing political eco-
nomic structure cannot be expected to reduce crime.
Demonetisation and the criminal economy20
On 8 November 2016, a sudden announcement made illegal most of 
the common paper tender in which 86 per cent of India’s cash currency 
transactions took place. ‘Notebandi’ was officially declared to be aimed 
at destroying corruption, counterfeiting, terrorism and black money. 
On 27 December 2016, the Prime Minister declared that this mission 
had been accomplished. But on 29 August 2018, when the Reserve Bank 
had finished counting banknotes, over 99 per cent had been returned. 
Only an outstanding 11,000 crore was written off, punishing its criminal 
owners – or those holding it in neighbouring countries (Anand 2018).
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Taking the stated objectives of demonetisation in turn, while cor-
ruption is the common man’s normal expectation in his encounter with 
the state, it has long been understood that tax evasion is far more quan-
titatively significant (Roy 1996; Bernie 2012). In fact, while only 3 per 
cent pay income tax, tax revenue rose by 12 per cent in the year following 
demonetisation.
The circulation of counterfeit money has been greatly overrated, 
however and does not justify the considerable economic disruption 
involved in demonetisation. Unless counterfeit notes are detected when 
deposited in a bank, demonetisation cannot eradicate them. The pro-
duction of forged notes depends on access to (illicit) technology and 
(imported) paper. The new currency is easier to forge. While the RBI 
reports a drop of some 30 per cent in the total seizure of counterfeit cur-
rency in 2017–18 (Reserve Bank of India 2018), the number of forged 
INR500 and INR2000 notes detected increased from 837 in 2016–17 to 
27,821 in 2017–18 (Scroll.in Editorial 2018).
As for terrorism, two facts speak eloquently about the practical 
success of the note-ban in combatting terror: first, the fact that money 
denominated in new INR2000 notes was recovered within six weeks 
of demonetisation from the corpses of terrorists in Kashmir and other 
places, and second that a rise in violence attributed to terrorism was 
documented subsequent to (but not necessarily related to) demonetisa-
tion (Tripathi 2017). Hence, the criminal black economy was the most 
significant declared objective for an unprecedentedly disruptive reform 
(Ghosh, Chandrasekhar and Patnaik 2017).21
Black political funding: Our case studies have confirmed the need 
for election costs to be met by untraceable funds. Indeed over 75 per cent 
of funds officially recorded as received by Indian political parties in 2004–
11 were from ‘unknown sources’. While the Indian government admits the 
need to reform political funding, the bill to do this has languished before 
parliament for two decades thanks to permanent cross-party reluctance 
to discuss it, let alone make party funding transparent. At this rate, until a 
government feels secure in its funding India will have to wait for reform. 
Yet the sudden announcement of demonetisation does not seem to have 
surprised the ruling party. The media reported unexpected large-scale 
land purchases outside future Smart Cities in advance of 8 November 
2016 by ruling party members, and the use of cooperatives – at least in 
Gujarat – to receive unusually huge deposits. Parties depositing demone-
tised currency notes in their accounts were exempt from income tax pro-
vided individual donations were below INR 20,000. Reports suggest that 
deposits of less than INR 2.5 lakh in political party accounts will ‘not nec-
essarily be chased by the Income Tax’ (Livemint Editorial 2016).
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Black money: As for the black economy, expert estimates of its size 
vary massively, from between 17 per cent (PTI 2017) to 52 per cent of 
GDP (Kar 2010; Sharma 2016). But the proportion of the black econ-
omy held in money form is thought to lie between 1 and 6 per cent. On 
demonetisation, this money was returned to banks using a range of 
mechanisms.22 The rest of the black economy is in kind – about half in 
real estate (not widely expected to have changed after demonetisation), 
less in gold and jewellery and the rest exported or laundered overseas 
through well-established hawala and ‘layering channels’ that operate 
through Nepal, Singapore, Dubai and Mauritius (Kar 2010). From there 
it may return in whitened forms, and may even be eligible for investment 
subsidies. Black money also escapes through untaxed donations to tem-
ples – and certain colleges and hospitals – that may benevolently return 
some fraction of the receipts to their donors.
Currency notes are neither black nor white but move in and out of 
this black cash sub-sector. In the first six weeks after demonetisation, of 
the INR 500 crore seized by the Income Tax Department, nearly 20 per 
cent was already denominated in INR 2,000 notes.
Criminal business: On 29 December 2016 the PM was quoted as 
concluding that demonetisation had had a ‘crippling impact on damaging 
illegal activities’ (India Today 2016). Yet there has been far less research 
into the impact of demonetisation on the apex of the criminal economy 
than on the policy’s monetary and fiscal effects, and what analysis there 
is mostly takes the form of low-quality evidence and press reports.
Demonetisation seems to have had mixed effects on the criminal 
economy, and these effects are changing over time. We need to know 
much more about each mafianised sector. For instance, there are frag-
ments of evidence that the trade in stolen coal from tailings and aban-
doned mines in Jharkhand and West Bengal, and the hub in Assam 
dealing in illegal ‘rat-hole’ Meghalayan coal, all initially paused due to 
the cash shortage and the need to invest time in depositing illegal tender. 
However, in 2018 they restarted. Others gamed the system: a coal mafi-
oso was seized in West Bengal one month after demonetisation holding 
INR 33 lakh in the new notes, plus arms and ammunition, in the com-
pany of a local BJP leader, while a Tamil Nadu sand baron was arrested 
in late December after an IT raid. Other crackdowns, however, – as in 
August 2016, on boats and engines of the Gujarat sand mafia, and in the 
September destruction of psychoactive plants in Himachal Pradesh – had 
preceded the 8 November decision, proving that demonetisation was not 
needed to punish criminal activity – enforcement agencies simply needed 
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to enforce the law. With respect to illegal commodities, it appears from 
reports by 10 rescue groups and the testimony of Nobel peace prize win-
ner Kailash Satyathi that the massive cash-based supply chain through 
which girls and women are trafficked for prostitution rapidly dried up 
after demonetisation. Contradictory reports find that cash demand for 
prostitutes atrophied, that the new bank notes create demand for ‘higher 
quality’ (young and new) sex workers and that prostitutes quickly turned 
to work on credit, for digital payment and even temporarily for pay to 
cover board and lodging. Law Ministry claims of a permanent drop in the 
flesh trade are denied by prostitutes (Bhattacharya 2017). Meanwhile, 
local narcotics control bureaus reported drugs seizures as dropping in 
Himachal Pradesh, Mumbai and on the Bangladesh border. Yet the signif-
icant international trade in hard drugs uses hardly any cash and was said 
to have been unaffected. There is little subsequent evidence to suggest 
that the objective of destroying the criminal economy was successful.
Demonetisation dealt a far keener blow to incomes, invest-
ments and livelihoods in the informal economy (Guerin et al. 2017) 
than to black wealth or the criminal economy. Cleaning up the crimi-
nal economy needs two kinds of political preconditions: first, triggers 
and second, levers of economic power. In India, the extreme event of 
demonetisation was one such trigger but it failed. The state is also a 
lever of power that has largely been co-opted. It is not able to prose-
cute individual company officials. Its progressive legal decrees are often 
ignored.
Our book develops an alternative position. Mafia assemblages and 
intreccio will only be threatened under three kinds of circumstances: 
first, when sufficient assets have been accumulated to reduce the need 
for criminal rents; second, when viable state apparatuses and publicly 
funded political parties are needed by capital to control criminal rents 
and regulate the economy. The case material shows, however, that there 
is no guarantee that processes of predatory rent and the undermining of 
legal-ethical obligations and organisational capacity will yield to those 
from legitimate profit-seeking capitalism. The third condition is when 
the workforce can no longer be deceived, captured and bought off. At 
present trade unions do not have sufficient countervailing power; some 
are viciously crushed by criminal organisations while others are in thrall 
to local mafias. Until such a time when these conditions develop, scholars 
will have to develop and debate South Asia’s mafia raj and openly main-
stream its many and serious implications for the economy, politics and 
policy analysis, in teaching and in public deliberation.
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Notes
 1. This is to invigorate political economy by borrowing insights from assemblage theory about 
multiple functionalities and fluidity in the elements/components of a social territory, while 
not accepting that field’s ahistoricity and abandonment of structure (see Karaman 2008 on 
LaLanda).
 2. See ‘Ear to the Ground’ at Scroll.in: https://scroll.in/topic/24308/ear-to-the-ground.
 3. Legal illiteracy is a worldwide phenomenon.
 4. The UK visa system has had 5,700 amendments between 2010–18; it is now 375,000 words 
long and ‘a disgrace’, according to a senior judge (Bozic et al. 2018).
 5. At the time of writing flooding in Kerala has devastated the land, due not only to extreme 
weather (following extreme storms in Northern India earlier in 2018 and extreme floods in 
Chennai in 2015–16) but to neglect and poor management of the fragile tropical biosphere, 
including criminal quarrying, illegal deforestation and illegal construction (see Gadgil 2011).
 6. Using World Bank modelling, Dev Kar’s estimate for the losses to the Indian economy of capital 
flight from Independence to 2008, in 2008 prices, was IS$500 billion. While 10 per cent of 
black income is exported (Kumar 2017) over 70 per cent of assets in India’s criminal economy 
are held abroad (Kar 2010).
 7. See Kumar 2015 (pp. 190 and 199) for case material on the politics of non-prosecution and 
non-punishment in contemporary Bihar.
 8. Rising from US$2 billion in 2009 to US$5 billion in 2014 (Kapur and Vaishnav 2018, citing 
Centre for Media Studies data).
 9. Communalism is another driver; the multifarious cultural seeds of fascism (Banaji 2013) a third.
10. They can also secure immunity by crossing state borders (see Michelutti in Chapter 6 of this 
volume).
11. See http://adrindia.org/content/lok-sabha-elections-2014. Of course it is countered that ac-
cusations are part of the regular political to and fro and so such crimes are fabricated, but with 
immunity extending during and often ‘informally’ after the period of office (a minute propor-
tion have been successfully pursued) it is hard to judge this argument.
12. Approximately US$2.1m, in a society where 70 per cent own less than US$70,000 (INR 50 
lakh) in wealth. See also Kumar 2015, 44–6.
13. This does not imply the absence of other sources of inefficiency, or that state enterprise cannot 
be efficient.
14. See Dasgupta 2014 and Crabtree 2018.
15. The relation between the predictions of neoliberal theory that pruning the state would reduce 
corruption and the apparent rise in corruption under neoliberal reforms was researched in 
general terms in White and Harriss-White 1996. The resilience of corruption in a neoliberal 
era has led to critiques of the intentionality of neoliberalism (Joseph 2018).
16. Respectively Khan 2000; Sundaresan 2013; Van Dijk 2017; Kulova and Varghese 2017, 126 
and 132; Kumar 2015.
17. See Chapter 5 of Kumar 2015 for the gang-mediated, state-supported caste war over land be-
tween Rajputs and Yadavs in Bihar.
18. The Assam government, compiling a new National Register of Citizens, threatens with state-
lessness and deportation an estimated 5 million people (of a state population of 32 million) 
who are unable to supply ‘legacy documentation’ of settled status prior to 1971.
19. From a number of sources, under the NDA from 2014, these include the alleged criminal his-
tory of the party high command, cronyism in the allocation of land, natural resources and 
customs refunds, enabled absconding of individuals with allegedly massive unpaid loans, and 
fugitive money-launderers.
20. Unless referenced otherwise, this summary is based on evidence and sources in Ghosh, Chan-
drasekhar and Patnaik 2017; Harriss-White 2017; Kumar 2017.
21. The annual growth rate dropped by between 1.5 and 1.9 per cent. According to CMIE data the 
labour force fell from 440 million in 2016–17 to 426 million in 2017–18 and 402 million in the 
first quarter of 2018–19. In the first two years, the participation rate fell from 46 per cent to 44 
per cent as a result of demonetisation and General Sales Tax reforms (Vyas 2018).
22. Ghosh, Chandrasekhar and Patnaik (2017) report multiple ID cards and bank accounts, use of 
accounts belonging to friends, relatives and employees, use of middlemen converting at dis-
count rates of 18–40 per cent, conversion to gold and jewellery, backdated receipts, advance 
payments for travel and fuel, receipts for agricultural transactions and the payment of taxes!
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Laws alleged or established to have 
been broken – with main offenders
Chapter 1: coal
•	 Scavenging coal from abandoned mines and tailings
•	 Illegal transport of coal – syndicates and coal traders
•	 Illegal sales to legal businesses
•	 Extortion, forgery, manipulation of auctions, control of railways, 
violent enforcement (paramount regulatory authority), murders, 
paper companies, paper transactions, widespread bribery to pri-
vate managers and state officials – mafia
•	 Tax evasion – coal traders and mafia
•	 Simultaneous leadership of several labour unions – mafia
Chapter 2: fire
•	 Neglect of laws for fire-fighting and prevention – central and state 
corporations
•	 Neglect of stabilisation of abandoned mines – central and state 
corporations
•	 Restrictive re-interpretation of eligibility for resettlement and 
rehabilitation, evasion of liability for resettlement and rehabil-
itation, forced eviction of ‘trespassers’ – state corporations and 
departments, police
•	 Unregulated subterranean mining – central and state corpora-
tions, private companies
•	 Illegal opencast mining – coal mafia
•	 Violation of fire regulations – general
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•	 Violation of mining regulations in proximity of infrastructure – 
central and state agencies
•	 Total neglect of health and safety regulations (e.g. electricity 
cables) – central and state agencies
•	 Neglect of treatment/compensation for preventable accidents and 
explosions – central and state agencies
•	 Complete lack of implementation of environmental law – central 
and state agencies
•	 Diversion of sand for stowage, false invoicing – state agencies, coal 
mafia
•	 Illegal private subcontracting of fire control – central and state 
agencies
•	 Negligent planning – state agencies
•	 Theft from mines and tailings – at all levels of coal-mining opera-
tions and criminal organisations
•	 Theft from rail wagons – organised for larger criminal coal-mining 
operations by unions
•	 Threat of violence against trade unionists (murder) – mafia
•	 Extortion of scavengers – state agencies and criminals
•	 Appointments in state enterprise based on mafia allegiances 
throughout the system – all India
Chapter 3: sand
•	 Violation of dozens of riverbed sand-mining regulations (unmarked 
mines, unrecorded extraction, depth exceeded, shift length 
exceeded, lorry loading limits exceeded, unauthorised roads con-
structed, unauthorised diversion of water courses) – sand miners 
on an increasing scale and party members
•	 Misuse of permit allocation procedure – politicians
•	 Negligent failure to monitor and enforce – state agencies
•	 Sabotage of court cases; failure to implement judgments; failure 
to act on state-ordered enquiry commissions – mafia, state (and 
judiciary)
•	 Extensive complicity with criminal mining, criminal sharing of ille-
gal profits – mafia, bureaucracy and politicians
•	 Physical assault and murder
•	 Massive tax evasion – mafia
•	 Purchase of votes – political party cadres funded from apex
•	 Threats and fear leading to press self-censorship
354 APPENDIX
Chapter 4: water
•	 Opaque memoranda of understanding leading to the emergence of 
criminal markets in MoUs – state and speculative capital
•	 Violations of laws for environmental clearance, compensation – 
state
•	 Discretionary and nepotistic awards of contracts and permits – 
political elite
•	 Theft of and black market in materials – business
•	 Threat and abuse of illegitimate force – politicians
•	 Widespread violations of state and tribal customary norms – engi-
neering and procurement companies
•	 Diversion of resources and unauthorised privatisation of common 
property – business, local headmen
•	 Bribes to voters – local politicians
Chapter 5: spectrum
•	 Criminal abuse of insider information – state and business
•	 Undeclared conflicts of interest between business and politics – 
state and business with pressure on regulators
•	 Unpunished violations of policy/ad hoc (retrospective) policy 
changes – state
•	 Discretionary queue-jumping in allocations – state and business
•	 Negligent enforcement – state
•	 Bribery, favours in kind and nepotism – business
•	 Undermining of regulations
Chapter 6: fuel oil and sand
6.1. Fuel oil
•	 Vandalism of pipelines – mafia and engineers
•	 Unauthorised tunnelling – mafia and engineers with labour
•	 Theft from pipelines – mafia and engineers
•	 Illegal mini refineries – mafia
•	 Unlicensed tankers, trucks and retailers – mafia
•	 Forgery – mafia
•	 Adulteration of fuel oil and kerosene – mafia with skilled labour
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•	 Illegal trade in adulterants – mafia
•	 Distribution of petrol station licences through political patronage 
not merit – politicians and mafia
•	 Pollution from violations of air quality legislation – state and 
business
•	 Manipulation and evasion of state regulations to avoid prosecu-
tion – mafia
•	 Tax evasion – mafia
•	 Structuring of operations through cross-state impunity – mafia
•	 Illegal protection by mafia as brokers for political protection – mafia
•	 Violence, murder – mafia
•	 Bribes to Police, Civil Supplies Department bureaucracies and vil-
lage-level politicians and officials – mafia
6.2. Sand
•	 Widespread violation of environmental and mining laws and regu-
lations as per Chapter 3 – mafia
•	 Illegal rental markets for trucks – mafia
•	 Bribery of police – mafia
•	 Bribes to Regional Transport Office and to check-post goons – ille-
gal transporters/mafia
•	 Extortion of taxes from small miners and transporters – mining 
mafia
•	 Murder, violent injury and abduction
Chapter 7: red sanders timber
•	 Violation (and manipulation) of legislation protecting endangered 
species – state and mafia
•	 International trafficking
•	 Bribery and criminal protection by politicians and officials at 
every stage of inter-State trade and international export, diversion 
through SEZs, concealed storage in forests, port godowns, SEZs, 
containers, fake registration of trucks, forged government seals on 
containers, fake customs information – mafia with complicity and 
direct involvement of politicians
•	 Mafia control over – and profits from – markets for postings in 
bureaucracy, police, customs and excise and port authorities. 
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Bribes and in-kind payments to officials in Forest Department, 
check-posts, regional transport authorities, extortion from mafia 
by officials in police – mafia and state agencies
•	 Torture, mutilation, encounters and murder on massive scales – 
mafia, politicians and state agencies
•	 Private party-politicised use of machinery of state violence – poli-
ticians
•	 Politically justified brutality on the part of the state’s task forces – 
politicians and private militias
•	 Coercive control of labour; criminalisation of labour – mafia with 
state and police
•	 Arrests disproportionate to convictions – police and state
Chapter 8: real estate
•	 Breaches of Urban Land Acts (Regulation and Ceilings) and Rent/
Tenancy Acts – landlords and brokers
•	 Manipulation of contracts (unfulfillable conditions) and proce-
dure – lawyers and brokers
•	 Speculative litigation and brokerage as businesses; intimidation, 
threats by hired thugs and killings – brokers and criminal gangs
•	 Bribery of police and courts – litigants
•	 Clashes of custom and law for tenant protection – power asym-
metries in out-of-court settlements
Chapter 9: land
•	 Breaches of rights to rural tenancies of SCs
•	 Fraudulent re-registration of common land – local politicians and 
mafia
•	 Illegal privatisation (and politicisation) of encroachments on 
urban land – local politicians and mafia
•	 Extortion by hired thugs – politicians and police; private armies – 
criminal businesses in illegal commodities
•	 False charges – bribed police
•	 Forced land sales – landlords, speculators and brokers
•	 Forgery of documents – landlords, speculators and brokers
•	 Bribery in return for protection from charges – landlords, specula-
tors and brokers
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•	 Arbitrary fines and delays raising costs of non-compliance with 
non-compliance – land speculators
•	 Emerging speculative business in disputed titles
Chapter 10: procurement (Bangladesh)
•	 Criminal businesses in legal goods, in goods plundered from the 
state, and in protection services
•	 Police corruption in return for non-prosecution – contractors
•	 Bribery of officials in return for political favours and speed – con-
tractors
•	 Illegal contracting from state – state and politicians
•	 Intimidation and threats, violent enforcement (murders and dis-
appearances) (in decline) – politicians and contractors
•	 Collusion and politicisation of bids – contractors
•	 Illegal commodification of licences – state
•	 [Politicised ownership of media and use to blackmail and silence]
Chapter 11: factory fire (Pakistan)
•	 Violation of building regulations – delinquent architects
•	 Illegal water supply – state and construction firms
•	 Abuse of energy supply – factory owner
•	 Lack of emergency procedure – factory owner
•	 Banal criminality against factory labour; brutal violations of 
health and safety; inadequate labour inspection force; factory 
labour controlled by extortion squads; compliance on paper with 
international labour standards although disregarded in practice – 
factory owner
•	 Egregious neglect of compensation claims – factory owner, with 
the state
•	 Party political interference at all levels with investigations and 
charges; forensic investigation neglected by police; owners exon-
erated without investigation by police – politicians
•	 Criminal incompetence in handling and preservation of 
corpses – police
•	 Pressure on judiciary – (para)military and intelligence
•	 Coercive pressure on witnesses – police and politicians
•	 Illegal taxes – politicians, factory owner
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•	 Violent vendettas between groups of thugs for control of factory 
labour – contractors
•	 Intimidation of labour – contractors
•	 Tax evasion – factory owner and others
•	 Deliberate casualisation and evasion of social protection obliga-
tions – factory owner
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Glossary
Aadhaar unique identity number





Bari sarkar deep state
Bayalishi gathering of 42 villages
Benami contracts disguising the identities of transacting parties




Bhumihar a high caste
Chamcha lit. spoon; fig. sycophant




Dalit member of lowest, oppressed castes, untouchable
Darbar court




Dharna non-violent sit-in protest
Gaon burha village headman, generally considered as the chief of the ‘tra-
ditional’/ customary village institutions of the tribes, recog-
nised by the government as running in parallel to the system of 
panchayats.
Gherao a form of protest in which employees prevent employers from 
leaving their workplace until their demands are agreed or met.
Godown warehouse or storage space
Goonda thug
Hawala a method of transferring money without any money actually 
 moving
Hydel hydroelectric power
Jama’at khanas centres of worship doubling as educational and welfare centres
Jat traditionally agricultural community in Northern India and 
 Pakistan
Kabaddi a muscular Punjabi contact sport
Kabza property grabbing
Kebang village council
Khap unit of 84 villages
Khap panchayats assembly of Khap elders or extra-legal caste/community courts
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Katha (also spelled kattha or cottah)  a measure of land used (to connote varying areas) in 
Bangladesh, India and Nepal; in West Bengal 1 katha is 
equal to 720 ft2
Kirana spices, grains
Kulli boli open auctions
Ladai/yudh war
Lakh one hundred thousand
Lok Sabha lower house of India’s bicameral parliament
Marla  Measure of land connoting roughly 25 square metres, 
though variable in different periods and regions of the 
subcontinent.
Meena tribe
Nazool land  land which once belonged predominantly to Muslim 
evacuees who left for Pakistan at partition, and which 
was meant to be handed over to Dalit cooperatives
Neta leader
Octroi municipality entry tax
Panchayat system of local government
Paregallu those who rule
Parivar family
Patta the legal ownership document for land
Qabza land-grabbing operations




Salaami/bhada salaami  a rental agreement for heritable, non-expiring leases 
where rent is paid in advance, usually in cash. The rent 
is low because of the advance arrangement. Similar 
 practices elsewhere in India are termed pagdi (literally 
turban)
Samaj association, group
Sarpanch village panchayat head; elected village headman
Sena private army
Sepahi soldiers
Shamlaat zameen village common land
Shomman respect
Tal local shops that sell construction materials
Taluk subdivision of a district
Tehsil sub-district
Tehsildar revenue collector at the tehsil level
Tekhedar contractor
Tel oil
Tempu light transport vehicles
Thana police station
Tibbas sandy hillocks
Vidhan Sabha legislative assembly
Wallah  a suffix to denote a person practising a particular activity 
(e.g. coal cycle wallah)
Yadav a low to mid-ranking caste of pastoral agriculturalists
Zila parishad district council
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